STATEMENT OF

ADMIRAL JAMES O. ELLIS, USN

COMMANDER IN CHIEF

UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND

BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

STRATEGIC SUBCOMMITTEE

ON

COMMAND POSTURE

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Mr. Chairman, Senator Allard, Distinguished Members of the Committee:

It is an honor to appear before you representing the outstanding men and women of United States Strategic Command. As you know, I appeared before the full Senate Armed Services Committee to discuss the policy issues associated with the Nuclear Posture Review, and I welcome this opportunity to address the Strategic Subcommittee on the programmatics and requirements supporting my command's posture.

I appear before you today to report that our Nation's strategic forces are ready. As they have been for the past 56 years, they are manned by true professionals, trained and ready to respond when called, yet hopeful that our efforts of dissuasion and deterrence prevail to prevent military attacks against the United States and our allies. Nonetheless, the renewed focus on supporting and modernizing aging strategic systems and infrastructure must be sustained to ensure our forces remain a ready, reliable and credible element of our Nation's security posture. Thank you for your sustained support of our strategic forces and your commitment to a safe, reliable, and secure nuclear weapons stockpile.

Evolution of Strategic Policy

Since the end of World War II, the United States has had forces postured to conduct long-range strategic operations in support of our national defense. The creation of Strategic Air Command in 1946 integrated the impressive conventional long-range strike capabilities developed during World War II with the emergent capabilities of nuclear weapons. As the Cold War developed and simmered, our strategic forces assumed a decidedly nuclear focus in order to deter the imposing threat of nuclear war with the Soviet Union and her allies. The enormous responsibility of safeguarding, maintaining, and, if needed, employing nuclear weapons demanded a culture of rigorous discipline and professional excellence that continues to this day both in our strategic task forces and in our headquarters.

With the development of both land-based and sea-based ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear payloads, our war planning process, already complex to support our strategic aviation forces, required significant improvements in capability to ensure the triad of sea, air and land forces could be effectively employed in support of our national defense. At the same time, we realized the strategic mission required joint cooperation for effective integration. That was achieved through the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff which, in 1960, effectively formed the first joint organization with global responsibilities. Strategic Air Command and the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff served the Nation well during the Cold War. Today's culture of excellence, complex weapons, and our existing triad of operating forces that make up US Strategic Command were all forged during that period.

The end of the Cold War provided an imperative to reevaluate the organization and focus of our strategic forces. In 1992, our nuclear forces were integrated under one Combatant Commander charged with planning and, if directed by the President, executing our Nation's strategic warplans. What had been a large element of our national strategy during the Cold War, became a more streamlined, and focused, but still essential element of our national strategy. Forces allocated to US Strategic Command now represent less than 3% of all DoD personnel and expend less than 3% of the DoD's total obligational authority.

The mission of our Nation's strategic forces over the last 56 years has been enduring: to deter a major military attack on the United States and if necessary employ strategic forces to defeat any adversary. While that specific purpose is unchanged, our methods of meeting that mission have changed dramatically.

During the Cold War, we fielded increasingly complex weapons focused on a specific group of states, the Soviet Union and its allies. Our war plans were developed to counter these states and the threat they represented. Today, the Soviet Union no longer exists. None of its successor states are

considered our enemy. Yet, the specter of a major attack using weapons of mass destruction remains and is growing more complex. The key difference between the international environment today and the environment during the Cold War is that the United States cannot predict with confidence what nation, combination of nations or non-state actors may pose a threat to our vital interests or those of our friends and allies decades from now. As a result, our war plans and operating forces must be postured to assure our allies, dissuade potential enemies, deter those countries that threaten us, and, with Presidential direction, defend our nation and defeat those that may choose to attack us.

The Nuclear Posture Review

As I noted in my testimony before you last month, I welcome the results of the Nuclear Posture Review. More than a much needed capabilities assessment, it brings increased focus to ensure all our strategic forces, weapons, infrastructure, communications, intelligence and planning receive the resources required to enhance their capabilities and, in many cases, extend them well beyond their original design life. Over the next decade, our national strategic capability will integrate improved strategic strike forces, both nuclear and conventional, active and passive defenses, and a renewed and responsive infrastructure. This new triad will be enabled by improved command and control systems as well as robust, adaptive and responsive intelligence and planning capabilities.

To become a reality, this new triad will require sustained support by the Services and Congress. Success in this effort will allow us to continue to reduce the Nation’s reliance on nuclear weapons and enable us to meet the President’s goal of 2200-1700 operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons by 2012. For fiscal year 2003, the President’s budget includes increased funding to cover the highest priorities for our strategic forces and for capabilities supporting these forces. Increased funding has also been directed towards infrastructure, defenses and development of new capabilities.

