Benson J. Lossing, Pictorial Field Book of the Civil War. Volume 1.

[584]

Chapter 25: the battle of Bull's Run,

• Composition of the opposing armies, 584.--585.
-- movements of the National troops on Fairfax Court House, 586. -- the troops at Centreville, 587. -- skirmish at Blackburn's Ford, 588. -- plans of attack by each party, 590. -- Beauregard re-enforced by Johnston, 591. -- the forward movement, 592. -- the battle of Bull's Run in the morning, 593. -- battle in the afternoon, 598. -- the Confederates re-enforced, 601. -- flight of the National Army, 603. -- the retreat to the defenses of Washington, 606. -- the immediate result, of the battle, 607.

---

The long-desired forward movement of the greater portion of the National Army that lay in the vicinity of the Capital, full fifty thousand in number, began on the afternoon of Tuesday, the 16th of July,

1861.

leaving about fifteen thousand, under General Mansfield, to guard the seat of Government. The advancing troops consisted chiefly of volunteers from New England, New York, and New Jersey, and some from Western States. A greater portion of them had enlisted for only three months, and their terms of service were nearly ended. The remainder were chiefly recent volunteers for “three years or the war,” who were almost wholly undisciplined; and when the army moved, some of the regiments were not even brigaded. There were also seven or eight hundred regular troops (the fragments of regiments), and a small cavalry force, and several light batteries. With the exception of the regulars, the only troops on whom McDowell might rely were the three-months men. He had only seven companies of regular cavalry in his army, and two of these were left for the defense of Washington City.¹

McDowell's forces were organized in five divisions,² commanded respectively [585] by Brigadier-Generals Daniel Tyler and Theodore Runyon, and Colonels David Hunter, Samuel P. Heintzelman, and Dixon S. Miles. The Confederate force against which this army was to move was distributed along Bull's Run,⁴ from Union Mill, where the Orange and Alexandria Railway crosses that stream, to the Stone Bridge of the Warrenton Turnpike, the interval being about eight miles.⁵ The run formed an admirable line of defense. Its steep, rocky, and wooded banks, and its deep bed, formed an almost impassable barrier to troops, excepting at the fords, which were a mile or two apart. They had reserves at Camp Pickens, near Manassas Junction, a dreary hamlet before the war, on a high, bleak plain, and composed of an indifferent railway station-house and place of refreshments and a few scattered cottages. Near there,

Daniel Tyler.

at Weir's house, at the junction of the Centreville and Union Mill roads, Beauregard had his Headquarters. The Confederates had an outpost, with fortifications, at Centreville, and strong pickets and slight fortifications at Fairfax Court House, a village, ten miles from the main army, in the direction of Washington City. General Johnston, as we have observed, was strongly intrenched at Winchester, in the Shenandoah [586] Valley; and General Patterson was at Martinsburg, a few miles below him, charged with the duty of keeping Johnston from re-enforcing Beauregard at Bull's Run. The subjoined map indicates the theater of operations on which the four armies were about to perform.

Orders for the advance were given on the 15th,

July, 1861.

and at half-past 2 o'clock in the afternoon of the next day, Tyler's column, forming the right wing, went forward to Vienna, and encamped for the night. At sunrise the next morning,

July 17.

the whole army moved in four columns. The men were in light marching order, with cooked provisions for three days in their knapsacks. The village of Fairfax Court House was their destination, where, it was expected, the Confederates would offer battle.

Beauregard's Headquarters at Manassas.

Tyler, with the right wing, moved along the Georgetown Road. Hunter, with the center, advanced by the Leesburg and Centreville Road; and a portion of the left wing, under Heintzelman, went out from near Alexandria, along the Little River Turnpike. Another portion, under Miles, proceeded by the old “Braddock road,” that passes through Fairfax Court House and Centreville, where it becomes the Warrenton Turnpike. They found the roads obstructed by felled trees near Fairfax Court House, but no opposing troops. These had fallen back to Centreville. The impediments were soon removed. At noon, the National Army occupied the deserted village, and the National flag, raised by some of Burnside's Rhode Islanders, soon occupied the place of a Confederate one found flying over the Court House. The Commanding General and Tyler's division moved on two miles farther to the

The field of operations.

little village of Germantown, where it encamped. The conquest had been so easy, that the troops, in high spirits, and under the inspiration of a belief that the march to Richmond was to be like a pleasure excursion, committed some excesses, which the commander promptly rebuked. He reminded them that they were there “to fight the [587] enemies of the country, not to judge or punish the unarmed and defenseless, however guilty they may be.” The excesses were not repeated.⁶

General McDowell, pretty well informed concerning the strong position of the Confederate force; intended to turn its right flank at Manassas by a sudden movement to his left, crossing the Occoquan River below the mouth of Bull's Run, and, seizing the railway in the rear of his foe, compel both Beauregard and Johnston to fall back from their positions, so menacing to the National Capital. With this view, he made a reconnoissance on the morning of the 18th, while Tyler moved forward with his division, and at nine o'clock marched through Centreville without any opposition, and halted in a little valley between it and Bull's Run. This movement was intended as a feint, but ended in a sharp engagement.

Centreville was a small village on the west side of a ridge running nearly parallel with the general course of Bull's Run, which was west of it five or six miles, and near it the Confederates had erected strong earthworks. These were occupied by a brigade of South Carolinians under General Bonham, who fled, at the approach of Tyler, to the wooded banks of bull's Run. Several roads, public and private, led to that stream from Centreville.

The Stone Bridge.7

One was the Warrenton Turnpike, that crossed at the Stone Bridge, a structure of a single arch that spanned the Run; another led to Mitchel]s Ford, midway between Centreville and Manassas Junction; and still another led to Blackburn's Ford, over which General James Longstreet was watching.

