Building Confederate vessels in France.
[The following extract, from Captain Bullock's ‘Secret Service of the Confederate States in Europe,’ gives a very interesting account of French duplicity in this matter:]I have always understood that when the proposition to raise a loan in Europe was first broached, the Confederate government was not greatly impressed with the scheme, and was somewhat reluctant to accept the offer of the bankers who proposed to undertake the negotiation. After some discussion, it was, however, determined to make the experiment with the moderate amount of £ 3,000,000. The financial enterprise was undertaken by Messrs. Erlanger, of Frarkfort and Paris, and they managed the transaction with great skill and ability. When the prospectus was issued there was a prompt and gratifying response. In a very short time the amount subscribed was £ 15,000,000, or five times the amount wanted, and it was thought that a much larger sum still would have been offered if it had been applied for. The financial agents of the Confederate government lamented their inability to issue bonds for the whole amount offered, but, looking back upon the transaction now, all must feel gratified that the loss to the European public was limited to the smaller figures.
The necessities of the financial situation defined the extent of our naval operations in France, and on the 16th of July, 1863, I closed a contract with M. L. Arman for two ironclad vessels of the dimensions and power afore-mentioned. About a fortnight after the completion [455] of the arrangements, in respect to the above contract, I received a cypher despatch from the Secretary of the Navy on the subject of getting ships in France, and as it affords conclusive proof of the hopes that were held out, and the expectations which were aroused at Richmond in consequence, I think a portion of its contents may properly be given here as a part of the facts necessary to a full understanding of that strange episode in the war which forms the chief subject of this chapter. The following is an extract from the above-mentioned despatch, dated ‘Richmond, May 26th, 1863’
My letter of the 6th instant, enclosed you a copy of a Secret Act of Congress relative to building ships abroad. Since that letter was written, I have received additional assurances, which I regard as satisfactory, that iron-plated ships-of-war can be constructed in France by French builders, and delivered to us ready for service upon the high seas or elsewhere.
Heretofore I have brought to your attention an intimation which I deem not unworthy of notice, from the quarter whence it reached me, that one or more of the ironclads of the French Navy might be so transferred as to come into our possession, and as I have heard, only incidentally from you on the point, and know that you have recently, by your visit to France, had an opportunity of learning the value of this suggestion, I again ask your attention to it.
‘The immediate possession of two or three good armored ships, capable of entering the Mississippi, would be of incalculable value to us, and though the hope of thus obtaining them is not sanguine, I still deem it proper to attempt it. You will, therefore, if you have not already acted, take such measures for this purpose as you may deem best.’
In reply to the portion of the foregoing despatch, which referred to the possible purchase of one or more ironclads from the French Navy, I informed Mr. Mallory that ‘inquiries have been, and continue to be, made. Most of the ironclads already built, or now under construction for the European powers, are either too large, and of too heavy draft, for our especial purposes, or they are mere floating batteries, too small and heavily armed to cross the Atlantic.’
The subject was fully discussed with Mr. Slidell, and he did not see how the negotiation could be opened in such a way as to get the proposition before the Emperor, unless it should appear that he had determined to recognize the Confederate government independently of England, and there was no evidence that he intended to take any such decisive step alone. Mr. Slidell thought that we should be content [456] with the covert intimation that no ship-builder we might employ would be prevented from despatching the vessels to sea when they were completed. Personally, I fully agreed with Mr. Slidell, and on the general question I subsequently wrote to the Secretary of the Navy as follows:
‘You may rely upon it that the purchase of men-of-war from any of the European navies is not practicable under existing circumstances. The transaction would necessarily be managed through intermediaries, who, from the very nature of the negotiations, would be forced to sacrifice principle by prevaricating, and then all sorts of objectionable means would have to be used, even bribery, and after all we would only get cast-off vessels. I, make these remarks as the result of experience, for I have had propositions from many persons, and I know wherein they are all wanting.’