Taken together, these funding increases put us on the path of refocused strategic capability and the lowest number of nuclear weapons consistent with our national security.

Strategic Force Structure

To address a broad range of threats, our Nation's security rests on several factors, particularly on our demonstrated will and capability to uphold our security commitments when they are challenged. Our declaratory policy communicates costs to potential adversaries. Our warfighting capability, including a robust triad of strategic forces, conveys credibility across the full spectrum of conflict — conventional to nuclear. The Nuclear Posture Review reaffirmed the wisdom of preserving the complementary strategic triad of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and strategic bombers as the backbone of our strategic strike forces.

Each leg of the Nation's offensive strike forces possesses unique attributes that enhance deterrence and reduce risk. Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) provide prompt response; strategic submarines (SSBN) provide survivability; and bombers provide flexibility. The diversity of our strategic forces and the synergy created by these attributes are designed to complicate any adversary's offensive and defensive planning calculations while simultaneously providing protection against the failure of a single leg of the triad.

Intercontinental ballistic missiles continue to provide a reliable, low cost, prompt response capability with a high readiness rate. They also promote stability by ensuring that a potential adversary takes their geographically dispersed capabilities into account if contemplating a disarming first strike. Without a capable ICBM force, the prospect of destroying a significant percentage of America's strategic infrastructure with a handful of weapons might be tempting to a potential adversary in a crisis.

Ballistic missile submarines continue to carry the largest portion of our strategic strike force. With approximately two-thirds of the force at sea at any one time, the strategic submarine force is the most survivable leg of the triad, providing the United States with a powerful, assured response capability against any adversary. Submarines at sea are inherently survivable and hence stabilizing. Submarines in port, however, are more vulnerable and could offer an extremely lucrative target in crisis. Thus, in any foreseeable force structure, the United States must preserve a sufficiently large strategic nuclear submarine force to enable two-ocean operations with sufficient assets to ensure an at-sea response force capable of deterring any adversary in a crisis.

Strategic bombers are the most flexible element of our strategic strike forces. The “man in the loop” allows force dispersal to improve survivability and aircraft recall during mission execution. The low-observable technology of the B-2 bomber enables it to penetrate heavily defended areas and hold high-value targets at risk deep inside an adversary’s territory. In contrast, the B-52 bomber can be employed in a standoff role using long-range cruise missiles to attack from outside enemy air defenses. This mixed bomber force can generate to alert status when necessary to deter escalation or provide assured response should deterrence fail.

In accordance with the Nuclear Posture Review our strategic forces are proceeding to the following levels:

- 500 Minuteman III ICBMs
- 14 Trident SSBNs equipped with Trident II (D-5) missiles
- 76 B-52 and 21 B-2 bombers

In addition, the Nuclear Posture Review confirmed the plan to deactivate our 50 Peacekeeper ICBMs, eliminate the nuclear re-role requirement for the B-1 bomber, and remove four Trident SSBNs from strategic service.

With no new forces in development, this triad of strategic strike forces will remain the backbone of our Nation’s strategic deterrent capability for at

least the next twenty years. As such, we must ensure these forces remain robust, reliable, and secure.

Strategic Force Modernization and Sustainment

Today we have no new strategic systems under development. With the exception of the Trident II (D-5) missile, which is still in low-rate production, the United States has in-hand all of its major strategic systems. Therefore, as our Nation comes to rely on our existing strategic force, the imperative for modernizing and sustaining that force becomes even more critical. And since we must maintain these existing systems for at least the next twenty years, it is also crucial to sustain the industrial base that provides key components and systems unique to our strategic forces.

Sustainment and modernization of the strategic bomber force is critical to provide a force which can support our strategic strike requirements as well as the conventional needs of our regional Combatant Commanders. The B-52 is projected to remain the workhorse of our bombers through 2040. That will make it an eighty-year old aircraft when it is finally retired. Based on current trends, the critical focus for sustaining the B-52 is upgrading electronic components to ensure command and control capability and platform survivability in future conflicts. The Advanced EHF communications upgrade for the B-52 is vital to maintaining a capability across the spectrum of conflict and executing the flexible, adaptable plans necessary to address a wide range of threats. We cannot afford to slip this upgrade any further without adversely impacting combat capability when the UHF Milstar communications constellation begins to lose capability. In addition, we will need to monitor the impacts of unforeseen aging problems with the airframes themselves as we continue to use these venerable aircraft in the Global War on Terrorism.

