‘ [126] Second Division, reported to me that the enemy had disappeared from his front, and I immediately ordered him to push forward a heavy skirmish line, which he did promptly, and reported the enemy in force in the works surrounding Atlanta.’
Upon this corps, a few hours later, fell the chief brunt of the battle, as it was hastening to defend the left, and the character of its fighting is sufficiently shown by the facts that it first held its ground, then repulsed the enemy, and that every field officer engaged appears to have been on the list of the killed or wounded.
The character of the surprise upon the left is shown by the following extract from General Blair's report of the battle:
‘In the morning of the 22d the enemy came in on my rear and left in very heavy force, with the intention of overpowering and destroying this corps. Although we had no warning of his approach, and although attacked immediately in rear, the men and officers behaved with unparalleled gallantry, repulsing every assault, changing front repeatedly with a coolness and courage which can not be too highly praised.’
The account given in the above narrative, of the early note to McPherson not to extend so far to the left, certainly needs further explanation in the light of the order, also an early one, to pursue the rebels well to the left, past Atlanta even, and on toward East Point.
The question also arises, if Hood, in his sally, was practising one of his ‘favorite games,’ why he was allowed to succeed so well in his play.
But the one point that will stand out in bolder relief than any other, is the flippancy with which the terms ‘volunteers’ and ‘political generals’ are used against those who, in the midst of grave surprise, brought on by the order of the commanding general, rallied their three corps in the face of an army that had outflanked them, and burst upon them in reverse as well, and fought for hours with the rebel line—sometimes from one face of abandoned Confederate works, sometimes from the other, through that long Summer
