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whole country once again barren of supplies for any pursuing force. The only episode which enlivened our monotonous inactivity was a cavalry engagement (October second) between a small detachment of Stuart's command and a heavy force under Pleasanton. The enemy were very desirous of ascertaining our whereabouts and strength; and for this purpose a considerable number of cavalry and twelve pieces of artillery crossed the stream near Shepherdstown, and advanced up towards our lines. They were met by Fitz-Hugh Lee, and sharp fighting ensued; but the latter, being overpowered, bravely maintained the combat, and sent for reenforcements. Stuart was immediately in the saddle, and swooping down upon Pleasanton, with a fresh force, drove that commander from the field, and pursued him to within a short distance of Shepherdstown, where a large force of the enemy were then stationed. This cavalry encounter was a smart affair, and conducted by both leaders with marked ability. Had not dar
g resumed. camp life at the Bower. Pleasantries with Pleasanton. we lose and Recapture Martinsburg. Osculatory ovationgence that several brigades of Federal cavalry under General Pleasanton had crossed the river, driven in our pickets, and we horse and annihilate his command. He had been with General Pleasanton at West Point, and they had there been bitter enemies. Pleasanton had annoyed Stuart greatly in the olden days by his foppish vanity, and in the latter days by his dash and en general of his army; and adding, that as I supposed General Pleasanton to be supreme in command of this portion of the lineht — I ask your pardon. But why did you inquire for General Pleasanton, and what in the world induced you to suppose that he was in command here? I do not myself know where General Pleasanton is-at this moment he may be on your side of the Potomac. Confed. Major.-Where General Pleasanton is to-day I am certainly not able to tell; but as I had the pleasure of seein
Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain, The Passing of the Armies: The Last Campaign of the Armies., Chapter 9: the last review. (search)
winter of 1862 and 1863, had redeemed from servitude as scattered orderlies and provost guards at headquarters and loose-governed cities, and transformed into a species of soldier not known since the flood-times of Persia, the Huns of Attila, or hordes of Tamerlane; cavalry whose manoeuvres have no place in the tactics of modern Europe; rough-rider, raiders, scouts-in-force, cutting communications, sweeping around armies and leagues of entrenched lines in an enemy's country,--Stoneman and Pleasanton and Wilson, Kilpatrick, Custer, and alas! Dahlgren. And when the solid front of pitched battle opposes, then terrible in edge and onset, as in the straight-drawn squadron charges at Brandy Station, the clattering sweep at Aldie, the heroic lone-hand in the lead at Gettysburg, holding back the battle till our splendid First Corps could surge forward to meet its crested wave, and John Buford and John Reynolds could shake hands! Through the dark campaign of 1864, everywhere giving accoun
costume, his careless laughter, his love of ladies; at his banjo-player, his flower-wreathed horses, and his gay verses. The enemy were wiser. Buford, Bayard, Pleasanton, Stoneman, and their associates, did not commit that blunder. They had felt the heavy arm too often; and knew too well the weight of that flower-encircled weapss just as the enemy rushed on them. A third instance was the second ride around McClellan in Maryland, October, 1862; when coming to the Monocacy he found General Pleasanton, with a heavy force of cavalry, infantry, and artillery, in his path, but unhesitatingly attacked and cut his way through. Still another at Jack's Shop, whed to him, he was never whipped. More than once he was driven back, and two or three times badly hurt; but it was not the superior genius of Buford, Stoneman, Pleasanton, or other adversaries, which achieved those results. It was the presence of an obstacle which his weapon could not break. Numbers were too much for brain and
John Esten Cooke, Wearing of the Gray: Being Personal Portraits, Scenes, and Adventures of War., From the Rapidan to Frying-Pan in October, 1863. (search)
he advance at Mitchell's Station, on the Orange road, and General Lee faced him on the south bank of the Rapidan. One day there came from our signal-station, on Clarke's Mountain, the message: General Meade's Headquarters are at Wallack's, and Pleasanton's at Cumberland, Georgia. General Fitz Lee thereupon sent to General Stuart, after the jocose fashion of General Fitz, to ask why Pleasanton had been sent to Cumberland, Georgia. The message should have been Cumberland George's-the house, thaPleasanton had been sent to Cumberland, Georgia. The message should have been Cumberland George's-the house, that is to say, of the Rev. Mr. George, in the suburbs of Culpeper Court-House. Every day, at that time, the whistle of the Yankee cars, as we used to call them, was heard a few miles off, at Mitchell's Station; and as General Meade was plainly going to advance, it was obvious that he was going to fall back. It was at this time, early in October, that for reasons best known to himself, General Lee determined upon a movement through Madison, along the base of the Blue Ridge, to flank General Me
John Esten Cooke, Wearing of the Gray: Being Personal Portraits, Scenes, and Adventures of War., Facetiae of the camp: souvenirs of a C. S. Officer. (search)
