

Defense Reforms

Almost 15 years have passed since the enactment of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms.

Question: Has your view of the importance, implementation, and practice of these reforms changed since you last testified on this matter?

Answer: No.

Question: Do you foresee the need for additional modifications of Goldwater-Nichols in light of the changing environment and possible revisions to the national security strategy? If so, what areas do you believe it might be appropriate to address in these possible modifications?

Answer: I do not see the need for any additional modifications at this time.

Question: Based upon your experience as Commander-in-Chief, US Southern Command and Director for Operations (J-3) of the Joint Staff, do you believe that the roles of the combatant commanders and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under the Goldwater-Nichols legislation are appropriate and that the policies and procedures in existence allow those roles to be fulfilled?

Answer: Yes. In addition to strengthening civilian control over the armed forces, it also gives the various unified combatant commanders clear responsibility and authority for accomplishing their respective missions. Command and control of joint forces from the National Command Authorities through the combatant commander has eliminated much of the confusion and competing command and service influences that existed in the pre-Goldwater-Nichols era.

Duties

Question: What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

Answer: Section 154(c), Title 10, U.S. Code, states that the Vice Chairman performs the duties prescribed for him as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as those duties prescribed by the Chairman, with the approval of the Secretary of Defense.

Currently, in addition to the duties as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chairman has assigned the Vice Chairman to act as the Chairman of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), and as his representative to the National Security Council Deputies Committee. Further, the Vice Chairman has been charged with responsibility to stay abreast of on-going operations and policy deliberations, so that he is able to provide appropriate military advice to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council in the Chairman's absence. Although it will be within the Chairman's judgement as to which of these duties I will exercise as Vice Chairman, if I am confirmed, I have no reason to anticipate significant changes.

Question: What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties?

Answer: From my first command as a platoon leader in Vietnam to my current position as Commander in Chief, United States Southern Command, I have served in command and staff duties that have given me a global perspective and understanding on how our own government functions and a keen appreciation of how fortunate we are to be citizens of the United States. These insights and practical experience will serve me well if confirmed as the Vice-Chairman.

Question: Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to enhance your ability to perform the duties of Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

Answer: My background and experience have prepared me to assume the Vice Chairmanship of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. That said, it will be important for me to listen to the advice of those around me and to do my homework on each issue and challenge I will face.

Relationships

Section 162(b) of Title 10, United States Code, provides that the chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense and from the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commands. Other sections of law and traditional practice, however, establish important relationships outside the chain of command.

Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the following officials:

A. The Secretary of Defense

Answer: As a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Vice Chairman performs the duties prescribed for him and other such duties as may be prescribed by the Chairman with the approval of the Secretary of Defense.

Additionally, in the absence or disability of the Chairman, the Vice Chairman acts as the Chairman and performs the duties of the Chairman until a successor is appointed or until the absence or disability ceases. These duties include serving as the principal military adviser to the NCA.

As a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Vice Chairman may submit advice or opinions to the Chairman in disagreement with, or in addition to, the advice presented by the Chairman to the President, the National Security Council or the Secretary of Defense. The Chairman submits such opinion or advice at the same time he delivers his own, to the President, the National Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense.

The Vice Chairman, as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, may also individually or collectively, in his capacity as a military adviser, provide the Secretary of Defense advice upon the Secretary's request.

B. The Deputy Secretary of Defense

Answer: Under existing directives, the Deputy Secretary of Defense is delegated full power and authority to act for the Secretary of Defense on any matters concerning which the Secretary is authorized to act. As such, the relationship of the Vice Chairman with the Deputy Secretary is similar to that with the Secretary.

C. The Under Secretaries of Defense

Answer: Title 10, United States Code, and current DoD directives establish the Under Secretaries of Defense as the principal staff assistants and advisors to the Secretary regarding matters related to their functional areas. Within their areas, Under Secretaries exercise policy and oversight functions. In discharging their responsibilities, the Under Secretaries may issue instructions and directive-type memoranda that implement policy approved by the Secretary. These instructions and directives are applicable to all DoD components. They may also obtain reports and information necessary to carry out all their functions. In carrying out their responsibilities, communications from the Under Secretaries are transmitted through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

D. The Assistant Secretaries of Defense

Answer: With the exception of the Assistant Secretaries of Defense for C3I, Public Affairs, Legislative Affairs, and Intelligence Oversight, all Assistant Secretaries of Defense are subordinate to one of the Under Secretaries of Defense. In carrying out their responsibilities, as with Under Secretaries,

communications from the Assistant Secretaries are transmitted through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

E. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Answer: The Vice Chairman performs the duties prescribed for him as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and such other duties as may be prescribed by the Chairman with the approval of the Secretary of Defense. When there is a vacancy in the office of Chairman or in the absence or disability of the Chairman, the Vice Chairman acts as Chairman and performs the duties of the Chairman until a successor is appointed or the absence or disability ceases.

