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18. In the same summer in which these measures were taken at Rome and these operations carried on in Africa, Publius Quinctilius Varus, a praetor, and Marcus Cornelius, the proconsul, fought a pitched battle with Mago the Carthaginian in the territory of the Insubrian Gauls.1 The praetor's legions were in the first line. [2] Cornelius kept his legions in reserve while he himself rode up to the front. And from in front of the two wings praetor and proconsul kept urging the soldiers to advance their ranks against the enemy with all their strength. [3] When they failed to drive the enemy back, Quinctilius then said to Cornelius: “The battle is slowing down, [p. 433]as you see, and their unexpected resistance is hardening2 the enemy against fright, and the danger is that fear may turn into daring. We must rouse our cavalry to a sudden charge if we wish to confuse and dislodge them. [4] Accordingly, either do you in the front line keep up the fight, and I will lead the cavalry into the fray. Or I will command here at the front, and you shall send out the horse of four legions into the enemy.” [5] As the proconsul was ready to accept whichever part of the task the praetor wished him to take, Quinctilius, the praetor, with his son, an active youth whose praenomen was Marcus, made his way to the cavalry and ordering them to mount suddenly sent them out against the enemy. [6] The confusion wrought by the cavalry was heightened also by the shouting of the legions, and the enemy's line would not have kept its position if Mago at the first movement of the cavalry had not at once led the elephants, which were kept in readiness, into battle. [7] Terrified by their roar and odour and by the sight of them the horses made the assistance of the cavalry useless. And although, so long as they were in the thick of the fight, where they could make use of the lance and, at close quarters, of the sword, the Roman horsemen were the stronger, still when they were carried to a distance by frightened horses, the Numidians were the more successful in hurling javelins from a longer range. [8] Of the infantry also the twelfth legion at the same time was largely cut to pieces and holding its ground more from a sense of honour than by its strength. [9] And it would not have held on long if the thirteenth legion, brought up from the reserves into the front line, had not taken over the indecisive battle. [10] Mago likewise [p. 435]brought up Gauls from his reserves to face the fresh3 legion. After these had been routed with no great effort, the hastati of the eleventh legion massed together and attacked the elephants, which by this time were bringing disorder even to the-infantry line. [11] When the legionaries had hurled javelins against them in their close order, scarcely one missile being without effect, they drove all the elephants back into their own battle-line. [12] Four of them, hampered by wounds, fell to the ground. Then for the first time the enemy's line was driven back, since all the cavalry, on seeing the elephants in flight, dashed out to increase the panic and confusion. [13] But so long as Mago stood before the standards, his men as they slowly retired kept their ranks and continued to fight. After they saw him falling with his thigh pierced, and then borne almost lifeless from the battlefield, at once they all took to flight. [14] About five thousand of the enemy were slain that day and twenty-two military standards were captured. Nor was it a bloodless victory for the Romans. Two thousand three hundred were lost from the army of the praetor, much the larger part of them from the twelfth legion; from it also two tribunes of the soldiers, Marcus Cosconius and Marcus Maevius. [15] Of the thirteenth legion also, which had taken part in the last phase of the battle, Gaius Helvius, tribune of the soldiers, fell while rallying the men. And about twenty-two knights of the upper class were trampled by the elephants and perished together with a number of centurions. Also the engagement would have lasted even longer, had not victory been conceded because of the general's wound.

[p. 437]

1 The battle which follows is evidently taken from one of the Roman annalists and can be accepted only with reservations. To reject the whole passage as unhistorical, as has been done, is virtually to claim that Mago could remain on the Ligurian coast for three summers without ever penetrating to the plains of the Po. He may not have advanced so far as Mediolan(i)um (Milan), chief town of the Insubrians (V. xxxiv. 9; XXXIV. xlvi.).. C.A.H. VIII. 102 f.; De Sanctis 540 f. and note; Neumann 536 f.; but also Ehrenberg in Pauly-Wissowa s.v. Mago 503; Kahrstedt 555 f.; G. Hesselbarth, Unter- suchungen z. dritten Dekade d. Livius 572 f.

2 B.C. 203

3 B.C. 203

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load focus Notes (W. Weissenborn, H. J. Müller, 1884)
load focus Summary (English, Frank Gardener Moore, Professor Emeritus in Columbia University, 1949)
load focus Summary (Latin, W. Weissenborn, H. J. Müller, 1884)
load focus Summary (Latin, Frank Gardener Moore, Professor Emeritus in Columbia University, 1949)
load focus Latin (Frank Gardener Moore, Professor Emeritus in Columbia University, 1949)
load focus English (Rev. Canon Roberts, 1912)
load focus Latin (W. Weissenborn, H. J. Müller, 1884)
load focus English (Cyrus Evans, 1850)
load focus Latin (Robert Seymour Conway, Stephen Keymer Johnson, 1935)
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  • Commentary references to this page (7):
    • Titus Livius (Livy), Ab urbe condita libri, erklärt von M. Weissenborn, books 31-32, commentary, 32.7
    • Titus Livius (Livy), Ab urbe condita libri, erklärt von M. Weissenborn, books 33-34, commentary, 33.25
    • Titus Livius (Livy), Ab urbe condita libri, erklärt von M. Weissenborn, books 35-38, commentary, 38.22
    • Titus Livius (Livy), Ab urbe condita libri, erklärt von M. Weissenborn, books 35-38, commentary, 38.25
    • Titus Livius (Livy), Ab urbe condita libri, erklärt von M. Weissenborn, books 35-38, commentary, 38.48
    • Titus Livius (Livy), Ab urbe condita libri, erklärt von M. Weissenborn, books 39-40, commentary, 39.31
    • Titus Livius (Livy), Ab urbe condita libri, erklärt von M. Weissenborn, books 43-44, commentary, 44.35
  • Cross-references to this page (18):
  • Cross-references in general dictionaries to this page (16):
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