

NATIONAL TRAINING CENTER



FORSCOM COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

Note: Comments in “Yellow” boxes are annotations made by two experienced field grade officers. One is an active duty Army armored officer with more than 50 rotations through the NTC as a member of the Opfor or a Brigade; the other is a Marine infantry officer with combat tours in the Persian Gulf War and Somalia.

Their conclusions are in “Light Blue”



**RECONNAISSANCE
AND SURVEILLANCE
PLANNING
AND EXECUTION**



**SYNCHRONIZATION AND
INTEGRATION OF COMBAT
MULTIPLIERS**



**INTEGRATION OF FIRES
IN THE CLOSE FIGHT**

ROTATIONAL TRENDS



**PLANNING AND BUILDING
FLEXIBILITY INTO THE
ORDERS PROCESS**



**TACTICAL MAINTENANCE...
FAULT IDENTIFICATION
AND REPAIR PART
TRACKING**

“This is a predictable consequence of Synchronization Warfare(SW), with its heavy reliance on bureaucratic procedures & checklists. Since officers **CAN NOT BE TRUSTED** to act on their own, they tend to **FOCUS INWARD** on plans & procedures, instead of outward toward the enemy.”

“These bullets are related: There are **no fixed recipes** in the art of war: Many different solutions can be evolved for any given tactical situation. The wealth of knowledge required can only be obtained through thorough STUDY of military history and CONTINUAL PRACTICE in a wide variety of competitive FREE-PLAY exercises, where one’s mind is free to roam and learn from mistakes. Only then will a group have the opportunity to develop a flexible common outlook based on wealth of shared experience. But in today's Army, however, the daily demands of the bureaucracy require staffs to spend an incredible amount of time filling out reports, and endless hours making power point presentations.”

“This is a natural consequence of a SW doctrine that encourages micromanagers to control ALL actions of subordinates to avoid error. Moreover, a bloated officer corps at the middle and senior levels drives decisions higher up the chair of command and robs subordinates of the necessary autonomy needed to take the initiative to exploit or adapt to unforeseen circumstances.”

“**Synchronization evolved out of the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) staffs use to make decisions.** The MDMP was introduced in the 1890s by Major Eben Swift, who translated a French interpretation of a German method used in tactical decision games. The French MISTAKENLY systematized a tutorial device, and Swift broke the process into even more procedures. He created the famous 5-paragraph Operations Order. This formalism feeds inward focus because effort is now directed toward how the order is written rather than "why" it is written.). Swift did not understand that the German method was simply an educational tool to introduce students to the concept of HARMONIZATION and it never left the introductory level. The flaw with the MDMP is that it forces staffs to focus on "checking the blocks" of the matrix instead of focusing on the enemy, mission and commander's intent. In fact, the enemy only occupies a small portion of the MDMP matrix.”

TRENDS

SYNCHRONIZATION & INTEGRATION OF COMBAT MULTIPLIERS

- BATTLE COMMAND - CDRs DO NOT ENVISION HOW THE ENEMY FIGHTS... AND HOW WE WILL FIGHT
- STAFFS DO NOT UNDERSTAND THE CAPABILITIES & LIMITATIONS OF SYSTEMS, TIME AND SPACE
- STAFFS STRUGGLE WITH WARGAMING
- UNITS DO NOT INTEGRATE AIR AND GROUND CAPABILITIES
- WE LACK FLEXIBILITY AND INITIATIVE IN BATTLE EXECUTION
- SIMULATION VS TACTICAL APPLICATION/EXECUTION

“Train the Force!”

“This could reflect two factors:

1. Its become **too expensive** to train together because of the cost of maintaining, and sustaining high-tech weapons.
2. Erosion of experience base due to **exodus** of Captains and the increased need to train to train younger officers in basic core skills.”

“This is a consequence of the **detailed orders** and the **top-down command styles** of Synchronization Warfare. Even a company-level mission is governed by detailed and lengthy orders. Moreover, because the **zero defects** culture places the commander's career at risk in exercises, proper execution of the order is top priority, so staffs become determined to carry the plan through despite the actions of the enemy.”

“In synchronization warfare, the commanders usually tell their staffs exactly what to do, because the commanders are being told what to do. So each echelon of command is like a cog in giant machine and must have detailed instructions and procedures to use in a precisely planned scenario. But the variety of circumstances (even in an exercise) is so great, it is logically **impossible** for a commander to give complete guidance to his staff”

Lack of Cohesion

“In addition to the above, flexibility in decision making requires cohesive units and staffs who stay together for more than six months. These staffs need a common bond and unity of outlook that only comes from shared experiences in a wide variety of stressful tactical scenarios. But the **personnel system rotates people too quickly** to achieve this kind of organizational stability.”

