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Lucius R. Paige, History of Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1630-1877, with a genealogical register 51 51 Browse Search
Harper's Encyclopedia of United States History (ed. Benson Lossing) 19 19 Browse Search
Knight's Mechanical Encyclopedia (ed. Knight) 11 11 Browse Search
George Bancroft, History of the United States from the Discovery of the American Continent, Vol. 3, 15th edition. 5 5 Browse Search
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.) 5 5 Browse Search
Benjamin Cutter, William R. Cutter, History of the town of Arlington, Massachusetts, ormerly the second precinct in Cambridge, or District of Menotomy, afterward the town of West Cambridge. 1635-1879 with a genealogical register of the inhabitants of the precinct. 4 4 Browse Search
H. Wager Halleck , A. M. , Lieut. of Engineers, U. S. Army ., Elements of Military Art and Science; or, Course of Instruction in Strategy, Fortification, Tactis of Battles &c., Embracing the Duties of Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery and Engineers. Adapted to the Use of Volunteers and Militia. 4 4 Browse Search
HISTORY OF THE TOWN OF MEDFORD, Middlesex County, Massachusetts, FROM ITS FIRST SETTLEMENT, IN 1630, TO THE PRESENT TIME, 1855. (ed. Charles Brooks) 3 3 Browse Search
Bliss Perry, The American spirit in lierature: a chronicle of great interpreters 3 3 Browse Search
Medford Historical Society Papers, Volume 8. 2 2 Browse Search
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Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Chapter 1: the policy of war. (search)
y small States, become preponderant, by knowing how to seize this fitness of time. Two examples will suffice to prove this. In 1552, the Elector Maurice, of Saxony, dared to declare himself openly against Charles Fifth, master of Spain, of Italy, and of the Germanic empire; against Charles, victorious over Francis First, and pressing France in his firm grasp. This movement, which transported the war to the heart of the Tyrol, arrested the great man who menaced to swallow up everything. In 1706, the Duke of Savoy, Victor Amedius, declaring against Louis XIV, changes the face of affairs in Italy, and brings back the French army upon the banks of the Adige, to the walls of Turin, where it experienced the bloody catastrophe which immortalized the Prince Eugene. How insignificant statesmen will appear to those who have meditated upon these two events, and upon the great questions to which they apply! We have said enough upon the advantages of these opportune interventions; the numbe
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Chapter 3: strategy. (search)
uried itself in lines of circumvallation and countervallation, requiring as much expense and trouble as the siege itself. The famous affair of the lines of Turin, 1706, where the Prince Eugene of Savoy forced, with forty thousand men, a French army of seventy-eight thousand, well intrenched, but which, having six leagues of fortiRhine the same part as those of Wissemburg upon the left, was not more fortunate. Those of the Queich and of the Kinzig had the same fate. The lines of Turin, (1706) and those of Mayence (1795), though destined to serve for circumvallation, offer a complete analogy, to all possible lines, if not by their strength, at least by is no enemy, however insignificant he may be, with whom it would not be useful to become allied; the influence which the change of policy of the Duke of Savoy, in 1706, exercised upon the events of that epoch, also the declaration of Maurice of Saxony, in 1551, and of Bavaria in 1813, sufficiently proves that it is important to a
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Chapter 4: grand tactics, and battles. (search)
not the less merit in the execution. As for continuous intrenched lines, although they seem better connected than isolated works, they are yet more easy to carry, because constructed upon an extent of many leagues, it is almost impossible to prevent the enemy from penetrating upon some one point; the taking of those of Mayence, and Wissemburg, which we have reported in the history of the wars of the Revolution, (Chap. 21, and 52,) that of the lines of Turin, by Prince Eugene of Savoy, in 1706, are great lessons to study. This famous event of Turin, which we have already often cited, is too well known for us to recall its circumstances, but we could not dispense with observing that never was a triumph bought so cheaply, nor more difficult to conceive. In truth, the strategic plan was admirable; the march from the Adige by Placentia upon Asti by the right of the Po, leaving the French upon the Mincio, was perfectly combined; but as for the operations under Turin, it must be owne