made up of trifles — is it not? General Fitz Lee, one day in the fall of 1863, sent a courier up from the Lower Rappahannock, to ask General Stuart why General Pleasanton of the U. S. Army had been sent to Georgia? --a dispatch by signal from corps headquarters having communicated that intelligence. Grand tableau when the affair was explained! General Stuart had signalled: Meade's Headquarters are at Wallack's, and Pleasanton's at Cumberland George's --names of persons residing near Culpeper Court-house. The signal flags had said: Meade's headquarters are at Wallack's, and Pleasanton's at Cumberland Georgia! Ii. In November, 1863, LiPleasanton's at Cumberland Georgia! Ii. In November, 1863, Lieutenant — was in an old deserted mansion near Culpeper Court-house, with some prisoners confined in the upper rooms; the enemy not being far distant. While waiting, a blaze shot up from a fire which some soldiers had kindled near, and threw the shadow of the Lieutenant on the wall. Thinking the shadow was a human being he calle
no guerilla, was the reply. What do you belong to? The first New Jersey. Who comamnds it? Major Janaway. Right. Who commands the brigade? Colonel Taylor. Right again. Where is it stationed? In the edge of Warrenton. Yes. Who commands the division? Look here, said S— , who was thoroughly acquainted with every part of his role, I am tired of your asking me so many questions; but I will answer. The First New Jersey is in Taylor's brigade, Gregg's division, and Pleasanton commands the whole. I belong to the regiment, and am no guerilla. He's all right, boys, said one of the men; let him go. No, said another; I saw him capture one of our men ten minutes ago. You are mistaken, said S-. You are a guerilla! exclaimed the man. And how do I know you are not guerillas? said S— ; you have on blue coats, but let me see your pantaloons. They raised their coat-skirts and showed their blue regulation pantaloons. Now show yours, they said.
e Yankee papers say that their loss of field officers is unaccountable; and add, that but for the wounding of General Hooker, they would have driven us into the Potomac! September 25th, 1862. The tables were turned on Saturday, as we succeeded in driving a good many of them into the Potomac. Ten thousand Yankees crossed at Shepherdstown, but unfortunately for them, they found the glorious Stonewall there. A fight ensued at Boteler's Mill, in which General Jackson totally routed General Pleasanton and his command. The account of the Yankee slaughter is fearful. As they were recrossing the river our cannon was suddenly turned upon them. They were fording. The river is represented as being blocked up with the dead and dying, and crimsoned with blood. Horrible to think of! But why will they have it so? At any time they might stop fighting, and return to their own homes. We do not want their blood, but only to be separated from them as a people, eternally and everlastingly.
Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 4. (ed. Reverend J. William Jones), Gen. Lee's strength and losses at Gettysburg. (search)
e number of Federal troops engaged the first day, that Dr. Bates gives a widely different strength to Buford's cavalry division from that assigned to it by Gen, Pleasanton, who, as Commander-in-Chief of the Federal cavalry, should, next to Buford himself, have known the truth. Dr. Bates says that the cavalry engaged the first day (Buford's) amounted to 2,200 men. Pleasanton puts Buford's strength at 4,000. (See Pleasanton's report to Hon. Ben. Wade, Oct. 15, 1865.) In regard to the Confederate strength, Dr. Bates' conclusions are scarcely worthy of criticism. Were we at this late day seriously to attempt to determine Meade's force by giving the estiPleasanton's report to Hon. Ben. Wade, Oct. 15, 1865.) In regard to the Confederate strength, Dr. Bates' conclusions are scarcely worthy of criticism. Were we at this late day seriously to attempt to determine Meade's force by giving the estimates made of it at the time of the battle, by Lee, or Longstreet, or Ewell, or by citizens, we would expose ourselves to the ridicule of., and of every other intelligent man. Yet this is what Dr. Bates has done in regard to Lee's force. The only scrap of respectable evidence he offers in support of his estimate as to the Confede
Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 4. (ed. Reverend J. William Jones), Causes of the defeat of Gen. Lee's Army at the battle of Gettysburg-opinions of leading Confederate soldiers. (search)
; but in order to judge of the propriety of making the attacks on the 2d and 3d, we should consider the circumstances and conditions under which those attacks were ordered, and not merely their failure from other circumstances and conditions beyond the control of the Commander-in-Chief. Gen. Longstreet's long delay on the 3d seems to have been based mainly on the idea that his right flank was in danger from a body of troops on the enemy's extreme left. By examining the testimony of Gen. Pleasanton before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, pages 359-60, same volume of the report already referred to, you will find that the troops threatening Longstreet's right were really only two brigades of cavalry, which were posted there to prevent Meade's left from being turned. Two divisions of infantry were used to keep off that force, when one brigade ought to have been amply sufficient. From some communications made to Mr. Swinton by Gen. Longstreet after. the war, and contain