Showing posts with label Goldman. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Goldman. Show all posts

Thursday, December 19, 2013

Goldman loses the Volcker Rule battle over credit funds

About a year ago we discussed the argument made by Goldman's lawyers that under the Volcker rule, banks should be allowed to invest in credit funds (see post). The rationale is that if banks can lend to companies directly, why can't they invest in funds who make the same types of loans? In particular, Goldman was defending its lucrative mezzanine fund business which provides junior capital to companies. Goldman and other banks compete with private equity firms such as Blackstone in managing credit portfolios for clients.

The final Volcker Rule regulation seems to indicate that Goldman has lost that argument. (See great summary on Volcker Rule pertaining to private funds from Simpson Thacher - below)
Simpson Thacher: - the Agencies were unpersuaded by industry comments that ... credit funds (which are generally formed as partnerships with third-party capital that invest in loans or make loans or otherwise extend the type of credit that banks are authorized to undertake on their own balance sheet) should also be excluded.
That means Goldman and other banks will be limited to the standard 3% investment in the mezzanine or other credit funds they manage. And clients generally expect banks to commit significantly more of banks' own capital to funds they manage in order to avoid potential conflicts (such as having banks stuff these funds with bad investment banking transactions).

This is a big win for private equity firms who will be able to grab market share of this business from banks. However it's not a great outcome for companies who rely on this type of financing, as lender competition declines.


STB Volcker Memo



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Friday, November 30, 2012

Goldman: No recovery for Spain until 2015

Spain's large temp labor force (see discussion) should help reduce unemployment quickly, once recovery takes hold. But given the sorry state of the banking system (see post), when do economists actually expect Spain's economy to begin growing again? The latest forecast from Goldman shows that it will be some three years before even a modest real GDP growth should be expected.

Purple = forecast (source: GS)

What's amazing is that earlier this year many mainstream economists were projecting a "short and shallow" recession (see discussion). In fact economists have been consistently lowering their forecasts all year. The chart below from Goldman shows the consecutive worsening of the 2013 forecast for Spain's GDP growth.

Source: GS

Given Spain's limited ability to grow its debt levels (simply because the market and the EMU will not let them), the debt to GDP ratio is expected to level off just under 100% on a gross basis. And simply for reference (and many people will take issue with this comparison), the US is already at 100% debt to GDP on a gross basis.

Purple = forecast (source: GS)


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Wednesday, October 31, 2012

Spooky Halloween surprise from Goldman

The Goldman Sachs Analyst Index (GSAI) hit a new post-recession low this month. The index is a composite of corporate outlook by industry from Goldman's company research. In the past, the index generally fell in line with other economic activity indices such as ISM Manufacturing - but not recently. While the ISM index is showing a slight expansion (though we don't yet have the October ISM number), GSAI is pointing to the sharpest contraction across US industries since 2009. Sales, shipments, new orders - all came in weak. This indicates that the positive economic numbers in September (see discussion) may have been an aberration.
GS: - The Goldman Sachs Analyst Index (GSAI) tumbled to 32.9 in October from 44.1 in September. Underlying components also fell across the board, suggesting depressed business activity from the bottom-up.
...
In addition to the headline index, most of the underlying components of the GSAI also fell sharply. The sales index gave back its gain in September, falling 12 points to 36.4 in October from 48.4, registering the fifth consecutive month below the 50 mark. Similarly, the new orders index fell 15.4 points to 26.3 from 41.7, contributing 4.6 points alone to the headline drop. The inventories index saw the lone gain, rising 1.6 points to 43.3. Consequently, the orders-inventories gap fell back into negative territory at -17.0 versus flat in September. The sharp reversal in the sales, new orders, and orders-inventories gap measures suggest that the broad improvement in September was likely transient, and that activity and demand will likely remain depressed despite tight inventories.
Source: GS

This points to significant downside risk to the ISM Manufacturing number that comes out tomorrow (Thursday). Another troubling indicator from GS is the GSAI Employment Index - a component of the overall GSAI measure.

Source: GS
GS: - The employment index fell for the second consecutive month to 39.3 from 45.3 in September. This is the lowest index level since February 2010, and—similar to weakness in the employment component in the Empire State and Philadelphia Fed surveys—continues to point to a slow recovery in the labor market. While the September employment report showed encouraging improvements particularly from the household side, the pace of improvement is unlikely to sustain; we expect only a moderate gain of 125,000 in nonfarm payrolls in the October employment report on Friday.
Based on the GSAI indicators, we could be looking at a series of negative economic surprises as October economic numbers are released next month. Economic activity and corporate earnings in Q4 may in fact end up being far less rosy than many expect.


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Wednesday, October 10, 2012

Credit/mezz funds create a major hole in the Volcker Rule

There is a hole in the Volcker Rule that banks are trying exploit. But before jumping to conclusions, let's walk through the following logic. The Volcker Rule prohibits significant proprietary trading and limits banks' investments in hedge funds and private equity to 3% of Tier-1 capital. It also prohibits banks from holding more than 3% of any one fund's assets. The purpose of Volcker Rule is to focus the bulk of banks' capital on its primary business of lending. Seems clear-cut, right?

But what if a bank invests in a finance company whose primary business is lending to corporations. That should be permitted under the Volcker rule - at least based on the rationale behind the rule. But what if the finance company is a partnership that is structured like a private equity fund and its role is to lend to companies - as a bank would. Is that OK? And what if the fund makes risky corporate loans - possibly subordinated and unsecured high yielding loans. Is that "crossing the line"? The Volcker Rule does not prohibit a bank from making risky loans - in fact there is nothing in the Dodd-Frank legislation that prohibits banks from doing so. The US actually needs more risky business loans, not less, in order to get the economy moving. After all most small and midium-size business loans are risky by their nature. So why can't a bank jointly with investors own a company that makes such loans?