The construction of the corvettes at Bordeaux and Nantes, and the two ironclad vessels, progressed rapidly, and for some months there did not arise any question which suggested a doubt in regard to the purposes of the Imperial government in respect to their departure when completed. On the 23d of November, 1863, I reported that the armored vessels were quite three-fifths finished, and that the corvettes would probably be ready for sea within the contract time, but by that date affairs began to change in their aspect. The American papers began to discuss the probable destination of the ships, and it was stated that Mr. Dayton, the United States Minister, had addressed a protest to the French government against their completion, and it was even affirmed that he had been assured by the Minister of Marine that none of the ships would be allowed to leave France. Commenting upon these uncomfortable rumors, in a subsequent despatch (November 26th, 1863,) to the Secretary of the Navy, I wrote as follows:
The extent to which the system of bribery and spying has been, and continues to be, practised by the agents of the United States in Europe, is scarcely credible. The servants of gentlemen, supposed to have Southern sympathies, are tampered with, confidential clerks, and even the messengers from telegraph offices, are bribed to betray their trust, and I have lately been informed that the English and French post-offices, hitherto considered immaculate, are now scarcely safe modes of communication.
Mere suspicion is not, I regret to say, the basis of Mr. Dayton's protest. He has furnished the French government with copies of certain letters, alleged to have passed between the builders, which go [457] to show that the ships are for us. The confidential clerk, who has had charge of the correspondence of M. Voruz, one of the parties to the contracts, has disappeared, and has unfortunately carried off some letters and papers relating to the business. M. Voruz has not yet discovered the full extent to which he has been robbed, but is using every effort to trace the theft to its source, and to discover how far he can prove complicity on the part of the United States officials. We know that the stolen papers contain evidence that the ships are for us, for the fact has been so stated by the Minister of Marine to one of the builders, but the French government has only thus become aware of a transaction it was perfectly well informed of before. Indeed, I may say, that the attempt to build ships in France was undertaken at the instigation of the Imperial government itself. When the construction of the corvettes was in progress of negotiation, a draft of the proposed contract was shown to the highest person in the Empire, and it received his sanction—at least I was so informed at the time. At any rate, I have a copy of the letter addressed to the builders by the Minister of Marine, giving authority to arm the corvettes in France, and specifying the number of guns, and I have the original document signed by M. Chasseloup Laubat himself, granting like authority for the rams. It can never, therefore, be charged that the Confederate States government, through its agent, has violated the neutrality of France by attempting the construction of ships in her ports, and if Mr. Dayton has received the assurances we see printed in the American papers, the time is rapidly approaching when the policy of the Imperial government, in reference to American affairs, must be positively and definitely expressed.
The builders are still sanguine that they will be allowed to send ships to sea, but I confess that I do not see any such assurance in what they say, and the manner in which the protest of the American Minister had been received is well calculated to confirm my doubts. When Mr. Dayton went to the Minister of Foreign Affairs with a complaint, and with copies of certain letters to substantiate it, the Minister might have said, ‘These are alleged copies of the private correspondence of two prominent and highly respected French citizens; they could only have come into your possession by means of bribery or treachery. I cannot, therefore, receive them as evidence, and must insist that you produce the originals, and explain how you came to be possessed of them.’ It strikes me that such a course would have effectually silenced Mr. Dayton, and we could have felt [458] some assurance of getting our ships to sea. Instead of this, the stolen letters have been received without hesitation, and the United States officials profess to be satisfied with the action, or promised action, of the French government. The builders are sent for, and warned by the Minister of Marine, and although those gentlemen come from their interviews still possessed by the belief that the ships will be allowed to depart, and thus, as I said before, excite hopes, I cannot be blind to the significancy of the above circumstances.
My belief is, that the construction of the ships will not be interfered with, but whether they will be allowed to leave France or not will depend upon the position of affairs in America at the time of their completion. If at that time our cause is in the ascendant, the local authorities will be instructed not to be too inquisitive, and the departure of our ships will be connived at. If, on the contrary, the Federal cause prospers, the affair of the ‘Confederate ships’ will be turned over to the responsible Ministers of the Empire, who will justify their claim to American gratitude by a strict enforcement of the neutrality of France. Hoping always for the best, I shall not permit any fears to create delay in the progress of work. The ships shall be ready as soon as possible, and every effort shall be made to get them to sea in the manner least calculated to compromise the French authorities if they choose only to be judiciously blind.
