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North Carolina (North Carolina, United States) (search for this): chapter 3
ous States. The general plan of operation, as devised by the government of the North, we suppose to be as follows:-- 1st. A.-- Army of the Potomac, 200,000 men. Base of operation, the Potomac. Orders: to take Richmond, to advance to North Carolina, and to occupy Georgia. 2d. AI.-- Army of Fort Monroe, 100,000 men. Base of operation, Fort Monroe. Orders: to co-operate with A. 3d. AII.-- Reserve army, 75,000 men, divided in the depots, arsenals, forts, towns, sea-ports, etc. of as possible with the armies nearest to him. Let us begin with the operations of the Potomac and Fort Monroe armies. These two armies have to co-operate; and they have for main object the taking of Richmond and the occupation of Virginia, North Carolina, and Georgia. Their nearest object is the destruction of the armies B, BI, and BII. A and AI united are stronger than the three rebel armies B, BI, and BII, and therefore their action should be simultaneous, to engage at one and the same
Ulm, was turned by Napoleon, and obliged to capitulate. This result was obtained in consequence of the position and extension of the two bases of operation. Fig. 2 will explain this, by supposing that a b forms the base of the French, (the Rhine,) and that they advance from a to n, and cut the Austrian army, which has advanced in the direction of m, from its base, c d. In 1806, the Prussians were also cut from their communications, obliged to fight at Jena and Auerstadt, front against Prussia; they were defeated, and the remainder of their army obliged to lay down arms, as they found their line of retreat continually closed by Napoleon's division advancing parallel with them in the direction of the Baltic Sea. In Fig. 1 we have but to replace a c by the River Maine, a b by the Rhine, and c d by the Baltic Sea. A would be the Prussian army, which has for sole retreat c d. F is the first, and F′ the second, position of the French. Should the enemy, however, keep such a positi
Winchester, Va. (Virginia, United States) (search for this): chapter 3
s of industry and wealth which would have been endangered if it had effected a retreat to the North. (Frederick, in 1757, and Soult, in 1814, executed similar retreats.) A might, perhaps, have done even better in retreating from Manassas to Winchester, instead of to Washington, if such a course was possible, after the first engagements, forcing it to the retreat, as by such a step it prevents B, at the very outset, from acting against the capital, or dividing it from the North; it remains longer on the enemy's territory, and forces the Army B to follow it in the direction of Winchester; but, on the other hand, it is also more exposed to the attacks of the stronger B. In neither of these cases, however, can B proceed to Washington, as, in doing so, A would be continually in its rear and on its communications, and A, being now daily reinforced by the reserve Army AII, would soon be enabled to pass again to the offensive, and place B in a similar position to what its own would have
Switzerland (Switzerland) (search for this): chapter 3
and must fall under the blows of our superior force. The plan of the campaign of 1800, as devised by Napoleon, is the finest example that can be offered for a similar operation. Melas, with a large army in Italy, had arrived at a short distance from the French frontier; Kray, with another army, threatened the Rhine. Moreau, near Basel, was to act against Kray; and the reserve army, disposed on the Swiss frontier, was to act in Italy. Napoleon's plan was for Moreau to pass through Switzerland, cross the Rhine an Schaffhausen, to cut (ray from his communications, and thereby destroy his army, while Napoleon crossed the Alps by the Passages of the Great St. Bernard Simplon, St. Gothard, and Spluegen, and arrived in the rear of Melas. Moreau did not entirely conform to Napoleon's plan; he crossed the Rhine near Basel, where he was already in possession of a tete-de-pont, and therefore the campaign in Germany was not so decisive as that in Italy. Melas found himself turned, an
Decatur (Illinois, United States) (search for this): chapter 3
l Army BIV. BIV crosses the river at Memphis, and is transported by rail to Decatur, where the greatest part of the reserve Army BV is already stationed. BIII, iuis to Memphis, and the same time for the Kentucky army to go from the Ohio to Decatur. Considering that the rebels use every obstacle for defense, destroy the brabout four weeks to reach Memphis, while AIII requires five weeks to arrive at Decatur. The 70,000 men of BIV, who are transported by rail to the junction with BIf AVII from Port Royal, they have become disposable. BIII and BIV are near Decatur, with 180,000 to 190,000 men, and 20,000 are left at Memphis, opposed to AIV. the attack of A and the arrival of its own reinforcements from Port Royal and Decatur. BIII and BIV have only one step to take — that is, to proceed at once agaiII, as BIII would require only seven or eight days to go, partly by rail, from Decatur to Paducah, the distance not being more than ten ordinary days' march. From t
Lonato (Italy) (search for this): chapter 3
