Wheeler's recent expedition to Charleston, Tenn.
The recent expedition of Gen. Wheeler late Tennessee to intercept a train of one hundred and fifty wagons bound to Burnside's army; proved a failure. The train was successfully gotten across the Hiawassee river and out of Confederate reach, Gen. Wheeler then determined in attack the Yankee force at Charleston, Tenn. A writer in the Atlanta Appeal, who was with the expeditions says:‘ Accordingly, upon our arrival there, dispositions to that end, of the troops forming the expedition, were made in the following manner: The first brigade (Col. Wade's) occupied the extreme right of the line of battle, and, being dismounted, took a strong position upon the crest of a hill in front of and overlooking the town; the first, second, and ninth Kentucky regiments held the centre, and were posted in a dense cedar bindle on the slope of the hill and immediately upon the right of the railroad; the first Kentucky battalion, Captain. Kirkpatrick commanding, held the left of the line, on the north side of the railroad, with the advance line of skirmishers under the immediate charge of Capt. J. A. Cooper, of company D, and about six hundred yards from the right of the enemy's line; the second Kentucky battalion, Capt, was ordered, early in the day, to remain with the artillery, which it did, consequently did not participate in the affair. Before our lines was fairly established skirmishing had begun, and being kept up for more than an hour, principally at long range, resulted in but little loss to either side. The delay on the part of Gen. Wheeler gave the enemy full time for preparation and ample opportunity to recross troops over the river from Calhoun, thus increasing his force to several thousand infantry and cavalry. The appearance of several regiments of infantry on both sides of the railroad showed but too plainly their intention to charge our position. We could distinctly, on the left of our line, hear the commands given by the enemy commander position across the railroad. From a few scattering shots and a brick skirmish, the firing became more earnest and general. For a short-time our lines remained firm; but when the Yankees raised the yell and charged, they broke and scattered in the wildest confusion.
’ A portion of the 2d brigade attempted to check the enemy's advance, but being too small in numbers, found it impossible to do so. Then commenced a scene of the most shameful character, many of the regiments scattering and making no effort, except to get as far from the reach of the Yankees as possible. A number of dismounted men, on reaching the line of horse holders, found their horses gone and themselves left on foot with the enemy's cavalry charging upon them. In this way nearly one hundred and fifty of our men fell into the hands of the Yankees. One instance in this connection is worthy of mention. Private Thos. B Adley, of Capt. Lawrence Jones's company, 9th Kentucky, lost his horse during the fight, and was captured by the 5th Ohio cavalry. Private Jos. Miller, of the same company, who, at the time, was a few yards in advance, wheeled his horse, charged the Yankees, reached Bradley, assisted him in getting behind him, (Miller,) and passed out under a shower of bullets, both reaching our lines in safety. Our losses in killed and wounded were comparatively small, the heaviest being in prisoners, of whom the number already mentioned, or very nearly that number, were taken in the confusion consequent upon the sudden breaking of our lines. Col. Wade, commanding 1st brigade of Kelly's division, received a flesh wound in the thigh, not of a severe nature. A few were wounded in the 9th Kentucky, and we understand a small number were also wounded in the 1st brigade. The retreat was conducted by Lieut.--Col. Griffith, both Gens. Wheeler and Kelly being forced, in order to prevent capture, to take a different road. Both rejoined the command in the retreat that night, on the road to Tunnel Hill.
The following night we returned to camps, near Tunnel Hill, wearied, hungry, and exhausted, having been absent three days, during which time we had traveled upward of seventy-five miles, over roads barely possible for man or horse to pass.--The entire expedition was a failure — complete and perfect in itself. Why General Wheeler attacked the enemy at Charleston is better known to himself than the writer of this. That the fight, on his part, evinced the least military skill and judgment possible, is true, and known to every man present during the engagement. It will not suffice to say he was unaware of the enemy's real strength. He had all to lose and nothing to gain by making the attack. The train that he so certainly counted upon intercepting had already escaped him. Our men had marched all the day before through rain, cold, and mud, and were prevented by the heavy fall of rain from obtaining any rest at night.
In addition to this, at least one half of the supply of ammunition on hand was so much damaged as to be unfit for use. The artillery could not be moved to the scene of action at Charleston, owing to the condition of the roads. Then why risk an engagement under all these disadvantages?