F. The Secretaries of the Military Departments

Answer: Title 10, United States Code, Section 165 provides that, subject to the authority, direction and control of the Secretary of Defense, and subject to the authority of the combatant commanders, the Secretaries of Military Departments are responsible for administration and support of forces that are assigned to unified and specified commands. The Chairman or Vice Chairman when directed or when acting as the Chairman, advises the Secretary of Defense on the extent to which program recommendations and budget proposals of the Military Departments conform with priorities in strategic plans and with the priorities established for requirements of the combatant commands.

G. The Chiefs of Staff of the Services

Answer: As a result of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the Service Chiefs are no longer involved in the operational chain of command. They have two significant roles. First and foremost, they are responsible for the organization, training, and equipping of their respective Service. Without the full support and cooperation of the Service Chiefs, no CINC can ensure the preparedness of his assigned forces for missions directed by the NCA. As advisors to the Chairman and the NCA and as the senior uniformed leaders of their respective Services, the Service Chiefs play a critically important role in shaping and transforming their Services' force structure and capabilities. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Service Chiefs and their Vice Chiefs to fulfill war fighting requirements.

H. The Combatant Commanders

Answer: The combatant commanders are the warfighters. By law and to the extent directed by the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman serves as spokesman for the Combatant commanders and is charged with overseeing their activities. He provides a vital linkage between the Combatant commanders and other elements of the Department of Defense. When the Vice Chairman is performing the Chairman's duties in the latter's absence, Combatant Commanders' relationships are as if the Vice were the Chairman.

Joint Requirements Oversight Council

As a combatant commander, you have been the user of the equipment, systems and systems of systems that have been provided by the Services to the operating forces. Over the years, there have been a number of after-action reports that have documented the lack of interoperability and jointness of equipment and systems. In the past year, the JROC has shifted its focus to a more strategic level so as to make sure that the systems coming along are, as General Myers put it in his testimony before the committee, "born joint." If confirmed, you will be the Chairman of the JROC.

Question: Based on your operational experience, particularly as Commander in Chief, U.S. Southern Command, do you support this shift in focus?

Answer: Yes

Question: What role, if any, do you see for the combatant commanders in the JROC process?

Answer: The fundamental changes made to the JROC process, starting 16 months ago, have as their central focus and goal to advance joint warfighting and give future joint force commanders the capabilities they will need to decisively defeat future threats. To this end, the JROC embarked on developing future operational concepts and corresponding architectures that will drive future weapon system requirements as well as crucial changes to doctrine, organization, personnel and other non-material solutions.

In chartering the Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment (JWCA) teams to lead the development of these operational concepts and architectures, the JROC is ensuring that our combatant commanders have an active and visible role in developing and validating those concepts. The JROC has clearly recognized that the involvement of the combatant commanders in developing future requirements is central to delivering the interoperable joint systems and overall capability our warfighters need and deserve. The same holds true for the ability of the combatant commanders to influence and gain the JROC's support to deal with more immediate priorities as they continue to work closely with the JROC during the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) decision cycles.

Question: What is your vision for both the role and relevancy of the JROC?

Answer: Since the Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, the JROC has fulfilled a multifaceted role which includes overseeing military requirements generation, defense acquisition programs, and formulating the Chairman's programmatic advice and alternative program recommendations. Early in 2000, the Chairman initiated efforts to strengthen the JROC's strategic focus. These efforts represent a fundamental shift in how the JROC does business, and are anchored on: enhancing the JROC's influence of requirements integration through the development of operational concepts and architectures; integrating US Joint Forces Command joint experimentation efforts into the

JROC process; and shifting the JROC's focus to future joint warfighting requirements while still addressing current CINC priorities.