Toward noon, Tyler went out on a reconnaissance toward Blackburn's [588] Ford, taking with him Richardson's brigade, a squadron of cavalry, and Ayres's battery, and holding Sherman's brigade in reserve. He found the Confederates in heavy force. Beauregard, who had been informed of all of McDowell's movements by spies and traitors,⁸ was there, and had ordered up from Manassas some North Carolina and Louisiana troops, who had just arrived there on their way to Winchester. The woods were so thick that his forces were mostly concealed, as well as his batteries, excepting one on an open elevation. Hoping to draw their fire and discover their positions Ayres's battery was placed on a commanding eminence, and a 20-pound cannon, under Lieutenant Edwards, was fired at random. Only the battery in view responded, and grape-shot from it killed two cavalry horses and

The field of operations from July 16 to July 19.9

wounded two men. Richardson now sent forward the Second Michigan regiment as skirmishers. They were soon engaged in a severe contest in the woods, on a level bottom near the Run. The Third Michigan, First Massachusetts, and Twelfth New York were pushed forward to support the advance, and these, too, were soon fighting severely. The cavalry and two howitzers were now sent forward, and were furiously assailed by musketry in the woods, and at the same time a severe enfilading fire came from a concealed battery on a ridge six hundred yards in front of the Ford. In the mean time, Longstreet had called up some re-enforcements from Early's [589] brigade, and the Nationals, greatly outnumbered, withdrew behind Ayres's battery on the hill. In this movement, a part — of the New York Twelfth were thrown into confusion, but were soon rallied. Just then, Sherman with his brigade came up, having Colonel Corcoran's New York Sixty-ninth in front, when Ayres's battery again opened fire, and an artillery duel was kept up for an hour, the Confederates responding gun for gun. It was now four o'clock in the afternoon. McDowell had just returned from his reconnoissance, satisfied that his plan for turning the Confederate position was impracticable; and he ordered the whole body to fall back to Centreville.¹⁰ This severe skirmish was called by the Confederates the battle of Bull's Run, and was claimed by them as a victory. The loss of the combatants was about equal, that of McDowell being seventy-three, and of Beauregard, seventy.¹¹

The affair at Blackburn's Ford elated the Confederates and depressed the Nationals. The loss of life saddened the soldiers and the people at home. Yet the result of that reconnoissance was important and useful, in revealing the strength and excellent equipment of the Confederates, which had been much underrated, and caused that circumspection which prevented the Nationals from being allured, by the appearance of weakness and timidity on the part of

Corcoran's Sixty-Ninth New York.

their foes, into a fatal snare. It appears to have been a part of Beauregard's plan to entice McDowell, by skirmishes and retreats, across Bull's Run, and when he had placed that stream at the back of his antagonist, to fall upon him, front and flank. For this purpose, he carefully concealed his batteries.

McDowell felt the pressing necessity for an immediate and vigorous attack on the Confederates. In the course of a few days he might lose full ten thousand of his best troops, in consequence of the expiration of their term of service, while Beauregard's army was daily increasing. He concentrated all of his forces at and around Centreville on the 18th, and made instant preparations for an advance. He had thirty thousand men there, and five thousand more, under Runyon, were within call, guarding his communications with Washington. He caused a thorough reconnoissance to be made on the 19th with the intention of attacking his foe on Saturday, the 20th. [590] But his needful supplies did not arrive until Friday night, and he was compelled to remain at Centreville a day longer than he expected to. On that evening, his army began to melt away. The term of service of the Fourth Pennsylvania and Varian's battery of the New York Eighth expired that day, and neither the persuasions of the Commanding General, nor those of the Secretary of War, who was at Headquarters, could induce them to remain. They turned their faces homeward that evening, and a few hours later they heard the thunders of the battle at their backs, in which their brave companions were engaged. On the evening of the 20th, McDowell's force consisted of about twenty-eight thousand men and forty-nine cannon.

The reconnoissance on the 19th satisfied McDowell that an attack on the Confederate front would not be prudent, and he resolved to attempt to turn their left, drive them from the Stone Bridge, where they had a strong battery, force them from the Warrenton Turnpike, and, by a quick movement, seize the Manassas Gap Railway, and thus sever the most important connection between Beauregard and Johnston. For this purpose, Tyler was to move along the Warrenton Turnpike, and open fire on the Confederate left at the Stone Bridge, while Hunter and Heintzelman, with about fifteen thousand men, should make a circuit by a forest road, cross Bull's Run at fords near Sudley Church, and fall upon the flank and rear of the Confederates at the Stone Bridge, where Colonel Evans was in command, with his Headquarters at Van Pelt's. In the mean time, Richardson's brigade was to be temporarily attached to Miles's division, which was left, as a reserve, at Centreville, with orders to strengthen the intrenchments there, and see that the Confederates did not cross Bull's Run, and, by a flank movement, capture the supplies and ammunition of the Nationals there, and cut off their line of retreat. Richardson kept almost the exact position occupied by him on the 18th during the artillery duel.

Fully informed of McDowell's force and position by spies and traitors, Beauregard was contemplating an attack upon the Nationals at Centreville at the same time. The orders for an advance and attack by McDowell and Beauregard were dated on the same day.

July 20, 1861.

The latter ordered the brigades of Ewell and Holmes to cross Bull's Run at Union Mill Ford, to be ready to support the attack on Centreville. The brigades of Jones and Longstreet were directed to cross at McLean's Ford, for the same purpose; while those of Bonham and Bartow were to cross at Mitchell's Ford, and

Grayson Dare-Devils.

those of Cocke and Evans at the Stone Bridge, and make the direct attack on Centreville. The brigades of Bee and Wilcox, with Stuart's cavalry (among whom was a dashing corps known as the Grayson Dare-devils), with the whole of Walton's New Orleans Battery, were to form a reserve, and to cross at Mitchell's Ford when called for. Confident of success, Beauregard ordered the Fourth [591] and Fifth Divisions of his army “to advance to the attack of Fairfax Court House by way of the Old Braddock Road,” “after the fall of Centreville.” ¹²

McDowell issued specific orders on the 20th,

July, 1861.

for the advance and method of attack by the three divisions chosen for the work. The troops were supplied with three days rations. The columns were to move at about two o'clock in the morning of Sunday, the 21st. Tyler was to be in position at four o'clock, or daybreak, to menace the Confederate left at the Stone Bridge, while the real attack was to be made by Hunter and Heintzelman, about two hours later. Every thing was in readiness by midnight. The camp-fires of forty regiments were burning dimly all around Centreville. The full moon was shining brightly. The air was fresh and still. Never was there a midnight more calm and beautiful; never did a Sabbath morning approach with gentler aspect on the face of nature.

