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The Daily Dispatch: September 18, 1861., [Electronic resource] 12 0 Browse Search
Elias Nason, McClellan's Own Story: the war for the union, the soldiers who fought it, the civilians who directed it, and his relations to them. 8 0 Browse Search
Alfred Roman, The military operations of General Beauregard in the war between the states, 1861 to 1865 8 0 Browse Search
Benjamin Cutter, William R. Cutter, History of the town of Arlington, Massachusetts, ormerly the second precinct in Cambridge, or District of Menotomy, afterward the town of West Cambridge. 1635-1879 with a genealogical register of the inhabitants of the precinct. 4 0 Browse Search
Maj. Jed. Hotchkiss, Confederate Military History, a library of Confederate States Military History: Volume 3, Virginia (ed. Clement Anselm Evans) 4 0 Browse Search
Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 9. (ed. Reverend J. William Jones) 4 0 Browse Search
The Daily Dispatch: September 12, 1861., [Electronic resource] 4 0 Browse Search
General Joseph E. Johnston, Narrative of Military Operations During the Civil War 4 0 Browse Search
Francis Jackson Garrison, William Lloyd Garrison, 1805-1879; the story of his life told by his children: volume 3 4 0 Browse Search
Thomas C. DeLeon, Four years in Rebel capitals: an inside view of life in the southern confederacy, from birth to death. 4 0 Browse Search
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Robert Lewis Dabney, Life and Commands of Lieutenand- General Thomas J. Jackson, Chapter 7: Manassas. (search)
d. And, therefore, notwithstanding the imperfections of the Confederate army, the present was its opportunity, and its earliest blows would be successful at least cost to it. A few days after the battle of Manassas, General Jackson moved his brigade to a pleasant woodland, a mile in advance of Centreville. There he busied himself in perfecting the discipline of the troops. After a time the Confederate generals, whose forces had grown to about 60,000 men, pushed their lines forward to Munson's and Mason's Hills, within sight of the Federal capital, and erected slight earthworks upon these eminences. Their object was to tempt General McClellan to an assault. But this leader was too well taught by the disasters of Bull Run to risk a general action. He occupied the attention of the Confederates with skirmishes of pickets and occasional feints, which required the advance of heavy supports to the front. In these alarms the 1st Brigade was always conspicuous for the promptitude wi
nd it; the fortifications were perfectly uncovered and their small garrisons utterly demoralized by the woe-begone and terrified fugitives constantly streaming by them. The triumphant legions of the South were almost near enough for their battle-cry to be heard in the Cabinet; and the southern people could not believe that the bright victory that had perched upon their banners would be allowed to fold her wings before another and bloodier flight, that would leave the North prostrate at her feet. Day after day they waited and — the wish being father to the thought-day after day the sun rose on fresh stories of an advance---a bloody fight — a splendid victory-or the capture of Washington. But the sun always set on an authoritative contradiction of them; and at last the excitement was forced to settle down on the news that General Johnston had extended his pickets as far as Mason's and Munson's hills, and the army had gone into camp on the field it had so bloodily won the week befo
our pursuit; the strong forces occupying the works near Georgetown, Arlington and Alexandria; the certainty, too, that General Patterson, if needed, would reach Washington with his army of more than 30,000, sooner than we could; and the condition and inadequate means of the army in ammunition, provision and transportation, prevented any serious thoughts of advancing against the Capital. To the second question, I reply, that it has never been feasible for the army to advance further than it has done — to the line of Fairfax Courthouse, with its advanced posts at Upton's, Munson's and Mason's Hills. After a conference at Fairfax Courthouse with the three senior General officers, you announced it to be impracticable to give this army the strength which those officers considered necessary to enable it to assume the offensive. Upon which, I drew it back to its present position. Most respectfully your obedient servant, J. E. Johnston. A true copy: G. W. C. Lee, Col. and A. D. C
Varina Davis, Jefferson Davis: Ex-President of the Confederate States of America, A Memoir by his Wife, Volume 2, Chapter 13: responsibility for the failure to pursue. (search)
ria; the certainty, too, that General Patterson, if needed, would reach Washington with his army of more than thirty thousand sooner than we could; and the condition and inadequate means of the army in ammunition, provisions, and transportation, prevented any serious thought of advancing upon the Capitol. To the second question I reply that it has never been feasible for the army to advance farther than it has done — to the line of Fairfax Court-House, with its advanced posts at Upton's, Munson's, and Mason's Hill. After a conference at Fairfax Court-House with the three senior general officers, you announced it to be impracticable to give this army the strength which those officers considered necessary to enable it to assume the offensive. Upon which I drew it back to its present position. Most respectfully, your obedient servant, J. E. Johnston. This answer to my inquiry was conclusive as to the charge which had been industriously circulated, that I had prevented the imm
Robert Underwood Johnson, Clarence Clough Buell, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War: Volume 2., chapter 6.33 (search)
vidence Pope, with Halleck's assent, gave permission to move as suggested. The march from Flat-top Mountain to the head of navigation on the Kanawha, ninety miles, was made in three days, and the Kanawha Division reached Washington within the time appointed. One train-load of two regiments joined Pope at Warrenton Junction when the railroad was cut at Manassas Junction by Stonewall Jackson. Two other regiments got as far as Bull Run bridge and had a lively affair with the enemy. Afterward I was ordered into the forts on Upton's and Munson's hills to cover the front of Washington toward Centreville. Here, with McClellan in person, we listened to the cannonade of the Second Bull Run, and through our lines Pope and McDowell retired within the defenses of Washington. It has often been a subject of interested speculation to inquire what would have been the fate of the Kanawha Division, had it been approaching Charlottesville at this time, in accordance with Halleck's original order .