The B-2 bomber is similarly projected to remain in service through 2040. While certainly a newer aircraft, the B-2 must also receive the same command and control capability as the B-52, allowing flexible targeting. This will

require an Advanced EHF suite to ensure the capability for in-flight retargeting and recall in both nuclear and conventional roles.

US Strategic Command relies heavily on air refueling forces to support both bomber and airborne command and control aircraft. We are facing similar challenges in sustaining the aging KC-135 aircraft which are committed to direct support of our strategic forces. I fully support the Air Force's continuing efforts to sustain these aircraft while pursuing a follow-on capability which will remain critical to our strategic mission.

Our ICBM force will undergo significant transition over the next decade. As you know, the Peacekeeper ICBM system is programmed for deactivation beginning in the first quarter of fiscal year 2003 and aggressively continuing over the following three years. This retirement program is fully funded in the President's budget and phased to meet our warfighting requirements while adhering to the highest standards of safety and security requirements. The Minuteman III missile system is also undergoing comprehensive inter-related modernization programs designed to extend its service life through 2020. The President's budget funds the guidance and propulsion replacement programs at procurement rates that ensure the overall readiness, reliability, and capability of our ICBM forces into the next decade. Equally important, the safety enhanced reentry vehicle program will allow us to use the Peacekeeper W87 warhead on the Minuteman III ICBM as the Peacekeeper leaves service. This modification enables us to retain the capability of one of our newest warheads with its modern safety and reliability features while retiring the W62, the oldest ICBM warhead in our inventory later in this decade.

Our ballistic missile submarine force is also in the midst of significant transition. The Navy is in the process of converting four of our older Trident ballistic missile submarines to carry the Trident II (D-5) missile system. This conversion will provide us with fourteen D-5 equipped SSBNs while making four Trident I (C-4) missile equipped submarines available

for conversion to cruise missile and special operations capable submarines. The program for D-5 conversions is fully funded and on track.

On a very positive note, our Trident submarines' hull lives have been extended from 30 to 44 years. Although the Navy must procure additional missiles and conduct a D-5 missile life extension program, this will ensure sufficient missiles are available throughout the Trident submarine service life. This program was fully funded in the President's budget, however, last year's $25 million dollar reduction in the D-5 missile program budget will result in an overall $60 million dollar cost associated with the shutdown and restart of three critical component production lines during fiscal year 2002. I am working with the Navy to address these impacts in their future years defense program for the D-5 missile.

In regards to our nuclear weapons, my overall assessment is that our stockpile is reliable and safe. I have concerns, shared by NNSA's John Gordon, that the stockpile is showing signs of aging, and manufacturing defects are being discovered which indicate that previous reliability assessments were optimistic. This is due, in part, to the success of the Stockpile Stewardship Program in expanding our knowledge of warhead performance through the development of improved surveillance, modeling, and simulation tools. This greater scientific understanding has enabled us to identify potential problems and uncertainties of which we were previously unaware. The ongoing refurbishment of the W87 warhead has marked an important technical milestone for stockpile stewardship, as it is the first major refurbishment of a nuclear warhead in a non-testing environment. Approval has also been given for several critical warhead life extension programs – the B61, the W76, and the W80. Together these four systems will comprise a significant portion of our country's enduring nuclear stockpile.

Command and Control, Intelligence, and Planning Sustainment and Modernization

Our command and control, as well as intelligence and planning capabilities, are essential "force multipliers" and serve to enhance and unify

our forces. As we transition to the broader range of deterrent capabilities suggested by the Nuclear Posture Review, we must ensure new command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities are available across the range of strategic options. Our current C4ISR capabilities include a robust war planning capability, fixed and mobile command and control facilities, and a joint intelligence center. As with our other strategic forces, these systems must be modernized in terms of capabilities and capacity.

The security challenges of the next decade require that we become more flexible and adaptive in our shift from a specific state, or threat-based strategy, to a capabilities-based strategy. US Strategic Command has begun development of a planning system that retains the rigor and expertise developed over the last several decades, yet employs modern computing techniques and streamlined processes to significantly improve our planning capability. This effort is a critical element in enabling rapid, flexible crisis response that integrates nuclear, conventional and non-kinetic weapons into our war plans. This new approach to planning will require significantly more collaboration with the regional Combatant Commanders as we continue to better integrate our military capabilities across the spectrum of conflict. Our goal is to remove inefficiencies between current theater and strategic war planning development by eliminating seams and expanding available options for our senior leaders in future crises. This is a significant change and will be facilitated by a comprehensive review of our current war planning processes.