On the 18th of February, 1864, I reported further to the Secretary of the Navy as follows:
I have the honor to enclose herewith duplicate of my despatch of November 26th, 1863, on the subject of the ironclads and corvettes building for us in France, wherein I ventured to express some apprehension as to the policy the Imperial government would pursue when the ships approached completion. That policy has been pronounced sooner than I anticipated, and the Emperor, through his Ministers of Foreign Affairs and of Marine, has formally notified the builders that the ironclads cannot be permitted to sail, and that the corvettes must not be armed in France, but must be nominally sold to some foreign merchant and despatched as ordinary trading vessels. I believe that M. Arman has acted in a perfectly loyal manner thus far in these transactions, and he sincerely regrets the present turn of events. He has proposed that a nominal sale of the vessels should be made to a Danish banker, and that there should be a private agreement providing for a redelivery to us at some point beyond the jurisdiction of France. This would simply be substituting France for England, and then Denmark for France, and the Danish banker [459] for Messrs. Bravay, and if the two most powerful maritime nations in the world have not been able to resist the importunities of the United States, it would be simply absurd to hope for success through the medium of Denmark, a weak power at best, and just now struggling, almost hopelessly, for her very existence.1 The proposition was therefore declined, as it only involved an increased and useless expenditure of money without a hope of profit. * * * * This case may be summed up in a very few words. It is one of simple deception. I never should have entered into such large undertakings except with the assurance of success. I was not as a private individual, but as an agent of the Confederate States, invited to build ships-of-war in France, and so far at least as the corvettes are concerned, received every possible assurance that they might be actually armed in the ports of construction. During three or four months after the contracts were made, the work advanced very rapidly, but latterly there has been a gradual falling off, which caused me to fear that the builders had received some discouraging intimations from the government. I am not fully convinced on this point, but the result would seem to indicate that my suspicions were not unfounded. By affording refuge to our ships at Calais, Brest and Cherbourg, the Imperial government has shown us more favor than that of her Britannic Majesty, and I presume that the Emperor, trusting to the chances of war and diplomacy, hoped that, before the completion of the ships, affairs both in America and Europe would be in such a condition as would enable him to let them go without apprehension. He now favors us so far as to tell us frankly to sell out and save our money, but this can scarcely ameliorate the disappointment.
The two Bordeaux ironclads and the four corvettes would have been a formidable attacking squadron, and would have enabled its commander to strike severe and telling blows upon the Northern seaboard. The loss of the ironclads changes the whole character of the force, and deprives it of its real power of offence. It is difficult to predict what may be the state of Europe even a month hence, and how the progress of events may affect the chances of getting the wooden ships to sea. I shall, however, make every effort to get at least two of them out to supply the places of our present cruisers should the casualties of the sea reduce their number. There really seems but [460] little for our ships to do now upon the open sea. LieutenantCom-manding Low, of the Tuscaloosa,2 reports that in a cruise of several months, during which he spoke over one hundred vessels, only one proved to be an American, and she being loaded entirely on neutral account, he felt forced to release her after taking a bond. The Alabama also only picks up a vessel at intervals, although she is in the East Indies, heretofore rich in American traffic. Nevertheless, if all our ships should be withdrawn, the United States flag would again make its appearance; and it is therefore essential to provide the necessary relay of vessels. There is, however, no resisting the logic of accomplished facts. I am now convinced that we cannot get ironclads to sea, and unless otherwise instructed, I will make no more contracts for such vessels, except with such a pecuniary guarantee for actual delivery upon the ocean as will secure us against loss.
M. Arman having received positive instructions not to attempt to send the ironclad vessels to sea, but being still permitted to suppose that the corvettes would not be stopped if sent to sea without their guns, it was arranged with him to push the completion of the latter vessels to the utmost, and to go on with the armored ships more leisurely, while we were considering what might be done with them. The course of events and the denouement is more clearly and fairly explained in the following despatch, written to the Secretary of the Navy at the time, than by any version I could give of the transaction now. The despatch referred to was written June 10th, 1864, and was as follows:—
It is now my painful duty to report upon the most remarkable and astounding circumstance that has yet occurred in reference to our operations in Europe. Previous despatches have informed you under what influences, impressions and expectations I undertook the construction of ships of war in the building-yards of France, and how smoothly and satisfactorily the work progressed for several months after it was begun. I reported to you when it became evident that the government was interfering and checking the progress of the work, and finally informed you when the authorities forbade the completion of the rams, and directed the builders of the corvettes to sell them.
