Advance Questions for R. L. Brownlee Nominee for the Position of Under Secretary of the Army

Defense Reforms

Almost 15 years have passed since the enactment of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms.

Do you support full implementation of these defense reforms?

Yes, I fully support the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and related Special Operations initiatives for defense reform.

What is your view of the extent to which these defense reforms have been implemented?

In my opinion, these defense reforms have been implemented and have achieved desired results. Having said that, I believe it is important, and consistent with the intent of the reform legislation, that the Army continues to assess and modify its operations and internal procedures to meet the challenges of a dynamic security environment.

What do you consider to be the most important aspects of these defense reforms?

The most important aspects of these reforms in my view were strengthening civilian control; streamlining the operational chain of command, improving the military advice provided to the National Command Authorities, clarifying authority for combatant commanders, enhancing the effectiveness of military operations, and improving the efficiency in the use of defense resources.

The goals of the Congress in enacting these defense reforms, as reflected in section 3 of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act, can be summarized as strengthening civilian control; improving military advice; placing clear responsibility on the combatant commanders for the accomplishment of their missions; ensuring the authority of the combatant commanders is commensurate with their responsibility; increasing attention to the formulation of strategy and to contingency planning; providing for more efficient use of defense resources; and enhancing the effectiveness of military operations and improving the management and administration of the Department of Defense.

Do you agree with these goals?

Yes, I fully support the Congressional goals reflected in the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and other related defense reform legislation.

Recently, there have been articles which indicate an interest within the Department of Defense in modifying Goldwater-Nichols in light of the changing environment and possible revisions to the national strategy.

Do you anticipate that legislative proposals to amend Goldwater-Nichols may be appropriate? If so, what areas do you believe it might be appropriate to address in these proposals?

I am not aware of any current proposals to amend Goldwater-Nichols. I do believe that both the Congress and the Department of Defense should recommend changes as new situations dictate.

Duties

What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Under Secretary of the Army?

Section 3015 of Title 10, United States Code, provides that the Under Secretary of the Army performs such duties and exercises such powers as the Secretary of the Army may prescribe.

What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties?

Twenty two years as an Army officer and almost eighteen years on Senate staff.

Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Under Secretary of the Army?

I need to better learn the current challenges facing the Army – from the Army's point of view.

Assuming you are confirmed, what duties and functions do you expect that the Secretary of the Army would prescribe for you?

If confirmed, I will serve as the principal advisor and deputy to the Secretary of the Army and will support him in the general management of the Department in the fulfillment of his Title 10, United States Code, responsibilities. I envision that the Secretary will also prescribe specific duties to me that will support his efforts to ensure that the Department of the Army is efficiently administered in accordance with the policies promulgated by the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

In carrying out your duties, how will you work with the following officials:

- 1. The Secretary of the Army.
- 2. The Chief of Staff of the Army.
- 3. The Assistant Secretaries of the Army.

If confirmed, I will establish and maintain appropriate, professional relationships with the Secretary of the Army, the Chief of Staff of the Army, and each of the Assistant Secretaries and the General Counsel. I prefer direct and open communication with these officials and an environment of cooperative teamwork within the Secretariat and with the Army Staff.

Major Challenges and Problems

In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the Under Secretary of the Army?

I agree with the Secretary of the Army that the greatest challenge the Army faces is change. The challenges the Army faces are similar to those of the other services as we collectively readjust our organizations to the threats our country faces. The Army must manage and maintain the momentum of changes that will assure our Army's preeminence in the 21st century to deter threats and defend our national security interest and do it within the joint community.

Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

If confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary of the Army, the Assistant Secretaries, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and Congress to ensure the Army meets America's future security needs. This includes attracting, training, and retaining America's best and brightest, while providing for their quality of life and well-being. The Army must maintain balance in allocating its resources to remain ready to fight today's battles while transforming itself to address future conflict.

What do you consider to be the most serious problems in the performance of the functions of the Under Secretary of the Army?

If confirmed, I would evaluate the specific roles and functions within the Office of the Under Secretary of the Army as assigned by the Secretary of the Army. It is premature for me to identify potential problems at this time. If confirmed, what management actions and time lines would you establish to address these problems?

If confirmed, after evaluating the specific roles and functions within the office of the Under Secretary as assigned by the Secretary of the Army, I would recommend appropriate, timely actions to address any such problems.