McDowell, fearful of unforeseen obstacles, proposed to make a part of the march toward Bull's Run on the evening of the 20th, but he was, unfortunately, overruled by the opinions of others. He was satisfied that Beauregard's army, on the 19th, was inferior to his own; and he had no information of his having been re-enforced. He believed Patterson was holding Johnston at Winchester;¹³ and whilst he felt extremely anxious under the weight of responsibility laid upon him, he did not permit himself to entertain a doubt of his success, if his orders as to time and place should be promptly executed.

But important circumstances, of which McDowell was ignorant, had occurred. When he advanced to Fairfax Court House on the 17th, Beauregard informed the Confederate War Department of the fact, and orders were immediately telegraphed to Johnston for the Army of the Shenandoah to join that of the Potomac at Manassas at once. Johnston received the dispatch at one o'clock on the morning

Joseph E. Johnston.

of the 18th. It was necessary to fight and defeat General Patterson or to elude him. The latter was accomplished, and Johnston, with six thousand infantry, reached Manassas Junction at about noon on the 20th. His whole army, excepting about two thousand of his sick and a guard of militia, who had been left at Winchester, had marched by the way of Millwood through Ashby's Gap to Piedmont,¹⁴ whence the infantry were conveyed by railway, while the cavalry and artillery, because of a lack of rolling stock¹⁵ on the road, were compelled to continue their march as before. Johnston's six thousand made Beauregard's army stronger [592] than McDowell's by at least four thousand men. He was the senior officer, and took the chief command of the army. He approved of Beauregard's plan for an attack on the left wing of the Nationals; and both generals, before daybreak on the morning of the 21st, made active preparations for its execution. A few hours later the Confederates, instead of being the aggressors, were fighting on the defensive on their side of Bull's Run.

The general disposition of the Confederate army on the 21st

July 1861.

was nearly the same as on the 18th.¹⁶ The arrival of re-enforcements, and preparations for the attack on the National left, had made some changes. The detachments of the brigades of Bee of South Carolina, and Bartow of Georgia, that came from the Shenandoah Valley with Johnston, about three thousand in number, had been placed in reserve between McLean's and Blackburn's Fords; and Colonel Cocke's brigade, with which were connected two companies of cavalry and a battery of four 6-pounders, occupied a line in front of Bull's Run, below the Stone Bridge, to guard Island, Ball's, and Lewis's Fords. Three hundred of Stuart's cavalry, of the Army of the Shenandoah, and two companies of Radford's cavalry, were in reserve not far from Mitchell's Ford. Near them was a small brigade under General Holmes, and some cavalry.¹⁷

The three divisions of the National army moved from Centreville in the bright moonlight at the appointed hour.

July 21, 1861.

They advanced slowly, for raw troops were difficult to handle. After crossing Cub Run, Hunter and Heintzelman turned into the road to the right that led through the “Big woods,” whilst Tyler moved along the Warrenton turnpike directly toward the Stone Bridge, with the brigades of Schenck and Sherman, leaving Keyes to watch the road that came up from Manassas, and Richardson

Fourteenth Virginia Cavalry.

to co-operate with Miles in keeping ward over Blackburn's Ford and vicinity, on the extreme left. Tyler's division was accompanied by the batteries of Ayres and Carlisle; and its first business was to make a feigned attack near the bridge at dawn, to deceive the foe and divert his attention until Hunter and Heintzelman should fall upon the flank and rear of his left wing. McDowell, who was ill, had followed the columns from Centreville in a carriage, and he took a position at the junction of the turnpike and the forest road, where he might be in quick communication with all his forces.

These movements were all much slower than had been calculated upon, and the mistake in not making an advance the previous evening was soon painfully apparent. The advantage of a surprise was lost. It was half-past 6 o'clock, when the sun had been shining on the Stone Bridge nearly two hours, before Tyler was ready to open fire on the Confederates there; and [593] the forest road was so rough and obscure, and the distance so much greater than was expected, that Hunter and Heintzelman were. four hours behind the appointed time, when they crossed Bull's Run at and near Sudley's Ford. McDowell had become exceedingly impatient of delay, and at length he mounted his horse, and with his escort, composed of Captain A. G. Brackett's company of United States Cavalry, he rode forward, and overtook and passed Hunter and Heintzelman. McDowell and his attendants were the first in the open fields that became a battle-ground, and were the targets for the first bullets fired by the Confederates.

Tyler placed Schenck's brigade on the left of the turnpike, in a position that menaced the Confederate battery at the Stone Bridge, and Sherman's was posted on the right, to be in a position to sustain Schenck or to cross Bull's Run, as circumstances might require. When this disposition was made, a shell was hurled from a 30-pounder Parrott gun of Edwards's Fifth Artillery battery (then attached to Carlisle's, and stationed in the road, under the direction of Lieutenant Haines) at a line of Confederate infantry seen in a meadow beyond Bull's Run. This was the herald of the fierce battle on that eventful day. It exploded over the heads of the Confederates, and scattered their ranks. Other shells were sent in quick succession, but elicited no reply. This silence made McDowell suspect that the Confederates were concentrating their forces at some point below, to strike his left wing. He therefore held one of Heintzelman's brigades (Howard's) in reserve for a while, to assist Miles and Richardson if it should be necessary.

Colonel Evans, commanding at the Stone Bridge, believing Tyler's feint to be a real attack, sent word to Beauregard that the left wing of their army was strongly assailed. Re-enforcements were ordered forward, and Cocke and Evans were instructed to hold the position at the bridge at all hazards, At the same time, hoping to recall the troops in front of Evans, Johnston ordered an immediate, quick, and vigorous attack upon McDowell's left at Centreville; and his force was so strong on his right, that he and Beauregard confidently expected to achieve a complete victory before noon. The movement miscarried, as Ewell soon informed them; and crowding events changed their plans. From an eminence about a mile from Mitchell's Ford, the two commanders watched the general movements, and waited for tidings of the battle that soon began, with the greatest anxiety. A cloud of dust, seen some distance to the northward, gave Johnston apprehensions that Patterson was approaching, not doubting that he had hastened to re-enforce McDowell as soon as he discovered that the Army of the Shenandoah had eluded him.

