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ith much courage and gallantry. Owing to the early fall of McCulloch and McIntosh some six or seven of our regiments were never brought into action. The enemy's forces were at least double ours. Another account. Col. John P. McMillan, of Missouri, has arrived at New Orleans, just from Price's army in Arkansas. He gives a thrilling account of the baptism of fire and blood through which Missouri has already passed in her heroic struggle against her oppressor. His own house, in Hannibal, was one of the first the invaders visited. They took him prisoner, and stole several of his servants. The latter were subsequently restored, but again taken away. He refused to take the oath of allegiance, but agreed not actually to take up arms against the United States until exchanged, and was thereupon paroled. He considers himself still a prisoner, but is at liberty to engage in the recruiting service for Price's army, and it is for that purpose that he visits New Orleans. He stat
that we shall soon hear some good news. The belief in Beauregard's talents is, as we have said, very general. It is so with the Confederates, and, what is more, it is so with the enemy. The people feel a degree of security when they know that he is present anywhere that is quite unaccountable. The enemy feel a correspondent diffidence in their own plans and officers. He always exposes his person with the greatest frankness. Yet he has never been wounded. Like Alexander the Great, Hannibal, Cæsar, Marlborough, Frederick, Washington, Napoleon, Wellington, he seems to bear a charmed life. Are not these sure indications of a "Man of Destiny"--of a man designed by Providence to work out some great work — of a man under the protection of the higher powers? The Rev. Mr. Davis foretold the lofty mission of Washington, from the narrow escape he made in the battle in which Braddock was defeated and slain. Providence, he thought, would never have led him unscathed through such a fur
statements with regard to successes. The truth will be sure to come out at last, and, when a victory is claimed where a defeat has been sustained, the reaction in the public mind is always proportionate to its previous exaltation as soon as the truth leaks out. One of our contemporaries alludes to a curious instance of this, related by Polybius, in his narrative of the 2d Punic war. A Roman consul, whose army had been almost entirely destroyed in the first of those tremendous defeats which Hannibal inflicted upon his countrymen, wrote home that he had gained a victory, although he had not the third part of his army around his banners, and had retreated or rather fled some thirty or forty miles from the scene of conflict.--The Senate proclaimed it to the people, and the people were intoxicated with joy. In the mean time, however, stragglers began to come in at first singly, then in couples, finally in bands. All of them told the same tale. They had been beaten on the bloodiest field
essful end to his enterprise by a single exertion more, Rome had time to breathe, and she soon resumed all her wonted vigor. The elasticity with which she rebounded from her fall, has made her an example to all future ages and countries. While Hannibal was amusing himself on the Aufidus, spoiling the dead and sending their gold rings by the bushel to Carthage planning, plotting, deliberating, and probably digging ditches and throwing up earth works, after the fashion of all Generals who do notition to resist an attack after the battle of Cannes than Carthage was after the battle of Rama. But the public spirit of the people, and the vigor of the Senate, saved Rome from annihilation. The contrary qualities rendered even the genius of Hannibal important to avert the deem of Carthage. He must be a very timid or a very fanciful man, who can even compare our situation new with that of Rome after the battle of Cannes. It is true, we have thrown away mighty advantages. We gained a v
An example. We believe that there is no species of exhortation so encouraging to men placed in a trying situation as that which points to others who have struggled through similar difficulties, and by dint of energy and resolution, come out victorious. For the purpose of cheering our citizens in the present crisis — our soldiers are in need of no such stimulant — we alluded yesterday to the desperate straits to which Rome was reduced by the victories of Hannibal, the magnanimity with which she encountered them, and the powerful force of will and determination, which enabled her to triumph over them. There is a modern example — an example of the present century — more striking even than that of Rome, from which the heart of the patriot must draw courage when he contemplates it. An old and proud nation, which but two centuries age had threatened to impose her yoke upon one half of Europe — which had enjoyed the glory of giving a new world to mankind — whose banner had fl