Priorities

If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish in terms of issues which must be addressed by the Under Secretary of the Army?

If I am confirmed, my priorities will, of course, be in accordance with the specific roles and functions as assigned by the Secretary of the Army. However, my priorities would begin with attracting, training, and retaining America's best and brightest young men and women, while providing quality of life and well-being for them and their families. Another priority would be to achieve balance in the allocation of the Army's resources to ensure current readiness while addressing the essential needs of the future. I believe it is also important to review the Army's acquisition process, and the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution process, along with financial management systems and processes.

Headquarters Reorganization

The Army is undertaking an effort to reorganize its headquarters by consolidating functions of the Secretariat and the Army Staff.

In your view, how would the proposed reorganization be accomplished, and what are the expected manpower savings to be realized from that action?

If confirmed, how would you, with a consolidated staff, balance the prerogatives of civilian control with the prerequisite of a clearly delineated military chain of command? More specifically, what role would the Army Chief of Staff perform if subordinate assistant chiefs of staff serve as military deputies to civilian assistant secretaries?

I have not been briefed on the specifics of the Army's proposed reorganization. I am committed to the principle of civilian control of the military services. I support the roles of the Secretary of the Army, the Chief of Staff, and other civilian officials and military officers of the Army, as prescribed and intended by applicable law.

National Guard Divisions

In your view, what effect have the results of the most recent Quadrennial Defense Review had on the mission of the eight National Guard divisions of the strategic reserve?

The QDR confirmed the need for the Army to retain a robust force in depth. All eight ARNG divisions would, I believe, retain a warfighting capability and increase the Army's global responsiveness.

With the increasing role and responsibilities of the Army National Guard in homeland defense, what mission and force structure changes do you anticipate for the Army National Guard? More specifically, in your view, should the strategic reserve divisions be restructured for a homeland defense mission?

The scope of the Homeland Defense mission continues to develop. The National Guard has formed unique structure such as the Weapons-of-Mass-Destruction Civil Support Teams (CSTs). The Homeland Defense mission may require adjustments to existing structure such as CSTs, aviation, and military police units. In my view, restructuring of the strategic reserve divisions for Homeland Defense should be examined in light of their other missions.

Transformation

The Army has embarked on a campaign to transform itself to better combat the expected threats of the new century.

In your view, does the Army have sufficient resources to carry out its transformation? If not, what is the magnitude of the shortfall?

The Army, along with the other military services, has unfunded requirements, the magnitude of which are known to the committee. If confirmed, I will work to ensure adequate resources are requested by the Army and allocated to accomplish the Transformation of the Army as well as its other essential missions.

In the absence of any substantial increases in the Army budget, how would you recommend, if confirmed, to the Secretaries of the Army and Defense that the Army meet its current and future readiness and transformation requirements?

The Army must strive to achieve an appropriate balance in allocating its resources to ensure current readiness while transforming and modernizing itself to address future conflict.

The transformation of the Army will be strongly dependent on technological advancements made by science and technology programs both inside and outside of the Army.

In your view, has the Army sufficiently funded S&T programs needed to develop new systems including chemical and biological sensors, unmanned ground vehicles, computer network defense, and others?

I believe that the Army has appropriately funded within available resources its S&T program to focus on achieving the Army's Transformation to the Objective Force.

If confirmed, would you be in favor of setting a target percentage of Army Total Obligation Authority for Army S&T programs?

I support the Department of Defense's guidelines that have a goal of budgeting S&T as 3% of the overall DOD budget by 2007. The Army should continue to maintain robust funding for S&T to achieve its Objective Force capabilities.

To date, Army leaders have not clearly delineated the relative priorities of the requirements to develop the Objective Force, field six Interim Brigade Combat Teams, and recapitalize and selectively modernize the existing "legacy" forces. If confirmed, how would you prioritize those requirements?

In my view, each of these requirements is essential. If confirmed, I will assist the Secretary of the Army in achieving an appropriate balance among these essential priorities.

In your view, how should recapitalization and modernization of the legacy forces be accomplished?

In my opinion, the Army must continue to inform Congress of the Army's needs and leverage its existing resources to recapitalize and modernize its essential legacy forces primarily through upgrades and overhauls of these existing systems while moving to the Objective Force. Depots and industry partners should be adequately resourced to support recapitalization and modernization programs.

