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Comte de Paris, History of the Civil War in America. Vol. 3. (ed. Henry Coppee , LL.D.), Book I:—the war on the Rapidan. (search)
thousand men composing it scarcely six thousand really belonged to that nationality: it is true that a large number of the other seven thousand were of the same origin, and even yet spoke German. These troops had made the campaign of Manassas in Pope's army, under Sigel. But in the month of March, 1863, the latter, having taken an unlimited leave of absence, was replaced by Howard, Assumed command April 2.—Ed. who had recovered from the serious wound which had cost him an arm at the battle out of a total of 20,842 men, numbered 16,472 who had enlisted for two years at the breaking out of hostilities in April, 1861; also eight regiments of Pennsylvania, mustered into service for nine months only by the call for troops which followed Pope's disaster in August, 1862, and which numbered 6421 officers and men under arms. The soldiers appertaining to the first category, trained up to the hardships of war by two years of campaigning, were about to leave a great void in the Army of the
Comte de Paris, History of the Civil War in America. Vol. 3. (ed. Henry Coppee , LL.D.), Book III:—Pennsylvania. (search)
oward Maryland by the valley of the Shenandoah, masking his movement behind the Blue Ridge. The first plan, which had proved successful the preceding year against Pope, was too hazardous to be tried again a second time in the face of an adversary taught by experience. Lee adopted the second, which left the enemy in a state of unbut to manoeuvre so as to follow his adversary—to cover Washington and, if possible, Harper's Ferry. He had to avoid, on the one hand, being taken in the rear, as Pope had been; on the other, not to allow himself to be drawn too far from the capital in some position where the enemy might be able to concentrate all his forces agairounded by powerful works, became an impregnable base of operations for the Army of the Potomac on the very boundary of the enemy's territory. When Lee had driven Pope's troops, conquered at Manassas, back into these works, he became convinced that his great victory did not open to him the gates of Washington, and the next day he
Comte de Paris, History of the Civil War in America. Vol. 3. (ed. Henry Coppee , LL.D.), Book IV:—Third winter. (search)
as before so well succeeded, and returns nearly to the plan already followed in August, 1862. But finding, no doubt, that his adversary guards himself better than Pope on the Rapidan, he will turn him by crossing Robertson's River near its source to gain access to Culpeper by the north-west. In order to conceal this movement, Hi his adversary two days before will still prevent his attacking the Confederate army in its march at the foot of Bull Run Mountain. Troubled by the remembrance of Pope's disaster, he does not consider himself secure behind Broad Run. He will cross Bull Run, and halt only at Centreville. This resolution was not worthy of the conerhaps to a superstitious fear of the Bull Run battlefield, and wish to spare themselves a third encounter on the ground which has been the scene of McDowell's and Pope's defeats. The main column follows, as on the preceding day, the line of the railroad, the Sixth corps taking the lead, then the First, and after it the Fifth. W
Comte de Paris, History of the Civil War in America. Vol. 3. (ed. Henry Coppee , LL.D.), Notes. (search)
cDowell and Porter were carrying out the new instructions they had received from Pope, who, as we have stated (page 288), directed them to march from Manassas Junctioe therefore found himself suddenly in the presence of an enemy upon whom neither Pope nor himself had counted, and utterly unable to continue the movement which had bhe road from Gainesville to Bristoe would not permit him to strike his flank, as Pope desired, determined, instead of attacking him in front with his forces and thoseainst Jackson's right wing. This decision, which justified the latitude left by Pope's orders, was certainly the best, and it is only to be regretted that he did notination of the combat between Hood and King. It was, in fact, on the road where Pope, still believing in his ability to outflank Jackson's right, and ignorant of Lon whole day. As we stated (p. 292), he did not receive the order of attack, which Pope sent him at half-past 4 o'clock, in time to execute it: this order only reached