

FY 95 CONGRESSIONAL MAXI-\$-TRACK WEAPONS PROCUREMENT (3020)
(Dollars In Thousands, Quantities Underneath Dollars)

<u>SEQ</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>PBR</u>	<u>HASC</u>	<u>SASC</u>	<u>AUTH</u> <u>CONF</u>	<u>HAC</u>	<u>SAC</u>	<u>APPN</u> <u>CONF</u>	<u>NOTES</u>
002	MISSILE REP EQ-BALLISTIC	\$16,180	16,180	16,180	16,180	16,180	16,180	16,180	
003	HAVE NAP	\$0	26,000	0	26,000	8,600	26,000	26,000	
			36		36	12	36	36	
004	TRI-SERVICE ATTACK MISSILE	\$373,875	0	308,075	0	0	0	0	
		48	0	48	0	0	0		
006	AMRAAM	\$309,462	309,462	309,462	299,462	299,462	277,855	289,462	
		413	413	413	413	413	413	413	
007	AGM-130 POWERED GBU-15	\$71,756	71,756	71,756	71,756	69,256	71,756	69,256	
		102	102	102	102	102	102	102	
009	TARGET DRONES	\$29,043	29,043	29,043	29,043	17,043	29,043	23,043	
		48	48	48	48	48	48	48	
010	INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES	\$5,731	0	5,731	5,731	5,731	5,731	8,931	
011	MISSILE REP EQ-OTHER	\$14,883	14,883	14,883	14,883	14,883	14,883	14,883	
011A	GAMS			25,000			40,000	25,000	
				128					
011B	BAT/TMD DEMO			25,000					
011C	GAMS/BAT/TMD DEMO				40,000				
011D	MOD OF IN-SERVICE MISSILES								
013	AIR LAUNCH CRUISE MISSILE			40,000	29,500				
015	AIM-9 SIDEWINDER	\$8,304	8,304	8,304	8,304	8,304	8,304	8,304	
016	MM II/III MODIFICATIONS	\$18,284	7,784	6,284	9,284	9,284	9,284	9,284	
018	AGM-88A HARM	\$64,157	64,157	64,157	64,157	64,157	64,157	64,157	

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019	MODIFICATIONS UNDER \$2.0M	\$2,909	2,909	2,909	2,909	2,909	2,909	2,909	
019A	CALCM					29,400	0	29,400	
021	TOTAL SPARES AND REPAIR PARTS	\$68,332	68,332	68,332	68,332	68,332	65,149	65,149	
022	SPACEBORNE EQUIP (COMSEC)	\$2,092	2,092	2,092	2,092	0	2,092	2,092	
023	GLOBAL POSITIONING (MYP)	\$134,831	134,831	134,831	134,831	0	134,831	134,831	
		5	5	5	5	0	5	5	
024	GLOBAL POSITIONING (MYP) ADV PROC	\$55,352	55,352	55,352	55,352	0	55,352	55,352	
025	SPACE SHUTTLE OPERATIONS	\$103,518	103,518	103,518	103,518	0	103,518	103,518	
026	SPACE BOOSTERS (MYP)	\$381,817	381,817	381,817	381,817	0	381,817	381,817	
027	SPACE BOOSTERS (ADV PROC)	\$40,900	40,900	0	0	0	0	0	
028	MEDIUM LAUNCH VEHICLE	\$120,480	120,480	120,480	120,480	0	107,480	107,480	
		3	3	3	3	0	3	3	
029	MEDIUM LAUNCH VEHICLE ADV PROC (CY)	\$28,564	28,564	28,564	28,564	0	28,564	28,564	
030	DEF METEOROLOGICAL SAT PROG (MYP)	\$29,159	29,159	29,159	29,159	0	29,159	29,159	
031	DEFENSE SUPPORT PROGRAM (MYP)	\$363,959	363,959	363,959	363,959	0	363,959	363,959	
033	DEFENSE SAT COMM SYS	\$20,185	20,185	20,185	20,185	0	20,185	20,185	
034	IONDS (MYP)	\$35,649	35,649	35,649	35,649	0	35,649	35,649	
		5	5	5	5	0	5	5	
035	IONDS ADV PROC (CY)	\$9,954	9,954	9,954	9,954	0	9,954	9,954	

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					<u>CONF</u>	<u>HAC</u>		<u>CONF</u>	<u>CONF</u>	
036	SPECIAL UPDATE PROGRAMS	\$184,212	184,212	184,212	184,212	184,212	184,212	184,212	184,212	
037	SPECIAL PROGRAMS	\$1,619,032	1,569,032	1,586,032	1,577,532	1,960,532	1,532,032	1,541,532		
038	2.75 INCH ROCKET MOTOR	\$13,851	13,851	13,851	13,851	13,851	13,851	13,851	13,851	
		40,468	40,468	40,468	40,468	40,468	40,468	40,468	40,468	
039	ITEMS LESS THAN \$2M	\$1,990	1,990	1,990	1,990	1,990	1,990	1,990	1,990	
040	5.56MM CARTRIDGES	\$11,618	11,618	11,618	11,618	11,618	11,618	11,618	11,618	
		28,385	28,385	28,385	28,385	28,385	28,385	28,385	28,385	
041	20MM TRAINING	\$18,295	18,295	18,295	18,295	39,295	38,295	39,295	39,295	
		3,307	3,307	3,307	3,307	3,307	6,000	3,307	3,307	
042	30MM TRAINING	\$23,672	23,672	23,672	15,500	15,500	11,272	15,500	15,500	
		2,523	2,523	2,523	2,523	1,700	1,500	1,700	1,700	
043	CARTRIDGE CHAFF RR-180	\$5,339	2,403	5,339	2,403	5,339	5,339	5,339	5,339	
		523	523	523	523	523	523	523	523	
044	CARTRIDGE CHAFF RR-188	\$2,351	2,351	2,351	2,351	2,351	2,351	2,351	2,351	
		1,513	1,513	1,513	1,513	1,513	1,513	1,513	1,513	
045	SIGNAL MK-4 MOD 3	\$1,466	1,466	1,466	1,466	1,466	1,466	1,466	1,466	
		710	710	710	710	710	710	710	710	
046	ITEMS LESS THAN \$2M	\$4,523	4,523	4,523	4,523	4,523	4,523	4,523	4,523	
							0			
047	TIMER ACTUATOR FIN FUZE	\$8,742	8,742	8,742	8,742	8,742	8,742	8,742	8,742	
		18,000	18,000	18,000	18,000	18,000	18,000	18,000	18,000	
048	GBU-15	\$5,613	5,613	5,613	5,613	5,613	5,613	5,613	5,613	
049	BOMB PRACTICE 25 POUND	\$9,406	6,922	9,406	6,922	5,426	5,426	5,426	5,426	
		668,720	668,720	668,720	387,000	350,000	350,000	350,000	350,000	
050	SENSOR FUZED WEAPON	\$113,513	113,513	113,513	113,513	113,513	113,513	113,513	113,513	
		260	260	260	260	260	260	260	260	
051	ITEMS LESS THAN \$2M (TARGETS)	\$2,514	2,514	2,514	2,514	2,514	2,514	2,514	2,514	

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052	ITEMS LESS THAN \$2M (OTHER ITEMS)	\$822	822	822	822	822	822	822	
053	FLARE, IR MJU-7B	\$16,260	6,540	16,260	6,540	6,540	16,260	16,260	
		766,563	306,540	766,563	766,563	306,540	766,563	766,563	
054	PARACHUTE FLARE LUU-2 B/B	\$4,025	4,025	4,025	4,025	4,025	4,025	4,025	
		7,572	7,572	7,572	7,572	7,572	7,572	7,572	
055	M-206 CARTRIDGE FLARE	\$9,114	9,114	9,114	9,114	9,114	9,114	9,114	
		311,800	311,800	311,800	311,800	311,800	311,800	311,800	
056	INITIAL SPARES	\$161	161	161	161	161	161	161	
057	REPLENISHMENT SPARES	\$2,865	2,865	2,865	2,865	2,865	2,865	2,865	
058	MODIFICATIONS	\$507	507	507	507	507	507	507	
059	ITEMS LESS THAN \$2M	\$10,271	7,068	10,271	7,068	10,271	10,271	10,271	
060	FMU-139 FUZE	\$11,742	10,250	11,742	10,250	11,742	11,742	11,742	
061	ITEMS LESS THAN \$2M	\$60	60	60	60	60	60	60	
062	M-16 A2 RIFLE	\$833	833	833	833	833	833	833	
		1,450	1,450	1,450	1,450	1,450	1,450	1,450	

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TITLE: TRI-SERVICE ATTACK MISSILE

APPROP : 3020

	<u>PBR</u>	<u>HASC</u>	<u>SASC</u>	<u>AUTH</u> <u>CONF</u>	<u>HAC</u>	<u>SAC</u>	<u>APPN</u> <u>CONF</u>
DOLLARS:	\$373,875	0	308,075	0	0	0	0
QUANTITY:	48	0	48	0	0	0	

HASC:

Tri-service stand-off attack missile

The budget request contained \$373.9 million for procurement of 48 Tri-Service Stand-off Attack Missiles (TSSAM) for fiscal year 1995, and \$81.1 million for research and development.

