SPACE/COSMOS

Where The Elements Come From

The chlorine and potassium needed to support planet formation and sustain life come from exploding stars. CREDIT: JAXA

 December 31, 2025

By Eurasia Review

Why are we here?” is humanity’s most fundamental and persistent question. Tracing the origins of the elements is a direct attempt to answer this at its deepest level. We know many elements are created inside stars and supernovae, which then cast them out into the universe, yet the origins of some key elements has remained a mystery.

Chlorine and potassium, both odd-Z elements — possessing an odd number of protons — are essential to life and planet formation. According to current theoretical models, stars produce only about one-tenth the amount of these elements observed in the universe, a discrepancy that has long puzzled astrophysicists.

This inspired a group of researchers at Kyoto University and Meiji University to examine supernova remnants for traces of these elements. Using XRISM — short for X-Ray Imaging and Spectroscopy Mission, an X-ray satellite launched by JAXA in 2023 — the team was able to perform high-resolution X-ray spectroscopic observations of the Cassiopeia A supernova remnant within the Milky Way.

The scientists utilized the microcalorimeter Resolve device onboard XRISM, providing high energy resolution an order of magnitude better than previous X-ray detectors, which allowed them to detect faint emission lines from rare elements. They then analyzed the X-ray spectrum from Cassiopeia A and compared the abundances of chlorine and potassium with several supernova nucleosynthetic models.

The team discovered clear X-ray emission lines of both elements at abundances far higher than predicted by standard supernova models. This provided the first observational evidence that a supernova can create sufficient chlorine and potassium. The team suggests that strong mixing inside massive stars caused by fast rotation, binary interaction, or shell-merger events, can significantly enhance the production of these elements.

“When we saw the Resolve data for the first time, we detected elements I never expected to see before the launch. Making such a discovery with a satellite we developed is a true joy as a researcher,” says corresponding author Toshiki Sato.

These results reveal that the elements vital for life were produced in harsh, intense environments deep inside stars, far removed from anything resembling the conditions needed for life to emerge. The study also demonstrates the power of high-precision X-ray spectroscopy for probing the origins of elements and physical processes deep inside stars.

“I am delighted that we have been able, even if only slightly, to begin to understand what is happening inside exploding stars,” says corresponding author Hiroyuki Uchida.

Next, the team plans to observe other supernova remnants with XRISM to determine whether the enhanced production of chlorine and potassium is common among massive stars or unique to Cassiopeia A. This will help reveal whether such internal mixing processes are a universal feature of stellar evolution.

“How Earth and life came into existence is an eternal question that everyone has pondered at least once. Our study reveals only a small part of that vast story, but I feel truly honored to have contributed to it,” says corresponding author Kai Matsunaga.

Could the Next Solar Flare Cripple Modern Technology?

By ZeroHedge - Jan 01, 2026

• The Van Allen radiation belts, massive regions of charged particles trapped by Earth's magnetic field, have become "fully charged" due to repeated solar storms.
• A space weather observer warns that the next major solar storm could cause the energetic plasma in the belts to precipitate toward the planet's upper atmosphere.
• Intense solar storms pose a significant threat to modern infrastructure, potentially causing major disruptions to satellites, GPS, radio communications, and other space-based operations.The Van Allen radiation belts are massive, doughnut-shaped regions of charged particles trapped by Earth's magnetic field. When the Sun blasts Earth with strong solar wind or solar storms, energetic particles are injected into these belts, increasing their overall energy levels.

Now, the Van Allen radiation belts are "fully charged," according to space weather observer Stefan Burns. He warns that these belts of energetic particles have been building up due to repeated solar storms over the past few months.

"The next solar storm to hit could cause this plasma to precipitate downward toward the planet's upper atmosphere," Burns said.

The effects of intense solar storms are particularly significant for satellites, GPS, radio communications, and space operations, where disruptions can occur.

With growing discussion around space-based data centers and rapidly expanding satellite internet constellations, the question arises: can a modern society built on fragile semiconductors withstand repeated X-class solar flares or a Carrington-class coronal mass ejection?

By Zerohedge 

Joint ground- and space-based observations reveal Saturn-mass rogue planet

Summary author: Walter Beckwith

American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS)

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Simultaneous ground- and space-based observations of a newly discovered free-floating planet have enabled direct measurement of its mass and distance from Earth, according to a new study. The findings offer insights into the diverse and dynamic pathways by which planets can be cast adrift into interstellar space. Although studies to date have only revealed a handful of such free-floating planets, detections are expected to increase in the coming years, particularly with the NASA Nancy Grace Roman Space Telescope campaign that is scheduled for launch in 2027, notes Gavin Coleman in a related Perspective. “Simultaneous space- and ground-based observations of microlensing events could be applied in the planning of future exploratory missions and could lead to a better understanding of how planets form across the Galaxy.”

 

Planets are most often found bound to one or more stars, yet a growing body of evidence shows that some wander the galaxy alone. These objects, called free-floating or rogue planets, lack any known stellar companion. And, since they don’t emit very much light, they reveal themselves only through their subtle gravitational effects – a phenomenon called microlensing. One of the main limitations of this discovery method is that it cannot determine the distance to these planets, making independent measurement of their mass difficult. As a result, much about this elusive population of solitary worlds remains speculative.

 

Here, Subo Dong and colleagues report the discovery of a new free-floating planet detected via a fleeting microlensing event. However, unlike previous detections, Dong et al. uniquely observed this microlensing event simultaneously from both Earth and space, using several ground-based surveys alongside the Gaia space telescope. Tiny differences in the timing of the light reaching these distantly separated vantage points enabled measurement of the microlensing parallax, which, when combined with finite-source point-lens modeling, allowed the authors to determine the planet’s mass and location. It is ~22% the mass of Jupiter and roughly 3,000 parsecs from the center of the Milky Way. Because this planet’s mass is comparable to that of Saturn, Dong et al. argue that it likely formed within a planetary system, rather than in isolation like a small star or brown dwarf. Such low-mass rogue planets are thought to be born around stars and later expelled from their orbital confines through gravitational upheavals, such as interactions with neighboring planets or unstable stellar companions.

---

Journal

Science

DOI

10.1126/science.adv9266 

Article Title

A free-floating-planet microlensing event caused by a Saturn-mass object

Article Publication Date

1-Jan-2026

NO SEABED  MINING

US Interest In Seabed Mining In Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction – Analysis

Discoverer Inspiration delivers new containment cap to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill on 10 July 2010. In the background are the Discoverer Enterprise, GSF Development Driller II, and Helix Producer I. Photo Credit: U.S. Coast Guard

 photo by Petty Officer 1st Class Jonathan Caruk, Wikipedia Commons

December 31, 2025 
Congressional Research Service (CRS).
By Caitlin Keating-Bitonti

In 1980, Congress passed the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act (DSHMRA; 30 U.S.C. §§1401 et seq.) as an interim measure to allow the United States to proceed with seabed mining activities in areas beyond national jurisdiction (ABNJ) until an international regime was in place (i.e., the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea [UNCLOS]). DSHMRA established a framework for authorizing U.S. citizens (e.g., individuals, corporations) to explore for and recover minerals from seabed in ABNJ. In general, exploration means the at-sea observation and evaluation of seabed mineral resources and the taking of the resource as needed to design and test mining equipment, and commercial recovery (or exploitation) means the actual at-sea mining and processing of seabed minerals for the primary purpose of commercial use (30 U.S.C. §1403).

On April 24, 2025, as part of a broader national effort to secure reliable supplies of critical minerals, President Trump issued Executive Order (E.O.) 14285, “Unleashing America’s Offshore Critical Minerals and Resources,” which directed certain federal agencies to advance seabed mining activities. This In Focus discusses the actions of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and U.S. companies related to seabed mining in ABNJ as well as congressional interest in the topic. The regulation of mineral-related activities occurring on the U.S. outer continental shelf by the Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Ocean Energy Management is beyond the scope of this In Focus.

Background on UNCLOS and the International Seabed Authority

UNCLOS was adopted in 1982, establishing a comprehensive international legal framework to govern activities related to the global ocean, including seabed mining. In 1994, the Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (commonly known as the 1994 Agreement) substantially modified the seabed mining provisions of UNCLOS to address concerns held by many industrialized nations. After the adoption of the 1994 Agreement, UNCLOS received the necessary number of signatories for the agreement to enter into force. The United States is not a party to UNCLOS or the 1994 Agreement.

UNCLOS also established the International Seabed Authority (ISA), an autonomous organization that regulates parties to UNCLOS conducting mineral-related activities in ABNJ. The ISA came into existence with the adoption of the 1994 Agreement and became fully operational in 1996. The United States participates as an observer state in the ISA but, as a non-party, has no vote in ISA business and cannot apply for or obtain a contract for seabed mining exploration or exploitation through the ISA. To date, the ISA has issued 31 exploration contracts. China holds five exploration contracts, the most of any UNCLOS party. The Metals Company (TMC), a Canadian company, has two ISA exploration contracts through sponsorships with Nauru and Tonga. TMC’s two contracts are located in the Clarion-Clipperton Zone (CCZ), a 1.7-million-square-mile area of the seafloor in the Pacific Ocean. The CCZ is estimated to contain more cobalt, manganese, and nickel—identified by the U.S. Geological Survey as critical minerals—than all known land deposits combined.

The ISA has not issued any contracts for exploitation. The ISA is working toward finalizing exploitation regulations.

