[4] Hannibal, escaping with a few horsemen in the midst of the confusion, fled to Hadrumetum,2 having tried every expedient both before the battle and during the engagement before he withdrew from the fray. [5] And even by Scipio's admission and that of all the military experts he had achieved this distinction, that he had drawn up his line that day with extraordinary skill: [6] the elephants in the very front, that their haphazard charge and irresistible strength might prevent the Romans from following their standards and keeping their ranks, upon which tactics they based most of their hopes; [7] then the auxiliaries in front of the line of Carthaginians, that men who were brought together from the offscouring of all nations and held not by loyalty but by their pay might have no way of escape open to them; [8] that at the same time, as they met the first fiery attack of the enemy, they might exhaust them, and if they could do no more, might blunt the enemy's swords [p. 501]by their own wounds; [9] next in order the soldiers in3 whom lay all his hopes, the Carthaginians and Africans, that being equal to the Romans in everything else, they might have the advantage in fighting with strength undiminished against the weary and the wounded; then, removed to the last line and separated by an open space as well, the Italic troops, of whom it was uncertain whether they were allies or enemies. [10] Having produced this as his last masterpiece Hannibal after his flight to Hadrumetum was called away, returning to Carthage in the thirty-sixth year after he had left it as a boy. [11] Thereupon in the Senate House he admitted that he had been defeated not only in a battle but also in the war, and that there was no hope of safety except in successfully suing for peace.