Key to the JROC's strategic focus is the development of operational concepts and architectures that establish up-front interoperability and integration standards. This represents the cornerstone of the JROC's crucial role in transforming the future joint force. In his recent report to Congress on the status of the JROC evolution, GEN Shelton outlined numerous examples and actions that demonstrate the JROC's progress in accomplishing each of these goals.

Question: What changes in its organization, if any, would you recommend?

Answer: I would not recommend any further organizational changes at this time.

Role of U.S. Joint Forces Command

Question: U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) has been assigned the complementary missions of being the chief advocate for jointness and interoperability, being the DoD executive agent for joint concept development and experimentation, and playing a role in the joint requirements process. Those are similar to the functions given to the Chairman/Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by law and regulation.

Question: If confirmed, how would you envision working with the Commander-in-Chief, USJFCOM, and what role would you expect that individual to play in the JROC process?

Answer: For the last 18 months, the Chairman, Vice Chairman, Services, the USJFCOM CINC, and elements of the Joint Staff have been working to formalize JFCOM's role. JFCOM supports the joint process by evaluating operational concepts chartered by the Chairman and JROC, and must focus its experimentation efforts to support the development of these concepts and architectures. Also, because joint doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership/education, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF) has the potential to be as crucial as materiel, the agreed JROC process will now evaluate those key elements.

If confirmed as Vice Chairman, I will push for continued cooperation between the JROC and JFCOM to enable early review, oversight, and endorsement of critical JFCOM interoperability recommendations.

Vieques

As you know, over the past two years Naval forces deploying from the East Coast of the U.S. have been unable to conduct live-fire training on the Navy's training range on Vieques, Puerto Rico, which has degraded the readiness of these forces to execute their wartime missions.

Question: Based on your previous experience in looking at potential replacements for Vieques, do you believe a replacement site can be found that satisfies the Navy's goal of providing equivalent training capability for our Navy and Marine Corps units?

Answer: No. The Navy and Marine Corps have conducted a number of very thorough examinations of various sites in a search for potential training locations. No other single location in the Atlantic Ocean or Gulf of Mexico provides the air, land, sea space, and support facilities that exist at the Vieques range complex.

Question: If so, do you believe this can be accomplished with a single replacement site?

Answer: No.

Question: Do you believe a replacement for Vieques can be identified and made available for training purposes by May, 2003?

Answer: No.

Question: Do you believe we should cease training on Vieques by a certain date or only when a replacement for Vieques has become operational?

Answer: The Secretary of the Navy has made that decision and it is his decision to make.

Question: Do you believe the referendum on the future of live-fire training on Vieques currently scheduled for November 6, 2001 should be canceled?

Answer: The planning and execution of the referendum on Vieques is an issue addressed by both the current and previous Administrations and this Congress. I intend to follow the direction of the President and the laws of the land.

Colombia

As Commander in Chief, U.S. Southern Command, you have played a major role in dealing with the Colombian civilian, military and law enforcement authorities and in overseeing the U.S. military's training of the Colombian military's counter-narcotics forces and the provision of other assistance. Some commentators have criticized U.S. assistance on the basis that some members of the Colombian military have allegedly violated the human rights of its citizens and have cooperated with the paramilitaries; others believe that U.S. assistance should not be limited to fighting drug traffickers and should be expanded to include counter-insurgency so as to preserve Colombia's democratic form of government; and finally, others fear that any U.S. assistance might eventually result in U.S. military involvement in the conflict in Colombia.

Questions: Would you provide your views on the appropriate role of U.S. assistance to Colombia?

Answer: Our role should be one of continued training of the Colombian security forces because today the combined capabilities of both the Colombian National Police and military are insufficient to provide security throughout the country. Without countrywide security for both citizens and infrastructure, Plan Colombia will not succeed nor will the Government of Colombia be capable of providing law and order.

We can provide the needed training within the current personnel limits and without U.S. military involvement in the conflict. Properly trained counter narcotics forces will ultimately transform from an exclusive counter narcotics role to one of providing sustained security.

Military-to-Military Engagement

U.S. Southern Command uses military -to-military engagement, including combined operations, exercises, training and education, security assistance, and humanitarian assistance programs, with host nations' forces to engender regional security.

Question: Do you believe that Southern Command's military-to-military engagement has been successful and is cost effective?