presents itself, and then defeat the others. At the siege of Mantua, in 1796, Napoleon, being informed that Wurmser, who had advanced from the Tyrol against him, had divided his force and was descending one bank of the Lake of Garda with his main body, while Quasdanowich was descending the other, raised the siege of Mantua, advanced, and stationed himself at one end of the lake, thereby gaining a central position, and separating Wurmser from Quasdanowich ; the latter is first defeated, at Lonato, and the former at Castiglione. If obliged to form several lines of operation, we arrange them in the following manner :-- If, for instance, 100,000 men are to resist an invading army of 150,000 men, divided in three armies of 50,000 each, we should divide our force also. We form three corps of observation, each numbering 15,000 men. We keep the remaining 55,000 in reserve, and transport them successively by interior lines and forced marches to the three army corps, and form every tim
Amberg (Bavaria, Germany) (search for this): chapter 3
, the fate of which will not remain long undecided. In 1796, the Archduke Charles, in Germany, defeated the armies of Jordan and Moreau by retreating on concentric lines from the Rhine to the Bohemian frontier. To Jordan was opposed Wartensleben, with about 30,000 men. The Archduke Charles commanded in person the army opposed to Moreau; arrived near the Lech, he left General Latour, with 30,000 men, and, with the remainder of his army, he joined Wartensleben, after some forced marches at Amberg, where he defeated Jordan; he pursued and defeated him a second time at Wurzburg, and a third time on the Lahn; he then left a corps to continue the pursuit, while he himself turned against Moreau, and marched to cut him from his line of retreat. The news that the archduke had left the army opposed to him reached Moreau only after Jordan's defeat; he then commenced to retreat, but was overtaken by the duke, and defeated at Emmendingen and Schlingen, and forced again to cross the Rhine — an
Washington (United States) (search for this): chapter 3
ve a strong corps of observation opposite to Washington, and with their main force to cross the Potod give open battle. 2d. To await them in Washington, by trying to defend this place. 3d. To royed by the rebels, and the Union troops in Washington would be soon obliged to surrender in conseqrtake it, as the distance from this place to Washington is nearly equal to that from Point-of-Rocks imore. These lines form, with the road from Washington to Point-of-Rocks, a sort of equilateral triabove this point will evidently be master of Washington. The two armies, A and B, should thereforerefore suppose that from A's departure from Washington till B recommences operations on the Upper Puld be the following:-- A, after leaving Washington well garrisoned, retreated with 150,000 men,g from Manassas to Winchester, instead of to Washington, if such a course was possible, after the fier of these cases, however, can B proceed to Washington, as, in doing so, A would be continually in [1 more...]
Russian River (Alaska, United States) (search for this): chapter 3
e it advances, while, on the other hand, the defending army generally gets stronger the nearer it approaches the center of its country. If by this the difference in force is decreased, and the chances more equal, the army for the defense should pass to a vigorous offensive, either by unexpectedly attacking the enemy or by awaiting him in a well-chosen, strong, and fortified position. The campaign of 1812 is a fine example of such a defense. Napoleon entered Russia with 450,000 men. The Russian army retreated, defending only the town of Smolensk; by the many detachments Napoleon was obliged to make, and the losses already sustained, he arrived at Borodino with only 132,000 men. The Russians awaited him there, in a partly fortified position, with 117,000 men. What was impossible to do against an army of 450,000 men could be tried against one of 132,000. When the enemy has chosen two lines of operation, we may be induced to take but one line, and bring our army in a central posit
Maine (Maine, United States) (search for this): chapter 3
to n, and cut the Austrian army, which has advanced in the direction of m, from its base, c d. In 1806, the Prussians were also cut from their communications, obliged to fight at Jena and Auerstadt, front against Prussia; they were defeated, and the remainder of their army obliged to lay down arms, as they found their line of retreat continually closed by Napoleon's division advancing parallel with them in the direction of the Baltic Sea. In Fig. 1 we have but to replace a c by the River Maine, a b by the Rhine, and c d by the Baltic Sea. A would be the Prussian army, which has for sole retreat c d. F is the first, and F′ the second, position of the French. Should the enemy, however, keep such a position that neither the manoeures against his center nor against his communications are possible, then it is necessary to resort to stratagems which shall induce him to make wrong movements, divide his troops, extend his line, etc. For instance, we may give our whole army such a p
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