Such funds are actually quite common. Some are managed by private equity firms like KKR, while others are managed by banks like Goldman. In the case of Goldman (and other banks), the bank is also an investor in its own fund. From the investors' perspective that's a good practice to have the bank co-invest with them in order to eliminate potential conflicts - many investors in fact demand that banks invest alongside with them.


Some of these funds are called "mezzanine" ("mezz") funds because the loans they make tend to be in the part of the capital structure that is below the senior debt but above the equity. Goldman for example makes a great deal of money in this business as a GP (management/performance fees) and as an LP/investor (mostly income from these loans). The firm, together with other banks, has lobbied hard to allow it to stay in this business. Now the question before the regulators is whether such practices by banks should be prohibited.
WSJ: - Credit funds lend to companies that might not otherwise get financing, such as companies backed by private-equity firms, and tend to hold their investments to maturity while using a limited amount of leverage. Goldman has argued in meetings with regulators and in letters to them that these funds function like banks, just with a different structure, according to public records and the people familiar with the efforts.

The firm has argued that the funds help the economy by broadening the availability of credit and are less risky than other investments constrained by the Volcker rule. Regulators' response has been noncommittal, the people said.
As with any such regulation the answer is not clear-cut. To add to the puzzle, most non-bank investors in such funds are insurance firms and pension funds - corporate, municipal, state, teachers, police, and other types of pensions. So anyone who has a defined benefits pension in the US is most likely an indirect investor in credit funds.

With Romney as President, such activities would likely be permitted, as he pushes to change Dodd-Frank (per his campaign promises). Romney, being an ex-private-equity executive, understands credit funds and how they can potentially expand lending in the US to companies that would otherwise have a tough time obtaining credit. The current administration on other hand may push back on this lobbying effort by banks and move to prohibit investment in credit funds as being too risky. Whatever the case, one should always watch out for "unintended consequences" of new regulation.
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Friday, August 31, 2012

Goldman: US faces $8 trillion budget shortfall through 2022

Goldman's latest analysis of the US budget shows a staggering gap of $8 trillion in the next 10 years. This materially diverges from the latest White House projection as well as from the CBO's "baseline".
GS: - Through 2022, we forecast a cumulative deficit of roughly $8 trillion (3.9%) under a "business as usual" assumption that envisions extension of most current policies but no further deficit reduction measures.

Source: GS

Wednesday, August 1, 2012

Goldman's investor survey of ECB's decision tomorrow

Hopefully our friends at Goldman don't get too upset, but a portion of their recent survey is just too important not to post. The survey asked what investors (as well as analysts and economists) think will be the ECB announcement/policy change tomorrow. Here are the results. As a comparison to Barclays Capital internal assessment (and further discussion) see this earlier post.

Relaxation of collateral requirements and the restart of SMP (periphery bond purchases) in support of EFSF purchases seem to be the common themes with the Barclays analysis. Again, if these policy changes don't take place, we should expect a sharp selloff across risk assets.

Source: Goldman Sachs Global ECS Research. Survey taken August 1, 2012.




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Thursday, July 12, 2012

Goldman's Olympic performance forecast

Goldman has developed a regression model to predict nations' performance in the Olympic Games as measured by the number of medals. The model uses some intuitive indicators such as population size, GDP per capita, and political stability as well as the more subtle variables including macro conditions, human capital, technology, etc. One of the variables is whether or not a nation is hosting the Olympics, which gives it a significant advantage. That bodes well for the UK this summer. Here are the results.

Gold medals only:

Source: GS

Total medals:
Source: GS

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Tuesday, June 12, 2012

Berkshire steps in to bid for ResCap assets

In another strange twist to the developing story of ResCap's bankruptcy, Berkshire has stepped in to bid on ResCap's assets. Berkshire decided to bid against Nationstar (owned by Fortress) for the mortgage origination and servicing businesses (worth $2.3bn) and against Ally (ResCap's parent) for the residual financial assets ($1.45bn bid).
WSJ: - Berkshire offered to be the "stalking horse" bidder for a $374 billion mortgage-servicing portfolio that ResCap already has a proposed agreement to sell to Nationstar Mortgage Holdings Inc., a monoline mortgage servicer majority owned by Fortress Investment Group. It also seeks to buy a portfolio of ResCap mortgages for which Ally has agreed to service as the stalking- horse bidder. [Just to clarify, Berkshire wouldn't be buying " $374 billion" worth of mortgages, only the servicing rights.]
Berkshire has claimed that the original sale to Ally was an "affiliated" off-market transaction and ResCap was not getting fair value. Improving the sale terms will certainly help Berkshire's large ResCap junior secured bond position. The recovery on the unsecured bonds (with a big portion held by Goldman) remains unclear.


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Sunday, June 10, 2012

The strange story of ResCap bankruptcy that may pit Goldman against the US government

Here are some facts (in Q&A format) surrounding ResCap's recent bankruptcy, a story that has become somewhat of an enigma even to many in the financial services industry. This story involves some of the biggest players in the distressed and CDS markets, namely Citi, Goldman, Berkshire, Barclays, and of course the US government.

1. What is ResCap?
Wikipedia: - GMAC ResCap (Residential Capital) is a financial service company that focuses on residential estate loans. It was part of GMAC which was then taken over by Ally Financial. Its corporate headquarters are in Minneapolis, Minnesota. Its subsidiaries include GMAC Mortgage and online home lender Ditech.
2. Who owns Ally Bank (Ally Financial)?

Ally used to be called GMAC - the finance subsidiary of General Motors (many who bought or leased a GM vehicle a few years back got their financing from GMAC). Since late 2008, Ally Financial has been majority-owned (74%) by the United States government. The owners have been trying to build the Ally brand with a fairly aggressive TV campaign (see video at the bottom).