The committee notes that this program continues to have cost and developmental problems. The committee also understands that Air Force support for this program has begun to wane. With first the Army, and now the Navy, withdrawn from the program, it has become unaffordable for the Air Force.

Accordingly, the committee recommends that this program be terminated and that no funds be provided for either procurement or research and development. Unobligated prior year funds may be used for program termination costs. As an interim measure, the committee recommends \$26 million for the procurement of 36 Have Nap missiles.

HASC, p. 59

SASC:

Tri-Service standoff attack missile

The budget request contained \$66.7 million for the Navy, and \$81.1 million for the Air Force, to continue development of the tri-Service standoff attack missile (TSSAM). The budget request also contained \$373.9 million in procurement to begin low-rate initial production of the Air Force's combined effects bomblet (CEB) version of the missile. Finally, the budget request included \$82.5 million to pay for termination charges to cancel the Army portion of the program.

TSSAM is designed to provide the Air Force and the Navy with a weapon that can survive the heaviest air defenses and attack high value targets. The TSSAM payoff comes from reducing the exposure of manned aircraft to enemy air defenses and a higher probability of successfully attacking the toughest targets than any alternative standoff weapons. The TSSAM is an essential program for providing enhanced standoff capabilities in many existing and planned platforms.

The TSSAM program has experienced technical problems in the testing program since last year. When the missile works, performance meets or exceeds specifications, providing the designed capability to attack the most heavily defended targets. However, a series of process control problems has plagued the program. The Air Force, as manager of the joint program, has been disappointed with the contractor's performance, but has begun to see improvements in various program management indicators.

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The committee, adhering to its longstanding "fly-before-buy" philosophy, believes that the Air Force budget should reflect the current testing delays, by delaying production until testing can demonstrate the expected performance and reliability.

Therefore, the committee supports the Air Force and Navy budget request for research and development, but recommends a reduction for Air Force procurement of \$65.8 million. The committee directs that none of the fiscal year 1995 production funds be obligated until the testing program has: (1) achieved all contractual exit criteria for proceeding to the next phase of the program, and (2) passed the standards set forth in the classified annex to the statement of managers accompanying the conference report on the Department of Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1994 (H. Rept. 103-339).

The committee also understands that \$50.0 million of the funds in the Army's TSSAM budget request are excess to termination requirements, and recommends a similar reduction.

SASC, p. 40

Improving the bomber force and preserving bomber options

The committee has demonstrated a steadfast commitment over the years to supporting, and initiating when necessary, the programs needed to ensure a robust and effective bomber force, including the needed weapons. Thus, the committee has strongly supported the recommendations in the Air Force "Bomber Roadmap" of June 1992. This report identified a requirement for 184 total bombers, armed with precision conventional munitions, to deal with a single major regional contingency (MRC) in which an enemy armored force had begun a short-warning invasion of the territory of an ally.

The new Administration undertook a comprehensive review of future force requirements necessary to successfully deal with a variety of possible contingencies. This Bottom-Up Review (BUR) ultimately determined that the United States should retain the capability to deal with two "nearly simultaneous" MRCs. The BUR also called for a total force of 184 bombers, in order to provide "100 deployable" heavy bombers for each MRC. This analysis assumes that the highly-capable and stealthy B-2s would be shifted from the first theater to the second, once that second MRC began to unfold.

The BUR identified important roles for bombers armed with advanced conventional munitions. It concluded that, under many short-warning scenarios, long-range bombers and carrier-based tactical aircraft would be the only U.S. forces available early in a conflict to help a beleaguered ally defend itself against an invading armored force. This long-range offensive strike capability would be operational while U.S. ground and tactical air reinforcements were being deployed to the theater, and waiting for their required logistics chain to be established. U.S. reinforcements might have to "fight their way in" against future theater air and missile threats.

Viewed in the context of these demanding requirements, the committee finds the Department of Defense's bomber force posture and funding proposals unacceptable:

- (1) The "Bomber Roadmap" and the BUR called for a force structure of 184 bombers, yet the budget request funds only 100 during fiscal year 1995, and only 80 thereafter. The committee believes this is inadequate to meet current and future requirements.
- (2) Four recent independent studies all find that the planned DOD force structure of 80 to 100 non-stealthy bombers with only 20 B-2s is inadequate to deal with two MRCs. DOD has been unable to offer a coherent and consistent explanation for these discrepancies.
- (3) DOD appears unwilling to consider options for interim precision weapons for bombers, preferring to wait until the end of the decade for the tri-Service standoff attack missile (TSSAM) and the joint direct attack munitions (JDAM) family of weapons. Should conflict be thrust upon the United States before then, the bomber force would have only "dumb" iron bombs available. The committee believes interim precision weapon capabilities for bombers are both feasible and an inexpensive hedge.
- (4) DOD has settled on a force structure and modernization plan before it has completed numerous ongoing analyses and tests that bear on those plans:
 - (a) The Nuclear Posture Review, which includes bomber requirements for maintaining nuclear deterrence, is still ongoing. The Secretary of Defense has testified that the bomber review is "unfinished business."

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(b) The independent Roles and Missions Commission is examining bomber force structure tradeoffs with other military forces. The Commission will not submit its report on force structure tradeoffs until next summer.

(c) An important test of B-1B bomber operational readiness has just begun; results will not be available before next spring.

(5) The committee believes that, if DOD intends to reduce the bomber force level to between 80 and 100 non-stealthy bombers, then more than 20 B-2 stealth bombers will be required to meet the demands of a two-MRC scenario. Yet the final B-2 bombers are moving down the assembly lines, and more and more subcontractors and facilities are completing deliveries. The production base for bombers is rapidly disappearing.

Thus, the committee found itself with many unanswered questions as it addressed the current budget request. The committee decided to set in motion a process to ensure that DOD and the committee will be better prepared to address bomber requirement issues during the fiscal year 1996 budget cycle. To accomplish this, the committee directs specific actions in the following subsections in order to:

- (1) preserve all bomber force structure options for one year;
- (2) preserve the bomber industrial base for one year;
- (3) receive the results of further bomber force structure and effectiveness analyses prior to next year's defense budget deliberations; and
- (4) begin procurement of improved interim conventional weapons for bombers.

In summary, the committee recommendations would prevent DOD from retiring any B-52 or B-1 bombers this year, fully fund planned conventional upgrades for those bombers, preserve the B-2 industrial base for one year, initiate a program to acquire limited numbers of effective bomber weapons within the next two years, and direct numerous analyses to better prepare DOD and the Congress to decide future bomber force structure issues next year.

PRESERVATION OF BOMBER FORCE STRUCTURE OPTIONS

The committee has concluded that the planned bomber force level of between 80 and 100 is insufficient to meet current and future requirements, unless additional B-2 bombers are to be procured. Further, the ongoing Nuclear Posture Review is to address additional requirements for bombers to contribute to the maintenance of deterrence. The Roles and Missions Commission is to examine force tradeoffs including bombers. In other sections of this report, the committee also directs several independent studies of bomber issues. Therefore, the committee believes that all force structure options should be kept open at least through the next budget cycle.

First, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense not to retire any B-52H or B-1B bomber aircraft. All 95 B-52H and all 95 B-1B bombers (excluding one non-flying weapons-loading trainer B-1B aircraft) shall be retained, and any B-52H bombers transferred to Davis Monthan AFB before the date of this report shall be promptly returned to the Air Force Air Combat Command, for incorporation in an expanded B-52H attrition reserve. The committee understands that \$18.0 million in operation and maintenance funds is required in fiscal year 1995 to retain all 47 B-52H aircraft in attrition reserve status. The committee adds O&M funds for this purpose.

Second, although the Air Force plans to retain 26 B-1B bombers in attrition reserve status through the period of the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), it has not funded the incorporation of either the conventional weapons upgrades or the new ECM system on those B-1s. Third, the Air Force has seriously underfunded the conventional improvements and ECM upgrades on the active inventory of B-1B bombers. This underfunding results in a one-year delay in the introduction of the JDAM family of weapons and a six-year delay in TSSAM capability on the B-1B, relative to their incorporation on B-52H bombers. The B-1B ECM program is also under-funded, resulting in a delay in installation until 2003. This, for the Air Force's self-proclaimed "backbone of the bomber force."

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In the next FYDP submission, the committee directs the Air Force to fully fund the bomber conventional munitions upgrade programs for both B-1 and B-52 bombers, including funds for full modifications to all bombers proposed to be retained, whether in the active inventory or in an attrition reserve category. The committee understands this requires no increase in fiscal year 1995 funding, but will increase FYDP funding requirements for the B-1B bomber by approximately \$70 million, if all 95 B-1B bombers are retained.

The committee recommends fully funding the respective budget requests for RDT&E and procurement for fiscal year 1995 for the B-52H, the B-1B, and the B-2 bomber programs.

PRESERVING THE BOMBER INDUSTRIAL BASE

The committee has received testimony from Air Force and other witnesses regarding the desirability of maintaining an industrial base for the production of bombers, as DOD already is implementing for submarines, naval nuclear propulsion, and the tank industrial base. The committee also is in receipt of testimony and recent studies on the contributions that additional B-2 bombers could provide in future conventional conflicts. The committee is also aware of a proposal by the Northrop Corporation to produce a variant of the B-2 bomber that would have only a conventional weapons capability. Deletion of items on the B-2 related to nuclear missions would reportedly reduce the unit flyaway cost of a conventional-only stealth bomber by some \$25-30 million per aircraft.