H. Wager Halleck , A. M. , Lieut. of Engineers, U. S. Army ., Elements of Military Art and Science; or, Course of Instruction in Strategy, Fortification, Tactis of Battles &c., Embracing the Duties of Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery and Engineers. Adapted to the Use of Volunteers and Militia., Chapter 2: Strategy.—General divisions of the Art.—Rules for planning a Campaign.—Analysis of the military operations of Napoleon (search)
nd executed a corresponding tactical movement. By the former there had been some chance of success, but the latter exposed him to inevitable destruction. The little fort of Koenigsten, from its advantageous position, was more useful to the French, in 1813, than the vast works of Dresden. The little fort of Bard, with its handful of men, was near defeating the operations of Napoleon in 1800, by holding in check his entire army; whereas, on the other hand, the ill-advised lines of Ticino, in 1706, caused an army of 78,000 French to be defeated by only 40,000 men under Prince Eugene of Savoy. War, as has already been said, may be either offensive or defensive. If the attacking army be directed against an entire state, it becomes a war of invasion. If only a province, or a military position, or an army, be attacked, it is simply regarded as taking the initiative in offensive movements. Offensive war is ordinarily most advantageous in its moral and political influence. It is wage
H. Wager Halleck , A. M. , Lieut. of Engineers, U. S. Army ., Elements of Military Art and Science; or, Course of Instruction in Strategy, Fortification, Tactis of Battles &c., Embracing the Duties of Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery and Engineers. Adapted to the Use of Volunteers and Militia., Chapter 3: Fortifications.Their importance in the defence of States proved by numerous historical examples (search)
have usually great advantages over the besiegers; and unless the latter are vastly superior in number, or the work is of a very inferior character, or the garrison is destitute of the requisite means and energy to resist an attack, they will not be taken. Mezieres was not taken in 1520; nor Marseilles in 1524; nor Peronne in 1536; nor Landrecies in 1543; nor Metz in 1552; nor Montauban in 1621; nor Lerida in 1647; nor Maestricht in 1676; nor Vienna in 1529, and again in 1683; nor Turin in 1706; nor Conde in 1744; nor Lille in 1792; nor Landau in 1793; nor Ulm in 1800; nor Saragossa in 1808; nor Burgos in 1812. This list might be extended almost indefinitely with the names of places that could be reduced neither by force nor by starvation. But, as has already been noticed, some have asserted that fortifications have become of little comparative importance, under the new system of warfare introduced during the wars of the French Revolution. On this subject let us consult the opi
H. Wager Halleck , A. M. , Lieut. of Engineers, U. S. Army ., Elements of Military Art and Science; or, Course of Instruction in Strategy, Fortification, Tactis of Battles &c., Embracing the Duties of Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery and Engineers. Adapted to the Use of Volunteers and Militia., Chapter 5: Tactics.The twelve orders of battle, with examples of each.—Different Formations of infantry, cavalry, artillery, and engineers on the field of battle, with the Modes of bringing troops into action (search)
e the enemy's centre. (Figure 21.) The concave order may be used with advantage in certain cases, and in particular localities. Hannibal employed it at the battle of Cannae, the English at Crecy and Azincourt, and the Austrians at Essling, in 1809. (Figure 22.) The convex order is sometimes formed to cover a defile, to attack a concave line, or to oppose an attack before or after the passage of a river. The Romans formed this order at the battle of Cosilinum; the French at Ramilies in 1706, at Fleurus in 1794, at Essling in 1809, and at the second and third days of Leipsic in 1813, and at Brienne in 1814. (Figure 23.) The order by echelon on one wing may be frequently employed with advantage; but if the echelon be made on both wings, there is the same objection to its use as to the perpendicular order on both wings. At Dresden, Napoleon attacked both wings at the same time; this is the only instance in his whole history of a similar attack, and this was owing to peculiar ci