3. Why did ResCap file for bankruptcy?

Basically the US government wants to sell Ally - as it should. But the highly leveraged ResCap subsidiary had made Ally an unattractive asset because of the fears that the bank may become responsible for ResCap's debt. The US government decided to purge Ally of this perceived risk by putting ResCap into bankruptcy and walking away.
Wikipedia: - On May 15, 2012, Ally put the company into bankruptcy. ResCap posted a $402 million loss in 2011 and had missed a $20 million payment on unsecured debt on April 17, 2012. ResCap listed $10.9 billion in mortgages on December 31, 2012, after wiping $22 billion in mortgages off its books in 2009, 2010 and 2011. The company had booked a substantial number of subprime mortgages. The bankruptcy was seen as a step by Ally to exit the mortgage business to focus on its profitable auto loan and direct banking business.
4. Who owns ResCap debt?

ResCap bonds are widely held by numerous investors including many hedge funds. However Berkshire Hathaway (who said Berkshire is not a hedge fund?) until recently owned $500mm of the unsecured junior debt and $900mm of the 9.625% third-lien (secured) notes (40% of outstanding). Holding enough secured notes would allow Berkshire to prevent what's called a "cram-down" on the unsecured notes. In a cram-down the unsecured holders would have to live with (often) harsh restructuring terms pushed through by the secured creditors. By holding enough secured notes, Berkshire would in effect "protect" their unsecured claim by blocking a harsh cram-down. At least that was the theory.

5. What did Ally contribute to the ResCap bankruptcy in order to try to walk away (what did Ally think it needs to do to pacify the ResCap creditors)?
Bloomberg: - Ally agreed to pay ResCap $750 million to settle any claims against the parent, buy as much as $1.6 billion of securities if others don’t, and provide $150 million to help finance ResCap’s operations during bankruptcy, according to a company statement.
6. Is Ally done? After this large commitment can the government-owned bank just walk away?

It's not going to be as easy as the US government had hoped.
LCD: - In its own motion for discovery, the creditors’ committee identified at least 20 different transactions with Ally and its affiliates involving the purchase of assets and businesses from ResCap, or the extension of credit secured by ResCap’s assets. These transactions involved billions of dollars and sizable ongoing businesses, the most significant of which was Ally’s 2009 acquisition of ResCap’s ownership stake in IB Finance Holding Company, the direct holding company of Ally Bank. 
7. What's Berkshire's involvement in this claim?

Apparently Berkshire was going to fight Ally (and the US Government) on this.
Bloomberg: - Ted Weschler, a Berkshire investment manager, ... asked the judge overseeing ResCap’s bankruptcy in Manhattan to approve an examiner to investigate deals made before the company sought court protection, including transactions with its parent, Ally Financial Inc.
LCD: - This and other transactions may give rise to various potential claims that Ally harvested assets from ResCap before seeking a “quick and easy divorce through bankruptcy,” Berkshire said.  
What is evident – abundantly so – is that the debtors’ plan fits neatly into Ally’s publicly stated goal of separating itself, once and for all, from ResCap,” Berkshire said. “Whether Ally’s agenda also happens to be in the best interest of ResCap and its creditors is another question, one that should be a focus of a searching inquiry.”
The claim here is that Ally stripped ResCap of some juicy assets at below-market prices via "affiliate transactions" prior to filing. That would be the equivalent of someone selling a piece of bank funded property to their uncle before walking away from the mortgage. The bank would surely go after the uncle.

7. Does such action indicate that Berkshire is going to hang in there and fight for a higher recovery on their unsecured notes?

Surprisingly Berkshire's commitment to this fight that would potentially recover more on the unsecured notes was not as solid as people thought. The news came out last week that Berkshire dumped their $500mm of their unsecured notes. Some in the market wonder if the Obama administration gave Berkshire a call and asked them to walk away.
LCD: - Berkshire Hathaway dumped more than $500 million in unsecured bonds of Residential Capital, starting just hours after it filed a court motion seeking the appointment of an independent examiner in ResCap’s Chapter 11 proceedings, court filings show.
8. Who did Berkshire sell the notes to?

The exact details of the sale are unknown, but the market talk is that Berkshire sold at least a large part of their holdings to Citi.

9. What was Citi going to do with these notes?

This is where things become even more strange. Apparently Citi decided to deliver these notes into the ResCap CDS settlement auction. Remember the Greek bonds delivered into the Greek restructuring CDS auction? Welcome to the same type of auction but corporate credit style (a fairly common occurrence). Some speculate that Citi was long ResCap CDS protection. Dumping a big block of bonds would make the recovery lower and the payment on the CDS higher.

10. Who bought the ResCap bonds at the CDS auction?

It turns out that Goldman was on the other side of the trade. Being short the ResCap CDS (as many suspect it was), Goldman was interested in raising the recovery price because that would mean the bank didn't have to pay as much on the CDS settlement. The reason Goldman believed the recovery was going to be higher had to do with Berkshire's court filing (discussed above), complaining that Ally was stripping ResCap of good assets. Also Berkshire's holding of the secured (3d lien) notes to protect the unsecured gave Goldman comfort that Berkshire will fight for higher recovery in the unsecured bonds. And that likely got the firm involved in the short CDS trade. If Berkshire is indeed expected to recover more on the unsecured, the CDS will have to pay out less.  But when Berkshire dumped their bonds, Goldman got caught on the wrong side of the trade and had to bid on the bonds to defend their CDS position.
LCD: - But during the auction, there was a faceoff between two of the dealers, one delivering bonds and one that had a long thesis, according to sources. Those dealers were Goldman Sachs and Citi, sources said.