In view of the unsettled future requirements for heavy bombers, together with the additional studies and analyses of bomber force structure and industrial base options requested elsewhere in this report, the committee considers it prudent to recommend \$150.0 million in order to preserve a portion of the bomber industrial base for one year.

Funds appropriated pursuant to this authorization are to preserve tooling in ready status, preserve a production capability for spare parts within the lower-tier vendor structure, and develop detailed production plans for a conventional-capability-only B-2 bomber. Funds may not be used to procure any major structural B-2 item that would not be procured by the Air Force as an item of initial or sustaining spares. This recommendation would not authorize a twenty-second B-2 bomber; rather, it would allow DOD and the Congress time to gather further information on future bomber requirements, including industrial base requirements. Funds appropriated pursuant to this authorization would be exempt from section 131(d) of Public Law 103-160.

FURTHER BOMBER FORCE ANALYSES

The committee has directed bomber force structure questions to Department of Defense and other witnesses at more than a dozen hearings since the fiscal year 1995 budget request was submitted. The answers are, in totality, incomplete; many are inconsistent with others. The thrust of testimony from DOD witnesses is inconsistent with the published results of the Bottom-Up Review, as well as with the Air Force's 1992 "Bomber Roadmap", and with recent detailed analyses carried out by major defense contractors such as Boeing and Rockwell, by "think tanks" such as the RAND Corporation, and by respected independent analysts.

DOD has not revealed its own detailed analyses supporting its decisions to sharply reduce the bomber force structure. Nor has it attempted to refute any of the studies noted above, all of which call for substantially larger bomber forces than proposed in the budget request. Results of several of the independent studies show that a heavy bomber force reduced to the size and composition that DOD proposes to fund would be inadequate to prevent major losses in the opening phases of a two-MRC scenario, and would run high risk of failure even in single-MRC scenarios.

Given these substantial and unresolved differences between the new DOD bomber force levels and those derived in widely-available outside analyses, the committee is reluctant to make the irrevocable commitment to a smaller bomber force that would be brought about by approval of the current budget request for bombers.

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Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to reconstitute the independent review group originally mandated under section 121(e) of Public Law 101-189 for the purpose of reconciling the analyses of bomber forces conducted by the Department in support of the Bottom-Up Review and the recent analyses conducted by outside experts. The committee is seeking to understand how such striking differences in overall outcomes can arise-whether they are the result of different assumptions about numbers of targets, or about warning and deployment times available, or about munitions effectiveness. The review group should also pay particular attention to assumptions about the length of time required to establish full supply lines to theater-based forces in the presence of a theater ballistic missile threat. The committee directs the Secretary to ensure full access by the independent review group to models, personnel involved, and assumptions used in Bottom-Up Review analyses, including the illustrative scenario presented to this committee at a classified hearing on March 9, 1994. The independent review group should provide its analysis and results in both classified and unclassified form to the Secretary and the congressional defense committees not later than February 1, 1995.

Second, the committee urges the Roles and Missions Commission established by subtitle E of title IX of Public Law 103-160 to review thoroughly the capabilities of bombers and carrier-based air forces in the early phases of a short-warning MRC when enemy actions may constrain our ability to provide land-based tactical air power and ground force reinforcements. The committee believes that an important early contribution by carriers to the defeat of an armored incursion may reside in Navy combat air patrols (CAP) and suppression of organic enemy air defense assets (SEAD), allowing non-stealthy Air Force bombers to deliver large weapons payloads with improved survivability. Traditional tactical air support missions, such as CAP, SEAD, and jamming, may only be available from carriers until land bases can be secured and supply lines to the theater established.

The committee expects the Commission to also consider tradeoffs between more stealthy aircraft and fewer support assets such as those for CAP and SEAD, to reduce the deployment lift requirements, the personnel placed at risk in the theater of operations, and the extensive resupply requirements. The Commission should evaluate, in particular, the kinds of tradeoffs presented by the Air Force during testimony on the Department of Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 (S. Hrg. 102-255, Pt. 7, p. 794).

The committee looks forward with keen anticipation to the recommendations of the Roles and Missions Commission, and hopes its findings will shed additional light on future bomber requirements in time for action on the fiscal year 1996 request. To ensure the Commission has adequate independent expertise, the committee also recommends a provision that would authorize the Commission to draw upon the capabilities of the Department's federally funded research and development centers during fiscal years 1994 and 1995, for up to \$20.0 million in assistance.

Third, by the Secretary's own admission, the need to maintain some sort of bomber industrial base was not well-analyzed in the BUR. The Congress has, on several past occasions, relied upon the RAND Corporation to examine sensitive aspects of the B-2 bomber program. The committee believes that this background and RAND's long experience in acquisition and industrial base research warrant its directing the Secretary of Defense to ask the RAND Corporation to conduct an independent analysis of the need for the Defense Department to provide some industrial base protection for future bomber production requirements, as it has already determined to be necessary for the submarine and tank industrial bases. The RAND analysis and recommendations for whether, and, if so, how, to preserve an industrial base capability for bombers should be provided to the congressional defense committees not later than March 1, 1995.

None of these outside efforts are intended to preclude the Secretary of Defense from continuing to evaluate bomber force structure and effectiveness options and tradeoffs; to the contrary, he is encouraged to do so. The committee hopes that the defense budget request for fiscal year 1996 and the accompanying FYDP will present a clear and coherent bomber roadmap to the Congress.

"INTERIM" CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS FOR BOMBERS

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There are several possibilities for adding interim precision weapons capabilities to existing bombers. All would be limited in numbers and higher in cost than the precision munitions-the JDAM family of weapons-now in development for deployment near the end of the decade. The initial JDAM weapon, a guided 2000 lb. bomb, will greatly improve bomber effectiveness against fixed targets. However, it is not well-suited to defeat armored formations. Apart from the TSSAM, which offers both anti-armor submunitions and standoff delivery, bomber capabilities against armored incursions will remain limited into the next decade. Current tactical munitions dispensers (TMDs) containing anti-armor submunitions require low-altitude direct overflight delivery; as the British Tornado experience during Operation Desert Storm makes plain, this is a costly delivery tactic. The Air Force has announced plans to develop a "wind-corrected TMD" containing an inertial guidance unit, to allow delivery with some standoff capability from medium altitude and above of anti-armor submunitions from a wide variety of fighter and bomber aircraft. Unfortunately, the Air Force has yet to identify funding requirements for this approach and the planned initial operating capability (IOC) is not earlier than the end of the decade. Thus, this approach will not provide an "interim" capability.

The interim weapons possibilities include the following: further conversions of the nuclear-armed air launched cruise missile (ALCM) to any of several improved conventionally-armed ALCM capabilities (CALCM); a limited purchase of additional GPS-aided munitions system (GAMS) R&D weapons being developed as part of the GATS/GAMS capability to be tested on both B-1 and B-2 bombers; and incorporation of brilliant anti-tank (BAT) anti-armor submunitions in a TMD for high-altitude bomber delivery against armored formations.

For the CALCM, there are three separate options, each with a different delivery date and cost: (1) a modest improvement on the CALCMs used at the beginning of Operation Desert Storm; (2) a major improvement including better stealth and a penetrating warhead capability; and (3) a more ambitious effort to incorporate various anti-armor submunitions (WAM, SFW, and/or BAT) in a significantly modified ALCM. Any of the CALCM versions would be deliverable by B-52s, B-1Bs and Block 30 B-2s, and would provide substantial standoff range for the non-stealthy bombers. The committee understands that ALCM missiles are in such over-supply that some 150 ALCMs have been sent to storage areas outside of main operating bases.

The GAMS options would continue the production of the weapon guidance kits beyond the 42 that will be required for the B-2 GATS-GAMS test program. Additional production of GAMS kits would provide additional test weapons for the B-2, and for the B-1B bomber if its radar is found suitable, providing a limited contingency stockpile of precision bomber weapons. Northrop has proposed to deliver 128 additional GAMS weapons kits starting in mid-1996, for \$25.0 million.

A third option is to explore delivery of the BAT submunition from a slightly-modified, unguided TMD, for delivery from medium altitude. The BAT submunition has a large target acquisition range and footprint, which could offset somewhat the effect of wind drift on a TMD descending from medium altitude. An interim approach using the BAT would be to test its capability in an unguided TMD to determine whether medium-altitude release of this weapon from a platform with self-contained precision target location capabilities (such as the B-2) could reliably place the unguided dispenser within the lethal range of the submunitions. It appears this concept could be demonstrated and flight tested by mid-1996 for about \$25.0 million. If these tests were successful, interim BAT/TMD weapons could be available by late 1997.