Exploration Licenses Issued by NOAA

DSHMRA authorized the NOAA administrator to issue exploration licenses and commercial recovery permits to U.S. citizens for seabed mining activities in ABNJ (30 U.S.C. §1412). In 1984, NOAA issued exploration licenses for four sites located beyond U.S. jurisdiction in the CCZ. NOAA issued exploration licenses to four U.S. mining consortia, three of which were multinational private sector consortia with participating American companies. Under DSHMRA, exploration licenses are initially issued for 10 years (30 U.S.C. §1417(a)). NOAA has issued:USA-1 to Ocean Minerals Company, comprising Cyprus Minerals and Lockheed Martin Corporation (American companies);
USA-2 to Ocean Management Inc., comprising Schlumberger Technology (an American company) and Canadian, German, and Japanese companies;
USA-3 to Ocean Mining Associates, comprising Essex Minerals Co. and Sun Ocean Ventures, Inc. (American companies) and Belgian and Italian companies; and
USA-4 to Kennecott Consortium, comprising Kennecott Utah Copper Corporation (an American company) and British, Canadian, and Japanese companies.

NOAA issued these four exploration licenses 10 years before UNCLOS entered into force and 12 years before the ISA became operational. NOAA has not issued any exploration licenses since 1984, although the agency has approved extension requests. A license can be extended by five-year periods (30 U.S.C. §1417(a)). NOAA has not issued any commercial recovery permits.

Two of the four exploration licenses issued by NOAA have been surrendered. In 1997, Ocean Mining Associates relinquished USA-3. In 1999, Ocean Management Inc., the holder of USA-2, dissolved. Thus, NOAA considered USA-2 relinquished (64 Federal Register 3563).

USA-1 and USA-4 remain the only active exploration licenses issued by NOAA pursuant to DSHMRA. Lockheed Martin holds both licenses. It became the sole holder of the licenses by different means. In 1993, Kennecott Consortium relinquished USA-4 to NOAA (58 Federal Register 33933). Ocean Minerals Company, the consortium including Lockheed Martin, applied for USA-4 (58 Federal Register 34782), and NOAA issued the license in 1994 (59 Federal Register 66942). In 1995, Cyprus Minerals withdrew from Ocean Minerals Company, leaving Lockheed Martin as the sole company overseeing USA-1 and USA-4.

USA-1 and USA-4 are expected to remain in effect through June 2, 2027 (87 Federal Register 52743). However, in 2021, the ISA designated an area of the CCZ that partially overlaps with USA-1 as an Area of Particular Environmental Interest, thereby precluding seabed mining activities from taking place in the area. This designation appears to demonstrate that NOAA-issued seabed mining exploration licenses do not have international recognition. Because the United States is not a party to UNCLOS, this would likely be true for any future NOAA-issued commercial recovery permits. According to a 2017 NOAA notice, “any rights a U.S. company may have domestically are not secured internationally.”

Actions taken by Lockheed Martin suggest it may be divesting from seabed mining. In 2023, a Norwegian company, Loke Marine Minerals, acquired two ISA-issued exploration contracts from UK Seabed Resources, a subsidiary of the United Kingdom–based arm of Lockheed Martin. Loke has since filed for bankruptcy, in part due to difficulties raising new capital. Some suggest that the “industry is economically not viable.”

To extend USA-1 and USA-4 beyond June 2, 2027, Lockheed Martin would need to submit an extension request to NOAA at least six months prior to the expiration date. If the licenses are not extended, U.S. entities can request a transfer of USA-1 and/or USA-4. In such cases, NOAA is to process the request pursuant to Title 15, Section 970.516, of the Code of Federal Regulations. According to NOAA, the agency may choose not to actively solicit offers for the transfer of these licenses.

Pending Applications to NOAA

E.O. 14285 directed NOAA, in consultation with the Departments of State and Interior, to expedite the process for reviewing and issuing exploration licenses and commercial recovery permits under DSHMRA, among other actions. On April 29, 2025, TMC’s U.S. subsidiary (TMC USA) submitted applications to NOAA for two exploration licenses and one commercial recovery permit under DSHMRA. In June 2025, TMC USA amended its exploration applications. NOAA determined that these applications are “fully compliant” with DSHMRA requirements. TMC USA’s two exploration license applications (A and B) overlap with portions of TMC’s Nauru and Tonga ISA exploration contract areas in the CCZ. As part of NOAA’s applicant review process, the agency will receive and consider oral comments via virtual public hearings on January 26 and 27, 2026, and written comments through February 23, 2026.

To date, NOAA has not made a determination on TMC USA’s commercial recovery permit application. The information relevant to the application will be made public when NOAA publishes its notice in the Federal Register (15 C.F.R. §971.212).

Some speculate that TMC USA’s applications to NOAA may be part of “a tactic to put pressure on the ISA” to adopt its exploitation regulations. Exploitation regulations would allow pursuit of ISA exploitation contracts.

Recent Congressional Interest

Congress may continue to consider seabed mining issues in the context of E.O. 14285 and TMC USA’s applications to NOAA. Some bills introduced in the 119th Congress would codify and/or adapt E.O. 14285 (S. 2860, H.R. 3803, H.R. 4018). These bills echo the challenges presented in the E.O., including that “the United States faces unprecedented economic and national security challenges in securing reliable supplies of critical minerals independent of foreign adversary control.” TMC also contendsthat its subsidiary’s applications would contribute to “America’s mineral independence.” S. 2860, H.R. 3803, and H.R. 4018 would direct federal agencies to expedite the authorization of U.S. seabed mining activities under DSHMRA. According to the ISA, however, authorization of seabed mining activities outside the international framework (e.g., via DSHMRA) “may incur legal, diplomatic, economic, security, financial and reputational risks.” Congress may weigh in on whether NOAA seabed mining licenses and permits might present geopolitical conflicts. TMC USA stated that it does “not anticipate any use conflicts or interference with other users’ freedom of the high seas.” If approved, the NOAA-licensed areas would overlap with portions of areas the ISA already contracted to TMC through Tonga and Nauru sponsorships.

Some Members have called for the Senate to take up UNCLOS, contending that as a party to UNCLOS, the United States would be able to participate in setting and voting on ISA policies (S.Res. 331). Weighing the advantages and disadvantages of giving U.S. entities access to ISA contracts through U.S. accession to UNCLOS as a means to diversify its critical mineral supply chain is an ongoing issue for Congress. U.S. access to critical minerals located in ABNJ through U.S. accession to UNCLOS may reduce the potential for geopolitical conflicts. For example, following E.O. 14285 and TMC USA’s applications to NOAA, the Secretary-General of the ISA stated that “any unilateral action … sets a dangerous precedent that could destabilize the entire system of global ocean governance.”

Legislation has also been introduced (H.R. 664) to prohibit NOAA from issuing licenses and permits for seabed mining activities in ABNJ until more information is known about its potential impacts. This bill would also direct NOAA—along with the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine—to study the environmental impacts of mining activities. H.R. 663 would instruct the President to call for an international seabed mining moratorium until the ISA adopts a regulatory framework. As of December 2025, 40 countries have announced their opposition to deep-seabed mining.

About the author: Caitlin Keating-Bitonti, Specialist in Natural Resources Policy

Source: This article was published by the Congressional Research Service (CRS).

The Congressional Research Service (CRS) works exclusively for the United States Congress, providing policy and legal analysis to committees and Members of both the House and Senate, regardless of party affiliation. As a legislative branch agency within the Library of Congress, CRS has been a valued and respected resource on Capitol Hill for nearly a century.

US Financial Support To Argentina – Analysis

Argentina's President Javier Milei with US President Donald Trump. 

Photo Credit: White House, Flickr

January 1, 2026
The Congressional Research Service (CRS) 
By Joshua Klein and Rebecca M. Nelson

Since assuming office in December 2023, President Javier Milei has sought to overhaul Argentina’s economy through pro-market and public sector reforms, while increasing foreign policy alignment with the United States. Despite the economic reform agenda, the Argentine government has struggled to stabilize its currency. In October 2025, U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent announced U.S. financial support for Argentina, including a $20 billion currency swap line financed through the Treasury Department’s Exchange Stabilization Fund (ESF).

Although Secretary Bessent describes Argentina as a systemically important U.S. ally in Latin America, some Members of Congress have raised concerns about the use of taxpayer funds to support Argentina. For example, they have argued that the policies disadvantage U.S. exporters competing with Argentina in global markets (particularly for soy products); that a prospective increase in U.S. imports of Argentine beef could negatively impact U.S. ranchers; that U.S. support is not justified on economic grounds and puts taxpayer dollars at risk; that the measures amount to interference in a foreign democratic election; that the support unduly benefits private investors who had invested in the Argentine assets; and that the terms and details of the financial support are not public.

As Congress evaluates the Administration’s policy response to Argentina, Congress might conclude that the current status of ESF operations is the appropriate policy course and endorse the status quo. Alternatively, Congress might conclude that the current policy response is not optimal for U.S. interests. In that scenario, Congress has a number of policy options for shaping U.S. financial support to Argentina, depending on its policy goals. If Congress has concerns about financial support to Argentina, Congress could, for example, limit the Treasury Secretary’s ability to use ESF funds to support foreign governments or require the Treasury Secretary to disclose details about ESF operations involving foreign governments to key congressional committees. If Congress endorses greater financial support to Argentina, it could, for example, direct the Treasury Secretary to increase the amount and duration of currency swap line or explore additional measures of support.

For background on Argentina and the Milei administration, see CRS Report R48303, Argentina: Overview and U.S. Relations, by Joshua Klein.


