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John Bell Hood., Advance and Retreat: Personal Experiences in the United States and Confederate Armies, Chapter 12: (search)
en and horses had been placed under the command of Generals McCook and Stoneman, with the purpose to destroy our sole line of communication, and to release, at Andersonville, thirty-four thousand (34,000) Federal prisoners to ravage and pillage the country. These raiders, under McCook, came in contact with General Roddy's cavalrAugust deserves to be marked with a white stone. He, doubtless in common with every Southerner, experienced deep concern in regard to the Federal prisoners at Andersonville, as it was reported that Sherman had arms in readiness for their use. Fearful indeed would have been the consequences, had they been turned loose upon the coun order the Army to again turn its back to the foe. Howbeit, as stated in my official report, the presence of thirty-four thousand (34,000) Federal prisoners at Andersonville, rendered it absolutely incumbent to place the Army between Sherman and that point, in order to prevent the Federal commander from turning loose this large bod
John Bell Hood., Advance and Retreat: Personal Experiences in the United States and Confederate Armies, Chapter 13: (search)
ocket, or cul de sac, formed by the Chattahoochee river and Peach Tree creek, and finally have forced us to surrender. Had I attempted to extricate the Army, it would have been almost impossible to have pierced the enemy's works south, and utterly impossible, by reason of the proximity of the Federals, to have laid pontoons and crossed Peach Tree creek — as I would have done when Sherman was at the distance of Jonesboroa, but from which I was hindered by the presence of the prisoners at Andersonville. By reference to the map (page 167) it will be perceived that Sherman had simply to advance his right flank, in order to form a junction with the troops, near Decatur, and thus completely hem in our Army. This plan for the speedy capture of Atlanta could have been executed with an insignificant loss, as it would have been achieved mainly by manoeuvre. In view of the impaired morale of the Army at the close of the Dalton-Atlanta campaign; the numerical inferiority of our forces; the
John Bell Hood., Advance and Retreat: Personal Experiences in the United States and Confederate Armies, Chapter 15: (search)
ssible, from foraging south of Atlanta, and at the same time endeavor to prevent his massing supplies at that place. I deem it important that the prisoners at Andersonville should be so disposed of, as not to prevent this Army from moving in any direction it may be thought best. According to all human calculations, we should havefor it to be otherwise. I am of good heart, and feel that we shall yet succeed. The Army is much in need of a little rest. After removing the prisoners from Andersonville, I think we should, as soon as practicable, place our Army upon the communications of the enemy, drawing our supplies from the West Point and Montgomery Railrothat period, and do so with the more sincere regret that General Hardee is no longer able to speak in his own defence. After the removal of the prisoners at Andersonville — hitherto the principal obstacle to a movement in rear of ShermanI deemed it advisable, and, therefore ordered that the railroad iron for some distance on the
John Bell Hood., Advance and Retreat: Personal Experiences in the United States and Confederate Armies, Appendix. (search)
m attacking him in flank. The small loss in Hardee's Corps, and the much greater loss of the enemy, show my views to have been correct. The attack at Jonesboroa failed, though the number of men on our side considerably exceeded that of the enemy. The vigor of the attack may be in some sort imagined, when only fourteen hundred (1400) were killed and wounded out of the two corps engaged. The failure necessitated the evacuation of Atlanta. Thirty-four thousand (34,000) prisoners at Andersonville, Georgia, in my rear compelled me to place the Army between them and the enemy, thus preventing me at that time from moving oh his communications and destroying his depots of supplies at Marietta. A raid of cavalry could easily have released those prisoners, and the Federal commander was prepared to furnish them arms; such a body of men, an Army of itself, could have overrun and devastated the country from West Georgia to Savannah. The subsequent removal of the prisoners, at my request, ena