Of the interim options discussed above, the committee considers all but the second CALCM option to be worth pursuing vigorously, under streamlined acquisition procedures to ensure early availability of interim weapons. Three hundred of the CALCM-I version could be delivered during the last half of 1996 and the first half of 1997 at a unit cost of less than \$200,000. If an early demonstration of the anti-armor version of the CALCM were successful, 300 CALCM-III weapons could be delivered in late 1997 and 1998, at a unit cost of about \$400,000. Therefore, the committee recommends \$40.0 million for modifications to demonstrate the capability to dispense anti-armor submunitions from a modified ALCM, develop in-flight targeting updates for a proposed CALCM-III missile, and begin conversion of existing ALCM missiles to the CALCM-I configuration. The Air Force is authorized to procure up to 100 CALCM-I missiles with the recommended funds. The committee expects the Air Force to request both adequate funds to demonstrate the CALCM-III concept, and to procure an additional 200 CALCM-I missiles in fiscal year 1996, so long as the contracted unit price per missile for a lot of 300 conversions remains below \$200,000 per missile, not including government-furnished equipment. The committee expects the Department to negotiate a firm fixed-price contract for the additional CALCM-I conversions.

The committee also recommends \$25.0 million to procure an additional 128 GAMS kits, in order to provide an interim capability for B-2 and, should GATS tests prove successful, B-1 bombers.

The committee further recommends \$25.0 million to conduct a flight-test demonstration of the possibility of delivering BAT submunitions with sufficient accuracy from an unguided TMD released from medium altitude.

FY 1995 CONGRESSIONAL TRACK

The committee stresses to the Secretary of Defense the urgency it attaches to all of these interim weapons proposals, and directs him to ensure that these programs are carried out expeditiously, under streamlined acquisition procedures, and with a minimum of bureaucratic red-tape.

The committee observes that, even if all of the programs discussed above were successfully carried to fruition, the resulting inventory of interim precision weapons would be modest-no more than a few sorties per bomber. Therefore, the committee sees no need to increase the planned bomber force structure from the proposed level of 40 active B-52H and 60 active B-1B bombers, until such time as JDAM and TSSAM deliveries have increased the available precision munitions stockpiles.

Finally, the committee directs the Secretary to evaluate the recommendation by the RAND Corporation contained in testimony before the committee that the JDAM program be extended to include 1,000-lb. and 500-lb. iron bombs. The Secretary shall provide to the congressional defense committees a report on the cost-effectiveness of this action not later than April 30, 1995.

SASC, p. 54-61

HAC:

COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS
AUTHORIZATION CHANGES

The Committee recommends the following changes to the budget request in accordance with House authorization action:

Item	Budget request	Committee recommended	Change from request
Tri-service attack missile	373,875 HAC, p. 179	0	-373,875

SAC:

Tri-Service attack missile [TSSAM].-The fiscal year 1995 Air Force budget request includes \$373,875,000 for the low-rate initial procurement of 48 TSSAM missiles. The Committee, however, recommends no funds for the procurement of Tri-Service attack missiles in fiscal year 1995.

The Air Force has informed Congress that it will not initiate low-rate initial production in fiscal year 1995 because of technical problems within the development program. The Air Force proposes to restructure the TSSAM development, preproduction, and production contracts to accommodate the slips in the development program. As further evidence of the delays in the program, the Air Force has offered up as a reprogramming source \$73,316,000 of TSSAM procurement funds provided in fiscal year 1994 for preproduction activities.

While the Committee is not recommending production funds in fiscal year 1995, it does not agree with the House Armed Service Committee's direction to terminate the TSSAM program at this time.

SAC, p. 193

Spares and repair parts.-The Air Force budget request includes \$68,332,000 for the procurement of spares and repair parts for missiles procured in this account. The Committee recommends providing \$65,149,000 for these activities in fiscal year 1995, a reduction of \$3,183,000 from the budget request.

FY 1995 CONGRESSIONAL TRACK

Of the funds requested in this line, \$2,000,000 is for initial spares associated with the low-rate initial production of 48 Tri-Service standoff attack missiles [TSSAM]. Because of delays in the TSSAM development program, the Committee has provided no funding for TSSAM low-rate initial production in fiscal year 1995 and, therefore, denies the requested funding for the associated initial spares.

The General Accounting Office has informed the Committee that the requested spare parts can be further reduced by \$1,183,000 because the funding requested for advanced medium range air-to-air missile [AMRAAM] is excess to program requirements.

SAC, p. 194

FY 1995 CONGRESSIONAL TRACK

Of the funds requested in this line, \$2,000,000 is for initial spares associated with the low-rate initial production of 48 Tri-Service standoff attack missiles [TSSAM]. Because of delays in the TSSAM development program, the Committee has provided no funding for TSSAM low-rate initial production in fiscal year 1995 and, therefore, denies the requested funding for the associated initial spares.

The General Accounting Office has informed the Committee that the requested spare parts can be further reduced by \$1,183,000 because the funding requested for advanced medium range air-to-air missile [AMRAAM] is excess to program requirements.

SAC, p. 194

FY 1995 CONGRESSIONAL TRACK

TITLE: AGM-130 POWERED GBU-15

APPROP : 3020

	<u>PBR</u>	<u>HASC</u>	<u>SASC</u>	<u>AUTH</u> <u>CONF</u>	<u>HAC</u>	<u>SAC</u>	<u>APPN</u> <u>CONF</u>
DOLLARS:	\$71,756	71,756	71,756	71,756	69,256	71,756	69,256
QUANTITY:	102	102	102	102	102	102	102

HAC:

AGM-130

The Air Force budgeted \$71,756,000 for the AGM-130 program. The Committee recommends \$69,256,000, a reduction of \$2,500,000 from the fiscal year 1995 budget request. The reduction is made without prejudice to the following: peculiar support equipment, -\$1,000,000; special tooling the test equipment, -\$1,500,000.

HAC, p. 179

SAC:

The Committee disagrees with the following adjustments to the budget request contained in the House allowance:

FY 1995 CONGRESSIONAL TRACK

[In thousands of dollars]

Item	Budget request	House allowance	Committee recommendation	Committee recommendation compared to-	
				Budget request	House allowance
AGM-130 powered GBU-15	71,756	69,256	71,756		+2,500
Target drones	29,043	17,043	29,043		+12,000
CALCM		29,400			-29,400
Spaceborne equipment [COMSEC]	2,092		2,092		+2,092
Global positioning [MYP]	134,831		134,831		+134,831
Global positioning [AP-CY] [MYP]	55,352		55,352		+55,352
Space shuttle operations	103,518		103,518		+103,518
Space boosters	381,817		381,817		+381,817
Medium-launch vehicles [AP-CY]	28,564		28,564		+28,564
Defense meteorological satellite program	29,159		29,159		+29,159
Defense support program [MYP]	363,959		363,959		+363,959
Defense satellite communications system	20,185		20,185		+20,185
Ionds [MYP]	35,649		35,649		+35,649
Ionds [MYP] [AP-CY]	9,954		9,954		+9,954
Special programs	1,619,032	1,960,532	1,532,032	-87,000	-428,500

SAC, p. 197

FY 1995 CONGRESSIONAL TRACK

[In thousands of dollars]

Item	Budget request	House allowance	Committee recommen- dation	Committee recommendation compared to-	
				Budget request	House allowance
AGM-130 powered GBU-15	71,756	69,256	71,756		+2,500
Target drones	29,043	17,043	29,043		+12,000
CALCM		29,400			-29,400
Spaceborne equipment [COMSEC]	2,092		2,092		+2,092
Global positioning [MYP]	134,831		134,831		+134,831
Global positioning [AP-CY] [MYP]	55,352		55,352		+55,352
Space shuttle operations	103,518		103,518		+103,518
Space boosters	381,817		381,817		+381,817
Medium-launch vehicles [AP-CY]	28,564		28,564		+28,564
Defense meteorological satellite program	29,159		29,159		+29,159
Defense support program [MYP]	363,959		363,959		+363,959
Defense satellite communications system	20,185		20,185		+20,185
Ionds [MYP]	35,649		35,649		+35,649
Ionds [MYP] [AP-CY]	9,954		9,954		+9,954
Special programs	1,619,032	1,960,532	1,532,032	-87,000	-428,500
	SAC, p. 197				

FY 1995 CONGRESSIONAL TRACK

TITLE: GAMS

APPROP : 3020

	<u>PBR</u>	<u>HASC</u>	<u>SASC</u>	<u>AUTH</u> <u>CONF</u>	<u>HAC</u>	<u>SAC</u>	<u>APPN</u> <u>CONF</u>
DOLLARS:			25,000			40,000	25,000
QUANTITY:			128				

SAC:

GPS-aided munitions.-The Committee recommends providing \$40,000,000 for the procurement of GPS-aided munitions in fiscal year 1995.

SAC, p. 194

FY 1995 CONGRESSIONAL TRACK

TITLE: GAMS/BAT/TMD DEMO

APPROP : 3020

	<u>PBR</u>	<u>HASC</u>	<u>SASC</u>	<u>AUTH</u> <u>CONF</u>	<u>HAC</u>	<u>SAC</u>	<u>APPN</u> <u>CONF</u>
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DOLLARS: 40,000

QUANTITY:

AUTH CONF:

Bomber improvements

The Senate bill would provide \$90.0 million for improved interim conventional weapons for heavy bombers.

The House amendment would provide \$100.0 million for both accelerating conventional weapon upgrades on B-1B bombers and for transferring heavy bombers from attrition reserve status to the active inventory.

