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, when we go down street of evenings, and hear neither of a battle nor a skirmish, we always return home dissatisfied and sulky. "Congenial horrors" have become our every-day food, and their abstraction has a very deleterious effect on our nervous system. To sustain our theory, we are about to forfeit our credit for originality. Juvenile has this thought — that wars serve as subjects of entertainment to those who hear of them or read about them. Describing the life and character of Hannibal, he thus writes: " I, demens, et saevas curre per Alpes Ut pueris placeas, et declamatio flas." We have said that the effort of our people and our press to urge our officers to proceed with forward and offensive movements, and rebuking them for delay, is weak, wicked, and mischievous. We have a very recent proof and example of the correctness of our suggestions in the conduct of the Federals. Scott, Lincoln, and Seward knew that their troops were not sufficiently disciplined f
istration, of his army and of his officers, who have grown fat and saucy and presumptuous from feeding on Treasury pap, are often they who call loudest off "Le panvre peuple" to resolve all Government into mob rule, and take the conduct of affairs into their own hands. Every school-boy and school-girl, every tyro in history, well knows that the sure way to conquer an invading enemy, is to exhaust it by delays. Thus was Pyrrhus and his army overcome and ruined by the Romans. Thus was Hannibal, the greatest of warriors, after many victories, repulsed from Italy, and thus did Carthage perish. A nation that invades another, if repulsed abroad, is easy to conquer at home. The citizens of France made little or no resistance to the allied armies who invaded her territory. The defence, on the first invasion, was made by the remnant of Napoleon's veteran soldiers. In the last invasion, there was no defence at all. So Carthage, powerful in offensive warfare, became cowed and subdued
will deny that the structures of Thiers upon the actions of Soult are just and discriminating. Hannibal, the greatest of ancient, and Napoleon, the greatest of modern Generals, have been severely cribsolutely defensive, would be the best policy for us, because it saved Rome against Pyrrhus and Hannibal, and was practiced by the Duke of Wellington in the Peninsula. We deny both the proposition anlanguage of Dr, Arnold, "Rome was bleeding at every pore."--He knew it was vain to contend with Hannibal in the field. He felt that he was not his equal, as indeed who except Napoleon, ever was? He great Carthaginian General, or the Roman cavalry, with the Numidian horsemen. But he saw that Hannibal was two thousand miles from home; that the Romans had command of the sea; that no reinforcementhe dependencies of Rome put together — if the Carthaginian Senate had been pouring in troops to Hannibal at the rate of thirty five thousand per week — would it have been wisdom still to have acted on
cked. On the contrary, although he harassed his enemy — and that enemy, be it recollected, was Hannibal — by a series of skillful movements, marching, counter-marching, choosing unassailable positionry opportunity to attack, when it could be done to advantage. The manner in which he entrapped Hannibal among the mountains, and the strategem of the burning faggots tied to the cows' horns, by meansrcellus took Syracuse, and Scipio invaded and conquered Spain, and finally carried the war into Hannibal's own country. Fabius opposed this last enterprise, maintaining that Hannibal should be drivenHannibal should be driven from Italy before the war should be carried abroad. Neverthless, notwithstanding his high authority, it seems to us very doubtful whether the Romans would ever have gotten rid of Hannibal if Scipio Hannibal if Scipio had not invaded Carthage. Washigton's campaigns were somewhat on the Fabian system. Yet it was repugnant to his disposition, which was naturally ardent and impetuous. He had to form an army out
dering the rejoicing of our rebellious States at the prospect of securing the aid of England's fleets and armies in the enterprise of the occupation of Washington. We are called upon now to exhibit the virtues of patience and moderation towards a domineering foreign Power, and to submit to its arrogant demands and pretensions, in order to grapple the more effectively with an insolent domestic enemy beleaguering our National Capital. But as Rome remembered Carthage from the invasion of Hannibal, and as France remembers St. Helena, so will the people of the United States remember and treasure up for the future this little affair of the Trent. Nor do we suppose that the pacific solution of this difficulty, upon the basis of England's offensive ultimatum, will be without equivalent or compensation. We expect that it will secure a more decent regard hereafter for England's professions of neutrality than she has heretofore exhibited; that such scandalous neutral hospitalities as