be born a General, or else all the military schools in the world cannot make up the deficiency. We have as much contempt as any one for politicians who affect to play the part of great soldiers; but it is absurd to assume that all are soldiers who have gone through a military school, and that a man cannot be a General who has not rubbed against the walls of one of these institutions. Napoleon would have been Napoleon if he had never been in a school of arms, just as Alexander, Cœsar, and Hannibal were without any such advantages. What would have become of our Revolution without Washington, who never had a military cation? The last war with England would never have known its greatest victory but for the farmer Jackson, who defended successfully against the picked veterans of England that city which a graduate of West Point has given up without firing a gun ! Even Scott himself, who gained such laurels in that war, was not educated to the profession of arms. West Point is very well
of him, he thought the design of only driving Hannibal out of Italy rot great enough to answer the hrthage the seat of the war, and so to college Hannibal, instead of invading the countries of others,ight expose Rome itself to be the conquest of Hannibal. His authority and persuasions prevailed witoung conqueror should have the glory to drive Hannibal out of Italy and to the war, which had for sple that Scipio did not only himself fly from Hannibal, but did also endeavor to drain Italy of all us had been compelled to send their envoys to Hannibal to tail him home, and leave Italy to defend C done by himself) could please him. Nay, when Hannibal had put his army on shipboard, and taken leavh was never more in danger than now and that Hannibal was a more dreadful enemy under the walls of were brought to believe that the farther off Hannibal was, the nearer was their danger. But Scipio afterwards fought Hannibal and defeated them and sufficiently humbled the pride of hage, whereby t
is true, that the war has shows that mere land armies are useless against armies supported by gunboats. But the Southerns say that a season is coming when the Ohio, the Tennessee, and the Cumberland rivers will be too shallow for navigate and when the most terrible and irresistible enemies the south here will be removed from them. In the midst of their reverses they still indulge in dreams of victory. It may be only loud talking, but it may also be the resolve which Rome showed when Hannibal was near her gate. Our correspondence from New York seems to estimated that the enemies of the South give it full credit for spirit to hold and, although the of the end is come" the public mind is veering road to views of peace. If the American people were not upon all political matters the most ignorant in the world, if they were not, like a tyrant told only what is pleasant, and if they over listened to what is unpleasantly true, we should have more immediate hope of this. But, if th
l engender. For the sake of union now and of union hereafter — not enforced union, but the strong union of willing hearts — let the word of peace go forth; let the hand of reconciliation be extended. Why, sir, I have heard such words of bitter hatred expressed towards these Southerners by Northern lips, that I fear it may be already too late ever to renew the bonds of fraternity. Such sentiments I have heard of implacable resentment, of thirsting vengeance, of sectional antipathy, as Hannibal was taught to nurture against Rome; as Rome, in her quenchless jealousy, conceived towards Carthage to the end. And the doom of Carthage may be accepted by the South rather than re-union at the bayonet's point. I appeal to this Congress to avert that fate as inglorious to the victor as to the vanquished. Let the door to negotiation be flung wide open, flung open now while we can make advances with good grace and with laurels upon our brow. To the winds with the doctrine that you will
est, except by the Potomac and the bay. One effect which the invasion of Pennsylvania would have we have not yet alluded to, and it is the most important of any. It would compel McClellan to follow Lee and to fight a battle outside of his entrenchments. General Lee would have his own choice of ground and his own time to fight. He could lead him so far off that he could not get to his burrow.--He would inevitably rout him, and probably destroy his whole army. It was in this way that Hannibal brought the Consul Flaminius to battle at Thrasymene, and destroyed his whole army. The Carthaginian General passed through the rich district of Perugia, ravaging and burning as he went, and still directing the head of his columns towards Rome. The allies of Rome called aloud for assistance, and the Roman General was compelled to afford it.--He followed the track of his enemy, who kept before him until he found a position in which he cold give battle with advantage, and then he halted. B