I am pleased with the increased attention given to the long-term modernization and sustainment of our two airborne command and control systems. The National Airborne Operations Center, the E-4, is operated by Strategic Command as an airborne element of the National Military Command System. As with most of our strategic forces, it requires sustainment and modernization investments into current capability while integrating new command, control, and communications requirements. Increased senior leader attention during the

last year has resulted in significant improvements in E-4 modernization funding in the President's budget. This vital funding ensures these aircraft have the required capabilities to support our senior leadership in any future national crisis. Similarly, the E-6B airborne command and control aircraft modernization is funded by the fiscal year 2003 budget submission. The funding requested corrects demonstrated operational deficiencies impacting aircraft mission capability rates.

As the combatant commander of strategic forces, I am very interested in the replacements for our Defense Support Program (DSP) constellation and Milstar communications satellites. The successful fielding of these systems directly affects our strategic warning and communications requirements. The Space-Based Infrared System-High (SBIRS-High) capability is vital to our warning timelines and ability to execute our strategic forces when under attack. Similarly, the Advanced Extremely High Frequency satellite system is necessary to ensure global, secure, survivable communications between our senior leadership and strategic forces. I understand the concern with the costs and schedule progress of both of these systems, however, the current DSP and Milstar systems have finite lifetimes, and we must preserve the requirement for replacement of these critical capabilities as they approach the end of their technological life. If current legacy satellite systems degrade significantly without replacements, we are seriously affecting the ability to capably respond with our strategic assets, as well as with all of our modern, networked military forces.

Our Strategic Joint Intelligence Center is tasked with a wide range of intelligence requirements supporting development of our strategic and theater war plans. It also supports all regional Combatant Commanders in the Global War on Terrorism through participation in a Federated Intelligence process, where we apply our imagery analysis expertise in such areas as weapons of mass destruction proliferation, hard and deeply buried targets, and battle damage assessment. I personally benefited from this expertise in 1999 as the

commander of forces during Operation Allied Force and today I'm sure Central Command similarly appreciates their significant contribution to the ongoing campaign in Afghanistan.

As you may know, the current system of managing our intelligence information is reaching its maximum capability. This tasking, processing, exploitation, and dissemination (TPED) system is a limiting factor and has been previously identified as a problem area but still requires significant effort to correct. The President's budget includes funds to address this area. However, I believe an uncertainty still exists over the future years defense program to meet intelligence community requirements. This limitation will be exacerbated by the increased flow of intelligence information envisioned by emerging capabilities. Similarly, the intelligence information infrastructure is currently vulnerable to single-point failures. Now is the time to address these critical vulnerabilities as we expand our intelligence requirements against new threats. Given our military's growing reliance on network-centric warfare, we must keep pace in developing TPED systems if we are to prevent the fog of war from becoming digital.

I am very concerned about the future plan for equipment used to enable secure encrypted communications with not only our strategic forces and command and control aircraft but the entire military as well. Equipment used on our strategic forces will require replacement beginning in fiscal year 2005.

Preparing For the Future

As we transition into the future, it is essential that we sustain, modernize and enhance our existing strategic systems. The Quadrennial Defense Review and Nuclear Posture Review also direct investments in new capabilities that will support and enhance the national security elements of assure, dissuade, deter, defend and defeat. Some of these investments include advanced strike capabilities, defenses, intelligence and planning capabilities, and command and control improvements.

The Department of Defense is pursuing advanced precision strike capability to support our combatant forces throughout the spectrum of conflict. Our strategic forces will take advantage of these capabilities to replace certain missions previously assigned solely to nuclear weapons and provide non-nuclear options to our senior leadership as well. I support these initiatives. I also support the focus and resources expended on ensuring our nation's command and control systems are an enabler for our joint warfighters and not a constraint. General Myers, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is leading the charge on developing joint C4ISR that closes the gaps and seams between the combatant commands and the Service provided forces. In addition, I fully support Undersecretary Aldridge and Assistant Secretary Stenbit in their efforts to ensure that enduring national command and control requirements of global, secure, survivable communications are maintained in any future satellite architecture.

The challenges of hard and deeply buried targets, strategic relocatable or time critical targets, advanced conventional weapons employment, and offensive information operations targeting requires a much greater fidelity in intelligence than we currently possess. There are no immediate solutions to these challenges. I fully endorse the DoD systems approach to address these requirements, since it is far more than just a hardware or resource issue. We need to comprehensively assess our intelligence capability from our hardware, to our people, organizations and processes to ensure we develop a robust system that supports the full range of our Nation's warfighting capabilities.