TRENDS

PLANNING & BUILDING FLEXIBILITY INTO THE ORDERS PROCESS

- NOT PREPARED TO EXECUTE THE MDMP IN A TIME CONSTRAINED ENVIRONMENT [MDMP = Military Decision Making Process]
- RECEIVE INCOMPLETE GUIDANCE FROM THE COMMANDER
- UNITS DO NOT DEVELOP FLEXIBLE PLANS
- DO NOT ADJUST THE PLAN AS CONDITIONS CHANGE ACROSS THE BATTLEFIELD OPERATING SYSTEMS (BOS)... RUNNING ESTIMATE

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Bottom Line

“The complexity of internal arrangements in synchronization warfare forces participants to **FOCUS INWARD**. This can be seen in MDMP that focus on processes, formulas, and checklists. This **INTERNAL FOCUS** prevents flexibility when one must change in accordance with unexpected conditions. In maneuver warfare staffs create simple, yet flexible plans pushing decision making down to subordinates. Simplicity of internal arrangements in maneuver warfare permits the staff to **FOCUS OUTWARD** on the enemy rather than on themselves.

“Under the detailed procedures of Synchronization Warfare, subordinate commanders are told when, where, how, and what direction he will attack. In these circumstances, a subordinate commander has no need to understand the reconnaissance battle, he merely does as he is told. In effect his PIRs are set for him by the detailed requirements of the Synchronized effort. Consequently, reconnaissance is used to validate targeting data rather than focus on what the enemy is trying to do.

“This also stems from **lack of cohesion** and an inadequate number of shared experiences in tactically demanding situations. Moreover, it probably reflects effects of dealing with too much bureaucratic BS in garrison.

“**Lack of Cohesion:** units that do not train together until their departure time prior to a NTC rotation can not work together.

“This is yet another consequence of the detailed requirements of Synchronization Warfare: I have seen it a hundred times. If the commander does not understand the art of war, or how to imagine a battle in terms of a concise appreciation of his commander's intent, then how can he issue a clear task and purpose to his recon forces? The natural result is recon forces try to count up all the targets in their NAIs.”

“When the bulk of your R&D goes into high-tech wonder weapons to support synchronized war, then the simple needs of the scouts suffer.

TRENDS

RECONNAISSANCE & SURVEILLANCE
PLANNING & EXECUTION

- MUST ANSWER THE CDR'S PIR [Priority Intelligence Requirements]
- PLANNING IS NOT AN INTEGRATED STAFF EFFORT
- MAXIMIZE ALL ASSETS... SCOUTS, COLTS, ENGINEER RECON, ETAC/FAC
- SCOUTS HAVE NO CLEAR TASK & PURPOSE
- SIZE OF NAIs... NO FOCUS [NAIs = Named Areas of Interest]
- COMMUNICATIONS AND C2 OF THE R&S FORCE

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“**NAIs = Named Areas of Interest.**’ This is a natural consequence of the voracious information demands of Synchronization Warfare. It leads to **fighting the graphics instead of the enemy**. It is more important to fill up the acetate with beautiful graphics drawn with fine colored pins, then keep things simple. The result is information overload and time-consuming procedural complexities that cause battle staffs and commanders to **FOCUS INWARD.**”

Recommendation

Scouts are bogged down satisfying PIRs. Moreover, how can scouts answer the commander's PIR, if the commander does not convey a general intention of what he wants to do to the enemy? In Maneuver Warfare, reconnaissance, and an understanding on how to exploit information garnered from reconnaissance is key. Why not give the scouts a zone of operations and say, find the enemy and confirm or deny my intelligence appreciation, much like Napoleon's use of scouts.

“This slide is more evidence of **lack of professionalism**. The **whole purpose of Brigade level training exercises is to simulate the kind of stress one will experience in real war.**”

“It is particularly important to practice combat logistics at the tactical level for a hi-tech force that depends on automatic test equipment for fault isolation and diagnostics, but this slide tells us units are using the peacetime system. So it should not be surprising that the slower, more predictable peacetime Observation - Orientation - Decision - Action (OODA) cycle leads to --

- Maintenance requests, spare parts requests, and computerized diagnostics systems run on peacetime OODA cycles that **can not keep up** with the higher pace and greater irregularity of combat operations;
- Managers become **over-dependent** on perfect communications and peacetime SOPs and lack practice at improvising;
- Logistics leaders base decisions on peacetime management considerations instead of using logistic OODA loops to build combat power at the tactical and operational levels of war.”