General Joseph E. Johnston, Narrative of Military Operations During the Civil War, Chapter3 (search)
r active service by diligent instruction. The captured material enabled Colonel Pendleton to increase and improve our artillery very much. At the beginning of September the army was encamped about Fairfax Court-House, with strong outposts at Munson's and Mason's Hills, with the cavalry on their flanks. Stuart, who commanded it, had already impressed those who had opportunity to observe him, with the sagacity and courage that qualified him so admirably for the command of outposts. As had bepartment, to prevent the navigation of the Potomac by vessels of the United States. About the 20th of the month I became convinced that the increasing strength and efficiency of the Federal army were rendering the position of the outposts at Munson's and Mason's Hills more hazardous daily, and therefore had them withdrawn. We had been hoping, since the battle of Manassas, that the effective strength of the army would be so increased as to justify us in assuming the offensive, If such a
al offensive odors of a rebel Virginia camp were heightened in this case by the stench from a dead and decaying horse, which the rebels apparently had not energy enough to remove, but left to rot among them. Some six hundred yards to the rear of Munson's Hill, on the other side of the Leesburg turnpike, there is another elevation, undistinguished by a name, upon which the Virginians had erected another characteristic work. In appearance it was somewhat more imposing than the mud-mound on Munson's, having embrasures, and something like a ditch. A nearer approach, however, reduced its air of consequence. It was undoubtedly erected as a place of refuge, in case Munson's Hill should be stormed, to be held with artillery. It stands upon nearly a level with the other work, and is, consequently, not visible from any of our old positions. It is not an enclosure, although its present incompleteness may mislead one as to what its ultimate aspect might have been. Three sides are finished
. Not a man faced to the rear until he was ordered or carried back. Several fought after they were wounded, until the loss of blood rendered them unable to stand. It would be unjust, however, not to name Col. M. F. Force, of the Twentieth Ohio, whose coolness and courage inspired all who saw him. Major Fry, of the Twentieth Ohio, who commanded the advance when the attack was first made in the morning, was in the thickest of the fight all day. Lieut. Ayres, of the Twentieth Ohio, and Lieut. Munson, of the Seventy-eighth Ohio, who together commanded the mounted infantry, and without whose efforts we must have lost the day. Lieut. Hills, Twentieth Ohio, displayed great energy and bravery in snatching our dead and wounded from the very hands of the enemy. Capt. Kaga and Lieut. Melick, of the Twentieth Ohio, for the adroit management of their companies, and their indomitable courage. Captain Chandler, of the Seventy-eighth Ohio, whose coolness and bravery in manoeuvring the four com
No date (Sept. 30?) A most unhappy thing occurred last night among some of W. F. Smith's raw regiments. They three times mistook each other for the enemy and fired into each other. At least six were killed and several wounded, besides two horses were killed. It is dangerous to make night — marches on that account; but Smith's march was delayed by causes I could not foresee, and it was necessary to advance at all hazards. The manoeuvring in advance by our flanks alarmed the enemy, whose centre at Munson's and Upton's was much advanced. As soon as our pickets informed me that he had fallen back I rushed forward and seized those very important points. We now hold them in strength and have at once proceeded to fortify them. The moral effect of this advance will be great, and it will have a bad influence on the troops of the enemy. They can no longer say that they are flaunting their dirty little flag in my face, and I hope they have taken their last look at Washington. . .
rt of Franklin's division on the Leesburg pike, of McDowell's on Ball's cross-roads and Upton's Hill, and of Porter's on Hall's Hill, determined the evacuation of Munson's, Upton's, and Taylor's hills by the enemy's outposts, who had now seen the last of Washington until Early's raid in 1864. Taylor's, Perkins's, Upton's, and MMunson's hills were occupied by a brigade of McDowell's division, who at once commenced work upon the necessary fortifications. The occupation of this point was of great importance, as it gave ample room in rear for moving the troops in any direction, and, in the event of my deciding to attack Centreville, would enable me to reach that place in one march from the outposts. Immediately after the occupation of this new position the camp of Porter's division was moved forward to Hall's and Munson's hills, in easy supporting distance; a few days later Smith's division was moved to Marshall's Hill. To support this movement McCall's division was, on the 9th of