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Adam Badeau, Military history of Ulysses S. Grant from April 1861 to April 1865. Volume 1, Chapter 8: (search)
e hundred muskets; from these, however, his reserves were to be deducted, which, he said, would reduce the force in the trenches to fifteen thousand five hundred men. Although Pemberton said that he had only eighteen thousand five hundred men at this time, he surrendered thirty-one thousand nearly seven weeks later, and received no reenforcements in the mean while. Stevenson was put on the right, his troops reaching from the Warrenton road to the railroad, a distance of nearly five miles; Forney had the line between the railroad and the Graveyard road; and Smith, with his own troops, and some remnants of Loring's fugitive command that had straggled back into Vicksburg, had the extreme left, from the Graveyard road to the river on the north. Bowen was held in reserve, ready to strengthen any portion of the line most threatened. In addition to the guns on the water-front, one hundred and two pieces of artillery of different calibre, principally field, were placed in position on the
Adam Badeau, Military history of Ulysses S. Grant from April 1861 to April 1865. Volume 1, Chapter 9: (search)
elief of the garrison, should they become necessary, must be made by you. It would be a confession of weakness on my part, which I ought not to make, to propose them. When it becomes necessary to make terms, they may be considered as made under my authority. On the 1st of July, therefore, Pemberton having become satisfied that the time had arrived when he must either capitulate or evacuate the city, addressed the following communication to each of his four division commanders, Stevenson, Forney, Smith, and Bowen: Unless the siege of Vicksburg is raised, or supplies are thrown in, it will become necessary, very shortly, to evacuate the place. I see no prospect of the former, and there are many great if not insuperable obstacles in the way of the latter. You are, therefore, requested to inform me, with as little delay as possible, as to the condition of your troops, and their ability to make the marches and undergo the fatigues necessary to accomplish a successful evacuation. T