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Alabama (Alabama, United States) (search for this): article 2
. Passing to the stronger and closer parallel afforded by the case of the Spanish colonies, he points out that we did not recognize all of these, but only those in which Spain had practically ceased to keep up the war, omitting all mention of Peru, in which a Spanish army still asserted the right of the mother country. But the presence of that army in Peru created just the same danger to the other colonies that the presence of a Federal army of 200,000 men in Virginia creates for Georgia, Alabama, and the Carolinas. If Peru had been conquered, that army would have passed on to attack the other revolted possessions of Spain, and in fact, the plan of attacking them in detail was the only one which afforded any solid chance of success. The real equivalent, in the case of North America, for the action we took in the matter of the Spanish colonies, would be the recognition of the Confederate Government, waiving, as of course we should waive, the question of the frontier line. But, say
Delaware (Delaware, United States) (search for this): article 2
y be clearly seen by the precedents of Greece and Belgium. There are two or three distinct principles on which a frontier line might be drawn. We might recognize the acts of individual States, and confine the Southern Confederacy to those which have actually and formally become members thereof--Virginia, Tennessee, Arkansas, and the States south of them, with the territory of New Mexico. Or we might recognize the sovereign rights of the people, and allow Missouri, Kentucky, Maryland, and Delaware to decide their own fate Tuscany, the Legations, and the Duchies. Or we might undertake ourselves to draw a frontier line, giving to the North these districts which are Northern by sympathy, and to the South those which desire to be Southern. There could be few cases in which it would be easier to decide on a common basis of action; few in which the power of the mediators to enforce their decimation could be less doubtful. The South is ready to accept any fair terms of peace; if the Nor
Missouri (Missouri, United States) (search for this): article 2
oes not affect the question, as may be clearly seen by the precedents of Greece and Belgium. There are two or three distinct principles on which a frontier line might be drawn. We might recognize the acts of individual States, and confine the Southern Confederacy to those which have actually and formally become members thereof--Virginia, Tennessee, Arkansas, and the States south of them, with the territory of New Mexico. Or we might recognize the sovereign rights of the people, and allow Missouri, Kentucky, Maryland, and Delaware to decide their own fate Tuscany, the Legations, and the Duchies. Or we might undertake ourselves to draw a frontier line, giving to the North these districts which are Northern by sympathy, and to the South those which desire to be Southern. There could be few cases in which it would be easier to decide on a common basis of action; few in which the power of the mediators to enforce their decimation could be less doubtful. The South is ready to accept a
France (France) (search for this): article 2
or declining to interfere, in conjunction with France, to restore peace to America and cotton to Lann of war. Further, he asserts that the King of France knew that he was committing a hostile act, in never really secret. Great Britain knew that France was preparing for war; she knew that France haFrance had all along given aid and comfort to her enemies, and she chose her own time to strike, not because ing obedience the Powers divided, England and France supporting Belgium, and the other three PowersEuropean arbitration would provoke England and France to throw their swords into the scale? In ther which isolates England From Europe and leaves France, affronted and deserted, to take her own cours of action could be found on which England and France could agree. Why not? Because the question owhich could be jointly recommended by England, France, and Russia? The presence of a few Federal gaPowers deprived her of the command of the sea. France and England then, can, if they will, induce th[2 more...]