The conferees agree to recommend the following funding:

- (1) \$37.5 million for testing and conversion of the nuclear air-launched cruise missile to conventional weapons capability;
- (2) \$40.0 million for the acquisition of GPS-aided munition system (GAMS) weapons and for testing of the brilliant anti-tank (BAT) submunition in a tactical munitions dispenser;
- (3) \$5.3 million in procurement and \$18.1 million in operation and maintenance funds for the restoration of 24 B-52H bombers from attrition reserve status to active status; and
- (4) \$16.9 million for the acceleration of the integration of the joint direct attack munitions (JDAM) family of weapons onto the B-1B bomber.

Auth Conf, p. 525 (AF A/C Proc)

FY 1995 CONGRESSIONAL TRACK

TITLE: MM II/III MODIFICATIONS

APPROP : 3020

	<u>PBR</u>	<u>HASC</u>	<u>SASC</u>	<u>AUTH</u> <u>CONF</u>	<u>HAC</u>	<u>SAC</u>	<u>APPN</u> <u>CONF</u>
DOLLARS:	\$18,284	7,784	6,284	9,284	9,284	9,284	9,284

QUANTITY:

HASC:

Minuteman modifications

The budget request included \$18.3 million for modification of Minuteman III missiles. The committee is aware that \$12 million of the amount requested for the Dual Frequency Minimum Essential Emergency Communications Network Receiver (DFMR) is no longer needed because the DFMR program has been canceled. The committee also is aware that the deactivation schedule for Minuteman II ICBMs is at risk because of limited storage space for Minuteman II motors. The absence of storage space could delay the drawdown of U.S. strategic forces.

In order to maintain the deactivation schedule, the committee urges the Secretary of the Air Force to store excess Minuteman II rocket motors at Air Force Plant 78, Brigham City, Utah. To pay the costs associated with storing the excess motors, the committee recommends that \$1.5 million be transferred from the DFMR project for this purpose. Therefore, the committee recommends \$7.8 million for Minuteman III modifications.

HASC, p. 59

HAC:

MINUTEMAN III MODIFICATIONS

The Department of the Air Force budgeted \$18,284,000 for Minuteman III missile modifications. The Committee recommends \$9,284,000, a reduction of \$9,000,000 to the fiscal year 1995 budget request. It is the Committee's understanding that the cancellation of the Dual Frequency Minimum Essential Communications Network Receiver makes the budget request for this project unnecessary.

The Committee is also aware that the Air Force may be required to relocate Minuteman II rocket motors from Pueblo Army Depot. Should relocation occur, \$1,500,000 of the funds provided by the Committee for Minuteman III modifications shall be used to upgrade storage facilities at Air Force Plant 78 and for transfer of the rocket motors to that location.

HAC, p. 180

SAC:

OTHER ADJUSTMENTS

The Committee recommends incorporating the following adjustments to the budget estimate, in accordance with the Senate authorization committee action:

FY 1995 CONGRESSIONAL TRACK

[In thousands of dollars]

Item	Budget request	House allowance	Committee recommen- dation	Committee recommendation compared to-	
				Budget request	House allowance
MM III modifications	18,284	9,284	9,284	-9,000	

SAC, p. 197

FY 1995 CONGRESSIONAL TRACK

[In thousands of dollars]

Item	Budget request	House allowance	Committee recommendation	Committee recommendation compared to-	
				Budget request	House allowance
AGM-130 powered GBU-15	71,756	69,256	71,756		+2,500
Target drones	29,043	17,043	29,043		+12,000
CALCM		29,400			-29,400
Spaceborne equipment [COMSEC]	2,092		2,092		+2,092
Global positioning [MYP]	134,831		134,831		+134,831
Global positioning [AP-CY] [MYP]	55,352		55,352		+55,352
Space shuttle operations	103,518		103,518		+103,518
Space boosters	381,817		381,817		+381,817
Medium-launch vehicles [AP-CY]	28,564		28,564		+28,564
Defense meteorological satellite program	29,159		29,159		+29,159
Defense support program [MYP]	363,959		363,959		+363,959
Defense satellite communications system	20,185		20,185		+20,185
Ionds [MYP]	35,649		35,649		+35,649
Ionds [MYP] [AP-CY]	9,954		9,954		+9,954
Special programs	1,619,032	1,960,532	1,532,032	-87,000	-428,500
	SAC, p. 197				

FY 1995 CONGRESSIONAL TRACK

[In thousands of dollars]

Item	Budget request	House allowance	Committee recommendation	Committee recommendation compared to-	
				Budget request	House allowance
AGM-130 powered GBU-15 Target drones	71,756	69,256	71,756		+2,500
CALCM		29,400			-29,400
Spaceborne equipment [COMSEC]	2,092		2,092		+2,092
Global positioning [MYP]	134,831		134,831		+134,831
Global positioning [AP-CY] [MYP]	55,352		55,352		+55,352
Space shuttle operations	103,518		103,518		+103,518
Space boosters	381,817		381,817		+381,817
Medium-launch vehicles [AP-CY]	28,564		28,564		+28,564
Defense meteorological satellite program	29,159		29,159		+29,159
Defense support program [MYP]	363,959		363,959		+363,959
Defense satellite communications system	20,185		20,185		+20,185
Ionds [MYP]	35,649		35,649		+35,649
Ionds [MYP] [AP-CY]	9,954		9,954		+9,954
Special programs	1,619,032	1,960,532	1,532,032	-87,000	-428,500
	SAC, p. 197				

FY 1995 CONGRESSIONAL TRACK

TITLE: GLOBAL POSITIONING (MYP)

APPROP : 3020

	<u>PBR</u>	<u>HASC</u>	<u>SASC</u>	<u>AUTH</u> <u>CONF</u>	<u>HAC</u>	<u>SAC</u>	<u>APPN</u> <u>CONF</u>
DOLLARS:	\$134,831	134,831	134,831	134,831	0	134,831	134,831
QUANTITY:	5	5	5	5	0	5	5

HAC:

TRANSFER OF MAJOR SPACE PROGRAMS

As discussed elsewhere in this report under Space and Related Programs, a total of \$1,285,560,000 for major space programs has been transferred from Missile Procurement, Air Force to other accounts, primarily Procurement, Defense-Wide. The programs affected by this transfer are as follows:

[IN THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS]	TRANSFER amount
Program	
Spaceborne Equip (COMSEC)	-2,092
Global Positioning (MYP)	-134,831
Global Positioning (MYP) (AP-CY)	-55,352
Space Shuttle Operations	-103,518
Space Boosters	-381,817
Medium Launch Vehicle	-120,480
Medium Launch Vehicle (AP-CY)	-28,564
Def Meteorological Sat Program	-29,159
Defense Support Program (MYP)	-363,959
Defense Satellite Comm System	-20,185
Ionds (MYP)	-35,649
Ionds (MYP) (AP-CY)	-9,954

HAC, p. 180

SAC:

The Committee disagrees with the following adjustments to the budget request contained in the House allowance:

FY 1995 CONGRESSIONAL TRACK

[In thousands of dollars]

Item	Budget request	House allowance	Committee recommen- dation	Committee recommendation compared to-	
				Budget request	House allowance
AGM-130 powered GBU-15 Target drones	71,756	69,256	71,756		+2,500
CALCM		29,400			-29,400
Spaceborne equipment [COMSEC]	2,092		2,092		+2,092
Global positioning [MYP]	134,831		134,831		+134,831
Global positioning [AP-CY] [MYP]	55,352		55,352		+55,352
Space shuttle operations	103,518		103,518		+103,518
Space boosters	381,817		381,817		+381,817
Medium-launch vehicles [AP-CY]	28,564		28,564		+28,564
Defense meteorological satellite program	29,159		29,159		+29,159
Defense support program [MYP]	363,959		363,959		+363,959
Defense satellite communications system	20,185		20,185		+20,185
Ionds [MYP]	35,649		35,649		+35,649
Ionds [MYP] [AP-CY]	9,954		9,954		+9,954
Special programs	1,619,032	1,960,532	1,532,032	-87,000	-428,500

SAC, p. 197

FY 1995 CONGRESSIONAL TRACK

TITLE: GLOBAL POSITIONING (MYP) ADV PROC

APPROP : 3020

	<u>PBR</u>	<u>HASC</u>	<u>SASC</u>	<u>AUTH</u> <u>CONF</u>	<u>HAC</u>	<u>SAC</u>	<u>APPN</u> <u>CONF</u>
DOLLARS:	\$55,352	55,352	55,352	55,352	0	55,352	55,352

QUANTITY:

HAC:

TRANSFER OF MAJOR SPACE PROGRAMS

As discussed elsewhere in this report under Space and Related Programs, a total of \$1,285,560,000 for major space programs has been transferred from Missile Procurement, Air Force to other accounts, primarily Procurement, Defense-Wide. The programs affected by this transfer are as follows:

[IN THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS]	TRANSFER
Program	amount
Spaceborne Equip (COMSEC)	-2,092
Global Positioning (MYP)	-134,831
Global Positioning (MYP) (AP-CY)	-55,352
Space Shuttle Operations	-103,518
Space Boosters	-381,817
Medium Launch Vehicle	-120,480
Medium Launch Vehicle (AP-CY)	-28,564
Def Meteorological Sat Program	-29,159
Defense Support Program (MYP)	-363,959
Defense Satellite Comm System	-20,185
Ionds (MYP)	-35,649
Ionds (MYP) (AP-CY)	-9,954