Answer: Yes. Through our investment in military-to-military engagement, we are making a positive difference in helping to strengthen democracy, promote prosperity, and foster regional security in Latin America and the Caribbean. The resources invested in appropriate, focused engagement have helped shape a security environment characterized by increased regional cooperation and improved regional security.

We deploy small preventive forces today to avoid large scale, conflict resolution deployments later.

Question: Based upon your assignments elsewhere, do you believe that military-to-military engagement is a valuable tool for other regions of the world?

Answer: Yes.

Anthrax Vaccination

DOD officials have testified that anthrax is the greatest biological weapon threat to our military force because it is highly lethal, easy to produce in large quantities, and remains viable over long periods of time. The anthrax vaccination program has been curtailed because of limited quantities of FDA approved vaccine.

Question: Do you continue to support the policy of vaccinating our service men and women to immunize them against the use of weaponized anthrax?

Answer: Yes. This is a force protection issue. We must do everything possible as a nation, to protect our soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines from the threats they face in an uncertain environment.

Question: If confirmed, will you support full implementation of the Anthrax Vaccine Immunization Program if sufficient supplies of FDA approved anthrax vaccine become available?

Answer: Yes.

Lessons Learned

Question: What are the most important lessons that you have learned as Commander in Chief, U.S. Southern Command.

Answer: I have gained an appreciation of the strategic importance of the U.S. Southern Command's Area of Responsibility (AOR) to U.S. National Security interests. Thirty nine percent of U.S. trade is conducted in this hemisphere. Nearly 35 percent of our oil imports come from Latin America and the Caribbean, which is more than all of the Middle East countries combined. Of every dollar spent by countries in the AOR, 49 cents are on U.S. goods and services. Hispanics are the largest and fastest growing minority in the U.S. due mainly to immigration from Latin America. Although Colombia and counterdrug activities are important, U.S. Southern Command should not become Colombia or counterdrug centric. The strategic importance of the region is far too great to neglect our other partners and issues in the theater. We must strike a balance between our immediate priorities and our long-term interests.

Given the dominant role that military forces traditionally play in Latin America, U.S. Southern Command's comprehensive and multifaceted engagement strategy has, and will continue to positively influence governments in the region. We must allocate sufficient resources to leverage these engagement opportunities and thereby continue to enjoy the benefits of a stable southern flank.

I have also found that most regional problems and issues in the U.S. Southern Command's AOR require an interagency approach to be fully successful. Coordination and cooperation with the interagency has significantly improved our engagement with Partner Nations, counterdrug operations, and effectiveness in responding to regional crises.

Finally, I must state my admiration for the truly outstanding soldiers, sailors, Marines, airmen, coastguardsmen and civilians that serve at U.S. Southern Command. They are dedicated professionals and I am proud to serve with them and their families.

Major Challenges and Problems

Question: In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

Answer. If I am confirmed, my first priority will be to ensure our soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines, and coastguardsmen are ready to meet the near-term challenges of executing the tasks that support our National Military Strategy. We must ensure they are organized, trained, equipped, and supported with the tools required to protect our nation's security interests – both at home and abroad. Second, we must have the proper force structure to implement this strategy. Third, we must make the investment to modernize, recapitalize, and transform our forces to meet the challenges of the 21st century.

Question: Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

Answer. If confirmed, I'll assist the Chairman in working with the Secretary of Defense, the Service Chiefs, and the combatant commanders to ensure we focus on readiness issues for the near-term challenges while implementing programs in concert with the Secretary's Defense Planning Guidance to transform and modernize the force.

Question: What do you consider to be the most serious problems in the performance of the functions of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

Answer. The most important function of the Vice Chairman is to assist the Chairman in his duties to provide military advice to the Secretary of Defense, the President, and the National Security Council. Currently, there are no major problems in performing this function.

Question: If confirmed, what management actions and time lines would you establish to address these problems?

Answer. If confirmed, one of my top priorities would be to assist the Chairman in his efforts to better equip our staffs to enable swift, accurate information flow. Our information and decision capabilities are critical to providing accurate and timely advice to the National Command Authority (NCA). We must ensure that these systems are state of the art and interoperable. Furthermore, we must ensure that our transformation efforts enhance joint command and control throughout DOD.

Combatt~~i~~ng Terrorism

As you know, the Joint Task Force-Civil Support (JTF-CS) located within Joint Forces Command is a relatively new task force that is expected to be a key player should the Department of Defense be called upon to play a supporting role in the U.S. Government's response to a domestic weapons of mass destruction (WMD) event.

