for a further advance into Georgia, before next spring.
But it is unsafe to reason about the movements of the enemy.
With such a victory as that at Missionary Ridge, and such an army as he has at Chattanooga and in East Tennessee, he may conclude the Confederates are in to condition to resist him, and consequently decide upon a winter campaign.
If such are his intentions, however, it is impossible to explain his conduct in destroying the Georgia State Railroad from Ringgold back to Chickamauga Station, and the Georgia and East Tennessee Road from Cleveland to a point twelve miles this side.
The following table embraces our casualties during the late battles around Chattanooga, including the affairs on Lookout Mountain and at Riggold, as well as the battle on Missionary Ridge.
It will be seen that our less in killed and wounded is very slight — a fact which can only be accounted for on the theory that our forces were well protected by their position.
The greater part of the l
informed that Gen. Anderson said his (Manigault's) was the first to give way. Gen. Manigault went to Gen. Anderson and asked him about it, and he denied ever having said so; but, on the contrary, that he had always stated to every one that his own brigade was the first to give way. We all finally fell back about half a mile to the rear, where we rallied and reformed in line again.
After a short conference among the general officers it was decided to fall back across the creek towards Chickamauga Station.
We reached there about 10 o'clock at night.
I made me a pallet, and, hungry, cold, and
tired, I lay down to sleep and dream over the events of the past, sickened at the thoughts of our defeat.
We had been whipped and driven from our strong without making scarcely any resistance.
It is true, we were outnumbered three to one, but still we had the advantage in position.
We never will have another such an opportunity of completely destroying the Yankee army.
True, one force
paragraph of the review:
"A council of war was called at night (Monday night after the battle of Chickamauga) by the General commanding, at which it was determined, as I am credibly informed, to put the army in motion up the Tennessee river the following day, with the intention of crossing that stream, turning the enemy's left flank, and pushing on across the mountains towards Nashville.
Accordingly on the next day the troops were moved by the right flank towards Graysville and Chickamauga Station, in pursuance of the resolution come to at the council of war; but that night the whole programme was changed by the commander in chief, and the head of the column turned back to Chattanooga."
An intelligent officer, who was with General Bragg at the time indicated, points out the error in a letter, from which I take the following extract:
"You state that on the evening of the 21st of September a council of war was held, at which it was determined to cross the Tennessee rive
t advance for the relief of Knoxville.
Sherman's position not only threatened the right flank of the enemy, but, from his occupying a line across the mountain and to the railroad bridge across Chickamauga creek, his rear and stores at Chickamauga Station.
This caused the enemy to mass heavily against him. This movement of his being plainly seen from the position I occupied on Orchard Knoll, Baird's division, of the Fourteenth corps, was ordered to Sherman's support; but, receiving a note d Sherman to pursue the enemy early the next morning with all their available force, except that under Granger, intended for the relief of Knoxville.
The pursuit — Ringgold.
On the morning of the 26th Sherman advanced by way of of Chickamauga Station, and Thomas's forces, under Hooker and Palmer, moved on the Rossville road towards Grangeville and Ringgold.
The advance of Thomas's forces reached Ringgold on the morning of the 27th, where they found the enemy in strong position in t
