Titus Livius (Livy), The History of Rome, Book 45
William A. McDevitte, Sen. Class. Mod. Ex. Schol. A.B.T.C.D., Ed.

25. After so mournful a speech, they all prostrated themselves again, and as supplicants, held out olive branches; but at length they were raised, and withdrew from the senate-house. [2] They then began to ask the opinions of the senators. The most inveterate against the Rhodians were those, who as consuls, praetors, or lieutenant-generals, had been engaged in the war with Macedon. Marcus Porcius Cato was the principal supporter of their cause, who, though naturally austere, acted his part as a senator, on this occasion, with much mild- [p. 2145]ness and lenity. [3] I will not introduce here a specimen of his copious eloquence, by relating what he said: his speech is extant, and is comprised in the fifth book of his Antiquities. [4] The answer given to the Rhodians was, that “they should neither be declared enemies, nor any longer remain in alliance with Rome.” [5] At the head of this embassy were Philocrates and Astymedes. They determined that half their number, with Philocrates, should carry home to Rhodes an account of their proceedings; and that the other half, with Astymedes, should remain at Rome, that they might be acquainted with what passed, and inform their countrymen. [6] For the present, they were commanded to remove their governors out of Lycia and Caria, before a certain day. This intelligence was announced at Rhodes; and although it was galling in itself, yet as the Rhodians were relieved from the dread of a greater evil, for they had feared a war, the announcement created joy. [7] They therefore immediately voted a present, amounting in value to twenty thousand pieces of gold, and deputed Theatetus, the commander of their fleet, on that embassy. They wished to procure an alliance with the Romans; but, in such a manner, as that no order of the people should pass concerning it, nor any thing be committed to writing; for in either of these cases, if they failed in suc- ceeding, there would be greater disgrace in the refusal. [8] The admiral of the fleet was empowered, singly, to negotiate that business, if he could effect it without any law being brought forward at Rome on the subject; [9] for, during a considerable length of time, they had maintained a friendship with the Romans, in such a manner as not to bind themselves by a treaty of alliance, for no other reason than that they might neither preclude the kings from all hope of their assistance, if any of them should need it, nor themselves from a participation of the advantages which might accrue from the good fortune and liberality of the said kings. [10] At this time, however, an alliance seemed particularly desirable, not to render them more secure from others, (for excepting the Romans, they feared none,) but to make them less suspected by the Romans themselves. [11] About this time, the Caunians revolted from them, and the Mylasensians seized on the towns of the Euromensians. The spirit of their community was not so totally broken as to hinder their perceiving, that, if Lycia and [p. 2146]Caria were taken from them by the Romans, their other provinces would either assert their own freedom by a revolt, or be seized on by their neighbours; [12] and that they themselves would then be shut up in a small island; within the shores of a barren country, which could by no means maintain the numerous people in so large a city. [13] They therefore sent out, with all speed, a body of troops, and reduced the Caunians to obedience, though they had received succours from Cybara: and afterwards defeated in a battle at Orthosia the Mylassians and Alabandians, who, having seized the province of Euroma, had marched against them with their allied forces.