In your view, what is the appropriate role of experimentation in developing the Objective Force?

I believe experimentation is an essential element that is embedded throughout the overall plan to transform the Army. The process of experimentation helps the Army understand the future warfighting environment and examine a wide range of operational concepts and emerging technologies. As the Army continues the development of the Objective Force, both Joint and Army experimentation provide valuable insights into the capabilities the joint force will need to support our national defense.

In your view, does the Army have a sufficiently robust experimentation plan, and do the Interim Brigade Combat Teams have a role to play in that regard?

I have not been briefed on the specifics of the Army's experimentation plan. I believe that lessons learned and insights from fielding of IBCTs as well as joint and Army experiments should enhance the further development of IBCTs and the Objective Force.

If confirmed, what specifically would you recommend to the Secretary of the Army regarding the path to the Objective Force?

In my view, the Army should continue to pursue the essential levels of maturity of key technologies in support of the Objective Force.

In your view, does the Army have a capabilities gap which the Interim Brigade Combat Teams are designed to fill? If so, will fielding six IBCTs sufficiently close that gap? Is there an alternate solution that you would recommend to the Secretary of the Army, if confirmed, particularly in light of the severe Army funding constraints?

The Army has asserted that the IBCTs will fill the gap for a medium weight force. I believe that at an appropriate time, the Army should conduct an operational evaluation of the proposed IBCT force structure to determine whether it adequately closes that gap. I also believe that alternative solutions that might meet the Army's requirements at reduced costs should be thoroughly examined.

The Army has described the Interim Brigade Combat Teams as full spectrum capable, but optimized for peacekeeping.

In your view, are the IBCTs capable of full spectrum combat? If confirmed, would you recommend a comprehensive operational evaluation of the capabilities of the IBCTs in full spectrum combat?

I believe that a comprehensive operational evaluation of the IBCT should be conducted at an appropriate time to be determined by the Army. Such an evaluation should measure the combat capabilities of the IBCT.

In the Fiscal Year 2001 Defense Authorization Bill, Congress mandated a side-by-side operational and cost comparison of an Interim Brigade Combat Team unit equipped with the Army's choice of interim combat vehicle, and a unit similarly configured and trained, but equipped with the medium armored vehicle currently in the inventory.

In your view, would such a comparison provide worthwhile information for future decisions?

Given the current war on terrorism, would you recommend, if confirmed, that the Army conduct the side-by-side comparison as currently planned, or seek congressional relief from the requirement?

I believe that the Army should have full knowledge regarding the relative operational combat capabilities and costs of alternative combat vehicles that meet the Army's requirements for such vehicles. I believe it is important and worthwhile for the Army to have this information for current and future decisions. If the Army can provide satisfactory and timely information that the Congress requires without conducting a side-by-side test, then a test might not be necessary. The requirement was enacted before

September 11. If the Army concludes that the test would have a significant, negative impact on its preparations and operations for the current war on terrorism, I believe the Congress should reconsider the testing requirement.

Defense Laboratories

The Army is currently participating in a number of Congressionally mandated pilot programs to reform and revitalize the defense laboratory and test and evaluation enterprise. A number of these programs, including those intended for implementation at the Aberdeen Test Center, have been delayed due to legal and regulatory hurdles.

If confirmed, what actions would you propose to remove those barriers?

I realize that the defense laboratory and test and evaluation centers face many challenges. I understand that Congress has authorized several pilot programs to help reform and revitalize them. If confirmed, I will work with the Army leadership to ensure compliance with congressional mandates in this area.

Chemical and Biological Defenses

Army science and technology programs fund some of the world's most advanced research on chemical and biological defense and medical technologies. The various technologies that result from these efforts are often delayed by government (FDA and EPA) regulatory processes and therefore delayed in being transitioned to warfighters.

If confirmed, would you support streamlining the regulatory processes for highly critical technologies?

While I believe that essential testing and evaluation must be accomplished to ensure the health and safety of our soldiers, unnecessary procedures that impede timely fielding of advanced technologies—especially chemical and bio defense technologies—should be thoroughly examined and streamlined where possible.

If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you propose to have the Army assist its successful contractors through the FDA and EPA approval process?

I don't feel adequately informed to provide an answer to this question. If confirmed, I will be happy to look into this matter and respond to the committee if it requests.