Before we consider the conflict, let us take a glance at the topography of the region about to become a sanguinary battle-field:--

Near the Stone Bridge the general course of Bull's Run is north and south, and the Warrenton turnpike crossed it there nearly due west from Centreville. On the western side of the Run the road traversed a low wooded bottom for half a mile, and then, passing over a gentle hill, crossed, in a hollow beyond, a brook known as Young's Branch. Following the little valley of this brook, the road went up an easy slope to a plain in the direction of Groveton, about two miles from the Stone Bridge, where a road from Sudley's Spring crossed it. Between that road and the Stone Bridge, Young's Branch, bending northward of the turnpike, forms a curve, from [594] the outer edge of which the ground rises gently to the northward, in a series of undulating open fields,.dotted with small groves. On that slope was the scene of the earliest sharp conflict on the eventful 21st of July. From the inner edge of the curve of Young's Branch, southward, the ground rises quite abruptly to an altitude of about a hundred feet, and spreads out into a plateau, an irregular ellipse in form, a mile in length from northeast to southwest, and half a mile in width from northwest to southeast. It contained about two hundred acres of cleared land, with a few clumps of oak and pine trees. On the eastern and southern sides of the plateau was a dense wood of small pines; and on the western edge of the fields was a belt of oaks, through which the Sudley's Spring road passed. A short distance from this was

Topography of the battle-field.

the house of Judith Henry, a widow and an invalid, confined to her bed; and nearer the turnpike, on the northern edge of the plateau, were the house and out-houses of a free colored man, named Robinson. This table-land, which is bounded on three sides by a stream of water, was the theater of the principal struggle on the day in question.

Whilst the three brigades were operating against the Confederate left, Colonel Richardson, and Colonel T. A. Davies, of Miles's division, with their respective brigades and batteries, under Lieutenants Green and Benjamin, and Major Hunt, were making a strong demonstration on the Confederate right to distract him. Before nine o'clock, Evans had become satisfied that Tyler's attack, as well as the cannonade below, was only a feint, and that the real assault would be on his flank

Sudley Church.18

and rear. He had been informed of the moving of the heavy columns through the forest toward Sudley's Ford, two miles above him, and he took immediate steps to oppose them. At about half-past 9, when the head of Hunter's column, led by Burnside, was crossing at Sudley Church, and the men were filling their canteens with fresh water from Bull's Run, Evans was posting his troops in a commanding [595] position on the north side of the Warrenton turnpike, within the curve of Young's Branch. The re-enforcements ordered by Johnston had not reached him when he commenced this movement. He sent word to General Bee, who commanded the reserves nearest to him, to hurry forward in support, and leaving four of his fifteen regiments to guard the Stone Bridge, he hastened with the remaining eleven, composed of South Carolinians under Sloan, and Louisianians under Wheat, with two field-pieces of Latham's battery, to confront the approaching foe. He formed his line not far from the Pittsylvania Mansion of the Carter family, with the battery behind a house, his right covered by a grove, and his left sheltered by shrubbery along the road.

It was half-past 10 before the head of Hunter's column, led by Burnside, came in sight of Evans. The division had rested half an hour at the ford, and, being well supplied with water, was quite refreshed. The Second Rhode Island, Colonel John Slocum, led. As they approached the open fields he threw out skirmishers, and very soon his regiment, with Marston's Second New Hampshire, and Martin's Seventy-first New York, with Griffin's battery, and Major Reynolds's Marine Artillery, of Rhode Island, opened the battle. Evans was soon so hard pressed that his line was beginning to waver, when General Bee, who had advanced with the detachments of his own and Bartow's Georgia brigade, and Imboden's battery, to the northern verge of the plateau, just described, perceiving the peril, hurried down the slope, crossed Young's Branch valley, and gave the Confederates such strength that the Nationals were in turn sorely pressed. These re-enforcements consisted of two Georgia regiments (Seventh and Eighth), under Bartow, the Fourth Alabama, and some Mississippians, while Imboden's battery, on the plateau, poured a destructive fire upon the Nationals.

Burnside called for help; and Colonel Andrew Porter, whose brigade was marching down the Sudley's Spring Road, immediately furnished it, by sending a battalion of regulars

Georgia heavy Infantry.

under Major Sykes, of the Third Infantry, to his aid. These made the National line firm, and while the battle was raging with equal vigor on both sides, Colonel Hunter was so severely wounded that he was compelled to leave the field.¹⁹ Colonel Slocum, of the Second Rhode Island, fell mortally wounded soon afterward, and his Major, Sullivan Ballou, had his. leg crushed by a cannon-ball that killed his horse.²⁰ [596] Porter was next in rank to Hunter, but his position was such, with his brigade, that the battle was directed by Burnside, who was ably assisted by Colonel Sprague, the youthful Governor of Rhode Island, who took the immediate command of the troops from his State.

The conflict had been going on for about an hour, and the result was doubtful, when Porter came up and poured a heavy fire upon Evans's left, which made his whole column waver and bend. Just then a strong force was seen coming over a ridge, in the direction of Bull's Run, to the assistance of the Nationals, and the head of Heintzelman's division, which had not reached the ford above when the battle commenced, was coming upon the field. The column on the left was Sherman's brigade, from Tyler's right wing, led by Colonel Corcoran, with his New York Sixty-ninth, sixteen hundred strong. Using a high tree for an observatory, an officer of Tyler's staff had watched the movements of the columns of Hunter and Heintzelman from the moment when they crossed Bull's Run; and when there seemed danger that the tide of battle might be turned against the attacking force of his division, Tyler promptly ordered Sherman to cross just above the

Michael Corcoran.

Stone Bridge to their assistance. He did so without much molestation, when his advance (the Sixty-ninth) soon encountered some of the Confederates flying before Hunter's forces.