Goldman and Citi faced off during the CDS auction about the recovery of these unsecured bonds, because Citi came to market with a big block of the bonds – presumably Berkshire's – while Goldman had a long thesis that gave them more recovery, using Berkshire's own call for an examiner as support for the possibility that this allocation could somehow be renegotiated to get more recovery. At the CDS auction, Citi offered $520 million of the bonds &or sale, and Goldman bid on $345 million of those...
11. What happened to the bonds?
Bloomberg: - Yesterday and today, those same bonds fell. The 6.5 percent bonds that matured on June 1 dropped more than 7 percent. The 6.5 percent bonds maturing next year fell 16 percent. And the 6.875 percent bonds fell almost 12 percent. All were selling for 17.6 cents on the dollar...
12. What was the auction recovery on the CDS?
LCD: - Heavy trading of ResCap 8.5% notes due 2013 began June 5, continuing through today, at between 17 and 21.5, according to trade data. The level is not surprising given that the credit-event auction held on Wednesday to settle CDS contracts referencing Residential Capital set a final price of 17.625 cents on the dollar...
13. Who benefited from this mess?

Why Berkshire decided to sell the bonds remains unclear (a call from the government to Buffett would certainly explain it), but the firm is obviously not interested in a prolonged fight for the unsecureds' recovery. Berkshire may have taken a hit on its position. It is possible the firm hopes for a better recovery on their secured bond holdings. The cram-down is now far more likely as Berkshire no longer has the unsecured notes to defend.

It is also unclear if Citi made money on this transaction, although it looks like the bank (which coincidentally is also partially US government owned) was more in the loop than Goldman. GS is now stuck with the unsecured bonds (which it bought in the CDS auction) as part of the game of ResCap musical chairs.

14. How will ResCap operate in the mean time?

Barclays has arranged a DIP loan to the tune of $1.45 billion, which was well received in the market.
Reuters: - Barclays cut pricing on Residential Capital's $1.45 billion debtor in possession (DIP) facilities amidst strong investor demand.

The DIP facility will be modified to consist of a $175-200 million revolver, a $1.05-1.075 billion term loan A-1, and a $200 million term loan A-2. The DIP facility previously pegged the revolver at $200 million and the term loan A-1 at $1.05 billion.

The revolver upfront fee has been raised to 200bp from 100bp. The proposed pricing on the revolver loan is now 375bp over Libor, down from 400bp over Libor, with a 75bp unused line fee unchanged.
15. What will happen to the unsecured claims?

The new bond holders, with Goldman being the largest, will try to prove in court that Ally (effectively the US government) needs to cough more money because of the bank's affiliate transactions with ResCap. It certainly would be politically easier for the US government to fight Goldman in court than to take on Berkshire. Goldman vs. the US government will make for an interesting court case to say the least. Whatever the outcome, this story is far from over.






Ally has become known in the last couple of years for its aggressive marketing campaign as the US government tries to build the Ally brand.

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Saturday, June 9, 2012

Goldman: 75% chance the Fed will ease at next meeting

Goldman's latest research suggests that the Fed is likely to ease at the next meeting this month. This assesment is primarily based on their proprietary indicator called the GS Financials Conditions Index (GSFCI). As a backdrop, they point out that the US economy has slowed, as shown in the chart below. Both the nonfarm payroll growth and the CAI index (Goldman's index of broad economic activity) have declined sharply.


Nonfarm payrols and the CAI index (source: GS)

At the same time the Financial Conditions Index has shown a substantial tightening.

GS Financials Conditions Index (source: GS)
GS: - "In light of the weakening data and the intensification of the Euro area crisis in recent weeks, Fed officials have started to raise the possibility of additional monetary easing. Fed Vice Chair Janet Yellen and New York Fed President William Dudley, for example, identified three conditions that would warrant additional easing. These include: (1) an unsatisfactory pace of economic recovery, such that little or no improvement in labor market conditions is made; (2) sufficiently large downside risks to the outlook; or (3) a notable decline in core inflation below the FOMC’s 2% objective."
The chart below shows the Fed's easing probability as a function of GSFCI, which puts the probability for the next FOMC meeting at around 75%.

.
Probability of Fed easing vs. Financials Conditions Index (source:GS)

The Fed has limited options, one of which is quantitative easing (QE). But an outright QE3 is still unlikely however. Many point to the fact that this being an election year makes QE3 more probable as the current administration would be looking for Fed's support in a slowing economy. But an argument could be made that given how unpopular QE had been in the past with the public, the Fed is not likely to "rock the boat" - particularly in an election year. As much as we want to believe in Fed's independence, many of the FOMC members are keenly aware of the political implications of an unpopular policy decision - in particular a decision that may have only a limited impact on growth. Instead we are likely to see an extension of Operation Twist, which may ultimately morph into sterilized securities purchases.

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Saturday, December 10, 2011

Goldman taps the wholesale funding market

Unlike most of its competitors, Goldman Sachs does not have a deposit base or retail branches, making it vulnerable to liquidity risk. JPMorgan for example has a vast pool of overnight and term deposits (both retail and institutional) they can access during tight liquidity periods. Goldman however tends to rely on capital markets for funding, forcing it not only pay higher financing rates, but making its funding costs extremely volatile, translating into unstable earnings and high stock volatility.

The chart below shows the yield on Goldman's 2016 notes.  The yield can easily swing some 100 basis points in a short period, making it tough to manage the business, creating uncertainties about future revenues.

GS 3 5/8, 2-2016 notes (Bloomberg)
GS is obviously looking to diversify its sources of funding, particularly through wholesale funding.  The tremendous drop in certificate of deposit (CDs) rates in recent months clearly looks particularly attractive to Goldman. CDs present funding opportunities that are almost 3.5% cheaper (below) than the capital markets (above).

Source: BankRate.com
 As a new bank holding company (since 2008), Goldman is now able to tap retail deposits funding that affords the usual FDIC protection.  But without a retail network, tapping retail deposits could prove particularly difficult.   The fact that the firm (as well as other large banking institutions) tends to be poorly regarded by the public does not help in raising retail funds.
Chartered Quality Institute: The decline [in trust] has been blamed on a series of public crises at organizations including the ongoing backlash against bankers, fueled by widely publicized problems at Goldman Sachs. The survey showed that only 25% of Americans now trusted banks, down from 33% in 2009 and 71% before the financial crash.
As usual in situations like this, GS gets creative and offers "structured" CDs that may differentiate its product from the standard sleepy bank product paying under 1.2% per year.  In this case the product is a 4-year CD linked to the performance of the DJI index.  This type of product is not unique and was often used by banks in the 90s, particularly in Europe.  But not by Goldman, because they were not a bank holding company then.

This particular CD provides a minimum return of 2% over the life or roughly 0.5% per year - guaranteed (vs. say 1.2% for a standard CD).  Principal is FDIC insured.  The maximum return is the sum (not compounded) of monthly returns on the Dow, capped at 1.5%-2% per month.  The final return therefore is what some refer to as "path dependent".  Even if the Dow ends up in the same place, a more volatile path will produce a lower return on the CD because the holder would be subject to full drops in the index, while monthly increases would be capped.  The holder is in effect "short volatility".

Goldman on the other hand views this as purely a financing product and therefore will hedge it.  Here is what the hedge will look like:

1. Goldman will buy a 4-year call on the Dow Jones index (or a group of stocks that closely resembles the index).  The call will be struck close to at-the-money.
2. On a monthly basis Goldman will sell short term (around a month in maturity) calls that are 1.5-2% out-of-the money.

By cutting the guaranteed rate on the CD from "market" by some 0.7% and by selling short-term calls on a monthly basis, Goldman can finance the long-term call option (above) and the FDIC insurance costs.  On average after accounting for the net cost of the hedges, Goldman's funding cost will likely be close to a typical CD rate, certainly much cheaper than issuing a bond.  The straight sum of monthly returns vs. the compounding makes it even cheaper.

Obviously a sophisticated client can replicate this structure in her own portfolio and get a better return.  But for a typical retail investor who wants some upside, this might look interesting.

If it works, Goldman can diversify its funding sources and more effectively compete with banks that have a retail presence.  It may also open a new funding avenue for Morgan Stanley, which is is even more vulnerable than Goldman to funding risks.

Goldman Sachs Bank DJIA MLD Sum of Mo Incr 4Yrs 12-30-11

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Tuesday, November 3, 2009

Did "hedge everything" policy push Goldman into a bad deal?

Ed Grebeck, CEO of Tempus Advisors had an interesting story to share that may be pertinent to the recent Sober Look post on the Goldman - Buffett transaction:

1999: gold price declining and volatile. GS approached me [Employers Re., a subsidiary of GE capital] with a transaction to hedge their exposure to 3 gold mines [These firms had sold gold forward to Goldman to hedge their gold production]: Ashanti [Ghana; largely owned by Anglo-American], one in Indonesia [previously part of OK Tedi Gold/copper mine] and another in Southeast Asia that escapes my memory. One of the three was fringe BBB/BB. Other two were solid B. These firms also had significant "emerging market" credit issues all around, and CDS in such markets would've cost mega bps.

Trying to address the counterparty risk on the forward contracts, GS came up with a solution: number crunch "joint probability of default" into synthetic (structured finance) tranche exposure. "We want you to sell protection on MEZZ TRANCHE... which as you can see from our painstakingly researched model is... solid BBB"... our pricing is "standard for BBB, plus [small, almost infinitesimal] premium".


Goldman wanted to buy protection on these firms, but to make it cheaper, wanted protection for losses above a certain level on the portfolio of the three names (a mezz tranche CDS). And they were pricing it based on where standard BBB levels were at the time.

Ed Grebeck continues:

No serious mention of "liquidity... hedging ourselves"... other than "we [GS] don't mind if you reinsure yourself ... of course, we can help YOU hedge in cap mkts".

I rejected outright -- but I'm sure other P&C Re "convergence operations"... AIGFP (as well as other competitive silos within AIG), Swiss Re, Munich Re, names not in business today-- ACEFS, St. Paul Re, Gerling Global, Centre etc etc ... jumped at chance to "write premium for GS".

IF GS risk management went berserk 1999 over relatively small counterparty exposure to physical gold producers, imagine what they must have thought in the summer of 2008, when they saw HUGE, UNCOLLATERALIZED exposure on 10 year + S&P index to Berkshire Hathaway


The conclusion here is that with Goldman's focus on hedging all their exposures (based on internal policies), they must have been desperate to get some money out of Buffett to reduce their rapidly rising Berkshire risk (as the puts went deep into the money). It is therefore likely that Buffett was able to pressure Goldman into a transaction that was significantly skewed in his favor - not just because Goldman needed additional equity capital, but because they had to reduce their Berkshire exposure. This in fact provides additional support to a theory that Buffett took Goldman for a ride using his money losing short put positions as negotiating leverage.



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Thursday, September 24, 2009

CDS curves are moving to pre-crisis "normal"

As the corporate bond market opened for business this year, it slowly became clear that many corporations, even ones with poor business models, may be able to refinance their debt. The market just has that much appetite for paper. The number of expected defaults in the near-term has dropped off significantly (thanks in large part to all the liquidity chasing yield).

That means that the high front-loaded default probabilities of corporate debt in the CDS markets are shifting further out in time and falling overall. The CDS curves that have been highly inverted for some vulnerable names are starting to flatten or even become normalized (spreads increasing with term).

As an example consider what happened to Ford CDS in just a month:




Nobody thinks Ford is out of the woods on a long-term basis, but it took mostly just a reduction in the front-end default risk to change the shape that much. To get a feel of how a drop in near-term default probability drives the shape of the CDS curve, here is a simple illustration. The chart below shows a hypothetical default probability curve (probabilities for each year).



With only the front-end probability of default dropping, the resulting change in the shape of the CDS curve is as follows:



This effect is now seen across the corporate credit markets, with CDS curves changing shape this way. A spectacular example of that is seen in the financials. Consider the Goldman 1-year CDS spread. It is now at pre-crisis levels. According to the market, the government has succeeded in taking out the risk of a major financial institution failure.



And here is what the Goldman CDS curve looks like now, a month ago, and a quarter ago.



These moves in CDS curves are unprecedented. The markets are saying that in the corporate sector we are close to being back to the pre-crisis "normal". The question of course remains as to whether this is justified by the fundamentals or sustainable.

Thursday, July 30, 2009

The hazards of believing in invincibility




At what point does a man's success go to his head? What does it take to go from being an overachiever to thinking you are invincible? Well here is a guy that has reached that point. His name is Mikhail Malyshev. He achieves tremendous success in quantitative trading at the $11 billion hedge fund, Citadel. He is the star who makes money at Citadel when the rest of the fund is down 50+% and has to put up gates to halt redemptions (at the end of 08). He makes a sick amount of money for himself - but clearly that's not enough.

As Citadel starts marketing their quant fund as a stand-alone strategy (as opposed to their main multi-strat fund) with their star trader - Malyshev, he figures he can raise the money himself, without Citadel. He leaves Citadel with the usual 9-12 months non-compete that Citadel always imposes. All he has to do is wait until his little non-compete vacation is over to collect a really nice sum of money from Citadel, and he is free to go do whatever he wants. Take a trip around the world, enjoy your vacation.

But no, that's not good enough for Malyshev. He has to be in the game, he has to make his first billion. He's better than other traders from Citadel who have to wait (like the fundamental credit trader Joe Russell, who is taking his time after leaving almost 12 months ago). Screw Ken Griffin, Citatel, their army of lawyers, and their noncompete. Malyshev quietly launches his own firm called Teza Technologies. He figures he's so smart, he can do it behind Citadel's back and bring with him the software he developed at Citadel. But that's not good enough. He goes out and hires another quant trading guy, Sergey Aleynikov from Goldman. But that's not good enough either. Aleynikov brings Goldman's software algorithms with him.

So Goldman and the FBI go after Aleynikov and Teza for software theft. Citadel finds out about Teza from the news and sues Malyshev for violation of the non-compete and - you guessed it - taking Citadel's proprietary software. For those who don't know Citadel, they are notoriously litigious and will extract blood from Malyshev. His business is over, his star employee was arrested for theft by the FBI, and his personal assets may soon become the property of Ken Griffin. You can't make this stuff up! What a wonderful lesson on the hazards of believing in your own invincibility.

Saturday, July 18, 2009

Of Goldman, bubbles, and hype

If you haven't already read this widely distributed story on Goldman, it's worth a read, particularly on a Sunday night.

It's called The Great American Bubble Machine, by Matt Taibbi, first published by the Rolling Stone.


Illustration by Victor Juhasz (RS)

Reading the article will make you mad. But before you go out to lynch Goldman employees (as many Sober Look readers have suggested), think about the wise old statement "He that is without sin among you, let him first cast a stone..." (John 8:7). Our discussion here is not about defending Goldman or it's practices. It's about a much broader shared blame that goes way beyond the aggressive and profitable firm called Goldman Sachs.

On a personal note and for the purposes of disclosure, I have never worked for Goldman nor do I own GS shares. But some years back a recruiter called to tell me he wanted me to interview for a job at that firm. I told him thanks, but no thanks. He said "are you crazy? People would kill their grandmother to work there". My answer was "that's exactly why I DON'T want to work there."

I have however dealt with Goldman as a client (or a potential client) on numerous occasions. Goldman employees exude professionalism and creativity. They always have the latest twist on an existing product or a unique solution to a problem. In general they will be more expensive than others - they don't want to win on price. They also don't want to win on providing balance sheet (if they provide credit, they will unload the risk somewhere else). They generally want to win on innovation. If you've done a transaction with them, more likely than not they've made good money. And unless you have the sophistication to match theirs, you won't know how they made money on you.


Per Taibbi's story (as well as thousands of other conspiracy theories), Goldman alums are everywhere. They are particularly prevalent in government posts - from Corzine to Paulson. But think about these types of jobs. It takes a polished, smart, yet a ruthless and driven workaholic to have these government posts or to run for a major political office. It also takes much money and connections. Well, ex-Goldman guys have the perfect combination of these traits. That's why they are in these roles. Not because somehow the US government is controlled by Goldman (sorry to disappoint many of you).

This by the way is no different than the Skull and Bones society at Yale. Workaholic qualities, intelligence (sometimes), polished presentation, money, connections (in this case it's family connections vs. Goldman alums network) gives one a real advantage in politics.

With this backdrop, let's take a look at how Goldman "caused" or is about to cause all the financial bubbles, one at a time.
BUBBLE #1 The Great Depression

...Goldman ... sponsored a new trust, the Shenandoah Corporation, issuing millions more in shares in that fund — which in turn sponsored yet another trust called the Blue Ridge Corporation. In this way, each investment trust served as a front for an endless investment pyramid: Goldman hiding behind Goldman hiding behind Goldman. Of the 7,250,000 initial shares of Blue Ridge, 6,250,000 were actually owned by Shenandoah — which, of course, was in large part owned by Goldman Trading.