Question: What steps do you think should be taken to ensure that the JTF-CS is fully prepared to fulfill its responsibilities in the event of a domestic WMD event?

Answer: As you know, Joint Forces Command was directed to create a full-time, standing Joint Task Force Headquarters for Civil Support capable of responding to a Lead Federal Agency (e.g., the Federal Emergency Management Agency) request for assistance during an event involving Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, or High Explosive (CBRNE). Though JTF-CS has no standing forces assigned, forces may be assigned, attached, or placed under the operational control of JTF-CS on a situational basis.

Important steps associated with developing the capabilities of JTF-CS have already taken place, to include mission analysis, (including possible expansion) and then developing internal and external plans and exercises with the interagency. In light of recent events, it is clear that the capabilities of this trained Joint Task Force Headquarters are more critical than ever if DOD should be needed to respond for Consequence Management (CM) support to CBRNE incidents. Continued interagency liaison and training exercises are critical to the continued refinement of tactics, techniques and procedures to ensure a rapid and efficient DOD response.

Encroachment

On November 27th, 2000, the Senior Readiness Oversight Council identified several "encroachment" problems confronting the Department of Defense including protection of endangered species, unexploded ordnance and other constituents, commercial demand for bandwidth and frequency, sustainability of the maritime environment, demand for use of airspace, protection of air quality, abatement of airborne noise, and growth of urban areas. At a March 20, 2001, hearing before the Readiness and Management Support Subcommittee, representatives of the military services expressed concern that this encroachment was hindering their Title 10 responsibility to train the forces.

Questions: If confirmed, what actions would you take to address these problems?

Answer: Training is critical to the readiness of combat forces and encroachment is a serious issue with national security implications. Under Title 10, U.S. Code, training of the Armed Forces is a Service responsibility, and the Services are working hard not only to maintain their training facilities, but to improve their stewardship of the environment, while strengthening their relationships with local communities.

There is a collaborative effort within the Department of Defense to address encroachment issues. We have draft action plans for the various aspects of encroachment. We are working a community outreach program to minimize the impact of encroachment by fostering a dialogue with local leadership, discussing work-around initiatives, and developing potential technology solutions to provide a similar level of training.

This is a solid and prudent approach for resolving the encroachment issues. If confirmed, I'll continue to support these efforts.

Readiness Reporting System

The systems that the military services use to measure their readiness have been criticized as outdated and inappropriate for a military of the 21st Century. Some of the specific criticisms raised have been that the systems measure past readiness rather than future readiness, and measure the readiness of the forces to perform a major theater war mission rather than the mission to which they are currently assigned.

Question: Do you agree with these criticisms and, if confirmed, what actions would you take to change the readiness reporting system?

Answer: I agree in part. As Vice Chairman, I will be involved in the readiness of the force, in the assessment process, and in identifying solutions to our shortfalls. The Joint Staff hosts annual CINC/Service conferences on readiness, and based on the CINC/Service's feedback, the focus on joint warfighting is the proper emphasis, and is also in accordance with Section 117, Title 10, U.S. Code. Units are designed—manned, armed, equipped, and trained—to conduct wartime missions. But I also recognize the necessity to assess our readiness for missions other than war. Less than two years ago, the Joint Staff created a reporting mechanism within the Global Status of Resources and Training System to do this. While this was a good first effort, we need to explore the expansion and/or refinement of this reporting mechanism. As set forth in the DPG, the Services and Chairman must recommend to the Secretary of Defense a comprehensive readiness reporting system. If confirmed, I will assist the Chairman to further enhance the timeliness, accuracy, and usefulness of the readiness reporting system.

CINC-Identified Readiness Deficiencies

Over the last several years the Quarterly Readiness Reports that the Department prepares for the Congress have outlined a number of CINC identified readiness related deficiencies. Many of these are listed as Category I deficiencies which entail significant warfighting risk to execution of the National Military Strategy. Although these deficiencies have been reported for the past several years, they have not as yet been effectively addressed. This has raised concerns that the requirements of the warfighting CINCs are not being incorporated into the military services budgets and the Department's acquisition process.

If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure that these requirements are understood and funded within the Department's budget?