Transfer of Ballistic Missile Defense Programs to the Army

The Ballistic Missile Defense Organization has proposed transferring the MEADS and PAC-3 programs to the Army, starring in fiscal year 2002. Although PAC-3 is a mature program, now heading into its final phase of operational testing, the MEADS program is just now emerging from initial concept definition. MENDS is not scheduled for deployment until the end of this decade, or beyond.

What is your view of the proposed transfer of these programs to the Army? What are the advantages and disadvantages of such a transfer?

In your view, is the Army prepared to support and fund these two programs to completion?

I understand PAC-3 is a mature technology and transferring it to the Army who will operate the system makes sense. On the other hand, MEADS is still in development, although it leverages some existing PAC-3 technology. Therefore, in my view, MEADS should remain with BMDO until more fully developed. In my view, while the Army might be prepared to support these programs, funding would be difficult within their current budget.

Weapons of Mass Destruction, Civil Support Teams

In its September 2001 report on combating terrorism, which was mandated by the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2001, the General Accounting Office asserted that the Weapons of Mass Destruction - Civil Support Teams (WMD-CSTs) "continue to experience problems with readiness doctrine and roles, and deployment that undermine their usefulness in an actual terrorist incident"

In your view, is it necessary to maintain the WMD-CSTs? If so, what should be done to bring all of the teams up to a high, uniform standard of readiness?

Yes. If confirmed, I would support the Secretary of the Army in ensuring that the teams are properly manned, equipped, trained, and prepared to accomplish their assigned mission.

In your view, is there a requirement for additional WMD-CSTs, and should the Department consider augmenting the teams to include such capabilities as decontamination?

It is my understanding that several studies concluded that more CSTs would be required to ensure timely, full coverage across the nation. Because of the events on and after September 11, I believe the Department of Defense of should consider adding new teams. I understand the Army National Guard and Army Reserve have been provided decontamination equipment sets that could be utilized to support a mass casualty

decontamination requirement. The Department should seriously consider whether this capability is sufficient to meet the potential need.

In your view, should the active duty Army develop WMD-CST-like capabilities?

I believe the Active Army should continue its focus on its warfighting mission. The Reserve Components are best suited to work with our domestic state, and local first responder communities.

Army Installations Force Protection

A September 2001 GAO report on installation antiterrorism/force protection criticized the lack of standards and assessments across all the military services.

In your view, what measures should the Army take, together with the other services, to improve installation preparedness against terrorist attacks?

I believe the Army should define its requirements and standardize its force protection capabilities across its installations and facilities both at home as well as abroad, subject to the standards and requirements by unified commanders in their areas of responsibility. These efforts should be coordinated with other services, DoD, and, where appropriate, local authorities.

In your view, what are the greatest vulnerabilities that Army installations face in preventing terrorist attacks and in responding to them, and how would you, if confirmed, propose addressing those weaknesses?

I have not studied this in sufficient detail to provide an adequate response, but I intend to become familiar with all aspects of the vulnerabilities of the Army's installations and how to address them. I will be happy to provide a response to the committee, if confirmed, if the committee desires.

Encroachment

On November 27, 2000, the Senior Readiness Oversight Council identified several "encroachment" problems confronting the Department of Defense including protection of endangered species, unexploded ordnance and other constituents, commercial demand for bandwidth and frequency, sustainability of the maritime environment, demand for use of airspace, protection of air quality, abatement of airborne noise, and growth of urban areas. At a March 20, 2001, hearing before the Readiness and Management Support Subcommittee, representatives of the military services expressed concern that this encroachment was hindering their legal responsibility under Title 10, United States Code, to train the forces.

If confirmed, what actions would you propose to address these problems?

In my opinion these problems threaten the ability of our military forces to train adequately for combat. If confirmed, I would work with OSD, other services, and the Congress to address these problems.

AC-RC Relationships

During the past decade, relations between the Regular Army leadership and the reserve components, particularly the Army National Guard, have not always been harmonious.

In your opinion, has the Total Army leadership dealt adequately with this problem? If not, what steps would you recommend?

I believe the Army leadership is addressing these concerns and the Reserve Components, as an essential part of our total Force, will be a high priority for me.

Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?

Yes.

Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Under Secretary of the Army?

Yes.

Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees?

Yes.