

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION  
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES



\_\_\_\_\_) )  
In the Matter of ) )  
 ) )  
LabMD, Inc., ) )  
 a corporation, ) )  
 Respondent. ) )  
\_\_\_\_\_)

DOCKET NO. 9357

**ORDER GRANTING MOTION *IN LIMINE* TO  
LIMIT THE TESTIMONY OF ERIC JOHNSON**

On April 22, 2014, Respondent Lab MD, Inc. filed a Motion *in Limine* to Limit the Testimony of Eric Johnson (“Motion”). Specifically, Respondent seeks an order prohibiting Mr. Johnson’s testimony on the subject of “the consequences of inadvertent disclosures of consumers’ personal information.” Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) Complaint Counsel filed its Opposition on April 29, 2014 (“Opposition”). Having fully reviewed and considered the Motion and Opposition, and all assertions and arguments therein, the Motion is GRANTED, as explained below.

**I.**

The Complaint charges that Respondent, a lab that provides doctors with cancer detection services, engaged in an unfair trade practice in violation of Section 5(a) of the FTC Act by engaging in a number of data security practices that, “taken together, failed to provide reasonable and appropriate security for personal information on [Respondent’s] computer networks,” which conduct caused, or is likely to cause, substantial injury to consumers. Complaint ¶¶ 10, 22-23. Respondent’s Answer denies that Respondent violated the FTC Act or that any consumer was injured by the alleged security breach. Answer ¶¶ 17-23.

In Complaint Counsel’s Final Proposed Witness List, served on March 26, 2014, Complaint Counsel lists as a fact witness Mr. Eric Johnson, Dean of Owen Graduate School of Management, Vanderbilt University, and states that he is expected to testify about:

facts related to his study entitled “Data Hemorrhages in the Health-Care Sector,” including his research methodology and findings; the “P2P insurance aging file” referenced in Paragraph 17 of the Complaint; facts relating to the security incident alleged in Paragraphs 17-20 of the Complaint; peer-to-peer file sharing applications and networks and *the consequences of inadvertent disclosures of*

*consumers' personal information*; any other issues addressed in his deposition; any documents introduced into evidence by Respondent or Complaint Counsel as to which he has knowledge; or any other matters as to which he has knowledge that are relevant to the allegations of the Complaint, Respondent's affirmative defenses, or the proposed relief.

Opposition, Ex. C, Complaint Counsel's Final Proposed Witness List, at 16 (emphasis added).<sup>1</sup>

Respondent asserts that Complaint Counsel improperly intends to elicit expert testimony from Mr. Johnson, a lay witness whom Complaint Counsel has not designated as an expert witness. Motion at 1. Respondent contends that testimony about the "consequences of inadvertent disclosures of consumers' personal information" constitutes impermissible expert opinion because the opinion would necessarily be based upon the results of Mr. Johnson's academic research into data breaches, rather than his own personal knowledge. Thus, Respondent argues, the proffered testimony regarding the potential "consequences" that could befall generalized "consumers" through "inadvertent disclosures," constitutes the type of opinion that can only be given by an expert witness. *Id.* at 2-3. Because Complaint Counsel did not designate Mr. Johnson as an expert witness in this matter, the argument continues, such expert opinion testimony should be precluded. Moreover, Respondent argues that LabMD would be substantially prejudiced if Complaint Counsel were permitted to bypass the rules designed to ensure not only that expert testimony is reliable, but also that the opposing party has fair notice and opportunity to probe a witness offering expert testimony in order to be able to rebut his conclusions. *Id.* at 3.