Answer: If confirmed, I will assist the Chairman to report the combatant commanders' identified readiness deficiencies. I will also assist the Chairman to make assessments and recommendations to the Secretary of Defense regarding the reporting system, the effectiveness of the Services' budgets, and the acquisition process to solve these deficiencies.

Commercial vs Military Requirements for Frequency Spectrum

The Federal Government is trying to identify a band of frequencies that can be used for the operation of 3rd Generation Wireless Communications devices. As a part of this overall effort, the Department of Defense conducted a study to determine the cost and operational impact that would result if the military services were to surrender the use of the 1755 - 1850 MHz band of frequencies on which they currently operate their equipment. That study found that it would take at least \$4.3 billion and 17 years to vacate the band if a suitable band of alternative frequencies were identified for the Department's use. The Secretary of Defense and General Shelton recently signed a letter to members of Congress that outlined the importance of spectrum availability, and this band in particular, for the Department's operations.

What is your view of that assessment?

Answer: I fully support the position of the Secretary of Defense and General Shelton. Spectrum access is vital to combat operations and training. Guaranteed access to spectrum is a cornerstone of information superiority and our warfighting abilities. Without this access, the ability of the Department to use current and planned weapon systems, to employ new technologies, and to effectively command and control conventional and nuclear forces is seriously compromised. The 1755-1850 MHz frequency band supports over a \$100 billion investment in key satellite, air combat training, precision weapons guidance, and battlefield communications systems. These systems provide commanders and their forces real-time intelligence, voice, data, and video information and precision strike ability necessary for a leaner, more agile and more flexible force to meet global mission requirements. Competition for spectrum, both nationally and internationally, is increasing and the Department's growth and need for spectrum parallels commercial industry's needs. We must ensure any spectrum decision carefully considers national security, the needs of commercial interests, and other important national interests.

We are fully committed to cooperating with Congress and the Federal Communications Commission and within the Administration in finding solutions for 3rd generation implementation that meet commercial needs while protecting essential national security capabilities.

Role of CINC's

Question: Based on your service as the Commander in Chief, U.S. Southern Command, do you have any recommendation on ways to improve the effectiveness and capabilities of the regional combatant commanders?

Answer: Sound management of PERSTEMPO, equipment modernization, and investment in infrastructure will lead to more capable and efficient forces. One area in need of greater interagency synergy is the implementation of policy decisions. We need a mechanism at the national level to track and coordinate the efforts of individual departments.

Quality of Life, U.S. Southern Command Headquarters

Since the establishment of U.S. Southern Command Headquarters in Miami, there have been consistent concerns over the quality of life of our military personnel assigned to the Command.

Question: What, if any, improvements should be taken to improve the quality of life for these dedicated personnel?

Answer: Concern for quality of life issues is a critical element of leadership, one which properly reflects commitment to our personnel and helps create an environment supportive of recruitment, retention, and readiness. Regarding SOUTHCOM headquarters in Miami, I applaud the efforts of the Army, in particular, and of other organizations such as the Defense Commissary Agency, as they develop new and creative means to support quality of life requirements for SOUTHCOM personnel. The key element is providing predictability - a reasonable degree of consistency in the programs, policies, and services offered from one assignment to another, from one location to another.

The current SOUTHCOM headquarters location is strategically important for executing the mission of the command but it is in no way traditional; there is not an active installation from which to draw support. However, this does provide the opportunity to develop new and creative methods to meet requirements. Partnering with the local community and local businesses has been a key to development and continued improvement of support and services that are comparable to those found on a typical military installation. Childcare requirements, for example, are addressed by contracting for available space at nationally accredited childcare centers so that the service member pays rates comparable to those at any military installation. Junior enlisted housing is another example, we lease apartments from the existing capacity in the local community to provide for our junior personnel – and currently no one is on a waiting list. These are just two examples of progress.

Still, there are shortcomings. We have not yet established a partnership within the local community to approximate typical commissary savings for service members. However, we have received great support and flexibility from the Defense Commissary Agency to bring commissary benefits and savings to military personnel residing in Miami through a “Tent Sale” every four months. This is only an occasional relief, but it makes a positive impact and takes us a step closer to predictability. Another concern is with medical support. There is a small medical clinic and dispensing pharmacy at the headquarters that adequately serves as the primary care manager for SOUTHCOM active duty personnel and their family members. Additional requirements for specialized treatment, laboratory work, or dental care are met through the network of providers in the greater Miami area that participate with Tricare. The turnover of doctors participating in Tricare has been frustrating. Implementing changes or procedures that decrease the turnover in doctors will greatly improve continuity of care and satisfaction. Further, problems with administrative and billing processes have caused difficulty in the past.