H. Wager Halleck , A. M. , Lieut. of Engineers, U. S. Army ., Elements of Military Art and Science; or, Course of Instruction in Strategy, Fortification, Tactis of Battles &c., Embracing the Duties of Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery and Engineers. Adapted to the Use of Volunteers and Militia., Chapter 12: army organization—Engineers.—Their history, duties, and organization,—with a brief discussion, showing their importance as a part of a modern army organization. (search)
tter understood, and as the wants of the service required. Even in the earliest of these battles we find the engineers taking a prominent and distinguished part. In the war of 1688, twenty-four engineers were killed and wounded at the siege of Philipsbourg, eighteen at Namur, eight at Huy, ten at Charleroi, eight at Ath, thirty at Barcelona, &c. Such losses were good proofs of the usefulness of these officers, and before this war was closed, their number was increased to six hundred; and in 1706 the army contained eight brigades of engineers and four companies of miners. The engineer corps being partially disbanded in the early part of the French Revolution, great difficulty was experienced in reorganizing it and in finding competent men to supply the places of those who had been driven into exile or sacrificed during the reign of terror. Energy and activity, combined with republican zeal, could supply the place of skill in the other arms, but the science of the engineer could no
Rebellion Record: Introduction., Volume 1. (ed. Frank Moore), Introduction. (search)
curred even to his fervid imagination, that, because Ireland was an independent government when she entered into the union, it was competent for her at her discretion to secede from it. What would our English friends, who have learned from our Secessionists the inherent right of a disaffected State to secede from our Union, have thought, had Mr. O'Connell, in the paroxysms of his agitation, claimed the right on the part of Ireland, by her own act, to sever her union with England? Again, in 1706, Scotland and England formed a Constitutional Union. They also, though subject to the same monarch, were in other respects Sovereign and independent Kingdoms. They had each its separate parliament, courts of justice, laws, and established national church. Articles of union were established between them; but all the laws and statutes of either kingdom not contrary to these articles, remained in force. Rapin's History of England, vol. IV., p. 741-6. A powerful minority in Scotland disapp
s have fallen to us in pleasant places, and God hath given to us a goodly heritage. Chairmen of the board of Selectmen. Jonathan Wade1676. Nathaniel Wade1678. John Hall1679. Nathaniel Wade1681. Jonathan Wade1683. Thomas Willis1684. Nathaniel Wade1685. John Hall1689. Nathaniel Wade1690. John Hall1693. Nathaniel Wade1694. Jonathan Tufts1695. Nathaniel Wade1696. Peter Tufts1698. Nathaniel Wade1699. Peter Tufts1700. Nathaniel Wade1703. Peter Tufts1705. Nathaniel Wade1706. Stephen Francis1707. Stephen Willis1708. John Francis1709. Ebenezer Brooks1710. John Bradshaw1711. John Whitmore1712. Thomas Willis1713. Stephen Willis1714. Jonathan Tufts1715. Samuel Wade1717. Thomas Tufts1718. John Bradshaw1719. Jonathan Tufts1721. John Bradshaw1722. Thomas Tufts1723. Ebenezer Brooks1724. John Bradshaw1725. Ebenezer Brooks1726. Stephen Hall1730. Thomas Hall1732. John Hall1733. Stephen Hall1734. John Willis1736. John Hall1737. Benjamin Willis1738.
24, 1850, and had--  24-30Isabel E., b. Feb. 18, 1851. 22-26HORATIO James m. Caroline J. Mansfield, Dec. 25, 1851, and had--  26-31Stanley W., b. Aug. 24, 1853.  1DILL, Thomas, who d. Jan. 29, 1718, had by wife Mary--  1-2Mary, b. Oct. 35, 1706.  3Thomas, b. Dec. 19, 1708.  1EDES, John, and Martha, his wife, had--  1-2 John,b. Jan. 31, 1716. Nathan,  3   Eliot, Mary, widow of Francis, of Braintree, d. Jan. 17, 1697. She was mother-in-law of Deacon John Whitmore; and he, May 3, 1701.  10Thomas, b. Sept. 19, 1679; d. May 16, 1731.  11 John, b. Aug. 6, 1681; m.Rebecca Tufts, Apr. 17, 1717, who d. Aug. 21, 1747, aged 54. He d. Aug. 8, 1755.  12 Jonathan, b. Feb. 23, 1684; m.1st, Dorothy Wade, Oct. 17, 1706; 2d, widow Mary Eliot, 1726. He d. s. p., Sept., 1749.  13 Benjamin, b. Oct. 30, 1686; m.Ruth Bradshaw, Feb. 10, 1714, who d. Feb. 19, 1752. He d. Feb. 3, 1767.  14Hannah, b. 1688; m. Peter Seccomb.  15Mary, b. July 15, 1690;