previous next

Eager to press on, Philip was not in the least deterred by the clouds which had descended to the earth after the rain, and he ordered the standard-bearers to march out. [2] But so thick a fog had blotted out the daylight that the standard-bearers could not see their way, nor could the men see their standards. [3] Misled by the confused shouts, the column was thrown into as great disorder as if it had lost its way in a night march. [4] When they had surmounted the range of hills called Cynoscephalae, where they left a strong force of infantry and cavalry in occupation, they formed their camp. The Roman general was still in camp at Thetideum; he sent out, however, ten squadrons of cavalry and a thousand velites to reconnoitre and warned them to be on their guard against an ambuscade, which owing to the darkened daylight might not be detected even in open country. [5] When they reached the heights where the enemy were posted both sides stood stock-still as though paralysed by mutual fear. As soon as their alarm at the unexpected sight subsided they sent messages to their generals in camp and did not hesitate any longer to engage. [6] The action was begun by the advanced patrols, and then as the supports came up the fighting became general. The Romans were by no means a match for their opponents, and they sent message after message to their general to inform him that they were being overpowered. [7] A reinforcement of 500 cavalry and 2000 infantry, mostly Aetolians, under two military tribunes, was hastily despatched and restored the battle, which was going against the Romans. [8] This turn of fortune threw the Macedonians into difficulties and they sent to their king for help. But as owing to the darkness a battle was the last thing he had looked for on that day, and as a large number of men of all ranks had been sent out to forage, he was for a considerable time at a loss what to do. [9] The messages became more and more importunate, and as the fog had now cleared away and revealed the situation of the Macedonians who had been driven to the topmost height and were finding more safety in their position than in their arms, Philip felt that [10??] he ought to risk a general and decisive engagement rather than let a part of his force be lost through want of support. [11] Accordingly he sent Athenagoras, the commander of the mercenaries, with the whole of the foreign contingent, except the Thracians, and also the Macedonian and Thessalian cavalry. [12] Their appearance resulted in the Romans being dislodged from the hill and compelled to retreat to lower ground. [13] That they were not driven in disorderly flight was mainly owing to the Aetolian cavalry, which at that time was the best in Greece, though in infantry they were inferior to their neighbours.

Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 United States License.

An XML version of this text is available for download, with the additional restriction that you offer Perseus any modifications you make. Perseus provides credit for all accepted changes, storing new additions in a versioning system.

load focus Notes (1881)
load focus Notes (W. Weissenborn, H. J. Müller, 1883)
load focus Notes (W. Weissenborn, H. J. Müller, 1911)
load focus Summary (Latin, W. Weissenborn, H. J. Müller, 1911)
load focus Summary (English, Evan T. Sage, Ph.D. Professor of Latin and Head of the Department of Classics in the University of Pittsburgh, 1935)
load focus Summary (Latin, Evan T. Sage, Ph.D. Professor of Latin and Head of the Department of Classics in the University of Pittsburgh, 1935)
load focus Latin (W. Weissenborn, H. J. Müller, 1883)
load focus English (Cyrus Evans, 1850)
load focus English (Evan T. Sage, Ph.D. Professor of Latin and Head of the Department of Classics in the University of Pittsburgh, 1935)
load focus Latin (Evan T. Sage, Ph.D. Professor of Latin and Head of the Department of Classics in the University of Pittsburgh, 1935)
load focus Latin (W. Weissenborn, H. J. Müller, 1911)
hide References (38 total)
  • Commentary references to this page (13):
    • Titus Livius (Livy), Ab urbe condita libri, erklärt von M. Weissenborn, books 31-32, commentary, 32.17
    • Titus Livius (Livy), Ab urbe condita libri, erklärt von M. Weissenborn, books 31-32, commentary, 32.3
    • Titus Livius (Livy), Ab urbe condita libri, erklärt von M. Weissenborn, books 31-32, commentary, 32.34
    • Titus Livius (Livy), Ab urbe condita libri, erklärt von M. Weissenborn, books 31-32, commentary, 32.37
    • Titus Livius (Livy), Ab urbe condita libri, erklärt von M. Weissenborn, books 33-34, commentary, 33.32
    • Titus Livius (Livy), Ab urbe condita libri, erklärt von M. Weissenborn, books 33-34, commentary, 34.8
    • Titus Livius (Livy), Ab urbe condita libri, erklärt von M. Weissenborn, books 35-38, commentary, 35.26
    • Titus Livius (Livy), Ab urbe condita libri, erklärt von M. Weissenborn, books 35-38, commentary, 35.34
    • Titus Livius (Livy), Ab urbe condita libri, erklärt von M. Weissenborn, books 35-38, commentary, 35.48
    • Titus Livius (Livy), Ab urbe condita libri, erklärt von M. Weissenborn, books 43-44, commentary, 43.10
    • Titus Livius (Livy), Ab urbe condita libri, erklärt von M. Weissenborn, books 43-44, commentary, 44.17
    • Titus Livius (Livy), Ab urbe condita libri, erklärt von M. Weissenborn, books 43-44, commentary, 44.3
    • Titus Livius (Livy), Ab urbe condita libri, erklärt von M. Weissenborn, books 43-44, commentary, 44.34
  • Cross-references to this page (12):
  • Cross-references in notes to this page (2):
  • Cross-references in general dictionaries to this page (11):
hide Display Preferences
Greek Display:
Arabic Display:
View by Default:
Browse Bar: