Titus Livius (Livy), The History of Rome, Book 24
Frank Gardener Moore, Professor Emeritus in Columbia University, Ed.

20. At the same time that they left Casilinum after their success, Gracchus in Lucania sent a number of cohorts which had been enlisted in that region, under the command of a prefect of the allies, into the enemy's farm lands to plunder. [2] Hanno attacked as they were widely scattered, inflicting upon the enemy in return a defeat not much less serious than that which he had received near Beneventum, and withdrew hastily into the land of the Bruttians, that Gracchus might not overtake him. [3] Of the consuls, Marcellus returned to Nola, whence he had come, Fabius advanced into Samnium, to lay waste their farms and to recover by force the cities which had revolted. [4] Samnium around the Caudine Pass was more thoroughly laid waste. [5] Farms were burned over far and wide, cattle and men carried off as booty. Conpulteria, Telesia and Compsa, towns of that region, were taken by storm, also Fugifulae and Orbitanium in Lucania. [6] Blanda and, in Apulia, Aecae were taken after a siege. In these cities twenty-five thousand of the enemy were captured or slain, and three hundred and seventy deserters recovered. These were all sent to Rome by the consul, scourged in the Comitium and hurled from [p. 239]the Rock.¹ [7] Such were the acts of Fabius within a² few days, while Marcellus was kept out of employment by illness at Nola. [8] And the praetor Quintus Fabius, whose field of duty was around Luceria, stormed the town of Acuca about that time and fortified a permanent camp at Ardaneae.³

[9] While the Romans were thus employed elsewhere, Hannibal had now reached Tarentum, leaving the most complete devastation wherever he had passed. Not until it had entered the territory of Tarentum did his column begin to advance peaceably. [10] There they did no damage, and nowhere did they leave the road. And it was plain that this was not due to the self-restraint of the soldiers, but to the commander's orders, for the purpose of winning over the Tarentines. [11] But when he had come quite close to the walls, and there was no movement at the first sight of his column, as he supposed there would be, he pitched camp about a mile from the city. [12] In Tarentum three days before Hannibal approached the walls, Marcus Livius, who had been sent by Marcus Valerius, the propraetor in command of the fleet at Brundisium, actively enlisted young [13??] men, posted guards at all the gates and along the walls, wherever required, and alert by night as well as by day, he left neither the enemy nor wavering allies any opening for an attack. [14] After spending some days there to no purpose, Hannibal, since none of the men who had come before him at the Lake of Avernus either came in person or sent a messenger or letter, saw that he had rashly followed empty promises and moved his camp away. [15] Even then he left the [p. 241]territory of Tarentum unharmed, as he did not give⁴ up his hope of weakening their loyalty, although his pretended clemency had had no effect as yet. Arrived at Salapia, he brought in grain from the districts of Metapontum and Heraclea; for the summer was now over, and he thought well of the place for winter quarters. [16] From it Numidians and Mauri were sent out to plunder in the Sallentine territory⁵ and the nearest forests of Apulia. From these places not many other cattle were driven off as booty, but chiefly herds of horses, about four thousand of which were distributed among the cavalry to be broken.