When the consultation between Messrs. Mason, Slidell, and myself [461] was held in Paris, the result of which has already been reported to you, it was unanimously agreed that the ironclads must of necessity be sold, but it was thought that the corvettes should be completed, as the builders were confident that the government would not interfere with their departure, if despatched as commercial vessels, and under the assumed ownership of private individuals. Thus fortified by the opinions and advice of Messrs. Mason and Slidell, I gave M. Arman, the principal builder, written instructions to sell the ships, upon his representation that such a course was necessary in order that he might be able to show to the Minister of Marine that his business connection with me had ceased. There was at the same time an express understanding between M. Arman and me that the sale of the corvettes should be purely fictitious, and that the negotiations in respect to the rams should be kept in such a state that we might get possession of them again if there should be any change in the policy of the Emperor's government before their completion. Scarcely a month since, I had a long consultation with M. Arman regarding all of these matters, Mr. Eustis being present. M. Arman showed me a contract of sale of one of the ironclads to the Danish government, and told me he was then negotiating for the sale of the other to the same government. As Denmark was then at war, it had been arranged that the nominal ownership of the rams should vest in Sweden,3 and that government, I was informed, having consented to do this piece of good service for Denmark, M. Arman said that a Swedish naval officer was then at Bordeaux superintending the completion of the rams, as if for his own government. In the contract of sale, M. Arman had agreed to deliver the ships at Gottenburg, in Sweden, and he told me that he had made this unusual stipulation in order that he might be able to send the ships to sea under the French flag, and in charge of men of his own choice. “Now,” said he, “if you are willing to sacrifice one of the rams, and will consent to the bonafide delivery of the first one, I am sure that the second can be [462] saved to you. When the first ram is ready to sail,” continued M. Arman, ‘the American Minister will no doubt ask the Swedish Minister if the vessel belongs to his government. The reply will be ‘Yes;’ she will sail unmolested, and will arrive at her destination according to contract. This will avert all suspicion from the second ram, and when she sails under like circumstances with the first, my people, having a previous understanding with you, will take her to any rendezvous that may have been agreed upon, or will deliver her to you or your agent at sea.’
The above is almost a verbatim report of the proposition made by M. Arman, which, after some discussion upon matters of detail, was accepted, and I have since felt a reasonable assurance of seeing one of our rams at work upon the enemy. A day or two after I called on M. Arman again, taking with me Captain Tessier, my agent in France, a man of intelligence, a capital seaman, and of course master of the French language. The object of the visit was to discuss the arrangements necessary to get the corvettes to sea, and to send to them their armament and crews. I told M. Arman that it would not take a long time to set everything afloat when the proper moment arrived, but that the undertaking was one which not only involved a large expenditure of money, but which required to be managed with great caution and secrecy. When the expedition was ready I said it would be absolutely necessary for it to sail promptly, because delay would cause exposure, and certain interruption and failure would follow, and having due regard to such a contingency, it was very important and indeed essential that I should, if possible, get some assurance that when we were all ready to move, the government would permit the vessels to leave Bordeaux. M. Arman replied that he thought there was no doubt about the corvettes being allowed to sail unarmed, but he was to have a personal interview with the Emperor in ten days or a fortnight, and would then bring the matter to a close by direct appeal to his Imperial Majesty.
Many details relating to the best mode of shipping the guns, the engagement of reliable captains, and the possibility of getting seamen from the ports of Brittany were discussed, all in a most satisfactory manner. Before separating, M. Arman expressed great regret at the delay and interference we had met with, and said that as he had made the contracts for building all the ships in perfect good faith, and with the assurance that his government understood the whole transaction, and would permit him to carry it out, he felt doubly [463] bound to assist in every possible way, and to assume any responsibility that might be necessary.
In face of the foregoing statements, you will readily imagine my astonishment when Captain Tessier arrived here (Liverpool) yesterday afternoon, bringing me a letter from M. Arman, informing me that he had sold both the rams and both the corvettes to ‘governments of the north of Europe,’ in obedience to the imperative orders of his government. He (M. Arman) could not write particulars. * * * Captain Tessier was charged to deliver further verbal explanations as follows:
M. Arman obtained his promised interview with the Emperor, who rated him severely, threatened imprisonment, ordered him to sell the ships at once, bond fide, and said if this was not done he would have them seized and taken to Rochefort. Captain Tessier also brought me word that the two corvettes at Nantes were ordered to be sold, and the builders of those ships sent me by him a copy of the letter of the Minister of Marine conveying the order to them. The order is of the most peremptory kind, not only directing the sale, but requiring the builders to furnish proof to the Minister of Foreign Affairs that the sale is a real one. The Minister of Marine writes the order in a style of virtuous indignation, specifies the large scantling, the power of the engines, the space allotted to fuel, and the general arrangements of the ships as proving their warlike character, and dogmatically pronounces the one to which he especially refers ‘une veritable corvette de guerre.’ When you call to mind the fact that this same Minister of Marine, on the 6th day of June, 1863, wrote over his own official signature a formal authorization to arm those very ships with fourteen heavy guns each (canons rays de trente), the affectation of having just discovered them to be suitable for purposes of war, is really astonishing.4
I certainly thought this kind of crooked diplomacy had died out since the last century, and would not be ventured upon in these common-sense days. Fortunately, I have a certified copy of the permit to arm the ships, and I will get the copy of the indignant order to sell them certified also. Captain Tessier saw Mr. Slidell in Paris, who told him that he had been informed of the sale, and was both astonished and indignant.