Though some progress has occurred in this area, systemic improvements are needed. In addition, full implementation of the basic allowance for housing entitlement increases – eliminating the “out-of-pocket” burden for our personnel – is especially important. Finally, we will continue to seek a cost of Living Allowance (COLA) to offset the high cost in Miami.

Command and Control

Despite significant investment in military service, national and combatant commander command and control systems, more than one of the recently-convened defense review panels concluded that U.S. forces do not have a deployable, joint command and control system that can immediately be placed into operation to coordinate the efforts of U.S. and coalition forces.

Question: What actions do you think are necessary to ensure the rapid development of such an important capability?

Answer: This is an absolutely critical capability and we do have deficiencies in addressing the full command and control interoperability required by a Joint Task Force (JTF) headquarters. The current DPG calls for plans to establish standing JTF headquarters and recommends improvements to operating procedures and capabilities, to include addressing rapidly deployable interoperable command and control. This will be a major part of the experimentation in JFCOM's Millennium Challenge '02 exercise. Additionally, JFCOM will take the lead to identify and fix current mission critical JTF C2 legacy interoperability issues. Further, I fully support the criticality of development and fielding of rapidly deployable, interoperable, command and control systems. If confirmed, I will, in my delegated role as Chairman of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council along with the Service Vice Chiefs, provide the necessary senior military perspective to achieve an interoperable joint command and control capability.

Information Operations

Joint Vision 2020 and various defense reviews have highlighted the importance of information operations in future warfare.

What role and what obstacles do you see for information operations as an integral part of US joint military operations?

Answer: Information operations are a means to ensure decision superiority -- the key to successful military operations in the future. IO provides non-kinetic options, with promising effects to defeat adversaries, at low-risk to military forces. But we're faced with three challenges: planning and executing these activities the same way we would any wartime campaign; integrating the military's efforts with those of other U.S. Government agencies; identifying and removing unintended effects while keeping up with rapidly changing information technologies. We can meet these challenges.

Are you satisfied that there is unity of effort within the Department of Defense in the development of information operations capabilities?

Answer: Emerging computer network attack and defense capabilities represent an important aspect of information operations. We have been working hard to enhance the security of DOD computer networks and to defend those networks from unauthorized activity (e.g., exploitation of data or attack). Recognizing that the threat to our networked systems is real and increasing, we established the Joint Task Force - Computer Network Defense in December 1998, and assigned responsibility for that mission to U.S. Space Command in 1999. We have incorporated intrusion detection software in many of our networks, erected firewalls, and increased awareness training for our personnel through our information assurance program.

In October 2000, the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Space Command (USSPACECOM), assumed responsibility as the military lead for computer network attack as well, and charged USSPACECOM with overseeing the development of capabilities and procedures for this aspect of offensive information operations. In April 2001, U.S. Space Command redesignated the Joint Task Force - Computer Network Defense as the Joint Task Force - Computer Network Operations to reflect this new mission. The Services also cooperate with other Defense and Intelligence Community agencies in efforts to defend the networks that are vital to our national security.

As you have indicated, the Services, Defense Agencies, and combatant commanders are all devoting a great deal of effort to this area. I believe we have the structures and procedures in place to keep duplication of effort to a minimum and ensure advances in information operations capabilities across the Department.

Transformation/Revolution in Military Affairs

The President and the Secretary of Defense have called for a significant transformation of at least a portion of our armed forces to counter emerging 21st Century threats.

Question: In your opinion, what will constitute transformation of our armed forces?

Answer: Transformation is an on-going process for conceptualizing, developing and fielding new combinations of operational concepts, capabilities, organizational arrangements and training regimens that provide U.S. joint forces with advantages that fundamentally change our own, or render less effective potential adversaries', ways of waging war. It is usually evolutionary in nature, but may be revolutionary. Modernization of our weapons systems, information technology, and other defense materiel equipment is a key part, but only one of many elements in the transformation equation.