Sherman's approach was timely. Those in conflict, having been on their feet most of the time since midnight, and having fought for an hour in the scorching sun, were much exhausted. Sherman's troops were fresh, and the Confederates knew it. Menaced by these on their right, heavily pressed by Burnside and Sykes on their center, and terribly galled by. Porter on their left, they gave way, and their shattered column fled in confusion up the slopes of the plateau and across it, beyond the Robinson and Henry houses. The final blow that broke the Confederate line into fragments, and sent them flying, was a furious charge directly on their center by the New York Twenty-seventh, Colonel Henry W. Slocum.²¹

The fugitives found General T. J. Jackson, with Stanard's battery, on the plateau. He was in command of reserves next behind Bee, and had just arrived and taken position on the eastern edge of the table-land. When Bee hurriedly exclaimed, “They are beating us back!” Jackson calmly replied, “Well, Sir, we will give them the bayonet.” This firmness encouraged Bee, and he tried to rally his men. “Form! Form!” he cried. “There stands Jackson like a stone wall.” The force of that idea was wonderful. The flight was checked, and comparative order was soon evolved out of the direst confusion. [597] From that time, the calm leader that stopped the flight was known as “Stonewall Jackson.”

It was noon when Bee and Evans fled from the first field of close conflict, with their comrade, Colonel Wheat, desperately wounded, and joined Jackson on the plateau, while the Nationals were pressing closely in pursuit. Johnston and Beauregard, alarmed by the heavy firing, and by intelligence that reached them of the strength and movements of the Nationals, sent orders for Generals Holmes, Early, and Ewell to move with their troops with all possible speed in the direction of the sound of the battle, and for Bonham to send forward two regiments and a battery. They then hurried at a rapid gallop from their position, four miles distant, to the plateau, where they found the whole Confederate force to be only about seven thousand men, including Jackson's brigade. They were in a strong position, well sheltered by the thicket of pines already mentioned, and had thirteen cannon, most of them masked in shrubbery, in position to sweep the whole table-land with grape and canister. Pendleton, Johnston's Chief of Artillery, had been ordered to follow him with a battery. But the Nationals, who were then pressing hard upon them, greatly outnumbered them. It was a moment of intense anxiety for the Confederate commanders. They had little hope for victory unless their expected re-enforcements should speedily arrive.

There was not a moment to lose. Johnston comprehended the danger and sought to avert it. Placing himself by the colors of the Fourth Alabama Regiment, he proceeded to reorganize the broken columns of Bee, Bartow, and Evans; and Beauregard formed them in battle-line near the edge of the plateau, where the first shock of an impending attack might be felt. That leader, in a few hurried words, told his troops that the fate of the day depended on their holding their position on that commanding eminence.

When order was restored, Johnston left Beauregard in command on the battle-field, while he withdrew and made his Headquarters at the house of Mr. Lewis, known as “The portico,” on an eminence south of, and even higher than the plateau, from which he had a comprehensive view of the region beyond Bull's Run toward Centreville, the approaches to the Stone Bridge, the field of battle, and

Alabama Light Infantry.

the valley far away toward Manassas, whence his re-enforcements came. There he exercised a general supervision of the army, and forwarded reserves and re-enforcements. Near his new quarters, Colonel Wade Hampton, who had come up from Richmond by railway that morning, with six infantry companies of his legion, had taken position as a reserve; and other re-enforcements were now beginning to arrive. When, between one and two o'clock in the afternoon, the struggle for the plateau commenced, the Confederates had on the field about ten thousand men, horse, foot, and artillery, and twenty-two heavy guns. [598]

Whilst these movements were in progress on the west side of Bull's Run, General Schenck, with his brigade and Carlisle's battery, and a part of Ayres's, had been vainly endeavoring to turn or silence a Confederate battery opposite Tyler's extreme right. In this attempt the Second New York suffered severely. In the mean time, Keyes's brigade had followed Sherman's across the run, eight hundred yards above the Stone Bridge, taken a position on his left, and joined in the pursuit of the broken column of the Confederates. Their batteries near the bridge were soon withdrawn, and between two and three o'clock, Captain Alexander, of the Engineers, with a company of ax-men, proceeded to cut a passage through the abatis that obstructed the road. By three o'clock, there

“The portico.”

were no impediments in the way of the advance of re-enforcements from Centreville; for at one o'clock the National forces had possession of the Warrenton Turnpike from near the bridge westward, which was one of the grand objectives of the movement against the Confederate left.

But there was a formidable obstacle in the way of the complete execution of the design. The Confederates were on the commanding plateau, too near the turnpike and the bridge to make an attempt to strike the Manassas Gap Railway a safe operation. To drive them from it was the task now immediately in hand. To accomplish it, five brigades, namely, Porter's, Howard's, Franklin's, Wilcox's, and Sherman's, with the batteries of Ricketts, Griffin, and Arnold, and the cavalry under Major Palmer, were sent along and near the Sudley's Spring Road, to turn the Confederate left, while Keyes was sent to annoy them on the right. The brigade of Burnside, whose ammunition had been nearly exhausted in the morning battle, had withdrawn into a wood for the purpose of being supplied, and was not again in action. Eighteen thousand Nationals were on the west side of Bull's Run, and thirteen thousand of them were soon fighting the ten thousand Confederates on the plateau.

Up the slope south of the Warrenton Turnpike, the five brigades, the batteries, and the cavalry moved, accompanied by McDowell, with Heintzelman (whose division commenced the action here) as his chief lieutenant on the field. They were severely galled by the batteries of Imboden, Stanard,

Wade Hampton.

Pendleton, Alburtis of the Shenandoah Army, and portions of Walton's and Rogers's batteries of the Army of the Potomac. Yet they pressed forward, with the batteries of Ricketts and Griffin in front, and, outflanking the Confederates, were soon in possession of the western portion of the plateau. There was a swell of ground westward of the Henry [599] house occupied by the Confederates, the possession of which was very important. Whoever held it could command the entire plateau. Ricketts and Griffin were ordered to seize it, and plant their batteries there. The Eleventh New York (Ellsworth's Fire Zouaves), Colonel Farnham, were assigned to their immediate support; and the Twenty-seventh New York, Fifth and Eleventh Massachusetts, the Second Minnesota, and Corcoran's Sixty-ninth New York, were moved up to the left of the batteries.