Complaint Counsel contends that the facts related to Mr. Johnson's Health-Care Sector Data Hemorrhages Study, including his research methodology and findings and the consequences of inadvertent disclosures of personal information, constitute relevant and admissible lay testimony, because the testimony is based on Mr. Johnson's own personal knowledge in conducting the study. Opposition at 5. Complaint Counsel argues also that Respondent's motion should be denied because Respondent fails to identify any specific testimony that it seeks to exclude or demonstrate that such unspecified testimony is clearly inadmissible on all potential grounds; that Respondent waived any argument that Mr. Johnson's testimony lacks foundation by not objecting to it during his deposition; and that Respondent failed to meet and confer about its objection to Complaint Counsel's introduction of Mr. Johnson's testimony. *Id.*

## II.

As set forth in the Order Denying Respondent's recent Motion *in Limine* to Strike Trial Witness, issued May 1, 2014, a "motion *in limine*" refers "to any motion, whether made before

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<sup>1</sup> Respondent has also listed Mr. Johnson on its Final Proposed Witness List and indicates that it intends to call Mr. Johnson to testify to: "the facts underlying his study entitled 'Data Hemorrhages in the Health-Care Sector'; communications with the FTC, Tiversa, and/or Health and Human Services regarding LabMD, the 1718 file and his research methodology in general and specifically in relation to locating and downloading the 1718 [file]; facts relating to the security incidents alleged in Paragraphs 17-21 of the Complaint; and facts relating to affirmative defenses asserted in the Answer." Opposition, Ex. D at 3.

or during trial, to exclude anticipated prejudicial evidence before the evidence is actually offered.” *Luce v. United States*, 469 U.S. 38, 40 n.2 (1984); *see also In re Motor Up Corp.*, 1999 FTC LEXIS 207, at \*1 (Aug. 5, 1999).

Motions *in limine* are generally used to ensure evenhanded and expeditious management of trials by eliminating evidence that is clearly inadmissible. *Bouchard v. American Home Products*, 213 F. Supp. 2d 802, 810 (N.D. Ohio 2002); *Intermatic Inc. v. Toebben*, No. 96 C 1982, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15431, at \*6 (N.D. Ill. February 28, 1998). Evidence should be excluded on a motion *in limine* only when the evidence is clearly inadmissible on all potential grounds. *Hawthorne Partners v. AT&T Technologies, Inc.*, 831 F. Supp. 1398, 1400 (N.D. Ill. 1993); *see also Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. U.S. Environmental, Inc.*, No. 94 Civ. 6608 (PKL)(AJP), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19701, at \*5-6 (S.D.N.Y. October 16, 2002). Courts considering a motion *in limine* may reserve judgment until trial, so that the motion is placed in the appropriate factual context. *U.S. Environmental*, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19701, at \*6; *see, e.g., Veloso v. Western Bedding Supply Co., Inc.*, 281 F. Supp. 2d 743, 750 (D.N.J. 2003).

*In re POM Wonderful LLC*, 2011 FTC LEXIS 79, at \*6-8 (May 6, 2011).

“Denial of a motion *in limine* does not necessarily mean that all evidence contemplated by the motion will be admitted at trial. Denial merely means that without the context of trial, the court is unable to determine whether the evidence in question should be excluded.” *In re Daniel Chapter One*, 2009 FTC LEXIS 85, at \*20 (Apr. 20, 2009); *accord In re Gemtronics, Inc.*, 2009 FTC LEXIS 121, at \*6-7 (May 26, 2009).

### III.

The Scheduling Order entered in this case on September 25, 2013, adopts Federal Rule of Evidence 701, which provides that “[i]f a witness is not testifying as an expert, testimony in the form of an opinion is limited to one that is: (a) rationally based on the witness’s perception; (b) helpful to clearly understanding the witness’s testimony or to determining a fact in issue; and (c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.” Fed. R. Evid. 701; Scheduling Order, Additional Provision 18. The Scheduling Order also adopts Federal Rule of Evidence 602, which states that witnesses shall not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter. Fed. R. of Evid. 602; Scheduling Order, Additional Provision 17. The Advisory Committee Note explains that this requires a witness to “be a percipient witness whose testimony is grounded in first-hand information obtained through one of his or her five senses.” *405 Condo Assocs LLC v. Greenwich Ins. Co.*, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 181922, \*13 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 26, 2012); Fed. R. Evid. 602, Advisory Committee Note.

Rule 701 generally does “not permit a lay witness to express an opinion as to matters which are beyond the realm of common experience and which require the special skill and knowledge of an expert witness.” *Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s v. Sinkovich*, 232 F.3d 200, 203 (4th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). When Rule 701 was amended to emphasize that lay

opinion testimony is limited to observations that are “not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702” the Advisory Committee Notes explained:

Rule 701 has been amended to eliminate the risk that the reliability requirements set forth in Rule 702 will be evaded through the simple expedient of proffering an expert in lay witness clothing.

