Titus Livius (Livy), The History of Rome, Book 10
Benjamin Oliver Foster, Ph.D., Ed.

5. on receiving his message the dictator bade advance the standards, and commanded his men to arm and follow them. [2] but everything was almost sooner done than ordered; standards and arms were hurriedly caught up, and the soldiers could hardly be restrained from pushing forward at a run. it was not anger alone that spurred them on, as they thought of the defeat they had recently sustained, but the shouts, as well, that fell faster on their hearing as the fight waxed more hot. [3] so they urged one another forward and exhorted the standard —bearers to a faster pace. but the more haste the dictator saw them make, the more earnest was he to hold them in, and commanded them to [p. 375]slow down their march. [4] The Etruscans, on the¹ contrary, having been called out at the beginning of the battle, had taken the field with all their troops. one messenger after another informed the dictator that all the Etruscan legions were engaged and that his own men could hold out no longer; and looking down from the higher ground, he could see for himself the perilous situation of his people. [5] still, feeling fairly confident that his lieutenant was capable, even then, of maintaining the fight, and that he was himself not too far off to rescue him from danger, he desired the enemy to become completely exhausted, that he might fall upon them with undiminished vigour when their strength was spent. [6] yet although the Romans advanced but slowly, they had now but a little space to charge in, especially the horse. in the van were the standards of the legions, lest the enemy should be apprehensive of any concealed or rapid movement; but the dictator had left intervals between the files of the infantry, to allow ample room for the horses to go through. [7] The legionaries gave a cheer, and simultaneously the horsemen were let loose and with a free course galloped straight upon the enemy, who were not prepared to resist a shock of cavalry and were overwhelmed with a sudden panic. [8] and so, though the help had nearly come too late for men who were already well —nigh surrounded, yet they were now all given a respite, and the battle was taken over by fresh troops —a battle of no long duration nor of doubtful issue. [9] The routed enemy fled back to their camp, and when the Roman standard —bearers pressed in after them, they gave way and huddled up together in the farthest part [p. 377]of the enclosure. [10] The narrow gates became choked² with fugitives and a great part of them climbed upon the mound and palisade, in hopes that from that elevation they might be able either to defend themselves, or to climb over somewhere and escape. [11] it chanced that in a certain place the mound had not been solidly rammed down, and this, overburdened with the weight of those who stood upon it, slid over into the trench. [12] by that opening —crying out that the gods were providing them a means of flight —they saved themselves, but more got away without their arms than with them.

in this battle the might of the Etruscans was broken for the second time.³ by promising a year's pay for the soldiers, with two months' corn, they obtained permission from the dictator to send envoys to Rome to negotiate a peace. [13] Peace was denied them, but they were granted a truce of two years. The dictator returned to Rome and triumphed. —I find historians who say that Etruria was pacified by the dictator without any memorable battle, only by settling the dissensions of the Arretini and reconciling the Cilnian family with the plebs. —Marcus. Valerius resigned as dictator, to enter immediately upon the consulship.⁴ [14] some authors have recorded that he was elected without seeking the office, indeed without even being present, and that the election was presided over by an interrex; this only is not disputed, that he held the consulship in company with Apuleius Pansa.