The Artillery and the Zouaves went boldly forward in the face of a severe cannonade, until an ambushed Alabama regiment suddenly came oat from a clump of pines partly on their flank, and poured upon them a terrible shower of bullets. This hot and unexpected attack made the Zouaves, who had never been under fire, recoil, when two companies of the fine corps of Stuart's horsemen, known as the Black Horse Cavalry (Carter's and Hoge's), dashed furiously upon their rear from the woods on the Sudley's Spring Road. A portion of the Zouaves' line now broke in some confusion, and the cavalry went entirely

Virginia Artillery.--Rockingham Battery.

through their shattered column. Farnham and his officers displayed great coolness. They rallied most of the regiment, under the immediate eye of McDowell, and, with a part of Colburn's United States Cavalry, and led by Colonel J. H. Ward, of Wilcox's brigade, they attacked the Confederate horsemen and dispersed them. The Zouaves, as a compact regiment, did not again appear in the battle; but a larger portion of them, under their Colonel, and others who attached themselves to different regiments, did valiant service wherever they found work to do.

It was now about two o'clock. Keyes's brigade, on the left, had been arrested by a severe fire from a battery of eight guns on the hill near Robinson's buildings, and shelled by them from the National batteries on their left. Tyler ordered him to capture it.

Black horse Cavalry.22

He assigned the Third Connecticut, Colonel Chatfield, and the Second Maine, Colonel Jamieson, to that perilous duty. They charged directly up the northern slope of the plateau, and drove the [600] Confederates from Robinson's buildings; but the battery was too well defended by infantry and riflemen to be taken by them. They instantly found themselves exposed to a terrible fire from breastworks in their rear, which threatened their speedy annihilation. They withdrew; and under the brow of the hill, and sheltered by the pine thicket, Keyes led his brigade in search of some favorable spot to charge upon the Confederate left, but without success. This march, which led Keyes a mile or more from the hottest of the battle on the western edge of the plateau, caused the Confederates to retire from the Stone Bridge, and gave Captain Alexander the opportunity to make a passage through the abatis, as we have observed.

The struggle for the possession of the plateau, in the mean time, had been fearful. When the Zouaves gave way,. Heintzelman ordered up the First Minnesota Regiment, Colonel Gorman, to the support of the batteries, which were directed to take position on the extreme right. The infantry and the artillery did so at the double quick, when they found themselves suddenly confronted by troops less than a hundred feet from them. The Nationals were embarrassed, for an instant, by doubt whether they were friends or foes. Heintzelman himself was uncertain, and he rode in between the two lines. The problem was solved a moment afterward, when the colors of each were seen. .Then a blaze of fire flashed from each line, and terrible slaughter ensued. Both batteries were disabled by the first volley, for it prostrated a greater portion of the cannoneers and one-half of the horses. Captain Ricketts was wounded, and Lieutenant D. Ramsay was killed. The Confederates were there in overwhelming numbers. The Minnesota regiment was compelled to retire. The First Michigan and Fourteenth New York were likewise repulsed. The Confederates, too, were often pushed back, and both sides fought with the greatest bravery. “Stonewall Jackson” had dashed forward and attempted to carry off the guns, but was driven back by the Thirty-eighth New York and the. Zouaves, and the latter dragged three of Ricketts' pieces away, but not far enough to save them.

In the mean time, McDowell had ordered Sherman, who occupied the center of the National force, to charge the batteries of the Confederates with his entire brigade, and sweep them from the hill. Placing the riflemen of Quimby's Thirteenth New York in front, he ordered the Second Wisconsin, Lieutenant-Colonel Peck, the Seventy-ninth (Scotch) New York, Colonel Cameron, and the Sixty-ninth (Irish) New York, Colonel Corcoran, to follow in battle order. The brigade dashed across the Warrenton Turnpike and up the slopes of the plateau to the left of the Sudley's Spring Road, in the face of a galling artillery fire, toward the point where Ricketts' Battery was so severely cut up. They saw the Zouave and other regiments hurled back, but, steadily advancing, had reached the brow of the hill, when the Wisconsin regiment received a severe fire from the Confederates. They withstood it for a while, returning it with spirit, when they broke and fled down the hill in confusion. Being dressed in gray, like the great bulk of the Confederate army, they were fired upon by the Nationals. They rallied, pushed up to the brow of the hill, and were again repulsed. The Seventy-ninth New York then closed up, and pressed forward in the face of a murderous fire from rifles, muskets, and cannon. Headed by Cameron (who was brother of the Secretary of War), they charged across the hill, and fought desperately with the Confederates, [601] who were there in much greater force than was expected. The gallant Cameron was killed,²³ and for the third time they were repulsed. Then Corcoran led his Sixty-ninth to the charge, and the roar of cannon and musketry was incessant. The regiment received and repelled a furious charge of the Black Horse Cavalry, whose ranks were terribly shattered by the murderous fire of the Irish and some Zouaves who had joined them.. They held their position for some time, but were compelled at length to give way before fresh troops in overwhelming numbers, who were pouring in and turning the tide of battle. At that moment, Corcoran was some distance in front, and becoming separated from his troops by the falling of his horse, which was shot dead, he was made prisoner. It was now half-past 3 o'clock.

Now was the crisis of the battle. The slaughter had been fearful. For an hour, dead and wounded men of both sides had been carried from the field in large numbers. The Confederates had lost many officers. Bee and Bartow had fallen near each other, not far from Mrs. Henry's. Hampton, at the head of his legion, had been wounded during the charge of the Seventy-ninth, and Lieutenant-Colonel Johnston of his corps had been killed. Beauregard had placed himself at the head of the Legion, and led it gallantly against his foe, when he was slightly wounded by a shell that cut off the head of his horse and killed two others on which his aids were riding. Jackson had been wounded, but did not leave the field.

At that time the Confederates were sorely pressed, and Johnston, at “The portico,” with full knowledge of the situation, began to lose heart. Victory seemed about to perch on the National standard. He believed the day was lost. Why did not Early come with his three fresh regiments? He had sent him word at eleven

Cavalry of Hampton's Legion.

o'clock to hurry forward, and now it was three. By some mischance, the order did not reach him until two. He was on the way; but would he be up in time? “Oh for four regiments!” cried Johnston to Colonel Cocke, in the bitterness of his soul.²⁴ His wish was soon more than satisfied.