Fed. R. Evid. 701, 2000 Advisory Committee Note; *U.S. v. Conn*, 297 F.3d 548, 553 (7th Cir. 2002).

When testimony is based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge, it falls under Rule 702, which states that a witness who is “qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education” may testify to “scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge” in the form of opinion or otherwise where such knowledge “would assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” Fed. R. Evid. 702. Rule 702 thus requires that expert testimony be the product of reliable principles and methods. Fed. R. Evid. 702; *see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms.*, 509 U.S. 579, 593-94 (1993) (listing factors to guide courts in assessing reliability); *Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael*, 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999) (*Daubert’s* “gatekeeping” obligation applies not only to “scientific” expert testimony, but to all kinds of expert testimony). “Unlike a lay witness under Rule 701, an expert can answer hypothetical questions and offer opinions not based on first-hand knowledge because his opinions presumably ‘will have a reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of his discipline.’” *Sinkovich*, 232 F.3d at 204 (*quoting Daubert*, 509 U.S. at 592). In addition, a witness who presents testimony that falls under Rule 702 must be designated as an expert, as a matter of fundamental fairness, to prevent lay witness opinions being offered without compliance with all the expert witness disclosure requirements set forth in FTC Rule 3.31A, which enable a determination of the reliability of the expert’s opinions. Fed. R. Evid. 701, 2000 Advisory Committee Note (*citing Joseph, Emerging Expert Issues Under the 1993 Disclosure Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure*, 164 F.R.D. 97, 108 (1996) (noting that “there is no good reason to allow what is essentially surprise expert testimony,” and that “the Court should be vigilant to preclude manipulative conduct designed to thwart the expert disclosure and discovery process”)).

#### IV.

It is undisputed that Complaint Counsel did not list Mr. Johnson as an expert witness, provide an expert report for Mr. Johnson, or comply with the other expert disclosure requirements of FTC Rule 3.31A. Complaint Counsel argues that Mr. Johnson is a fact witness and the testimony it seeks to elicit from Mr. Johnson is based on his “personal knowledge from conducting the study.” Opposition at 5. However, even if Mr. Johnson has “personal knowledge” regarding the study, the findings and conclusions Mr. Johnson has reached regarding the “consequences of” data disclosure constitute his opinions, are based on his analysis of data generated by the study, and to this extent, Complaint Counsel’s argument runs counter to *Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s v. Sinkovich*, 232 F.3d 200 (4th Cir. 2000). There, the district court admitted several statements from a witness regarding a vessel involved in an accident and conditions surrounding the accident. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

found that the witness “did not have any first-hand knowledge of the accident nor were his conclusions ones that a normal person would form based upon his perceptions.” *Id.* at 204. Instead, the witness’s “sole basis of knowledge concerning the accident derived from his investigation and his analysis of the data he collected.” *Id.* The court found, “as a lay, not expert, witness, he lacked the personal knowledge necessary to express the opinions that he did . . . and his answers [to certain questions] exceed[ed] the scope of common experience.” *Id.* Accordingly, the Court of Appeals held that the district court erred in admitting the witness’s lay opinion. *Id.* See also *Medtronic, Inc. v. Boston Scientific Corp.*, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28355, \*74-75 (D. Minn. Aug. 8, 2002) (distinguishing opinion based on facts that can be perceived through one of the five senses, from opinion based on facts that must be inferred). Similarly, in the instant case, Mr. Johnson’s knowledge concerning “the consequences of inadvertent disclosures of consumers’ personal information” is derived from an analysis of data he collected, which data, in turn, reflects events and circumstances of which he has no personal knowledge. Under these circumstances, Mr. Johnson’s conclusions regarding the harm resulting from data disclosure is not based upon facts he perceived with his own senses and is not fairly characterized as “rationally based on [Mr. Johnson’s] perception.” In addition, this analysis is necessarily based on information that Mr. Johnson obtained from statements of persons who will not be present to testify in this case, and thus are not subject to cross examination. The truth of those underlying statements cannot and will not be presumed.