HAC, p. 180

SAC:

The Committee disagrees with the following adjustments to the budget request contained in the House allowance:

FY 1995 CONGRESSIONAL TRACK

[In thousands of dollars]

Item	Budget request	House allowance	Committee recommendation	Committee recommendation compared to-	
				Budget request	House allowance
AGM-130 powered GBU-15 Target drones	71,756	69,256	71,756		+2,500
CALCM		29,400			-29,400
Spaceborne equipment [COMSEC]	2,092		2,092		+2,092
Global positioning [MYP]	134,831		134,831		+134,831
Global positioning [AP-CY] [MYP]	55,352		55,352		+55,352
Space shuttle operations	103,518		103,518		+103,518
Space boosters	381,817		381,817		+381,817
Medium-launch vehicles [AP-CY]	28,564		28,564		+28,564
Defense meteorological satellite program	29,159		29,159		+29,159
Defense support program [MYP]	363,959		363,959		+363,959
Defense satellite communications system	20,185		20,185		+20,185
Ionds [MYP]	35,649		35,649		+35,649
Ionds [MYP] [AP-CY]	9,954		9,954		+9,954
Special programs	1,619,032	1,960,532	1,532,032	-87,000	-428,500

SAC, p. 197

FY 1995 CONGRESSIONAL TRACK

TITLE: SPACE SHUTTLE OPERATIONS

APPROP : 3020

	<u>PBR</u>	<u>HASC</u>	<u>SASC</u>	<u>AUTH</u> <u>CONF</u>	<u>HAC</u>	<u>SAC</u>	<u>APPN</u> <u>CONF</u>
DOLLARS:	\$103,518	103,518	103,518	103,518	0	103,518	103,518

QUANTITY:

HAC:

TRANSFER OF MAJOR SPACE PROGRAMS

As discussed elsewhere in this report under Space and Related Programs, a total of \$1,285,560,000 for major space programs has been transferred from Missile Procurement, Air Force to other accounts, primarily Procurement, Defense-Wide. The programs affected by this transfer are as follows:

[IN THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS]	TRANSFER
Program	amount
Spaceborne Equip (COMSEC)	-2,092
Global Positioning (MYP)	-134,831
Global Positioning (MYP) (AP-CY)	-55,352
Space Shuttle Operations	-103,518
Space Boosters	-381,817
Medium Launch Vehicle	-120,480
Medium Launch Vehicle (AP-CY)	-28,564
Def Meteorological Sat Program	-29,159
Defense Support Program (MYP)	-363,959
Defense Satellite Comm System	-20,185
Ionds (MYP)	-35,649
Ionds (MYP) (AP-CY)	-9,954

HAC, p. 180

SAC:

The Committee disagrees with the following adjustments to the budget request contained in the House allowance:

FY 1995 CONGRESSIONAL TRACK

[In thousands of dollars]

Item	Budget request	House allowance	Committee recommen- dation	Committee recommendation compared to-	
				Budget request	House allowance
AGM-130 powered GBU-15 Target drones	71,756	69,256	71,756		+2,500
CALCM		29,400			-29,400
Spaceborne equipment [COMSEC]	2,092		2,092		+2,092
Global positioning [MYP]	134,831		134,831		+134,831
Global positioning [AP-CY] [MYP]	55,352		55,352		+55,352
Space shuttle operations	103,518		103,518		+103,518
Space boosters	381,817		381,817		+381,817
Medium-launch vehicles [AP-CY]	28,564		28,564		+28,564
Defense meteorological satellite program	29,159		29,159		+29,159
Defense support program [MYP]	363,959		363,959		+363,959
Defense satellite communications system	20,185		20,185		+20,185
Ionds [MYP]	35,649		35,649		+35,649
Ionds [MYP] [AP-CY]	9,954		9,954		+9,954
Special programs	1,619,032	1,960,532	1,532,032	-87,000	-428,500
	SAC, p. 197				

FY 1995 CONGRESSIONAL TRACK

TITLE: SPACE BOOSTERS (MYP)

APPROP : 3020

	<u>PBR</u>	<u>HASC</u>	<u>SASC</u>	<u>AUTH</u> <u>CONF</u>	<u>HAC</u>	<u>SAC</u>	<u>APPN</u> <u>CONF</u>
DOLLARS:	\$381,817	381,817	381,817	381,817	0	381,817	381,817

QUANTITY:

HAC:

TRANSFER OF MAJOR SPACE PROGRAMS

As discussed elsewhere in this report under Space and Related Programs, a total of \$1,285,560,000 for major space programs has been transferred from Missile Procurement, Air Force to other accounts, primarily Procurement, Defense-Wide. The programs affected by this transfer are as follows:

[IN THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS]	TRANSFER
Program	amount
Spaceborne Equip (COMSEC)	-2,092
Global Positioning (MYP)	-134,831
Global Positioning (MYP) (AP-CY)	-55,352
Space Shuttle Operations	-103,518
Space Boosters	-381,817
Medium Launch Vehicle	-120,480
Medium Launch Vehicle (AP-CY)	-28,564
Def Meteorological Sat Program	-29,159
Defense Support Program (MYP)	-363,959
Defense Satellite Comm System	-20,185
Ionds (MYP)	-35,649
Ionds (MYP) (AP-CY)	-9,954

HAC, p. 180

PROCUREMENT OF ADDITIONAL TITAN IV LAUNCH VEHICLES

FY 1995 CONGRESSIONAL TRACK

As discussed elsewhere in this report under Space and Related Programs, the Committee has included a general provision prohibiting the use of any funds in this bill for acquisition of any TITAN IV launch vehicles beyond the current 41 already on contract.

HAC, p. 181

SAC:

OTHER SUPPORT

Space boosters.-The Committee remains concerned that, despite a series of studies, initiatives, and advanced technology programs, the Department of Defense continues to launch spacecraft in an inefficient and costly manner. This is the consequence of a number of factors that include low launch rates, suboptimal payload and launch vehicle processing, and widely varying payload configurations. More specifically, over the past 5 years, expendable launch vehicle [ELV] production and launch rates have fallen dramatically due to the reduced defense requirements in the post-cold war period. This has been compounded by the fact that satellites have exceeded their onorbit life expectancies. The Titan IV production rates, for example, have been reduced three times reflecting this decreased demand from 10 vehicles per year to 2 vehicles per year. As a result, the cost of a Titan launch has increased significantly. This decreased demand and associated cost growth has also affected the Atlas II and Delta II launch vehicles.

The Department of Defense is fortunate to have proven launch vehicles in virtually every payload weight category. Support by the Congress in prior years has produced modernized versions of the Titan, Atlas, and Delta launch vehicles, as well as a variety of smaller vehicles. Technology programs to enhance component performance and reliability are ongoing. Nonetheless, DOD has an insufficient process for organizing these elements into a forward-looking, fully funded program. The Defense Department has failed to clearly define the requirements against which these elements are to be matched. Therefore, the Committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide the following information to the congressional defense committees no later than April 1, 1995:

-Projected U.S. Government requirement for Delta II-Class payloads in the years 1995-2004;

-Projected U.S. Government requirement for Atlas II-Class payloads in the years 1995-2004;

-Projected U.S. Government requirements for Titan IV-Class payloads in the years 1995-2004;

-Projected U.S. Government requirements for all smaller-class payloads in the years 1995-2004; and

-Projected annual outlay requirements (in current and constant fiscal year 1994 dollars) to support the above launches using Delta, Atlas, and Titan launch vehicles, broken out by activity, that is, RDT&E, O&M, procurement.

The outlay data should clearly indicate any underlying assumptions, such as assumed reductions in infrastructure costs or processing time. The data should discuss the prospects for any particular payload or class of payloads to migrate to a lower payload class launch vehicle. Furthermore, the data should indicate the degree of confidence in the specific payloads, recognizing the prospects for DOD to increase its reliance on existing or emerging commercial satellites systems providing communications, remote sensing, and other services.

Recent actions have been taken by the Air Force and U.S. industry to consolidate excess capacity in the launch vehicle industry. These actions will reportedly result in savings of \$500,000,000 over 10 years. The consolidations efforts should ultimately result in lower Titan IV and Atlas II costs. The Committee supports the

FY 1995 CONGRESSIONAL TRACK

necessary restructuring of the Defense industrial base and anticipates not only cost savings but creativity to result from the process. This Nation has invested enormous resources in our current fleet and expects a return on that investment in the form of first-class access to space for important payloads.

Concerns about the rising cost of expendable launch vehicles prompted the Congress last year to direct an Air Force plan for space launch modernization. The space launch modernization plan, called the Moorman Report, has recently been issued. It developed four options but no specific course of action was recommended. The Department also has yet to recommend to Congress a specific course of action in response to the Moorman plan. The Committee is likewise aware of the recently published "Aerospace Corporation Report on the Titan IV Program." Nonetheless, the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense has directed that the Air Force initiate development of a family of new launch vehicles following the option 2 approach in the Moorman Report—evolving existing systems using current technologies. The House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense suggested that both a medium- and heavy-lift family of vehicles could be developed in this manner for between \$1,000,000,000 and \$2,000,000,000 and suggested the use of shuttle as an alternative for large payloads beyond Titan IV vehicle 41, the last Titan IV delivered under the current contract.