Department of Energy and Department of Defense Infrastructure

This year's Nuclear Posture Review officially recognized a responsive infrastructure as one of the critical elements of our strategic posture. The safety, surety, and reliability of our strategic nuclear arsenal depend heavily on the Department of Energy's (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). Your continued support of NNSA is vital to ensuring they can support our strategic forces. They are making great strides in

improving the nuclear weapons complex. As does John Gordon, I fully support current efforts to revitalize the laboratory and production infrastructure, and increase our nuclear test readiness.

Our nuclear weapons production complex has deteriorated to the point that significant investment is required in order to effectively refurbish our active stockpile. Without sustained investment in the NNSA infrastructure, we risk losing confidence in our nuclear stockpile and eliminate any possibility of accelerating retired warhead dismantlement. We must realize that a robust, agile, and flexible nuclear weapons complex – comprised of both infrastructure and talented people to research, design, develop and manufacture or refurbish nuclear weapons as necessary – provides us with the ability to respond to a changing national security environment and is itself a deterrent which complements our military forces. To this end, the need for sustained support of NNSA's Stockpile Stewardship Program has never been greater.

The Stockpile Stewardship Program provides no concrete assurance against the need for a nuclear weapons test in the future. As General Gordon stated in his testimony to the full committee last month:

> **"Over time, we believe that the stewardship program will provide the tools to ensure stockpile safety and reliability without nuclear testing. But there are no guarantees. It is only prudent to continue to hedge for the possibility that we may in the future uncover a safety or reliability problem in a warhead critical to the U.S. nuclear deterrent that could not be fixed without nuclear testing."**

There is currently no need to conduct a test today, however, our current test readiness posture of 24 to 36 months does not provide for a timely and effective response to unexpected events, whether internal (related to problems with the stockpile) or external (related to foreign actions). Both the Nuclear Posture Review and the fiscal year 2000 Foster Panel to Assess the

Reliability, Safety, and Security of the United States Nuclear Stockpile identified the need to improve test readiness. I fully support this effort.

A less visible, yet equally vital, element of a responsive strategic infrastructure is the industrial base supporting our strategic systems. One of the inevitable results of having no new development or production of strategic systems for almost ten years is the decline of critical industrial capabilities unique to strategic systems such as hardened electronics, solid rocket motors, and reentry system technology. The President's budget includes funding for programs sustaining strategic systems technology and I appreciate your continued support in this area.

Our People

As General Myers stated in his testimony before the full committee, the success in all our missions depends on our number one asset – our people. Maintaining our culture of excellence at US Strategic Command depends on recruiting and retaining the best and brightest. Working with nuclear weapons demands nothing less. I am grateful for the continued emphasis the Congress and this Administration have placed on raising the standard of living of our Service members and their families.

Strategic Command has always had a strong relationship with the Nation's Guard and Reserve personnel who support our strategic mission. As you know, the Guard and Reserve operate almost 75% of our designated tanker forces. In addition, we have 84 reservists recalled to active duty at our headquarters primarily supporting our dedicated efforts in support of the Global War on Terrorism.

Force Protection

Our people have unique responsibilities for stewardship of our nuclear weapons. They are dedicated and devoted professionals who take very seriously the development of our strategic war plans and the safeguarding and security of the nuclear weapon systems that provide the deterrent force for our Nation. The events of September 11th only served to heighten our keen sense of

awareness of our responsibility. Your committee has already received testimony from the Services and the National Nuclear Security Administration regarding ongoing efforts to increase our already high levels of nuclear weapons security. I appreciate your support of the President's budget request to increase funding for additional security personnel and force protection initiatives for our task forces and the Department of Energy.

Conclusion

I assure you that Strategic Command is ready now and I am personally committed to sustaining that readiness into a challenging future. I am pleased with the current focus on and resourcing of our strategic forces. Continued attention in the future years defense program is required to address previous reductions in the Trident II (D-5) missile life extension program, funding replacements for encryption equipment, and fully funded upgrades to the intelligence TPED system.

As you know, re-shaping our strategic capabilities will require sustained support in the years ahead. As the Secretary of Defense stated in the foreword to the Nuclear Posture Review:

> **"Constructing the New Triad, reducing our deployed nuclear weapons, and increasing flexibility in our strategic posture has resource implications. It costs money to retire old weapons systems and create new capabilities. Restoring the defense infrastructure, developing and deploying strategic defenses, improving our command and control, intelligence, planning, and non-nuclear strike capabilities require new defense initiatives and investments. However, these investments can make the U.S. more secure while reducing our dependence on nuclear weapons."**

I appreciate your continued support for the men and women of U.S. Strategic Command and the unique and essential contributions they make to our

Nation’s security. I look forward to reporting our progress to you in the future.

Thank-you and I welcome your questions.