Economic Crisis in Argentina

Argentina has a long history of economic turbulence—it has defaulted on its debt nine times since gaining independence in 1816, since 1950 it has had more economic recessions than any other country, and has been on an International Monetary Fund (IMF) financial assistance program for more than half of the years it has been a member of the organization.1 Analysts have pointed to a number of factors to explain the pattern of Argentina’s recurring and long-standing economic challenges, including exchange rate policy decisions, trade and investment policies, and unsustainable levels of government spending, among many others.2

Argentina’s current President, Javier Milei of the right-wing La Libertad Avanza (LLA) coalition, was elected in November 2023 on pledges to radically overhaul Argentina’s economy through libertarian free-market policymaking. Milei’s administration continues to face economic challenges and has struggled to stabilize Argentina’s currency, the peso. Some Members of Congress have expressed a range of concerns about the currency swap line extended by the Trump Administration to Argentina in October 2025.

Economic Reforms during the Milei Administration

Since taking office, President Milei has sought to introduce a pro-market, economic reform agenda. Although Milei is a polarizing figure in Argentina, he appears to have benefited from public disenchantment with traditional political parties, in part due to deteriorating economic conditions. In 2023, for example, annual inflation surpassed 200% under President Alberto Fernández (2019-2023) of the left-of-center Unión por la Patria coalition. President Milei has aimed to reduce inflation and improve Argentina’s economic prospects by implementing pro-market reforms and cutting government spending, while asserting such measures could cause short-term economic pain. Between late 2023 and 2024, the Milei administration used presidential decrees and collaborated with the Argentine congress to pass legislation that repealed or modified hundreds of laws, reduced the number of federal government ministries by nearly half, and eliminated tens of thousands of public sector jobs.

Although Milei campaigned on dollarization (officially replacing the Argentine peso with the U.S. dollar) as a way to bring stability to the country’s currency, the Milei administration instead opted for a sharp (50%) devaluation of the peso in December 2023. The “shock therapy” devaluation sought to bring the peso’s value closer in line with its market value, as well as to boost exports. The administration also announced measures for further controlled deprecation of the peso (1%-2% depreciation monthly), and, starting in April 2025, allowed the peso’s value to fluctuate within preset limits (often called an exchange rate band). The administration sought to prevent more rapid depreciation of the peso due to concerns about inflation and upcoming debt payments.3 As part of a four-year, $20 billion financial assistance program with the IMF, finalized in April 2025, the Argentine government committed to transitioning to a fully market-determined exchange rate (a “floating” exchange rate).

After a period of economic recession in the first half of 2024, President Milei’s economic adjustment policies have improved some economic conditions in Argentina. Notably, growth rebounded, inflation fell, and in 2024, the government’s ran its first fiscal surplus in more than a decade, due in large part to spending cuts (Figure 1).4 At the same time, labor unions, higher education sector workers, pensioners, health care workers, and others have organized national protests and strikes in response to the government’s spending cuts. Additionally, unemployment has fluctuated during President Milei’s tenure.5

Exchange Rate Instability Ahead of the October 2025 Midterms

The value of the peso came under renewed pressure in the runup to the October 26, 2025 midterm legislative elections. President Milei faced declining public approval ratings and increasing opposition in Argentina’s congress. Investors grew concerned that political pressures would cause the Milei government to roll back economic reforms and stymie future reforms. Investor confidence in Argentina’s economy continued to weaken as the peso hovered around the floor of the exchange rate band (Figure 2).


To keep the peso in the exchange rate band, Argentina’s central bank intervened in foreign exchange markets. Specifically, it bought pesos and sold foreign currencies. By decreasing the supply of pesos in circulation, it was able to increase the value of the peso. However, there were questions about how long the central bank could sustain this policy. For example, in one three-day period, it sold more than $1.1 billion in foreign currencies; its total foreign currency holdings at the time were around $40 billion.6 Normally central banks need foreign currencies for a variety of functions beyond management of the exchange rate, including debt payments and imports.

U.S. Financial Support

On October 9, 2025, U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent announced on X (formerly Twitter) a $20 billion currency swap with Argentina’s central bank. Specifically, the Treasury Department agreed to purchase up to $20 billion worth of pesos from Argentina’s central bank in exchange for U.S. dollars, using resources in the Department’s Exchange Stabilization Fund. The arrangement gives the Argentine government access to U.S. dollars and supports the value of the peso, an important objective of the Milei administration. Neither the Treasury Department nor the Argentine government has publicly disclosed the specifics of the agreement, including its duration. By the end of October 2025, Argentina’s central bank had traded pesos for $2.5 billion through the swap line.7 It is unusual, but not unprecedented, for the Treasury Secretary to use ESF resources to support foreign governments. Before Argentina, the most recent example is a $1.5 billion credit arrangement with Uruguay in 2002.8

In addition to the swap line, on October 15, 2025, Secretary Bessent told reporters that the United States was seeking to develop a partnership with private sector investors to provide an additional $20 billion in financing for Argentina.9 As of late November 2025, three U.S. banks were reportedly considering an agreement valued at about $5 billion.10 Also in October 2025, the Treasury Department provided $872 million in dollar liquidity support to Argentina through transactions in international reserve assets held at the IMF—support that is separate from, and in addition to, the swap line.11 The Trump Administration also announced a prospective trade and investment framework that would seek “to drive long-term growth” in Argentina by reducing tariffs and other trade barriers and improving intellectual property protections.12

Outlook for Argentina

President Milei’s party outperformed some pollsters’ expectations in the October 2025 midterm legislative elections, leading to a market rally and greater LLA representation in Argentina’s new congress. LLA became the largest bloc in the chamber of deputies and the second largest bloc in the senate of Argentina’s new congress (seated December 10), strengthening LLA’s position to advance Milei’s legislative agenda with the support of allied parties. Recurring public protests against Milei’s agenda and investigations into his administration’s alleged wrongdoings could challenge advancement of Milei’s economic policies. With the peso hovering near the floor of the exchange rate band (Figure 2) and government debt payments scheduled to rise over the next three years (Figure 3), the Milei administration may face additional hurdles to achieving economic reforms.

Argentina’s main source of foreign currency is the remaining balance on its currency swap line with the United States. The central bank’s foreign-exchange assets are largely offset by foreign-exchange liabilities, and Argentina does not have a strong trade surplus to generate inflows of foreign currency.13 If the Milei government finds itself without the adequate foreign exchange to make debt payments and sustain exchange rate policy goals, it will likely face difficult policy decisions, such as whether to default on its debt for a tenth time or allow more flexibility in the value of the peso.

Under such a scenario, the government might seek additional financial support from the United States, the IMF, or other official lenders. The prospects for securing such support are unclear. The willingness of the IMF to extend additional support to Argentina is in question given the level of exposure it faces to Argentina relative to other governments in its membership (Figure 4). Additionally, in August 2025, Argentina requested, and the IMF granted, a waiver for falling short of the foreign reserve holdings target established in the program.14


Policy Issues for Congress

The U.S. currency swap line with Argentina and related measures reflect a larger trend of strengthening U.S.-Argentina relations since President Milei assumed office. President Trump and President Milei appear to share personal and ideological affinities, and the two leaders have met in the White House twice, most recently on October 14, 2025. Secretary Bessent argued that “[t]he success of Argentina’s reform agenda is of systemic importance, and a strong, stable Argentina which helps anchor a prosperous Western Hemisphere is in the strategic interest of the United States.”15 Additionally, President Trump appeared to condition U.S. financial support on a positive electoral outcome for LLA.16

Trump officials have made statements that appear to suggest U.S. support for Argentina is intended to counter China’s influence in the country. During President Milei’s October 2025 White House visit, for example, Secretary Bessent expressed specific concern with China-linked “ports, military bases, and observation facilities that have been created in Argentina.”17 U.S. officials also have reportedly urged the Milei administration to prioritize U.S. investment in key sectors, including critical minerals and telecommunications, over that from China-based firms.18

Some Members of Congress have raised concerns about U.S. financial support for Argentina. For example, they argued that the policies disadvantage U.S. exporters competing with Argentina in global markets (particularly for soy and other agricultural products);
U.S. support puts taxpayer dollars at risk, given Argentina’s long-standing economic challenges and patterns of default;
conditioning U.S. financial assistance on certain electoral outcomes amounts to undue influence over a foreign democratic election;
the support unduly benefits private investors with interests in Argentine assets; and
the Administration has not disclosed the details and terms of the currency swap line publicly.

From an economic standpoint, there are also questions about the importance of Argentina as a U.S. trading partner or to the U.S. economy. Its previous crises, for example, have not generally spilled over to the United States or the broader global economy.

Policy Options for Congress

Congress has delegated broad discretion over the use of ESF resources to the Treasury Secretary. As Congress evaluates the Administration’s policy response to Argentina, Congress might conclude that the current status of ESF operations is the appropriate policy course and endorse the status quo. Alternatively, Congress might conclude that the current policy is not optimal for U.S. interests. In that scenario, Congress has a number of policy options for shaping U.S. financial support to Argentina and other foreign governments through the ESF, depending on its policy goals.If Congress supports U.S. financial support for Argentina, it could urge the Treasury Secretary to increase the amount or duration of the swap line, as well as coordinate with other U.S. government agencies to identify other potential sources of support. More broadly, if Congress considers the ESF a useful foreign policy tool, it could also consider increasing the size of the ESF. Congress could also provide additional guidance to the Treasury Secretary on expanding the use of ESF funds for foreign governments.