The product he is discussing here is basically a mutual fund on steroids - a stock portfolio with leverage. These actually exist today in another form: many ETFs have leverage. Goldman was by no means the first to set one of these up. The Foreign & Colonial Government Trust, the first investment trust, was set up in the UK in in 1868 and is still open to investors today (known as The Foreign & Colonial Investment Trust).

Share Investment Trust, launched in 1872, was the first to use leverage (also in the UK). By the time Goldman's Shenandoah came along, funds with leverage and ponzi schemes were everywhere. Goldman just did it in size, marketed these aggressively, and used tons of leverage. This ultimately nearly destroyed the firm.

In terms of the asset bubble, JPMorgan was probably more to blame than Goldman, as John Pierpont Morgan had been providing support for the stock market for years prior to the crash (similar to the Fed in the last 20 years), creating the ultimate in "moral hazard". William Durant and the Rockefeller family did their part as well. But the "get rich fast" mentality permeating the nation was the key driver for the bubble.

BUBBLE #2 Tech Stocks

... The basic scam in the Internet Age is pretty easy even for the financially illiterate to grasp. Companies that weren't much more than potfueled ideas scrawled on napkins by uptoolate bongsmokers were taken public via IPOs, hyped in the media and sold to the public for mega-millions. It was as if banks like Goldman were wrapping ribbons around watermelons, tossing them out 50-story windows and opening the phones for bids. In this game you were a winner only if you took your money out before the melon hit the pavement.

All true. Goldman was on the forefront of the tech IPO mania. But let's get some perspective here. Does anyone remember CSFB's role? Maybe not. How about Frank Quattrone? Ring any bells? Well it was actually not Goldman who was the top IPO banker, but CSFB's Quattrone (he took public Netscape, Cisco, and Amazon.com), earning $160 million a year. All investment banks who could get into the IPO game got in - large and small. Somehow Taibbi doesn't want to discuss this, as it may dilute his story.

Let's bring in a quick example from history: the great California Gold Rush. Many gave up their land and occupations to go to California. However, remember that very few miners actually made money. Instead it was all the service providers who got rich - in fact that's how San Francisco was built. Taibbi would probably argue that bubble was Goldman's fault as well.

In the 90s so much was made on a few successful IPOs that it became the new gold rush. Remember FNN getting into the game and spreading the IPO gospel, helping the mania? Remember the stay-home moms watching FNN all day and trading stocks? Remember 19-year-old kids taking out student loans to buy Yahoo! shares like it was a drug? How about people quitting their jobs and college in droves to start tech companies, hoping to become the next Bill Gates?

Goldman as well as CSFB and numerous others were riding the wave, ready to accommodate. It's absolutely true, these firms had deployed unethical and sometimes illegal practices, but just as the service providers in the Gold Rush, they didn't cause the bubble.

BUBBLE #3 The Housing Craze

... Take one $494 million issue that year, GSAMP Trust 2006S3. Many of the mortgages belonged to secondmortgage borrowers, and the average equity they had in their homes was 0.71 percent. Moreover, 58 percent of the loans included little or no documentation — no names of the borrowers, no addresses of the homes, just zip codes. Yet both of the major ratings agencies, Moody's and Standard & Poor's, rated 93 percent of the issue as investment grade. Moody's projected that less than 10 percent of the loans would default. In reality, 18 percent of the mortgages were in default within 18 months.


This is true. However Goldman was not the largest player in this market. This was in part because Goldman never liked committing balance sheet. Citi on the other hand was more than willing to commit balance sheet (via CP conduits), pushing sub-prime ABS product out the door in billions. Bear Stearns used it's internal hedge funds to buy (on leverage) sub-prime paper they (as well as others) structured. Lehman, Morgan Stanley, Merrill were all big players as well, and the list goes on. And just to help some remember, it was UBS that was the buyer of same of that paper (folks in Zurich felt that if it's real estate, it's got to be good) and always wanted more (in fact their internal hedge fund Dillon Read did the same thing that Bear Stearns was doing). Citi was right there to sell them more. Wachovia (remember that bank?) was a large scale buyer and structurer of sub-prime ABS as well.

Taibbi argues that Goldman shorted the paper it sold. At least Goldman publicly said they are negative on the asset class. Morgan Stanley was shorting sub-prime (though not enough to avoid huge losses). The firm known to short sub-prime on a large scale and tell clients about it was actually Deutsche Bank. Good for them.

And what was the Fed doing? Pumping more liquidity into the system to get the bubble nice and big. Sorry Mr. Taibbi, it wasn't Goldman that caused the housing bubble either. Everybody had a hand in it - from mortgage brokers, to house speculators, regional banks, investment banks, monolines, the rating agencies, the BIS and the Fed.

BUBBLE #4 $4 a Gallon

... With the public reluctant to put money in anything that felt like a paper investment, the Street quietly moved the casino to the physical-commodities market — stuff you could touch: corn, coffee, cocoa, wheat and, above all, energy commodities, especially oil. In conjunction with a decline in the dollar, the credit crunch and the housing crash caused a "flight to commodities." Oil futures in particular skyrocketed, as the price of a single barrel went from around $60 in the middle of 2007 to a high of $147 in the summer of 2008.

Put yourself into the environment of the early 2008. The supply/demand chart for oil looked ugly. As China/India demand was forecast to grow, the supply was predicted to shrink. The dollar was collapsing. Geopolitical situation looked terrible: from belligerent Iran and Venezuela, to newly aggressive Russia, to unstable Nigeria. Rice hoarding and shortages were popping up all over the globe. Think about it - Goldman or not - as a pension or an endowment, what would would you be investing in? Yes, Goldman economists were bullish oil to the last minute, but so was the rest of the world.