Just then, a cloud of dust was seen in the direction of the Manassas Gap Railway. Johnston had already been informed that United States troops were on that road. He believed Patterson had outmarched his oncoming [602] Army of the Shenandoah, and with fresh troops would easily gain a victory for the Nationals. The story was untrue. They were Johnston's own troops, about four thousand in number, under General E. Kirby Smith, of Connecticut. They had come down by the Manassas Gap Railway; and when Smith heard the thunder of cannon on his left, he stopped the cars, and leaving them, he hurried across the country with his troops in the direction of the conflict, with three regiments of Elzy's Brigade. Johnston received him at “The portico” with joy, and ordered him to attack the right flank of the Nationals immediately. In doing so he fell, severely wounded, when Colonel Elzy executed the order promptly.

Map illustrating the battle of Bull's Run.

When Johnson saw his re-enforcements coming, he ordered Colonel Cocke's brigade up from Bull's Run, to join in the action, and within a half an hour the South Carolina regiments of Cash and Kershaw, of Bonham's brigade, with Fisher's North Carolina regiment, were also pressing hard upon the right of the Nationals. With all these re-enforcements, Beauregard's army of twelve regiments, with which he began the battle, had been increased to the number of twenty-five. These were now all concentrating on the right and rear of McDowell's forces. The woods on his flank and rear were soon swarming with Confederates, who were pouring destructive volleys of musketry and cannon-shot upon him. The blow was sudden, unexpected, heavy, and overpowering. In the course of fifteen minutes, the National army, expectant of victory, was swept from the plateau and its slopes. There was no time for Burnside's rested brigade to come up, nor for Schenck's to cross Bull's Run. As regiment after regiment gave way, and hurried toward the turnpike in confusion, others were seized with panic, and joined in the race from danger. At four o'clock, a greater portion of the National Army was moving rapidly toward Sudley's Ford and other passages of Bull's Run, toward Centreville. With many of the regiments it was not a retreat, nor an orderly fight, but a rout, absolute and uncontrollable. It was seen [603] with the greatest exultation by Jefferson Davis, who had left Richmond that morning, arrived at Manassas Junction at four o'clock, and hastened on horseback to the Headquarters of Johnston. From the Junction, that night,

July 21, 1861.

he telegraphed to his “Congress,” which had convened in Richmond the day before--“Night has closed upon a hard-fought field. Our forces were victorious. The enemy was routed,

Bull's Run battle-ground.25

and fled precipitately, abandoning a large amount of arms, ammunition, knapsacks, and baggage. The ground was strewed for miles with those killed, and the farm-houses and the ground around were filled with wounded. . . . Our force was fifteen thousand; that of the enemy estimated at thirty-five thousand.” ²⁶

Why did not Patterson hold Johnston at Winchester, or re-enforce McDowell at Bull's Run? was a question asked by the people with the severest earnestness, when it was known that to the presence of the former and his troops must be, in a great degree, attributed the disasters that had befallen the National arms. With better information than the public then possessed, the question may now be answered, with the sanction of official and semi-official records, in these few words:--Because his force was greatly inferior in numbers and appointment to that of Johnston; because he was positively [604] instructed not to fight without a moral certainty of success;²⁷ because his army had commenced dissolving, by the expiration of the terms of enlistment of the three-months regiments, and when Johnston started for Manassas

July 18, 1861.

Patterson could not have brought ten thousand effective men into action; and because, by some strange mischance, he was for five days, at the most critical time, namely, from the 17th to the 22d of July, when McDowell was moving upon Manassas and fighting the Confederates, without the slightest communication from the General-in-chief, whilst he (Patterson) was anxiously asking for information and advice. He had been informed by General Scott on the 12th,

July.

that Manassas would be attacked on Tuesday, the 16th. On the 13th, he was directed by his Chief to make demonstrations to keep Johnston at Winchester, if he (Patterson) did not feel strong enough to attack him. Patterson made the demonstration, accordingly, on the day when Manassas was to be attacked, and drove Johnston's pickets within their intrenchments. On the following day he moved his army to Charlestown, where he could more, easily re-enforce McDowell, if called to do so; and at the same time he received a dispatch from Scott,

July 17.

saying--“McDowell's first day's work has driven the enemy beyond Fairfax Court House. Tomorrow, probably, the Junction will be carried.”

Johnston was still at Winchester, with full thirty thousand troops, and Patterson, supposing that the work at Manassas would be completed on the morrow, felt a satisfaction in having accomplished what he was ordered to, do. He was too weak to attack Johnston, but he had held him, he believed, until Beauregard was smitten. On the following morning,

July 18.

at the hour when Johnston received orders to hasten to Manassas, Patterson telegraphed to Scott the relative forces of the opposing armies in the Valley, showing his to be greatly inferior, but asking, “Shall I strike?” To this he received no reply; and when, on the 20th, he telegraphed to the Chief that Johnston, with a greater part of his army, had moved off southwest-ward, and he received no orders in reply, he supposed that McDowell had been victorious at Manassas, and that the Confederates, in numbers too overwhelming to make it prudent for him to follow, were flying from the Valley for safety. The first knowledge that he received of the battle, fought three days later than was intended, was conveyed to him in a newspaper from Philadelphia.²⁸ Patterson seems to have done all that was possible for a prudent and obedient soldier to do, under the circumstances. If he did not prevent the disaster at Bull's Run, he undoubtedly prevented a greater, by keeping Johnston and his heavy force from a meditated invasion of Maryland, and the capture of Washington City by assault in the rear.

The flight of the National army back to the defenses of Washington, and the attending circumstances, afforded one of the most impressive, picturesque, and even ludicrous episodes in history. The determination, the strength, and the resources of the Confederates had been greatly underrated, and there was perfect confidence in the public mind that the impending [605] battle near Manassas would result in absolute and crushing victory for the National arms. It was expected to be the finishing blow to the rebellion. The skirmish of the 18th had cast only a passing cloud over the otherwise serene sky of expectation; and it was dispelled in the course of twenty-four hours.