If Congress opposes financial support to Argentina, Congress could prohibit the use of ESF resources for any foreign government in general or Argentina in particular. It could also bar ESF use for particular categories of governments (e.g., governments of countries that are major export competitors or governments that are not adhering to IMF programs). Legislation has been introduced in the 119th Congress to prohibit the use of ESF funds to support Argentina (S. 2965), as well as to redirect the funds used for Argentina to other domestic priorities (H.R. 5984; H.R. 6050; and H.R. 6061).

If Congress wants to preserve the Treasury Secretary’s discretion to use ESF during crises while also exerting greater control and oversight of the fund, Congress might consider revising current rules on the use of ESF resources. For example, current law requires the President to submit to Congress a statement explaining the unique or emergency circumstances for an ESF loan or credit to a foreign government for more than six months in any 12-month period. Congress could shorten this timeframe (e.g., to one or two months). Congress also could require the Treasury Secretary to, for example, brief the relevant congressional committees within a week of establishing a new ESF financing arrangement with a foreign government; disclose the terms and conditions of ESF financing arrangements with foreign governments (e.g., to the relevant congressional committees or on the Treasury website); and/or secure congressional authorization for ESF financing to a foreign government above a certain amount or duration. Congress could also request a briefing or report that would assess any potential risks to ESF funds associated with programs to foreign governments or certain types of programs.

Conclusion

The Milei administration’s economic reforms have had mixed results. The economy is growing, inflation is down, and the government is running a budget surplus. However, unemployment has fluctuated, and there have been a number of protests against the government’s spending cuts. Going forward, questions persist about the stability of the Milei administration’s exchange rate policies and Argentina’s ability to honor looming increases in scheduled debt payments. There are also questions about whether the government will stay on track with its IMF program. The Trump Administration has used the flexibility granted to it by Congress to bolster Argentina’s foreign exchange reserves, an action that Members of Congress have debated. It remains to be seen the extent to which Congress will support or oppose actions by the Trump Administration to provide economic support to Argentina. About the authors: Joshua Klein, Analyst in Foreign Affairs, and Rebecca M. Nelson, Specialist in International Trade and Finance

Source: This article was published by the Congressional Research Service (CRS)

Footnotes
1. Ben Bartenstein et al., “One Country, Nine Defaults: Argentina is Caught in a Vicious Cycle, Bloomberg, September 11, 2019; World Bank Group, A New Growth Horizon: Improve Fiscal Policy, Open Markets, and Invest in Human Capital, 2024, p. 3; and International Monetary Fund (IMF), Argentina: History of Lending Commitments as of November 30, 2025.
2. See, for example, Eduardo Levy Yeyati, “It’s Groundhog Day in Argentina,” Americas Quarterly, April 22, 2019 and Hector Torres, “How to Fix Argentina’sRecurrent Debt Crises,” Foreign Policy, October 31, 2020.
3. Currency depreciation generally leads to inflation, as the price of imports rise. Currency depreciation also increases the size of the debt in terms of the national currency. More than half of Argentina’s outstanding debt is denominated in foreign currencies.
4. IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2025.
5. Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos, Mercado de Trabajo. Tasas e Indicadores Socioeconómicos (EPH). Primer Trimestre 2017 a Segundo Trimestre de 2025.
6. Facundo Iglesia, “Caputo Vows to Sell ‘Down to the Last Dollar’ as Central Bank Loses US$1.1bn in 3 Days,” Buenos Aires Herald, September 19, 2025.
7. Treasury Department, ESF Monthly Financial Statement for October 2025.
8. In 1994, the Treasury Department established a swap line with Mexico through the ESF, in the context of the North American Free Trade Agreement [NAFTA, now the U.S.-Mexico Canada Agreement (USMCA)]. The swap line has been renewed annually; Mexico last used it in 1995. Treasury Department, “Exchange Stabilization Fund History,” accessed December 27, 2025; U.S. Federal Reserve, “Central Bank Liquidity Swaps,” accessed December 29, 2025.
9. Ciara Nugent et al., “US Treasury Arranging Fresh $20bn in Debt Market Support for Argentina,” Financial Times, October 15, 2025.
10. Alexander Saeedy and Justin Baer, “U.S. Banks Shelve $20 Billion Bailout Plan for Argentina,” Wall Street Journal, November 20, 2025.
11. Treasury Department, ESF Monthly Financial Statement for October 2025.
12. White House, “Joint Statement on Framework for a United States-Argentina Agreement on Reciprocal Trade and Investment,” November 13, 2025.
13. Brad Setser, “Argentina Needs Foreign Exchange Reserves of Its Own,” Council on Foreign Relations, November 4, 2025.
14. IMF, Argentina: First Review under the Extended Arrangement Under the Extended Fund Facility, August 2025.
15. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent (@SecScottBessent), “The @USTreasury has concluded 4 days … ,” X post, October 9, 2025.
16. Nandita Bose, “Trump Won’t ‘Waste our Time’ with Argentina if Milei Loses in Midterms,” Reuters, October 15, 2025.
17. White House, “President Trump Participates in a Bilateral Lunch with the President of the Argentine Republic,” Youtube, October 14, 2025.
18. Brian Schwartz, “The U.S. Is Trying to Drive a Wedge Between Argentina and China,” Wall Street Journal, October 21, 2025.


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China’s Quiet Diplomacy In The Thai–Cambodian Border Crisis – Analysis

January 1, 2026 
Observer Research Foundation
By Sreeparna Banerjee

The Thai–Cambodian border clashes have intensified since fighting resumed on 8 December 2025, despite a temporary arrangement reached during the ASEAN summit in Kuala Lumpur in October 2025. The Kuala Lumpur Peace Accord was brokered by Malaysia in its role as ASEAN chair, with special mediation support from US President Donald Trump, to halt the border clashes that have been ongoing since July 2025. While both countries did sign the accord, Thailand has had reservations about calling it a peace deal and has made it clear that fighting could resume if Cambodia failed to keep its promise not to attack.

Thailand has since accused Cambodian forces of ambushing a team of Thai engineers on 7 December, injuring two soldiers. Cambodia, in turn, has alleged that Thai Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul is escalating the conflict to bolster his electoral prospects ahead of the general election. Against this backdrop of mutual accusations and deep mistrust, the latest round of fighting has erupted with greater intensity.

The Thai military appears determined this time to continue operations until it believes the Cambodian army no longer poses a threat along the border. Thai officers argue privately that Cambodia will not respect any truce unless it incurs far heavier losses than during the July clashes.

That hard line was reflected on 13 December, when Thai F-16s bombed a Chinese-built bridge over the Me Teuk river in Pursat province, severing a key link along Cambodia’s southern border. Airstrikes also hit a multi-storey building near a casino, which Thai authorities claimed was being used as a military command centre.



The situation remains tense. The Thai side is equipped with advanced weaponry that the Cambodian side lacks. On 16 December, the Thai foreign minister’s spokesperson demanded that Phnom Penh announce a ceasefire first, that the ceasefire be implemented continuously in practice, and that sincere efforts be made to clear landmines in the border regions.

Amid these developments, China has projected itself as a key external actor seeking to stabilise the situation. Beijing dispatched a special envoy on 18 December to facilitate dialogue and promote what it described as “peace” in the region. As a close neighbour with strong ties to both Thailand and Cambodia, China has positioned itself as a neutral mediator. However, Beijing’s approach appears cautious, prioritising stability over addressing the deeper political and military drivers of the conflict.
China’s Quiet Mediation

During the July conflict, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi met the Secretary-General of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Kao Kim Hourn in Beijing on 25 July. During their talks, Wang portrayed China as a non-colonial problem-solver and described the border dispute as a legacy of Western colonisation. He also urged ASEAN to act as the main mediator in the conflict.

China’s Foreign Ministry later confirmed that its special envoy for Asian affairs had visited both Thailand and Cambodia in late July to encourage peace talks, though the envoy was not publicly named at the time. A subsequent visit in September identified the envoy as Deng Xijun. Despite these diplomatic engagements, China’s efforts remained understated and received limited international attention.

Chinese President Xi Jinping later told US President Donald Trump during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Busan on 30 October that China had assisted both Cambodia and Thailand “in its own way” to resolve the dispute. This statement came shortly after the signing of the peace accord, at a time when Trump’s push for a ceasefire had already dominated the diplomatic narrative, effectively sidelining Beijing’s mediation role.

Despite this low-profile approach, China retains substantial leverage over both parties. Cambodia is a major recipient of Chinese arms and maintains deep defence ties with Beijing, including joint military exercises and reported Chinese access to the Ream Naval Base. Thailand, a major non-NATO US ally, is also a significant purchaser of Chinese weapons, with China accounting for 43 percent of its total arms imports in 2024, even as Thai forces reportedly deployed US-made F-16 fighter jets during the latest clashes.

Beijing’s role in the ongoing conflict is best understood not by what it projects on the world stage, but by what it carefully avoids. China’s approach has long relied on strategic patience and the tolerance of limited instability as a means of exerting influence. It focuses on managing or shaping the strategic environment rather than directly resolving conflicts.

It is important to note that China does not benefit from outright conflict between Thailand and Cambodia. Both countries are critical to Beijing’s long-term vision for continental Southeast Asia, particularly under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), with major infrastructural projects ongoing in the region. A prolonged conflict would continue to threaten BRI infrastructure projects and disrupt trade corridors.

