It is said that Mr. Seward will send a minister to Mexico, and thus give the final kick to the Monroe Doctrine, as hitherto understood in the United States.--What the United States Congress or the people of that subjugated country may think of this proceeding, is a matter of supreme indifference to its masters.--Their business is to conquer the South, and, if it be necessary for the accomplishment of this object, they will "stoop to conquer," no matter what the degradation. Having sacrificed the American Continent for that purpose, they cannot be expected to hesitate at offering up any abstraction, Monroe or otherwise, which may interfere with their one vital object of overwhelming the South.
But, of course, Mr. Seward, in taking this step, gets a good bargain, and insists upon a substantial consideration for what he gives. Seward is to let Napoleon alone, and Napoleon is to let him alone. All this is very good, as long as it lasts. That it cannot last always must be plain enough to both parties to the contract. Both are shrewd, experienced diplomatists, and each is aware of the complete hollowness of the other's purposes. If we assume that the Emperor of the French intends to stand by Maximilian, and render his occupation of Mexico permanent, he must either believe that the Southern Confederacy will inevitably accomplish its independence, or he is singular credulous of the good faith and honest intentions of the American Government. On the assumption of Southern independence, his conduct in attempting to secure the good will of the United States is reconcilable with his character as a sagacious and politic statesman. He gains time thereby for consolidating the throne of Maximilian, and, so far as the Confederacy is concerned, he is safe, at any rate, from interruption from that quarter. On the other hand, if he regards our cause as doubtful, and is seeking to make a friend of the United States for a rainy day, he is the most gullible, instead of the most sagacious, Frenchman now alive. He has studied the character of Wm. H. Seward and the temper of the United States people to little purpose if he supposes he or they will be bound by any such contract one moment longer than their political and military necessities require. If the United States come out triumphant from this war, it will have a disposable army of at least three hundred thousand men for the invasion of Mexico. It will have a navy which can blockade every Mexican port and compete with the regular navy of France on the ocean. It can have a swarm of privateers which will sweep every French merchantman from the ocean. It will seek to cement its domestic power by enlisting all the military adventurers of the South, who will be disbanded at the close of hostilities, in the same grand crusade. It will be eager to create in hostility to a foreign power a new bond of union for the now warring populations. Is it possible that, foreseeing all this, Louis Napoleon expects to propitiate the United States by agreeing not to interfere on behalf of the Southern Confederacy? If he does, he is the most gullible of mankind. The people of the United States have always coveted Mexico. There was respect enough for the opinions of mankind, at the close of the war with that country, combined with ignorance of our own strength, to prevent the wholesale plunder of it at that time from the hands of its own people. But the world's moral sense cannot be offended by taking that, to which Mexico has given up its right, from the hands of those who have compelled it to make the surrender. The United States will go to Mexico as its deliverers, and the great mass of the Mexican people will rally around its standard. The United States is no longer unconscious of its own power. It it comes out of this war victorious, it will be the vainest and most arrogant military nation on the face of the earth. And whoever conquers such soldiers as those of this Southern land, even with the odds of four to one, will have no reason to fear any force that France, or France and England combined, can transport to this continent. Within six months after the conquest of the Southern Confederacy, Mexico would become part and parcel of the United States. We are, therefore, led to the conclusion, either that Louis Napoleon has abiding faith in the ability of the Southern Confederacy to achieve its independence, or that he has no serious thoughts of the permanent establishment of Maximilian in Mexico. The latter idea is scarcely reconcilable with the deliberation of his character and the tenacity with which he always pursues his objects. The weighty commercial and political considerations which induced him to take so serious a step as the occupation of Mexico and the establishment of Maximilian on the throne, cannot, we should think, be lightly abandoned. However, we are inclined to think that Louis Napoleon retains his confidence in the ability of the Southern Confederacy to make good a resistance which is as vital to the security of the power of Maximilian as it is to the independence of the Southern States.