My first impulse was to resist and to take legal proceedings to [464] prevent the transfer of the ships to the purchasers, but a moment's reflection satisfied me that such a course could not restore the ships to us; at least it was manifest that they could not be reclaimed for use during the war. The proclamation of neutrality issued by the Emperor of the French on the 10th of June, 1861, contained a specific prohibition against any aid whatever being given by a French subject to either belligerent, and if the government had determined to enforce that prohibition strictly and literally, no effective resistance could be offered, and no plausible evasion could be attempted.
In England, where in theory the law is paramount, and members of the government had often declared that they neither could, nor would, exceed the restrictions as prescribed by statute, we found that pressure could, and did, overcome ministerial scruples, and that the law might be, and was not only ‘strained,’ but that the judgment of a court could be made inoperative by the interference of a Secretary of State. In France, the neutrality laws were in themselves more specific than the corresponding English act, but the power of the executive government to modify or to enlarge the legal prohibitions was far greater than in England, and while the permission or the connivance of a Minister of State would condone any apparent contravention of the law, his official prohibition would render an appeal to it worse than useless.
When Captain Tessier brought me the unwelcome and discouraging report of the forced sale of our French ships, I was so fully occupied with pressing affairs in England that it was impossible for me to go to France at once, but I sent him immediately back with a letter to Mr. Slidell, and with instructions to arrange with M. Arman to meet me in Paris, and followed in a few days. A consultation with Mr. Slidell resulted in nothing but the conviction that the Imperial government had changed the views which had been previously expressed, and that it would be impossible to retain possession of the ships, or to prevent their delivery to the purchasers by any process of law. It was manifest that the builders of the ships were as much surprised and disappointed by the action of the government as we were. They would not have undertaken the transaction unless they had been impressed with the belief that the supreme government fully understood and approved what they were doing, and they were ready and willing to comply with their engagements, and to assume any reasonable responsibility in the effort to fulfil them.
The course of the civil war about this time took an unfavorable [465] turn for the Confederate States, and the South began to show signs of exhaustion, which were painfully manifest to those of us who were conscious of the strain and the inadequacy of the means to resist it.
The apparent change in the probable result of the civil war, the manifest evidence that the Mexican enterprise was bitterly resented by the people of Mexico, and was also sorely vexatious to the majority in France, and the loss of prestige which failure in that expedition would doubtless inflict upon the Imperial regime, must have been very disquieting to the Emperior and to those immediately attached to his person and his government. At the same time Great Britain persistently declined to join with him in any act which might tend to strengthen the South, or to bring pressure upon the United States in respect to the recognition of the Confederate government, and he did not therefore feel equal to the effort of maintaining his position at home and abroad with the United States for an additional and open enemy, and the South unable to assist.
I can think of no other causes why there should have been any change in the policy of the Imperial government towards the South, and as those causes are sufficient to account for a departure from a course which was adopted for ‘reasons of State,’ we may assume that ‘reasons of State’ required the change. Nevertheless, it was our duty to act up to the very end of the struggle as if final success was assured, and to relax no effort that could in any way contribute to that end, or which might strengthen the position of the Confederate government in seeking the reparation which could have been justly claimed from that of France for the injury inflicted upon the South by the sudden and total change of policy.
There was no reason why the government at Richmond should have refrained from making those transactions public at the time, except that to have done so would have borne the appearance of malice, and the effect would have been to alienate the sympathies of the Imperial government, which Mr. Slidell was assured were still with the South; but it cannot be doubted that if the Confederate government had been able to maintain itself, and to achieve the independence of the Southern States, some explanation of those arbitrary and contradictory proceedings would have been required; at least, they would have been taken into account in settling the conditions of a treaty of amity and commerce between France and the new American Republic.