The Yankee forces. The Romans, when they were gradually pursuing the conquest of the world, increased their troops as the enterprises constantly offering themselves developed themselves before them. A few legions were sufficient to overruns the neighboring States of Italy. Not one hundred thousand men were in the field during the war with Pyrrhus, or at any time before the great war with Hannibal. Julius Cœsar led only six legions to the conquest of Gaul, and it is not believed that even after the Empire comprehended 150,000,000 subjects, it ever had more than half a million of men under arms. The greatest military States of modern times, including the French Empire under the first Napoleon, never kept on foot a force exceeding 600,000 men. How, then, are we to account for the army which Yankeedom has sprung upon the world? It is unlike anything in ancient or modern times. It does not resemble the hosts of Xerxes, for that was gathered together by a great King, holding
own...things in Missouri. General Sterling, Price, of Missouri, arrived in this city on Monday. His mission to the capital at this juncture is purely official, though it had been intimated that the President would send for him, in compliance with a request from the Missouri delegation in Congress for the promotion of Gen. Price.--There are many, however, who doubt that General Price will be elevated, since he is not a man of military education — not a graduate of West Point — but, like Hannibal and Cæsar, is simply a soldier of unsurpassed brilliancy and genius. The army at Spring field is now much larger than it ever was, and in better condition. The Southern cause in the State enlists the sympathies of every class of citizens, except a very trifling minority. Many even of those in arms opposed to us, under the auspices of the Lincoln State Government, are friendly towards the Southern cause, and would join us immediately, if practicable. As it is, desertions are of daily
duty better than the Duke of Wellington could have done it, the day before, or the day after, the battle of Waterloo. We are told that "war" in the time of Hannibal and Cæear, "was an art, not a science." It might have been added that it was so even in the time of the first Napoleon, at least he said it was. Nor do we see anns are in the hands of both parties, and they are thereby thus far on an equality, genius plays as important a part in producing results as it did in the days of Hannibal and Cæear. In this connexion, we may observe that Napoleon, who made more use of artillery than any other General had ever done before him, and who was accused ntary it is;) that the best school is the field — and that the next best is the campaigns of certain great Generals whom he enumerates, viz; Alexander the Great, Hannibal, and Julius Caesar, in ancient times; in modern times Gustavus Adolphus, Marshal Turenne, Prince Eugene of Savoy, and the Duke of Marlborough, and Frederick the
nted burns in the bosom of every man in this invaded land. If this be so, the Yankees are not within a thousand years, much less sixty days, of the conquest. After all our coasts are beleaguered and our frontier towns captured, we have still the heart of the Confederacy to defend in its hills and fastnesses. Our armies will be massed at important centres, and great battles fought by a whole people in arms. "Italy," says the Charleston Mercury, was overrun by the Carthagenians under Hannibal, and Spain by Napoleon — perhaps the two greatest leaders in ancient or modern times. Yet both were defeated and driven back from the soil they had occupied. Prussia, likewise, was overrun by France, Russia, and Austria; and yet were they driven back by Frederick after bloody defeats on his part, leaving twenty and thirty thousand dead men on the field." Greece, with 500,000 people, fought the Turks with 30,000,000 of population for seven years, and at last saved its independence. I
The spade and mattock. Hannibal, the Carthaginian, stood on the field of Cannon, surrounded the dead bodies of eighty thousand Rome who had fallen in that unheard of bat was advised by his master of the horse once upon Rome, and settle the the capture of that city. But, although as man never toiled before for the attainment of that it was at last come within the magnitude of his own success . He hesitated, Delibes . His enemy recovered their ernation--he gave them time and to recruit — they soon had new in the field — his victory turned to ashes he found that he had now to do who had profited by defeat, wisdom, and gathered safety, catastrophe which was to over forever. In the end he lost everything by his hesitation. His repu. --Italy, his own country very paid the forfeit of his want of Confederate army gained at Manassas almost as decided as that gained by . The number of the enemy was not great, it is true, but it was their whole army had bee