The Air Force study is an excellent effort and General Moorman should be commended. However, option 2 is a conceptual outline and provides only a general framework for development and procurement. As such, it lacks firm cost and schedule data. Moreover, the dramatically reduced demand for launch vehicles of all weight classes is only beginning to stabilize in this post-cold war period. Thus, the Committee disagrees with the House recommendation to begin an evolved, expendable launch vehicle program in fiscal year 1995. The Committee, on the other hand, directs a more measured approach be taken to defining an evolved ELV investment before final decisions are made. This assessment needs to take into account the results of the April 1, 1995, mission requirements data requested above, the recently released Aerospace Corp. report which recommends that Titan IV be used well beyond vehicle 41, and the August 1994 Titan IV Defense Acquisition Board Program Review.

The Committee further directs the Secretary of Defense to conduct an expendable launch vehicle industrial base study and report back by August 1, 1995. The study should address assured access to space by the different classes of expendable launch vehicles and the viability of the launch vehicle industry to support such access. The study should examine, in detail, all potential future options in the framework of current and evolving technologies. If the Secretary determines that a new launch vehicle or family of launch vehicles is required, a specific program plan should be defined in the report and funds sought in later budget submissions. This plan should consider the viability of the industry to support such a program while fulfilling Government requirements with the existing ELV fleet. The benefits for U.S. ELV competitiveness should be assessed for participation in the commercial launch vehicle market.

The Committee is very concerned about the Nation having assured access to space to maintain a superior military capability in the future. As proven in Persian Gulf war, our space systems are critical to the outstanding success of our military and will continue to be so in years to come. Launch on demand is an essential element of assured access to space. This requirement means that we must not place ourselves in a position of dependency on manned space systems such as shuttle for this military access. We need only to reflect on the Challenger accident and realize the lengthy time involved in returning manned space systems back to operation after a major mishap.

The Committee is mindful, however, of the need to avoid expending funds prematurely in pursuit of one or the other options. The Committee, therefore, will not provide the \$40,900,000 requested for advanced Titan IV procurement. If a decision is made for a follow-on Titan IV buy, ample time remains prior to the point when these funds must be committed for additional funding to be requested.

SAC, p. 194-196

The Committee disagrees with the following adjustments to the budget request contained in the House allowance:

FY 1995 CONGRESSIONAL TRACK

[In thousands of dollars]

Item	Budget request	House allowance	Committee recommen- dation	Committee recommendation compared to-	
				Budget request	House allowance
AGM-130 powered GBU-15	71,756	69,256	71,756		+2,500
Target drones	29,043	17,043	29,043		+12,000
CALCM		29,400			-29,400
Spaceborne equipment [COMSEC]	2,092		2,092		+2,092
Global positioning [MYP]	134,831		134,831		+134,831
Global positioning [AP-CY] [MYP]	55,352		55,352		+55,352
Space shuttle operations	103,518		103,518		+103,518
Space boosters	381,817		381,817		+381,817
Medium-launch vehicles [AP-CY]	28,564		28,564		+28,564
Defense meteorological satellite program	29,159		29,159		+29,159
Defense support program [MYP]	363,959		363,959		+363,959
Defense satellite communications system	20,185		20,185		+20,185
Ionds [MYP]	35,649		35,649		+35,649
Ionds [MYP] [AP-CY]	9,954		9,954		+9,954
Special programs	1,619,032	1,960,532	1,532,032	-87,000	-428,500
	SAC, p. 197				

FY 1995 CONGRESSIONAL TRACK

TITLE: MEDIUM LAUNCH VEHICLE

APPROP : 3020

	<u>PBR</u>	<u>HASC</u>	<u>SASC</u>	<u>AUTH</u> <u>CONF</u>	<u>HAC</u>	<u>SAC</u>	<u>APPN</u> <u>CONF</u>
DOLLARS:	\$120,480	120,480	120,480	120,480	0	107,480	107,480
QUANTITY:	3	3	3	3	0	3	3

HAC:

TRANSFER OF MAJOR SPACE PROGRAMS

As discussed elsewhere in this report under Space and Related Programs, a total of \$1,285,560,000 for major space programs has been transferred from Missile Procurement, Air Force to other accounts, primarily Procurement, Defense-Wide. The programs affected by this transfer are as follows:

[IN THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS]	TRANSFER
Program	amount
Spaceborne Equip (COMSEC)	-2,092
Global Positioning (MYP)	-134,831
Global Positioning (MYP) (AP-CY)	-55,352
Space Shuttle Operations	-103,518
Space Boosters	-381,817
Medium Launch Vehicle	-120,480
Medium Launch Vehicle (AP-CY)	-28,564
Def Meteorological Sat Program	-29,159
Defense Support Program (MYP)	-363,959
Defense Satellite Comm System	-20,185
Ionds (MYP)	-35,649
Ionds (MYP) (AP-CY)	-9,954

HAC, p. 180

SAC:

FY 1995 CONGRESSIONAL TRACK

Medium-launch vehicles.-The budget contains \$120,480,000 for the procurement of three medium-launch vehicles III [MLV's], launch services funding for Delta II's and Atlas II's, and technical services for all three programs. The Committee recommends providing \$107,480,000 for these activities in fiscal year 1995, a reduction of \$13,000,000. The explanation of this reduction is provided in the research and development, Air Force section of this report.

SAC, p. 196-197

The Committee disagrees with the following adjustments to the budget request contained in the House allowance:

[In thousands of dollars]

Item	Budget request	House allowance	Committee recommendation	Committee recommendation compared to-	
				Budget request	House allowance
AGM-130 powered GBU-15	71,756	69,256	71,756		+2,500
Target drones	29,043	17,043	29,043		+12,000
CALCM		29,400			-29,400
Spaceborne equipment [COMSEC]	2,092		2,092		+2,092
Global positioning [MYP]	134,831		134,831		+134,831
Global positioning [AP-CY] [MYP]	55,352		55,352		+55,352
Space shuttle operations	103,518		103,518		+103,518
Space boosters	381,817		381,817		+381,817
Medium-launch vehicles [AP-CY]	28,564		28,564		+28,564
Defense meteorological satellite program	29,159		29,159		+29,159
Defense support program [MYP]	363,959		363,959		+363,959
Defense satellite communications system	20,185		20,185		+20,185
Ionds [MYP]	35,649		35,649		+35,649
Ionds [MYP] [AP-CY]	9,954		9,954		+9,954
Special programs	1,619,032	1,960,532	1,532,032	-87,000	-428,500

SAC, p. 197

FY 1995 CONGRESSIONAL TRACK

TITLE: MEDIUM LAUNCH VEHICLE ADV PROC (CY)

APPROP : 3020

	<u>PBR</u>	<u>HASC</u>	<u>SASC</u>	<u>AUTH</u> <u>CONF</u>	<u>HAC</u>	<u>SAC</u>	<u>APPN</u> <u>CONF</u>
DOLLARS:	\$28,564	28,564	28,564	28,564	0	28,564	28,564

QUANTITY:

HAC:

TRANSFER OF MAJOR SPACE PROGRAMS

As discussed elsewhere in this report under Space and Related Programs, a total of \$1,285,560,000 for major space programs has been transferred from Missile Procurement, Air Force to other accounts, primarily Procurement, Defense-Wide. The programs affected by this transfer are as follows:

[IN THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS]	TRANSFER
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Defense Support Program (MYP)	-363,959
Defense Satellite Comm System	-20,185
Ionds (MYP)	-35,649
Ionds (MYP) (AP-CY)	-9,954

HAC, p. 180

FY 1995 CONGRESSIONAL TRACK

[In thousands of dollars]

Item	Budget request	House allowance	Committee recommendation	Committee recommendation compared to-	
				Budget request	House allowance
AGM-130 powered GBU-15 Target drones	71,756	69,256	71,756		+2,500
CALCM		29,400			-29,400
Spaceborne equipment [COMSEC]	2,092		2,092		+2,092
Global positioning [MYP]	134,831		134,831		+134,831
Global positioning [AP-CY] [MYP]	55,352		55,352		+55,352
Space shuttle operations	103,518		103,518		+103,518
Space boosters	381,817		381,817		+381,817
Medium-launch vehicles [AP-CY]	28,564		28,564		+28,564
Defense meteorological satellite program	29,159		29,159		+29,159
Defense support program [MYP]	363,959		363,959		+363,959
Defense satellite communications system	20,185		20,185		+20,185
Ionds [MYP]	35,649		35,649		+35,649
Ionds [MYP] [AP-CY]	9,954		9,954		+9,954
Special programs	1,619,032	1,960,532	1,532,032	-87,000	-428,500

SAC, p. 197

FY 1995 CONGRESSIONAL TRACK

As discussed elsewhere in this report under Space and Related Programs, a total of \$1,285,560,000 for major space programs has been transferred from Missile Procurement, Air Force to other accounts, primarily Procurement, Defense-Wide. The programs affected by this transfer are as follows:

[IN THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS]	TRANSFER
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HAC, p. 180

SAC:

The Committee disagrees with the following adjustments to the budget request contained in the House allowance:

FY 1995 CONGRESSIONAL TRACK

[In thousands of dollars]

Item	Budget request	House allowance	Committee recommen- dation	Committee recommendation compared to-	
				Budget request	House allowance
AGM-130 powered GBU-15	71,756	69,256	71,756		+2,500
Target drones	29,043	17,043	29,043		+12,000
CALCM		29,400			-29,400
Spaceborne equipment [COMSEC]	2,092		2,092		+2,092
Global positioning [MYP]	134,831		134,831		+134,831
Global positioning [AP-CY] [MYP]	55,352		55,352		+55,352
Space shuttle operations	103,518		103,518		+103,518
Space boosters	381,817		381,817		+381,817
Medium-launch vehicles [AP-CY]	28,564		28,564		+28,564
Defense meteorological satellite program	29,159		29,159		+29,159
Defense support program [MYP]	363,959		363,959		+363,959
Defense satellite communications system	20,185		20,185		+20,185
Ionds [MYP]	35,649		35,649		+35,649
Ionds [MYP] [AP-CY]	9,954		9,954		+9,954
Special programs	1,619,032	1,960,532	1,532,032	-87,000	-428,500
	SAC, p. 197				

FY 1995 CONGRESSIONAL TRACK

TITLE: DEFENSE SAT COMM SYS

APPROP : 3020

	<u>PBR</u>	<u>HASC</u>	<u>SASC</u>	<u>AUTH</u> <u>CONF</u>	<u>HAC</u>	<u>SAC</u>	<u>APPN</u> <u>CONF</u>
DOLLARS:	\$20,185	20,185	20,185	20,185	0	20,185	20,185

QUANTITY:

HAC:

TRANSFER OF MAJOR SPACE PROGRAMS

As discussed elsewhere in this report under Space and Related Programs, a total of \$1,285,560,000 for major space programs has been transferred from Missile Procurement, Air Force to other accounts, primarily Procurement, Defense-Wide. The programs affected by this transfer are as follows:

[IN THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS]	TRANSFER
Program	amount
Spaceborne Equip (COMSEC)	-2,092
Global Positioning (MYP)	-134,831
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Space Shuttle Operations	-103,518
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Defense Support Program (MYP)	-363,959
Defense Satellite Comm System	-20,185
Ionds (MYP)	-35,649
Ionds (MYP) (AP-CY)	-9,954

HAC, p. 180

SAC:

The Committee disagrees with the following adjustments to the budget request contained in the House allowance:

FY 1995 CONGRESSIONAL TRACK

[In thousands of dollars]

Item	Budget request	House allowance	Committee recommendation	Committee recommendation compared to-	
				Budget request	House allowance
AGM-130 powered GBU-15 Target drones	71,756	69,256	71,756		+2,500
CALCM		29,400			-29,400
Spaceborne equipment [COMSEC]	2,092		2,092		+2,092
Global positioning [MYP]	134,831		134,831		+134,831
Global positioning [AP-CY] [MYP]	55,352		55,352		+55,352
Space shuttle operations	103,518		103,518		+103,518
Space boosters	381,817		381,817		+381,817
Medium-launch vehicles [AP-CY]	28,564		28,564		+28,564
Defense meteorological satellite program	29,159		29,159		+29,159
Defense support program [MYP]	363,959		363,959		+363,959
Defense satellite communications system	20,185		20,185		+20,185
Ionds [MYP]	35,649		35,649		+35,649
Ionds [MYP] [AP-CY]	9,954		9,954		+9,954
Special programs	1,619,032	1,960,532	1,532,032	-87,000	-428,500
	SAC,p. 197				

FY 1995 CONGRESSIONAL TRACK

TITLE: IONDS (MYP) APPROP : 3020

	<u>PBR</u>	<u>HASC</u>	<u>SASC</u>	<u>AUTH</u> <u>CONF</u>	<u>HAC</u>	<u>SAC</u>	<u>APPN</u> <u>CONF</u>
DOLLARS:	\$35,649	35,649	35,649	35,649	0	35,649	35,649
QUANTITY:	5	5	5	5	0	5	5

HAC:

TRANSFER OF MAJOR SPACE PROGRAMS

As discussed elsewhere in this report under Space and Related Programs, a total of \$1,285,560,000 for major space programs has been transferred from Missile Procurement, Air Force to other accounts, primarily Procurement, Defense-Wide. The programs affected by this transfer are as follows:

[IN THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS]	TRANSFER
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Defense Satellite Comm System	-20,185
Ionds (MYP)	-35,649
Ionds (MYP) (AP-CY)	-9,954

HAC, p. 180

SAC:

The Committee disagrees with the following adjustments to the budget request contained in the House allowance:

FY 1995 CONGRESSIONAL TRACK

[In thousands of dollars]

Item	Budget request	House allowance	Committee recommen- dation	Committee recommendation compared to-	
				Budget request	House allowance
AGM-130 powered GBU-15 Target drones	71,756	69,256	71,756		+2,500
CALCM		29,400			-29,400
Spaceborne equipment [COMSEC]	2,092		2,092		+2,092
Global positioning [MYP]	134,831		134,831		+134,831
Global positioning [AP-CY] [MYP]	55,352		55,352		+55,352
Space shuttle operations	103,518		103,518		+103,518
Space boosters	381,817		381,817		+381,817
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Defense meteorological satellite program	29,159		29,159		+29,159
Defense support program [MYP]	363,959		363,959		+363,959
Defense satellite communications system	20,185		20,185		+20,185
Ionds [MYP]	35,649		35,649		+35,649
Ionds [MYP] [AP-CY]	9,954		9,954		+9,954
Special programs	1,619,032	1,960,532	1,532,032	-87,000	-428,500

SAC, p. 197

FY 1995 CONGRESSIONAL TRACK

[In thousands of dollars]

Item	Budget request	House allowance	Committee recommendation	Committee recommendation compared to-	
				Budget request	House allowance
AGM-130 powered GBU-15 Target drones	71,756	69,256	71,756		+2,500
CALCM		29,400			-29,400
Spaceborne equipment [COMSEC]	2,092		2,092		+2,092
Global positioning [MYP]	134,831		134,831		+134,831
Global positioning [AP-CY] [MYP]	55,352		55,352		+55,352
Space shuttle operations	103,518		103,518		+103,518
Space boosters	381,817		381,817		+381,817
Medium-launch vehicles [AP-CY]	28,564		28,564		+28,564
Defense meteorological satellite program	29,159		29,159		+29,159
Defense support program [MYP]	363,959		363,959		+363,959
Defense satellite communications system	20,185		20,185		+20,185
Ionds [MYP]	35,649		35,649		+35,649
Ionds [MYP] [AP-CY]	9,954		9,954		+9,954
Special programs	1,619,032	1,960,532	1,532,032	-87,000	-428,500

SAC, p. 197

FY 1995 CONGRESSIONAL TRACK

[In thousands of dollars]

Item	Budget request	House allowance	Committee recommendation	Committee recommendation compared to-	
				Budget request	House allowance
AGM-130 powered GBU-15	71,756	69,256	71,756		+2,500
Target drones	29,043	17,043	29,043		+12,000
CALCM		29,400			-29,400
Spaceborne equipment [COMSEC]	2,092		2,092		+2,092
Global positioning [MYP]	134,831		134,831		+134,831
Global positioning [AP-CY] [MYP]	55,352		55,352		+55,352
Space shuttle operations	103,518		103,518		+103,518
Space boosters	381,817		381,817		+381,817
Medium-launch vehicles [AP-CY]	28,564		28,564		+28,564
Defense meteorological satellite program	29,159		29,159		+29,159
Defense support program [MYP]	363,959		363,959		+363,959
Defense satellite communications system	20,185		20,185		+20,185
Ionds [MYP]	35,649		35,649		+35,649
Ionds [MYP] [AP-CY]	9,954		9,954		+9,954
Special programs	1,619,032	1,960,532	1,532,032	-87,000	-428,500
	SAC, p. 197				

FY 1995 CONGRESSIONAL TRACK

TITLE: BOMB PRACTICE 25 POUND

APPROP : 3020

	<u>PBR</u>	<u>HASC</u>	<u>SASC</u>	<u>AUTH</u> <u>CONF</u>	<u>HAC</u>	<u>SAC</u>	<u>APPN</u> <u>CONF</u>
DOLLARS:	\$9,406	6,922	9,406	6,922	5,426	5,426	5,426
QUANTITY:	668,720	668,720	668,720	387,000	350,000	350,000	350,000

HAC:

25 POUND PRACTICE BOMB

The Air Force budgeted \$9,406,000 for procurement of the 25 pound practice bomb. The Committee recommends \$5,426,000, a reduction of \$3,980,000. The Committee has learned that the Air Force inventory objective will be exceeded if the budgeted procurement is executed.

HAC, p. 183

SAC:

Bomb, practice 25 pound.-The General Accounting Office [GAO] recommends that the Air Force's \$9,406,000 fiscal year 1995 request for 25-pound practice bombs should be reduced by \$3,980,000 because the projected inventory will exceed the Air Force objective. The Committee, therefore, provides \$5,426,000 for the procurement of as many 25-pound practice bombs as these funds will allow.

SAC, p. 200