TRENDS

TACTICAL MAINTENANCE... FAULT IDENTIFICATION AND REPAIR PART TRACKING

UNITS DEPLOY WITH A GARRISON BASED LOGISTICS SYSTEM... NOT FOCUSED ON TACTICAL OPERATIONS

ORGANIZATIONAL MAINTENANCE... PMCS, DIAGNOSTICS, MAINTENANCE REQUESTS... NOT TIMELY OR TO STANDARD

MAINTENANCE MANAGEMENT... FWD SPT BN AND HIGHER RELIES COMPLETELY ON GOOD COMMS

LEADERS LACK FOCUS ON BUILDING COMBAT POWER



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Bottom Line

Joint Vision 2010 Establishes “**Focused Logistics**” as one of its Four Pillars;
Yet this slide tells us that the Army Does Not Practice Focused Logistics at the Super Bowl of Training Exercises.

“The problem here is that leaders are so concerned about safety and zero defects, they sacrifice that speed and flexibility.”

“Put another way, they forgot the artillery, so leaders hold back maneuver forces in order for everything to move by phaseline, like a well-oiled machine. Everything is tied to the ability to mass or synchronize fires. This reflects the **inward focus** of Synchronization Warfare at the expense of focus on the enemy.”

“This bullet reflects a failure to determine priorities, which is a natural consequence of the **inwardly focused check list mentality** that counts up all the targets in the area of interest.”

“If you do not focus on the enemy, then you do not know how or when to transition.”

“In synchronized air-land warfare (e.g., the Gulf War) air is a centralized asset, controlled by the highest level. Consequently, lower levels, like Brigade, do not learn how to employ close air support in a close in fight. To make matters worse, the Air Force does not believe in CAS, because they would be working for the Army. So as a practical matter, training opportunities are sadly lacking, and true combined arms warfare is more rhetorical than real, which is one reason why the Republican Guards escaped in the Gulf War”

TRENDS

INTEGRATION OF FIRES IN THE CLOSE FIGHT

INTEGRATION OF FIRES (DIRECT, INDIRECT, CAS) WITH MANEUVER DURING THE PLANNING PROCESS (WARGAMING)
SYNCHRONIZATION OF ARTILLERY MOVEMENT WITH SCHEME OF MANEUVER
LOSS OF FOCUS: TOO MANY EFSTs [= Essential Fire Supt Tasks]
TRANSITION OF FIRES: DEEP TO CLOSE
DEVELOPING AND EXECUTING THE OBSERVATION PLAN
CAS-BDEs DO NOT EMPLOY CAS IN THE CLOSE FIGHT

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Observation

“These deficiencies all flow naturally out of the synchronization doctrine and the pressure to **focus inward** on procedure, templates, and checklists.”



CONDITIONS MENU



**CORRELATION OF FORCES
DAY VS NIGHT
BOUNDARIES AND BATTLE SPACE
USE OF SPECIAL MUNITIONS (CHEM, ROCKETS,
FASCAM)
AMOUNT OF OPFOR INFANTRY
TIME ALLOWED FOR OPFOR PREP
USE OF CIVILIANS ON BATTLEFIELD
USE OF INSURGENTS
AMOUNT OF OPFOR FIXED/ROTARY WING AIRCRAFT
USE OF EW
MEDIA ON BATTLEFIELD**

“Train the Force!”

“No Comments”



NTC Scenarios Jan - Jun 00



1 Bde/1 CD (00-04)



3 Bde/4 ID (00-05)



3 Bde/1 AD (00-06)



3 Bde/3 ID (00-07)



2 Bde/1 CD (00-08)

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NTC Scenarios JUL - DEC 00



218 SIB (SCARNG) (00-09)



1 Bde/4 ID (00-10)



3 Bde/4 ID (01-01)



1 Bde/3 ID (01-02)



2 Bde/101 ID (01-03)

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[Addendum: Not part of FORSCOM Briefing]

Nato Press Briefing Slide

**Nato's Orientation to its Progress in the Serbo-Nato
War as of 19 May 1999**

[Http://www.nato.int/pictures/1999/990519/b990519h.gif](http://www.nato.int/pictures/1999/990519/b990519h.gif)

SUMMARY OF THE EFFECT OF NATO ACTION

**75 % OF FIXED SURFACE TO AIR MISSILE SITES (SAMS)
DESTROYED**

12% OF MOBILE SAMS DESTROYED

69% MIG 29S

34% OF ALL OTHER COMBAT AIRCRAFT

**MOST PRIMARY ROADS INTO KOSOVO AND ACROSS THE
DANUBE**

11 BATTALION/BRIGADE COMMAND POSTS

556 INDIVIDUAL PIECES OF EQUIPMENT IN KOSOVO

INCLUDING:

312 TANKS/ARTILLERY PIECES/ARMoured VEHICLES

**ESTIMATED AT 31% OF ALL SERB HEAVY FORCES IN
KOSOVO**