Turquie (Turkey) (search for this): article 2
ers, but by accrediting an Ambassador to their President. Conscious that in his first letter, written before the announcement of the French proposals by the Opposition journals, he had combination recognition by argument which told in favor of intervention, the eloquent defender of the Ministry again took up his pen to show that Europe, warned by what happened in the cases of Greece and Belgium should be careful not to interfere in America. We liberated Greece at the cost of a war with Turkey.--But why? Because we interfered unfairly and violently; because our first act was an act of hostility to the Sultan; because we did not interfere till he was on the point of crushing out the insurrection; and because one of the intervening Powers was actually at war with the Porto on her own account, and for sinister purposed of her own. Now, the North is not on the point of conquering the South; we should not begin our interference by blockading New York or burning the Federal fleet; we s
Tuscany (Italy) (search for this): article 2
of Greece and Belgium. There are two or three distinct principles on which a frontier line might be drawn. We might recognize the acts of individual States, and confine the Southern Confederacy to those which have actually and formally become members thereof--Virginia, Tennessee, Arkansas, and the States south of them, with the territory of New Mexico. Or we might recognize the sovereign rights of the people, and allow Missouri, Kentucky, Maryland, and Delaware to decide their own fate Tuscany, the Legations, and the Duchies. Or we might undertake ourselves to draw a frontier line, giving to the North these districts which are Northern by sympathy, and to the South those which desire to be Southern. There could be few cases in which it would be easier to decide on a common basis of action; few in which the power of the mediators to enforce their decimation could be less doubtful. The South is ready to accept any fair terms of peace; if the North should reject them, she would b
England (United Kingdom) (search for this): article 2
drew the sword for national existence. Historicus next brings forward a precedent of his own adverse to recognition. He says that when the Government of Louis XVI. made a treaty of commerce with the Government of our revolted colonies, Great Britain that act, involving as it did the recognition of the revolt, an act of hostility, and made it the ground for a declaration of war. Further, he asserts that the King of France knew that he was committing a hostile act, in as much as he made a secret treaty of offensive and defensive alliance with the Congress. Of course such treaties are never really secret. Great Britain knew that France was preparing for war; she knew that France had all along given aid and comfort to her enemies, and she chose her own time to strike, not because the considered the recognition of the colonies a casus but because that recognition was the symptom and signal of a conspiracy which had been long at work, and which she was undeniably entitled to pu
Arkansas (Arkansas, United States) (search for this): article 2
ent on the third which could be jointly recommended by England, France, and Russia? The presence of a few Federal garrisons on Southern soil does not affect the question, as may be clearly seen by the precedents of Greece and Belgium. There are two or three distinct principles on which a frontier line might be drawn. We might recognize the acts of individual States, and confine the Southern Confederacy to those which have actually and formally become members thereof--Virginia, Tennessee, Arkansas, and the States south of them, with the territory of New Mexico. Or we might recognize the sovereign rights of the people, and allow Missouri, Kentucky, Maryland, and Delaware to decide their own fate Tuscany, the Legations, and the Duchies. Or we might undertake ourselves to draw a frontier line, giving to the North these districts which are Northern by sympathy, and to the South those which desire to be Southern. There could be few cases in which it would be easier to decide on a comm
United States (United States) (search for this): article 2
ys Historicus, that war had lasted as many years as the present war has lasted months. Well, what of that? If the Confederate States have achieved in twenty months what it took the Spanish colonies twenty years to accomplish, is that any reason whympled out within a twelvemonth. Two years of such a war as that which the Federal Government is waging against the Confederate States are of far more account than twenty years of such a war as Spain waged against her revolted colonies; and to have sly a pretence. We do not recognize Territories, but Governments, we should recognize not "the South" but the Confederate States of America; and we should recognize them not by defining their frontiers, but by accrediting an Ambassador to their Pres a state of anarchy. But what has that to do with America? There is no fear of anarchy in the South. Each of the Confederate States has a Government of its own, which has, ever since its first existence in the Union, administered its affairs and p
Cotton (West Virginia, United States) (search for this): article 2
istrative capacity nor by diplomatic courtesy. The publication in this country of his dispatch to Lord Cowley, before it could have been read to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, was an outrageous breach of international courtesy. Some of his lordship's enemies attribute this extraordinary proceeding to an abject desire to conciliate Mr. Adams and his Government; a much more reasonable assumption is, that it was due to his eagerness to allay the anxiety of the Stock Exchange and the Cotton market. But it would have been very easy to attain this object by an informal publication of the purport of the dispatch; and the only conclusion we can come to is that Lord Russell is either ignorant or oblivious of diplomatic at quette. Hanuga seria duount in mala. The consequences of trivial discourtesies are not always trifling; and it is no light misfortune for England that her Foreign Minister should be as careless of official decorum as of national interests. But if the publication
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