However, China’s interest lies not in eliminating tensions altogether, but in ensuring that they remain manageable and externally contained. This approach allows China to reinforce its position as an indispensable external actor. In this context, Deng Xijun was again dispatched on 18 December to encourage restraint among both sides, emphasising China’s role as a constructive mediator. A spokesperson for China’s Foreign Ministry also denied accusations that Thai troops had seized Chinese-made anti-tank missiles from Cambodian soldiers during the clashes. Beijing reiterated that its longstanding defence cooperation with both countries is not aimed at third parties and is unrelated to the border conflict.
The Limits of ASEAN Mediation

Amid the escalating tensions, ASEAN has continued to push for ceasefire talks under Malaysia’s leadership as the bloc’s rotating chair. Although little tangible progress has been made, the Thai and Cambodian foreign ministers agreed to attend the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting on 22 December, which Kuala Lumpur framed as a platform for dialogue and confidence-building. Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim has repeatedly urged both sides to uphold “dialogue, wisdom, and mutual respect,” calling for a peaceful resolution through ASEAN mechanisms.

However, ASEAN’s role remains structurally limited. Its commitment to consensus and non-interference allows it to facilitate dialogue but not enforce outcomes. These constraints, however, also make ASEAN an attractive forum for China. ASEAN-led processes keep crises regionally bounded and resolutions procedurally slow, limiting the scope for decisive intervention by external actors, particularly the United States and its allies.

The 22 December meeting determined that both countries would meet on 24 December to explore reviving a ceasefire. Thailand has emphasised that it is seeking a “genuine ceasefire” backed by firm commitments, a clear implementation framework, and progress on demining. Thai Foreign Minister Sihasak Phuangketkeow stressed that a ceasefire “cannot simply be declared, but must be negotiated.” Notably, Bangkok has insisted that the peace talks are not the product of mediation by either the United States or China, but reflect a mutual decision by both parties. It has also stressed that the process is driven not by external pressure, but by conditions deemed appropriate for achieving stability.

While both sides agreed to reach an immediate ceasefire on 27 December, tensions remain. Thailand has raised concerns over the incursion of 250 unmanned drones from Cambodian territory within 12 hours of the ceasefire taking effect. Although Cambodian authorities described the incident as a “small issue” and said they are investigating it, such instances of mistrust risk further aggravating an already fractured situation if restraint is not maintained. On 31 December, Thailand released 18 Cambodian soldiers as the fragile ceasefire appeared to hold.

The Thai–Cambodian border crisis underscores the limits of mediation in the region. Current efforts by regional organisations, external powers, and the parties themselves continue to point to a conflict that is being managed rather than resolved. For now, stability rests less on trust and more on the careful avoidance of escalation.

About the author: Sreeparna Banerjee is an Associate Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.

Source: This article was published by the Observer Research Foundation.


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The 2025 Thai-Cambodian Conflict Viewed Through Glasl’s Nine-Stage Conflict Escalation Model – Analysis

LONG READ

January 1, 2026 
By Murray Hunter

This study examines the 2025 Thai-Cambodian border conflict through the lens of Friedrich Glasl’s Nine-Stage Conflict Escalation Model, analyzing its progression from simmering tensions to intense military engagement. Triggered by disputes over the Ta Muan Thom temple and escalating into widespread clashes along the Thai-Cambodian border from July 24 to July 28, 2025, the conflict resulted in over 30 deaths and significant civilian displacement. By mapping the conflict’s timeline onto Glasl’s model, this paper identifies its evolution through rational, emotional, and fighting phases, culminating in a fragile ASEAN-brokered ceasefire on August 7, 2025. The analysis highlights the model’s utility in dissecting the dynamics of interstate military conflicts, while also revealing its limitations in capturing historical, geopolitical, and socio-economic factors unique to nation-to-nation disputes. The findings underscore the need for nuanced conflict resolution strategies that address underlying territorial and political grievances to prevent future escalations.
Introduction

After several months of tensions, fighting erupted along the Thai-Cambodian border on July 24 2025, lasting four days and causing over 30 deaths. The resulting military conflict was triggered by several incidents at Ta Muan Thom temple, which very quickly ignited battles along the Danggrek Mountains within an area called the Emerald Triangle that day. Within two days, fighting had also erupted in the southern tip of the Thai-Cambodian border, where Cambodian troops spilled over into Thai territory in Trat Province. A ceasefire was agreed to by the Cambodian prime minister Hun Manet and acting Thai prime minister in Kuala Lumpur beginning at 2400 hours on July 28, with a 13-point ceasefire agreed to on August 7, 2025.

This latest conflict was much more intense than the fighting around Preah Vihear temple area in 2011. In the first few hours of July 24, Cambodian forces fired both artillery and old Soviet-era BM-21 rockets into Thailand, hitting residential areas and a 7-eleven at a petrol station at Kantharalak District in Sisaket Province. From a base in Khao Laem Hill Cambodia, artillery hit homes 6 km north of the Chong Chom border town in Thailand later that day.

Cambodian troops attempted to enter into Thai territory on a number of occasions, over the four days. The Thai military responded with artillery fire, and at 11 am dispatched a sortie of 6 F-16s jet fighters from Ubon Ratchatthani air force base to attack Cambodian military bases and other troop positions. On July 26, Cambodian troops entered Thai territory along the Trat province border area near Ban Chamrak in Muang District, not too far away from the Thai Ko Chang tourist areas. This forced Thai naval forces to respond.

The Thai army had amassed convoys of Thai armored personnel carriers and tanks along the Thai-Cambodian border, poised to enter Cambodia, if necessary. Around 140,000 Thai civilians were evacuated to schools, temples, and halls in case more Cambodian rockets were fired into Thai territory. Many Cambodian nationals returned home, as fear grew about Thai resentment of Cambodia (Ratcliffe & Siradapuvadol 2025).



Major fighting subsided only when the Malaysian government as the chair of ASEAN hosted a ceasefire agreement brokered by the United States and China. Cambodian prime minister Hun Manet and acting Thai prime minister Pheimtham Wechayachi agreed to the ceasefire which commenced at 2400 hours on July 28.

Tensions have remained tense along the border since, where several alleged breaches of the truce have occurred. The Cambodian defence minister Tea Seila and Thailand’s acting defence minister Nattaphon Narkphanit arrived at a 13-point ceasefire agreement. This allowed border observers led by ASEAN member countries deploy along the border on August 7. The ceasefire remained fragile with issues such as the release of prisoners and Thai anger over soldiers injured from land mines laid by the Cambodia military in disputed border areas, which continue to keep pressure on the situation.

This rest of this paper will review the stages of the conflict through the structure of Friedrich Plasl’s Nine-Step Model of Conflict Escalation and discuss the merits of the model in analyzing military conflicts.
Friedrich Glasl’s Nine-Stage Model of Conflict Escalation

Conflict models have been developed for the purpose of analyzing and determining conflict management strategies for labour and organization disputes. Most have been designed by the organization development practitioners in the second half of the 20th Century.

During the 1970s, Kenneth W. Thomas and Ralph H. Kilmann modified Robert Blake and Jane Mouton’s Managerial Grid Model (Blake and Mouton 1964) to create the Thomas-Kilmann Conflict Modal (Thomas and Kilmann 1978), which used a grid to determine strategic responses to conflict.

Based on his experience as both an academic and practitioner (1), Friedrich Glasl developed a more comprehensive conflict escalation model in the late 1970s, where practitioners could develop a greater understanding of the situational processes of organizational conflict escalation.

Glasl’s model was grounded upon the idea that conflicts develop through different stages and can escalate or decline. Glasl believed that conflict could be resolved by taking positive actions.

Glasl saw three major phases of a conflict.

First there is the rational phase, a potential win-win situation where the conflict is still under control, and the parties are capable of solving the conflict between themselves. If disagreements cannot be resolved then the conflict can move into an emotional phase where one party may win and the other lose.

In the emotional phase, the conflict becomes more personal and intense. Instead of looking for solutions, both parties try and win over the other party. They begin to see each other in a negative light, and seek support from external bodies to support their respective positions. Threats are often made which can lead to the fighting phase where a lose-lose situation may arise.

The fighting phase becomes so intense that both parties suffer harm. The conflict is no longer about winning, but making the other lose, even if it means harming themselves. Thus, actions taken by the parties are aimed at inflicting harm. This stage will require an external person/body to intervene and mediate.

As such, the nine-stage conflict escalation model became a diagnostic tool to assist in the development of interventionalist strategies at the various stages of a conflict through identifying what interventions would be required to dampen escalation of a conflict that may develop a momentum of its own.

Although, Glasl’s Conflict Model has extensively been used in organizational conflict resolution, particularly in Europe, knowledge about the use and application of the model for analyzing military conflicts is scarce. Consequently, the model has received limited attention for application in military conflicts.

Glasl’s model is being discovered as a tool for nation-to-nation conflicts. A recent article by Samirul Ariff Othman utilized Glasl’s Conflict Escalation to contrast the Thai-Cambodian conflict with other conflicts (Samirul 2025).
Timeline of Thai-Cambodia Conflict Superimposed onto Glasl’s Conflict Model

Below is a timeline of the Thai-Cambodian conflict superimposed upon Glasl’s Nine-Stage Model of Conflict Escalation.

The timeline is mapped out through the three levels. Each stage reflects increasing intensity of the conflict. These include the rational “Win-Win” phase, through stages 1-3, the emotional phase “Win-Lose”, through stages 4-6, and the fighting phase “Lose-Lose” through stages 7-9.

The border conflict data has been taken from numerous media and social media reports during the conflict. As such, the impartiality of all reports is unknown. However, this should be balanced out by using multiple media reports from different sources.