BUBBLE #5 Rigging the Bailout

... Once the bailouts were in place, Goldman went right back to business as usual, dreaming up impossibly convoluted schemes to pick the American carcass clean of its loose capital. One of its first moves in the postbailout era was to quietly push forward the calendar it uses to report its earnings, essentially wiping December 2008 — with its $1.3 billion in pretax losses — off the books. At the same time, the bank announced a highly suspicious $1.8 billion profit for the first quarter of 2009 — which apparently included a large chunk of money funneled to it by taxpayers via the AIG bailout. "They cooked those firstquarter results six ways from Sunday," says one hedgefund manager. "They hid the losses in the orphan month and called the bailout money profit.


That's right, Goldman did that. It made their 09 performance look better than it was. Must be that PwC is in on this as well - they are the auditor. Unlike Citi, UBS, Merrill, Wachovia, etc. however, Goldman did not rely on TARP to survive - they raised equity from Buffett. With regard to AIG, Goldman actually bought protection on AIG, fully prepared for it to go under. But all that aside, the bailout wasn't a "bubble", so Taibbi's bubble theme doesn't apply here.

BUBBLE #6 Global Warming

... Here's how it works: If the bill passes, there will be limits for coal plants, utilities, natural-gas distributors and numerous other industries on the amount of carbon emissions (a.k.a. greenhouse gases) they can produce per year. If the companies go over their allotment, they will be able to buy "allocations" or credits from other companies that have managed to produce fewer emissions. President Obama conservatively estimates that about $646 billion worth of carbon credits will be auctioned in the first seven years; one of his top economic aides speculates that the real number might be twice or even three times that amount.


This one is completely absurd. Goldman knows that carbon credit trading in the US is happening sooner or later. It's been in place in Europe for years. Any good business, when presented with a huge new market will invest to get ready for it.

With regard to the Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX), nobody will benefit more from carbon trading than it's founder, Richard Sandor. Sandor (not Goldman) is the inventor of carbon trading (he's worked on it for 20 years or so.) He owns the bulk of CCX, and he is the one who got Goldman to take a share in order to create liquidity in the fledgling market.

Carbon trading is in fact an implicit tax. This is probably not the right time to implement it, given the fragile economy. It's also unfair to push it on the US, while China continues to pump massive amounts of carbon into the atmosphere. But if one had a choice between "carbon cap" and "cap & trade", the latter is always preferable. Cap and trade will stimulate clean air technologies and create carbon offsets (such as farmers planting trees). The reason it will work is that people stand to make money doing it (from farmers, to biofuels manufacturers, to utilities). And investors/traders (including Goldman) stand to make money as well.

Just as many other large US corporations, from GE (dumping PCBs into the Hudson river) to Exxon (a little spill in Alaska), Goldman is guilty of a number of unethical and illegal practices over the years. But to say that Goldman caused the various bubbles throughout history is a bit of a stretch, wouldn't you agree Mr. Taibbi?

Friday, July 17, 2009

Financials' earnings may look spectacular, but they are highly unstable

The market loves the two financial leaders: Goldman and JPMorgan. You hear stories about financials leading the US out of this recession. Watch out. What really drives earnings of the big NY financial firms is the trading and market making. With wide spreads, those who have the expertise, the balance sheet, and the securities/derivatives client coverage, have and will do well in the near term. But that constitutes a fraction of the financial services industry.

Even giants like Citi can not take advantage of this market for the following reasons:
1. they have lost clients due to their shaky credit,
2. they have no balance sheet to put to work given the massive "bad bank" portfolio they are trying to unwind,
3. as a TARP bank there is no incentive for employees to generate extra revenue because they are not getting paid,
4. as a semi-government agency they have become somewhat incompetent.

The situation gets even tougher once you look at banks who have no access to capital markets activities. Associated Banc-Corp is an example. From AP:
Shares of Associated Banc-Corp. fell 9.9 percent Friday, a day after the regional bank reported a loss as it increased its loan loss provision and recorded a one-time assessment paid to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.

Associated Banc-Corp said on Thursday it fell to a loss of $24.7 million for the second quarter as charge-offs for bad loans jumped.
In fact if you compare the S&P500 financials index with S&P500 regional banks index (see chart below), the discrepancy between these two types of firms emerges. Regional banks continue to struggle.



This divergence has implications even for financial market leaders in New York. It says that if spreads tighten or market making and securities sales activity slows down, even the leading firms will have a tough time. The performance Goldman and JPMorgan have shown the market represents earnings with highly volatile characteristics that are often difficult to replicate. Don't bet on the financial sector in this environment.

Disclosure: the author does not hold any positions in financial firms or indices.

Wednesday, July 15, 2009

The story of two financial leaders

It's an amazing story of two firms who are the US financial leaders. Both repaid their TARP funds as quickly as possible, but that's where similarities end. Their culture and balance sheet structure couldn't be further apart.

During the financial crisis, Firm-1 helped (due to it's financial strength) the US government rescue two other large financial institutions that collapsed within several months. Firm-2 on the other hand was itself on the brink of collapse, and ended up getting an equity infusion from Warren Buffett.

Firm-1 was conservative, carefully deploying it's balance sheet and focusing on building up it's mortgage and credit card businesses. It ended up paying it's employees relatively little. Firm-2 took advantage of the wide spreads and cheap assets, loading up on risk and making markets where competition had all but disappeared. With it's profits soaring, Firm-2 will pay it's employees handsomely this year.

The market has rewarded Firm-2 dramatically more than Firm-1. Conservative approach, financial strength, and tight compensation policy are not the virtues that the market seems to care for. It may make folks in Washington and around the country angry, but it's reality.

For Firm-1 and it's employees this would be the time to shine, given they came out of this crisis on their own and in a reasonably good shape. But Firm-2 has stolen it's thunder and came out on top - at least in terms of rewarding employees and shareholders.

Firm-1 is JPMorgan, Firm-2 is Goldman, they are both market leaders, but their histories and outcomes could not have been more different.



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