True transformation can only occur through evolution within all the critical joint force considerations of doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership and education, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF). A comprehensive DOTMLPF approach is necessary to field and employ future capabilities that fundamentally change and improve our operational and warfighting effectiveness.

Joint Transformation also requires changes within the three supporting processes of requirements generation, acquisition, and the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) processes. Over the past year, the military has made significant strides in the improvement of the requirements generation process through the evolving strategic integration role of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). The Requirements Generation System (RGS) process was shifted from a threat-based system to a joint operational concept and capabilities-based system. Additionally, the process was adapted to enable the introduction and consideration of transformation initiatives from a variety of sources, to include Joint and Service experimentation. The Secretary of Defense is working hard to streamline the acquisition and PPBS processes to facilitate transformation.

Question: Are you confident that the defense review process/QDR now concluding will outline a clear vision for transformation within the Department?

Answer: The senior civilian and military leadership within DoD have reached consensus on an approach to transformation – one that focuses clearly on six critical operational challenges: 1) homeland defense; 2) projecting forces in anti-access environments; 3) engaging mobile targets at long range; 4) information operations; 5) space operations; and 6) developing a common operational picture. The QDR has identified the need for strengthening joint organizations and operations through the development of standing joint task force headquarters. It calls for increasing joint

experimentation and concept development. It places emphasis on exploiting U.S. advantages in intelligence. Finally, it charts a course for transforming U.S. military capabilities over time to address key operational challenges.

Quadrennial Defense Review

If confirmed, you will take office on or about the day the Quadrennial Defense Review is forwarded to Congress.

Question: Not having had a formal role in the review process, how do you perceive your role and responsibilities in implementing the recommendations of the QDR?

Answer: I did have a role in the process for this QDR. My fellow Unified Commanders and I had meetings with Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld to discuss this and we were encouraged to participate. I am familiar with the process and direction of the review. If confirmed as the Vice-Chairman, my role will be to support the Chairman in implementing the actions directed by the Secretary of Defense.

Question: As a combatant commander, were you satisfied that warfighting CINCs had ample access to the review process?

Answer: I was satisfied that I had as much time as was available in the review process. There was insufficient time given that a new Administration had recently taken office and was populating the defense establishment and establishing its own strategies and priorities.

Joint Standing Task Forces

At least two of the strategic review panels made recommendations concerning the need for permanent, operations-oriented, joint headquarters to better and more quickly integrate joint forces and conduct complex joint operations. Recent reporting indicates the Department of Defense may recommend the establishment of these standing joint headquarters at each of the combatant commands.

Question: As a combatant commander, did you perceive a need for such a standing operations headquarters in your area of responsibility?

Answer: Yes. In fact, U.S. Southern Command has had its own standing joint task force with JTF-Bravo in Soto Cano, Honduras. JTF-Bravo has served Southern Command's mission and our Nation well both in cooperative engagement and disaster response.

Question: In your opinion, are such elements needed at every combatant command?

Answer:

This question has been thoroughly debated within the Department of Defense over the past few months. There is a general consensus that some form of standing joint headquarters structure for each geographic combatant command will improve the performance of our joint forces.

The department is considering standing headquarters alternatives, including a model developed within JFCOM's joint experimentation program that will be tested next August during the MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE experiment. Any alternative must help build habitual pre-established relationships, provide continuity of planning and operations, and provide baseline Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR), and Standing Operating Procedures.

However, there are many significant issues, including manning, infrastructure, and cost, which we must consider before implementation. Also, each geographic combatant command has different requirements that may drive a different standing JTF headquarters structure. DOD is currently working toward final decision in Fall 2002, following the completion of MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE.

Question: Should any or all of these headquarters have specifically assigned joint forces that regularly train and operate together?

Answer: The Secretary of Defense tasked the Chairman to examine the issue and submit plans for establishing standing Joint Task Forces (JTFs) in Spring 2002. If we successfully implement our standing joint headquarters concept, we can tailor each JTF

as required by the situation, leaving forces available for other important uses in peacetime. One of the beauties of a JTF is its flexibility in organization to meet the requirements of each mission. Through effective joint training and aggressive joint experimentation, we can improve joint interoperability and effectiveness without incurring the disadvantages of assigning forces habitually to the standing JTF headquarters.

Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Question: Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?

Answer: Yes

Question: Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the Administration in power?

Answer: Yes

Question: Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

Answer: Yes

Question: Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees?

Answer: Yes