Some of the stages may overlap due to the quick escalation of the conflict.

Level One: The Rational Phase

Level One, the rational phase consists of three stages where conflicts involve rational discourse, with parties still open for collaboration and mutual gains. These can lead to “win-win” situations through negotiation and mutual agreements.
Stage 1: Hardening Tensions and Crystalized Standpoints

In stage one, the disagreements between the two parties become clear, increasing the tension of the conflict. Both parties aren’t sure whether to cooperate with each other and find a solution or ‘dig in’ their positions.

In early 2025 tensions began simmering over historical territorial disputes, particularly around Ta Muan Thom temple. This dispute is rooted in the International Court of Justice (ICJ)’s decision in 1962 awarding Preah Vihear to Cambodia. Both countries fixed positions and Thailand still disputes ICJ jurisdiction, where Cambodia claims an area around the temple. This dispute became clouded in nationalist sentiments expressed by “public” groups on both sides, which drastically increased tensions. However, no direct confrontations occurred.

Thai soldiers prevented Cambodian groups assembling and singing their national anthem at Ta Muen Thom temple on February 13, heightening friction on both sides. Much of the interchange at that time was both diplomatic and military to military discussions.

Stage 2: Debates and Polemics Leading to Emotional Tensions and Polarization

In this stage both parties move to strengthen their positions. The conflict begins to worsen as opposition between the parties increases. Both parties believe they are right and hold the moral high ground. This continues to increase tensions.

Between March-April 2025, Cambodia increases military posturing, with reports of troop movements and fortifications around Chong Bok and Phnom Prasat Thisou. Thailand responded by building a new road near Prasat Ta Muen Thom to improve access. There was escalating rhetoric about defending sovereignty, which public and social media narratives amplified. Cambodia’s development around Preah Vihear was framed as national development, where the Thais framed this as provocation. Both sides declared their moral credibility.

During April 2025 the contents of a phone call between Cambodian Senate President Hun Sen and Thai prime minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra was leaked to the public. The call was perceived in Thailand as undermining the actions of the Thai military. The issue was brought to the Constitutional Court by a group of Senators, leading Paetongtarn to step down as prime minister, subject to a Constitutional Court investigation. Domestic protests against Paetongtarn erupted in Bangkok, calling her a traitor.

Stage 3: Words turn into Actions

In this stage there is a move from verbal communication towards non-verbal provocations and messaging. Any discussions go nowhere and the other party mis-interprets or misunderstands the other party’s intentions, thus raising tensions.

On May 28, a skirmish at Ta Muen Thom temple resulted in the death of a Cambodian soldier. Both sides blamed each other, with Cambodia seeking an ICJ ruling. The Thai military reinforced its border positions at the temple. Diplomatic discussions on May 29 and June 5 failed to de-escalate the situation.

During June 2025, Cambodia banned imports of Thai fruits and vegetables and the Thai authorities cut power and internet services to cross-border areas of Poi Pet. The Cambodians closed their borders, only spasmodically reopening them.

Level Two: The Emotional Phase

Level two, the emotional phase incorporates stages 4-6 where conflicts become a zero-sum game, with one side gaining while the other side loses. These are win-lose situations. Solutions most often require external mediation for resolution.

Stage 4: Building coalitions of sympathizers and loss of neutrality

This stage moves from any ‘win-win’ possibilities towards potential ‘win-lose’ outcomes. Both sides request help and recognition of their positions from third parties. Thinking now becomes ‘tribal’, perceiving each other as ‘us and them’.

During June and July both nations appealed to their citizens for nationalistic support. In addition, both sides sought support from international institutions to endorse their positions and condemn the other party. Cambodia’s Hun Sen accused the Thai military leaders of ‘greed and ambition’ while rallying local nationalist NGOs. Pro-military forces in Thailand protested against Paetongtarn Shinawatra’s leadership, demanding a hardline stance towards Cambodia. Thailand accused Cambodia of breaking the United Nations charter in efforts to gain international legitimacy of their position. The social media war stepped up with both sides accusing the other of being the aggressor.

On June 26, the Thai Constitutional court suspends prime minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra, over her leaked phone call with Hun Sen. Cambodia continued to send weapons, including Soviet BM-21 rockets to the border. Potential military conflict is framed as a moral struggle.

Stage 5: Loss of Face, Denigration and Public Attacks

During this stage the parties openly ‘attack’ each other and question the other party’s integrity and sincerity. Emotions begin to rule over rational thinking, which increases the risk of the conflict taking a on a momentum of its own.

There were two landmine incidents that injured Thai soldiers between July 16-23, 2025. Thailand accused Cambodia of laying new PMN-2 landmines on disputed border land in previously cleared areas. Cambodian attributed the blasts to old mines. Public accusations escalated and became the prime media issues in both countries. Thailand began labeling Cambodia as the provocator seeking aggression against Thailand. Cambodia accused Thailand of firing first.

Cambodia launched surveillance drones and Thailand moved F-16 fighter jets to Ubon Ratchatthani Airforce Base, ready for immediate use.

Stage 6: Threat Strategies, Ultimatums and Power Displays

In this stage, threats play the major role. Demands are made with promises of punitive measures attached.

Armed conflict began on the morning of July 24 with Cambodia firing Soviet era BM-21 rockets into Sisaket province hitting a gas station in Kantharalak town. Thailand responded with a sortie of F-16s conducting airstrikes on Cambodian positions.

Thailand’s acting prime minister Phumtham Wechayaachi warned Cambodia that further action by Cambodia would lead to further Thai military response. Cambodian prime minister Hun Manet insisted Cambodia would respond to any Thai military action.

Cambodia had dug trenches up to 300 metres into Thai claimed territory. These positions were supported by heavy artillery. The conflict was poised to enter a ‘lose-lose’ scenario between the two parties to the conflict.

Level Three: Annihilation

Level three, the fighting phase involved conflicts producing mutual harm and losses. Attacks on one party would lead to retaliation by the other. A lose-lose situation exists.

Stage 7: Limited Destructive Blows

This stage turns to violence where both parties see a need to attack the other and create real damage to the other party. Any damage to the other party is seen as a victory.

Between July 24-27 fighting became direct and intense, resulting in at least 40 deaths on the Thai side. The Cambodian side have not released any official figures, but it is believed to be higher. On the Thai side around 140,000 civilians were evacuated at least 50 kilometres from the border. The land on the Cambodian side is sparsely populated and evacuation figures are unknown. Rockets and artillery fired from Cambodia into Thailand caused much damage, including killing a civilian and damaging a hospital in Surin province. This caused fear among Thai civilians, especially with the uncontrolled rockets landing deep into Thai territory. F-!6 and JAS 39 Gripen jet fighters attacked Cambodian military bases and troop concentrations appeared to be very effective. The Thais allege they captured a number of Cambodian spies on Thai territory directing artillery and rocket firing, and reporting Thai troop movements.

Stage 8: Fragments of Annihilation and Targeting Core Systems

This stage sees the conflict as a matter of ‘all or nothing’ where further escalation becomes possible. One of the parties may lose self-control.

The conflict escalated on July 27 with Cambodian troops crossing over into Trat province, not far from tourist areas, leading to sporadic battles. The Thai military moved tanks and armored personnel carriers close to the border in reserve, and moved troops from other parts of the country into backward positions. The Thai military had to push back Cambodian troops back across the border. In the last hours of the conflict, the Thai air force focused on destroying ‘scamming centres” in Cambodia, and attempted to regain strategic positions along the Dangrek Ridge.

Cambodia threatened to deploy their PHL-03 rockets with a 130 km range to target military bases and towns. However, this didn’t occur, as Saab Gripen fighter jets and a rapid mobile ground force was prepared to enter Cambodia, if necessary.

Stage 9: Mutual Annihilation

In this stage the parties have no option left but to go all out to destroy the other, even if it leads to their own losses.

This stage was not reached as there was a quickly organized ceasefire meeting arranged as the situation on the ground looked like becoming totally out of control. The Cambodians didn’t launch their longer-range rockets, and the Thai forces were well restrained in their responses. It must be noted that the ceasefire was arranged by external parties, the United States, China, with Malaysia, the ASEAN chair as host. One could speculate that the major factor forcing both parties to ceasefire talks was US president Trump’s remarks on using the August 1 tariff deadline as leverage if they didn’t. Both Thailand and Cambodia didn’t want to be stuck with a 36 percent tariff.

Both sides knowing that escalation was getting outside of their control welcomed the intervention of an external party. The ceasefire had been fragile, until a more comprehensive 13-point ceasefire agreement was negotiated in Kuala Lumpur between 4-7 August.

One must distinguish between any ceasefire and a long-term peace agreement. A ceasefire agreement doesn’t solve any of the root and underlying causes of the conflict. It only puts a ‘band aid’ over the wound. A long-term peace agreement would come to some mutual agreement concerning the root causes of the conflict and map out a pathway for a lasting peace.

The Thai military claim freshly laid land mines in Thai territory have wounds and maimed a soldier on July 12 at Chong Chub Ta Mok area, while the Cambodian deny any mines were ever laid within Thai territory. Once again, the dispute goes back to Stage 4, where the Thai authorities are lodging formal complaints to the Secretary-general of the Ottawa Convention and secretary-general of the United Nations and preparing counter-measures against the Cambodians.

There are still reports of local civilians in the Preah Vihear border area re-evacuating out of fears that further fighting may break out. Hundreds of thousands of Cambodian guest workers in Thailand are returning home after being summoned back by the Government. This appears to be an attempt of economic sabotage by Cambodia, as Cambodian workers have been vital in the farming, manufacturing, and construction industries.