Furthermore, it appears that if Mr. Johnson has formed an opinion on “the consequences of inadvertent disclosures of consumers’ personal information,” he has done so based on his scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge, in formulating a study, collecting data, analyzing the data, and drawing conclusions based on that data. In *General Steel Domestic Sales v. Chumley*, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55678 (April 20, 2012), where a party sought to introduce opinion from a witness who specialized in internet search engine marketing and forensic information technology analysis on degree of brand recognition, the court found the subject matter to be clearly “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge” “that would not be understood by an ordinary person” and thus found the witness’s testimony was inadmissible lay opinion testimony pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 701. *Id.* at\*7. Accord *Water Pik, Inc.*, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1373, at \*6-7 (D. Colo. 2012) (finding the same with respect to a witness who provided testimony based on “his extensive financial analysis expertise” and who “describe[d] the methods of analysis and calculations utilized and the results he obtained”); *Gunkel v. Robbinsville Custom Molding, Inc.*, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4020, \*29 (W.D.N.C. Jan. 10, 2013) (citation omitted) (Where plaintiff sought to introduce evidence through a witness “based on his credentials and training as an engineer, not his observations as a lay person,” the court excluded his testimony, noting “[h]is post-hoc assessments cannot be credited as a substitute for the personal knowledge and perception required under Rule 701.”). Because Mr. Johnson’s findings and conclusions regarding “the consequences of inadvertent disclosures of consumers’ personal information,” are clearly based on Mr. Johnson’s “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge,” such testimony is inadmissible lay opinion under Fed. R. Evid. 701(c) and the Scheduling Order in this case.

## V.

Complaint Counsel’s other objections to Respondent’s Motion are addressed as follows.

First, Complaint Counsel contends that Respondent has failed to identify any specific testimony that it seeks to exclude. This objection is rejected. Respondent has clearly identified the specific testimony that it seeks to exclude: Mr. Johnson's "expert opinions on the subject of 'the consequences of inadvertent disclosures of consumers' personal information.'" Motion at 4.

Second, Complaint Counsel objects that Respondent has failed to demonstrate that such testimony is clearly inadmissible on all potential grounds. As stated above, "[e]vidence should be excluded on a motion *in limine* only when the evidence is clearly inadmissible on all potential grounds" and courts "may reserve judgment until trial, so that the motion is placed in the appropriate factual context." *In re POM Wonderful LLC*, 2011 FTC LEXIS 79, at \*6-8 (citations omitted). As explained above, if a witness's testimony is based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702 and has not been "scrutinized under the rules regulating expert opinion," Fed. R. Evid. 701, 2000 Advisory Committee Note, it is not reliable. Under FTC Rule 3.43(b), "[i]rrelevant, immaterial, and unreliable evidence shall be excluded." 16 C.F.R. § 3.43(b). To be clear, because unreliable evidence shall be excluded, Mr. Johnson's opinions on "the consequences of inadvertent disclosures of consumers' personal information" is clearly inadmissible on all potential grounds and no trial context is necessary to resolve this issue.


Third, Complaint Counsel argues that Respondent waived any argument that Mr. Johnson's testimony lacks foundation by not objecting to it during his deposition. Mr. Johnson's opinion on the subject of the consequences of inadvertent disclosures of consumers' personal information is inadmissible because it is impermissible lay opinion, not because of lack of foundation. Accordingly, Complaint Counsel's argument that Respondent waived any argument based on lack of foundation by failing to make such objection at the deposition is without merit.

Fourth, Complaint Counsel's charge that Respondent failed to meet and confer about its objection to Complaint Counsel's introduction of Mr. Johnson's testimony is also without merit. A review of both the Motion and the Opposition reveals numerous communications between the parties on this subject.

## VI.

For the reasons set forth above, Respondent's Motion is GRANTED. Complaint Counsel is hereby precluded from eliciting testimony from Mr. Johnson on the subject of "the consequences of inadvertent disclosures of consumers' personal information."

ORDERED:

  
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D. Michael Chappell  
Chief Administrative Law Judge

Date: May 8, 2014