It became known at Washington on Saturday that McDowell was to attack Beauregard on the line of Bull's Run on Sunday, and scores of men, and even women — Congressmen, officials of every grade, and plain citizens — went out to see the grand spectacle, as the Romans went to the Coliseum to see the gladiators fight. They had tickets of admission to the amphitheater of hills near Bull's Run, in the form of passes from the military authorities; and early on Sunday morning Centreville was gay with civilians. The Headquarters of Colonel Miles was crowded with guests, where wine and cigars were used prodigally. The Hights during the day were covered with spectators and the soldiery enjoying the new sensation of the sight of clouds of smoke over the battle-field in the distance, and the roar of heavy guns far and near, whose booming a was heard even at Alexandria and Washington City. As the battle waxed hotter, and the interest became more intense,

Miles's Headquarters at Centreville.

some, more courageous or more curious than others, pushed on toward the Stone Bridge, some distance beyond Cub Run, where they could hear the scream of shells, and see the white puffs of smoke when they exploded in the air. The excitement was delicious whilst danger was distant; but before sunset, cheeks that glowed with exhilaration at noon, were pale with terror. Then the actors and the audience were commingled in wild disorder, in a flight from the scenes of the bloody drama as precipitate as that from a theater on fire.

When the right of the National army gave way, Johnston, hoping to cut off their retreat, ordered Ewell to cross Bull's Run in heavy force, and attack the left at Centreville. Ewell instantly made the attempt, but his columns were so severely smitten by a storm of grape and canister, from the heavy guns of the gallant Colonel Davies, that they recoiled, and fled back in confusion. The enterprise was abandoned, and thereafter the left was unmolested. Davies was the senior of Richardson in rank, and commanded the detachment which all day long had been watching the lower fords, and annoying passing columns of the Confederates beyond Bull's Run with shot and shell from the batteries of Green, Hunt, Benjamin, and Tidball, the latter belonging to Colonel Blenker's brigade.

Whilst the left was standing firmly, the vanquished right was moving from the field of strife, in haste and much disorder, towards the passages of [606] Bull's Run, from the Stone Bridge to Sudley's Ford, pursued by Confederates of all arms, who made many prisoners. Still greater would have been the number of captives, had not many of the troops been free from panic, and in condition to cover the retreat and give encouragement to the disordered mass. When McDowell perceived that the day was lost, and retreat inevitable, his first care was to protect his army in its flight. For this purpose he detailed Colonel Porter and his regulars, with the cavalry. He also sent word to Miles to order a brigade to the Warrenton Road, at Cub Run, for the same purpose, and Blenker was sent. McDowell himself hastened to the left, where he found much confusion that might prove dangerous, caused by orders and counter-orders of Miles and his brigade commanders. He was informed that Miles had been intoxicated nearly all day, and playing the buffoon, to the disgust of his officers and men. So he took command of the division himself) for Miles could not be trusted.

Porter performed his duties admirably. He kept the Confederates in check; and after the retreat had fairly begun, according to orders, there was not much panic or confusion visible, until those who crossed at and near the Stone Bridge, and others at the fords above, met in converging streams (one along the Warrenton Turnpike, and the other down the forest road traversed by Hunter and Heintzelman in the morning) near the bridge over Cub Run, which was barricaded by a caisson²⁹ that had been overturned on it by a solid shot from the pursuers. Schenck's Brigade had already crossed, and gone on to Centreville, but many civilians in his rear were caught here by the hurrying mass of soldiers. The excitement was intense. The number of the pursuers was magnified by fear from five hundred to five thousand, and they were not far behind. Shots from their Flying Artillery were coming too near to be harmless. Frightened teamsters cut their horses loose, mounted them, and scampered away, leaving their wagons to block the road. The drivers of artillery horses did the same, and left their cannon behind to be seized by the Confederates. Full one-third of the artillery lost that day was left between Cub Run and the Stone Bridge.³⁰

The caisson on the bridge was soon removed, and onward the excited mass pressed. Blenker's protecting brigade, lying across the road, opened and let them pass; and at twilight the fugitives were all behind the lines at Centreville, where the Fifth Division, intact, formed a strong protecting force. Ignorant of the number and exact position of McDowell's reserves, only five hundred cavalry of the pursuing force crossed Bull's Run that evening; [607] and when, at dusk, these encountered some of Blenker's pickets in the gloom, they wheeled and hastened back to the Stone Bridge, when some of his brigade went boldly forward, and brought away two of the cannon abandoned near Cub Run.³¹ In the mean time a part of Beauregard's reserves, which had been ordered up, had arrived.

At Centreville, McDowell held a brief and informal council with his officers, when it was determined to continue the retreat to the defenses of Washington, for the shattered and

Stone Church, Centreville.

demoralized army was in no condition to resist even one-half of the Confederates known to be at Manassas. They had been on duty almost twenty-four hours, without sleep, without much rest, and many of them without food; and during seven or eight hours of the time, a greater portion of those who came over Bull's Run had been fighting under a blazing sun. They needed rest; but so, dangerous did it seem to remain, that the soldiers cheerfully obeyed the order to move forward. Indeed, large numbers of them had already done so. Leaving the sick, and wounded, and dying, who could not be removed, under proper caretakers in a stone church at Centreville (which was used a long time as a hospital), the army moved forward at a little past ten o'clock, with Colonel Richardson's brigade as a rear-guard. Most of them reached the camps near Washington, which they had left

Monument on Bull's Run battle-ground.

in high spirits on the 16th,

July, 1861.

before daylight. Richardson left Centreville at two o'clock in the morning, when all the other troops and batteries had retired, and twelve hours afterward he was with his brigade on Arlington Hights. The survivors of the conflict had left behind them not less, probably, in killed, wounded, and prisoners, than three thousand five hundred of their comrades, [608] though the official report made the number somewhat less. The Confederates, who held the field, lost not less, it is believed, than twenty-five hundred, though Beauregard in his Report gave the number about nineteen hundred.³²

Such was the immediate and most dreadful result of this first great conflict of the Civil War, known as the battle of Bull's Run.³³ We shall hereafter observe its effects upon public sentiment — how it increased the arrogance of the conspirators, and the number of their adherents — how it quickened into powerful and practical action the feeling of nationality and intense love for the Union latent in the hearts of all loyal Americans — how it produced another and more important uprising of the faithful People in defense of the Republic, and how it made the enemies of the Union in Europe hopeful that it would utterly perish in the struggle then earnestly begun.