The weaknesses of the Glasl Conflict escalation Model

Such models used by outsiders to any conflict may miss data, and not pick up underlying factors that may create some meaning about long simmering micro-escalations. This is a weakness of Glasl’s model, when long-term historical factors exist that draw both parties to the same geographic area with a different narrative. Below is a list of factors the Glasl model doesn’t take into account in nation-to-nation conflict escalation.

Root Underlying and Causal Factors

The historical issues are often mentioned as an underlying causal factor. Along the border there is definitely an inherent source of conflict between the cultural heritage issues and a conflicting natural border, as witnessed by the cliff faces along the Dangrek mountains. Past maps defining the border have been ambiguous in defining border demarcations. Old Khmer civilization artefacts lay on the top of the cliff faces implying former Khmer empire, aka Cambodian sovereignty. This is supported by old colonial maps that have created ambiguity.

This factor has hindered the opportunity for countries to jointly developing tourism along the border, as existed at Preah Vihear before the previous Thai-Cambodian conflict between 2008-2011. There is little doubt that joint access to Ta Muen Thom temple will also cease after this latest conflict.

On the border demarcation issue, both Thailand and Cambodia have their own firm beliefs as to where the border demarcations should actually be. This area of difference is likely to cause continuous friction on the ground between Thai and Cambodian military (Khaosod 2025) for a long time to come, even after the ceasefire is firmly in place.

One cannot discount the ‘international family feud’ between the Shinawatra and Hun Sen, which became known to the public at large after Hun Sen leaked a telephone conversation between himself and Paetongtarn Shinawatra. As Thai political commentator Ken Lohatepanont said, no one knows about any of the underlying issues that led to the collapse of the relationship, and what it meant in terms of the conflict (Lohatepanont 2025).

There has been a concerted effort by Thai military authorities to cripple scam operations and money laundering activities on the Cambodian side of the border. These activities have been centered around Poi Pet border, where Thai authorities cut hidden underground electricity and communications cables with Thailand. There is some conjecture about who actually owns these illegal operations. Some reports say members of the Thai political establishment, while others say the Cambodian establishment. One news report links the scamming facilities in Poi Pet with Kok An, a Cambodian senator, reportedly close to Hun Sen, wanted by the Thai police (Thai PBS 2025).

The Thai military may have used the opportunity to eliminate ‘scam enterprises’ along the border region, which may have influenced Cambodian responses.

Perhaps the most fitting explanation of the underlying causes of the conflict was best described by CAN’s Nirmal Ghosh who wrote “any definitive explanation without real evidence is suspect; the origins of the conflict remain opaque and likely only really known to a relatively small circle of power elites in both capitals” (Ghosh 2025).

Geographic Factors

The Thai-Cambodia border stretches 817 kilometres from the Emerald Triangle to the coast at Trat. The border is il-defined along many locations, where pockets of Khmer heritage stand inside, what could be called a ‘natural border’. Most of the border is covered with dense forest, and a long ridge along the sandstone Dangrek mountains, which defines the edge of the Isaan Plateau. The border runs south through forested mountains along Chantaburi province and Trat Provinces to the sea. Much of this border is un-marked and subject to poor demarcation based upon old colonial maps.

Thailand has a massive natural military advantage along the Dangrek Ridge, where the drop is as much as 500 feet in some places, naturally protecting Thailand from Cambodian attack with ground forces. Its only in some places like Poi Pet, Ta Muen Thom, Chong Chom, and Preah Vihear, where there are roads down to the Cambodian plain. The 10th Century Ta Muen Thom temple was jointly patrolled by Thai and Cambodian military right up to July 24.

To the south along Chanthaburi and Trat Provinces lie the Cardamoms Ranges which are fully demarcated with the Ban Laem, Pong Nam Ron, Ban Pakkad, Had Lek and Ban Sattari border checkpoints.

Relative Military Strength

A major factor in any conflict is the relative military strength of each party. This can be a major factor in any escalation of conflict.

In the case of Thailand and Cambodia, Thailand clearly has a military advantage over Cambodia. According to Global Firepower, Thailand was ranked 25th and Cambodia 95th out of 145 countries (3). Thailand would most likely overpower Cambodia in an all-out war due to larger and relatively more modern forces. Cambodia’s military equipment is relatively outdated.

This factor didn’t play a major role in the recent conflict, except where outdated Cambodian BM-21 rockets caused civilian casualties, which could have caused escalation of the conflict by the Thai military forces, should they had chosen to do so.
Political Issues

A recent Nida poll taken in early August revealed that most Thais trust the military more than the civilian government to solve the border dispute (Bank Finance 2025). This was perhaps one of Hun Sen’s objectives, to destabilize the Thai government, although this is just speculation.

However, Cambodian opposition leader Sam Rainsy in a FB post (4) sees the motive of Hun Sen was to protect his shadow economy of “Scam centres” along the Thai-Cambodian border. Sam Rainsy sees criminal networks rather than patriarchy as the source of Hun Sen’s power in Cambodia. Thus, from this perspective, the conflict from the Cambodian side was about protecting these criminal networks. Thaksin Shinawatra’s attack on these networks in June was perceived as a direct threat to Hun Sen. This can partly explain why Hun Sen in Trat invaded Thai territory in an attempt to damage the reputation of Thai tourism safety.

Hun Sen’s media apparatus reframed Thai border enforcement actions as nationalist provocation against Cambodia, masking the real stakes of the conflict, the financial survival of the Hun Sen regime (Rainsy 2025).

An Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) review of the conflict reported that Cambodia had mobilized troops and heavy weapons, including BM-21 rocket artillery and 30 Soviet era tanks towards the Emerald Triangle between March and May 2025. Cambodian forces built trenches up to 300 metres into Thai territory at the Damnak Tuk Chom outpost according to satellite data (Suriyasenee & Ruser, 2025).

The Thai military only appeared to act only in direct response to initiated Cambodian attacks. This was according to publicly available evidence in a measured manner. However, this doesn’t mean the Thais were not ready to escalate into stage 9 if necessary. There is little doubt Thai troops would have moved into Cambodia to create a buffer to protect civilians against rocket attacks if they had continued to threaten civilians. The Thai public was ready for this with around the clock media coverage of Thai civilian casualties from Cambodia at the time. This did not occur as Cambodian rocket attacks after the first days declined sharply, as the Cambodians were most likely aware of the Thai military build up on the border.

Command and Control

There was doubt whether any diplomatic activities and initiatives would have been affective at this early stage of the conflict due to separation of command and control from the civilian heads of government and the military.

Both the Cambodian and Thai civilian governments had little direct control of the situation. Consequently, there was a civilian absence in the border dispute as decisions and operations are in the hands of the military.

On the Cambodian side, all military action is under the direction of Senate President Hun Sen, who has created a war room in his office. Cambodian prime minister Hun Manet, who is Hun Sen’s son had stayed out of the issue.

On the Thai side, all military activities were under the direct control of 2nd Army commander Lt General Boonsin Padklang. The civilian prime minister Paetongan Shinawatra has restricted herself to making comments from Bangkok. Acting Thai prime minister Phumtham Wechayachi was also silent, only participating in the ceasefire agreement in Kuala Lumpur.

External Influences

Now that there is a ceasefire, it will the ASEAN border monitors as a neutral party, which may play a major role in maintaining peace between Thai and Cambodian forces. The key to any lasting peace would be a demilitarization of the Thai-Cambodian border in a similar manner to the Thai-Malaysia and Thai-Lao border areas. Borders would once again be run by the civilian authorities of both nations, which still haven’t come back to man border checkpoints that still remain closed at the time of writing.
Consequences of conflict

The Thai-Cambodian conflict had turned into a Thai domestic political crisis. The prime minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra has been suspended while the Constitutional Court investigates the phone call between Paetongtarn and Hun Sen. Relations between Paetongtarn and the military have been strained. The Shinawatras are now politically isolated.

Coming events could lead to the fall of the Pheu Thai led government over the next few months. Once again, the intention and objectives of Hun Sen can only be speculative, although the conflict has contributed to the political woes of the Shinawatra family.

Returning Cambodian workers to their homes is going to affect Thai businesses in the short-term, but may have long-term unemployment issues in Cambodia. Approximately 400,000 Cambodian workers have returned home since the conflict began and have not returned, leaving Thailand with a labour shortage. Likewise cross-border trade and tourism has been affected, particularly in Trat. According to the Observer of Economic Complexity (OEC), annual Thai-Cambodian border trade was estimated at USD 8 billion per annum. (5) It’s uncertain how long-term these effects will last.

Tourism between Thailand and Cambodia along the border is temprarily finished. Hotels and businesses in Aranyaprathet are feeling the stop of tourism and transit business across the border. The only way to travel between Cambodia and Thailand is by plane from cities like Bangkok and Siem Reap.

On the Cambodian side, one must look past the social media propaganda to see the consequences of the conflict. Both Hun Sen and Hun Manet appear politically strong and popular after conflict. With Cambodia’s RSF Press Freedom ranking at 161 out of 181 countries, one must be cautious in making conclusions from media reports (RSF 2025). While there appears to be overwhelming support for Hun Sen in the media, discussions with Cambodian nationals in Thailand indicate otherwise. (6)

The Southeast Asian Association of Professional Translators and Interpreters (SEAProTI) concluded that the media on both sides of the conflict not only reported events but made meaning with psychological warfare and information warfare strategies, thus themselves became instruments of the conflict (Sumanat 2025).

Discussion

Friedrich Glasl’s Nine-Stage Conflict Escalation Model is a robust framework for analyzing conflict dynamics, particularly in organizational settings, but its application to interstate military conflicts, such as the 2025 Thai-Cambodian border conflict, reveals several limitations. These limitations in detail, focusing on how they manifest in the context of nation-to-nation disputes. The analysis is structured around key areas where the model falls short, ensuring a comprehensive yet concise evaluation.

1. Limited Consideration of Historical and Cultural Context

Issue: Glasl’s model is designed primarily for organizational conflicts, where disputes typically lack the deep historical and cultural roots often present in interstate conflicts. The model assumes conflicts escalate in a linear fashion through stages driven by immediate actions and reactions, but it does not adequately account for long-standing historical grievances or cultural narratives that shape nation-to-nation disputes.

Thai-Cambodian Context: The article highlights the historical territorial disputes rooted in the 1962 International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling on Preah Vihear and ambiguities in colonial-era maps, which fueled nationalist sentiments and tensions around Ta Muan Thom temple. These underlying factors, simmering for decades, created a predisposition for conflict that Glasl’s model does not explicitly address. The model’s focus on immediate escalation stages overlooks how historical narratives, such as competing claims over Khmer heritage sites, drive “micro-escalations” that predate Stage 1 (Hardening Tensions).

Implication: Without integrating historical context, the model risks misinterpreting the root causes of conflict, limiting its diagnostic depth for interstate disputes where history and culture are central drivers.

2. Inadequate Handling of Geopolitical and External Influences

Issue: Glasl’s model focuses on the internal dynamics between conflicting parties, with external intervention primarily considered in later stages (e.g., mediation in the fighting phase). It does not account for the significant role of other actors, or external pressures that shape nation-to-nation conflicts from the outset.

Thai-Cambodian Context: Malaysia, the United States, and China played a significant role in brokering the ceasefire, with U.S. President Trump’s tariff threats reportedly influencing both parties’ decisions. Additionally, the involvement of ASEAN border monitors post-ceasefire highlights the ongoing influence of external entities. Glasl’s model does not provide a framework for analyzing how such external pressures affect escalation or de-escalation at various stages, particularly in the rational and emotional phases.

Implication: The model’s limited focus on external actors underestimates their impact on conflict trajectories, especially in interstate disputes where global powers and regional organizations often play pivotal roles.

3. Neglect of Political Factors

Issue: Glasl’s model emphasizes psychological and behavioral escalation (e.g., hardening positions, loss of face) but does not sufficiently incorporate socio-economic or political factors that can drive or sustain conflicts. In nation-to-nation conflicts, issues like economic interests, domestic political instability, or criminal networks can be central to escalation.

Thai-Cambodian Context: Political drivers, such as Cambodia’s alleged protection of “scam centers” in Poi Pet, linked to figures like Senator Kok An, and the economic impact of 400,000 Cambodian workers returning home, disrupting Thai industries. Additionally, the domestic political crisis in Thailand, including the suspension of Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra and tensions between the Shinawatra family and the military, exacerbated the conflict. Glasl’s model does not account for these complex political and economic motivations, such as Hun Sen’s potential aim to destabilize Thailand’s government or protect shadow economies.

Implication: By focusing on interpersonal or group dynamics, the model misses critical structural factors that can sustain or escalate interstate conflicts, limiting its applicability to disputes with multifaceted socio-political dimensions.

4. Assumption of Linear Escalation

Issue: Glasl’s model assumes a sequential progression through nine stages, across three level implying a relatively predictable escalation path. However, nation-to-nation military conflicts often involve rapid, non-linear escalation or overlapping stages due to the intensity of military actions and the involvement of multiple actors, as was seen within this conflict.

Thai-Cambodian Context: The article notes that some stages of the conflict overlapped due to its rapid escalation, with the conflict moving from Stage 1 (Hardening Tensions) to Stage 7 (Limited Destructive Blows) within months, driven by incidents like the Cambodian soldier’s death and rocket attacks. The model’s linear structure struggles to capture such accelerated or concurrent escalation, particularly when military actions (e.g., F-16 airstrikes, rocket barrages) create immediate jumps to higher stages.

Implication: The model’s linear framework may oversimplify the chaotic and multifaceted nature of military conflicts, reducing its ability to reflect real-time dynamics accurately.

5. Limited Applicability to Military Dynamics

Issue: Glasl’s model was developed for organizational settings, where conflicts typically involve non-violent disputes (e.g., labor disagreements). It is less equipped to handle the unique dynamics of military conflicts, such as the role of relative military strength, command-and-control structures, or the strategic use of violence.

Thai-Cambodian Context: Thailand’s military advantage (ranked 25th globally vs. Cambodia’s 95th) and the role of military command structures (e.g., Thailand’s 2nd Army commander Lt. General Boonsin Padklang and Cambodia’s Senate President Hun Sen directing operations). Glasl’s model does not account for how military capabilities, such as Thailand’s F-16s and JAS 39 Gripens or Cambodia’s outdated BM-21 rockets, influence escalation decisions. Nor does it address the separation of civilian and military control, which limited diplomatic de-escalation efforts in the early stages.

Implication: The model’s focus on psychological and social dynamics overlooks the strategic and logistical aspects of military conflicts, reducing its utility for analyzing wars or border disputes.

6. Data Sensitivity and Bias in Application

Issue: Glasl’s model relies on accurate data to map conflict stages, but in nation-to-nation conflicts, data is often incomplete, biased, or influenced by propaganda, making it challenging to apply the model objectively.

Thai-Cambodian Context: The fact that conflict data was drawn from media and social media reports, with unknown impartiality may bias the analysis. Both sides engaged in psychological and information warfare, with Cambodia framing Thai actions as nationalist provocation and Thailand accusing Cambodia of aggression. Glasl’s model does not provide tools to navigate such biased or incomplete information, which can distort stage identification (e.g., whether landmine incidents were new or old).

Implication: The model’s reliance on clear, objective data limits its effectiveness in conflicts where media manipulation and propaganda obscure the true progression of events.

7. Focus on Escalation Over De-escalation

Issue: Glasl’s model is primarily a diagnostic tool for understanding escalation, with less emphasis on de-escalation strategies or the sustainability of resolutions like ceasefires. In nation-to-nation conflicts, where ceasefires are often fragile, this focus limits the model’s practical utility for long-term peacebuilding.

Thai-Cambodian Context: The fragility of the August 7, 2025, ceasefire, with ongoing issues like landmine disputes and civilian evacuations indicating a return to Stage 4 (Building Coalitions). Glasl’s model does not provide a clear framework for analyzing post-conflict dynamics or the steps needed to achieve a lasting peace agreement, as opposed to a temporary ceasefire.

Implication: The model’s emphasis on escalation stages leaves gaps in addressing how to sustain de-escalation or resolve underlying issues, critical for preventing conflict recurrence in interstate disputes.

Conclusion

While Glasl’s Nine-Stage Conflict Escalation Model offers a valuable framework for mapping the progression of the 2025 Thai-Cambodian conflict, its limitations are evident in its application to interstate military disputes. The model struggles to account for historical and cultural roots, contextual influences, political drivers, non-linear escalation, military dynamics, data biases, and post-conflict de-escalation.

These shortcomings suggest that while Glasl’s model can provide a structured analysis of conflict stages, it requires supplementation with context-specific frameworks that address the unique complexities of nation-to-nation conflicts. For future applications, integrating historical analysis, geopolitical considerations, and socio-economic factors could enhance the model’s utility in analyzing and managing interstate disputes.Originally published in Conflict and Peace Studies Journal Vol. 4 No. 2 July – December 2025

Endnotes:Murray Hunter, Independent Researcher and Writer, E-mail: murrayhunter58@gmail.com
Friedrich Glasl was a political scientist, and expert in organizational conflict management. He worked at the NPI for Organisational Development for many years, and lectured in conflict at Salzburg University. Friedrich Glasl was also active as a mediator and organizational development consultant.

See Global Firepower 2025 Nation Rankings, https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.php (Retrieved August 20, 2025)

Sam Rainsy’s Facebook post at https://web.facebook.com/rainsy.sam.5/posts/pfbid02bD5W8gJqJGcwGxtZwXNP39qN8a5Pe5qzHj9svowgrGPaLYNoEooDnsjG6JRpHevAl?_rdc=1&_rdr# (Retrieved August 14, 2025)
OEC, https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/tha/partner/khm?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email (Retrieved August 24, 2025)
A group of Cambodian factory workers in Bangkok were interviewed by the author with an interpreter late July.


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Murray Hunter

Murray Hunter has been involved in Asia-Pacific business for the last 30 years as an entrepreneur, consultant, academic, and researcher. As an entrepreneur he was involved in numerous start-ups, developing a lot of patented technology, where one of his enterprises was listed in 1992 as the 5th fastest going company on the BRW/Price Waterhouse Fast100 list in Australia. Murray is now an associate professor at the University Malaysia Perlis, spending a lot of time consulting to Asian governments on community development and village biotechnology, both at the strategic level and “on the ground”. He is also a visiting professor at a number of universities and regular speaker at conferences and workshops in the region. Murray is the author of a number of books, numerous research and conceptual papers in referred journals, and commentator on the issues of entrepreneurship, development, and politics in a number of magazines and online news sites around the world. Murray takes a trans-disciplinary view of issues and events, trying to relate this to the enrichment and empowerment of people in the region.