More Political Selling = More Public Support?

Regardless of who you believe regarding the Canadian public's support for the mission in Afghanistan, would more people support finishing the job (or at least doing more of it before we go) if more politicians were out there explaining why we're there?

Some say yes.

DRDC Looking At Intelligence Analysis Bias

A recent posting on MERX:

“….Defence Research & Development Canada (DRDC) have a requirement to retain the services of a contractor to provide support for DRDC Toronto’s data collection and collection involving a series of behavioural science experiments with human subjects. The experiments described in this Statement of Work (SOW) are motivated by DRDC Toronto’s Applied Research Program (ARP) project, entitled “Understanding and Augmenting Human Capabilities for Intelligence Production,” which is under the project management of Dr. David R. Mandel, Group Leader of the Thinking, Risk, and Intelligence Group within DRDC Toronto’s Adversarial Intent Section. The overarching objectives of the ARP project and the experiments described herein for which contractor support is sought are: (a) to identify systematic biases in human performance that may effect the quality of intelligence analysis; (b) to identify factors that may attenuate or amplify such biases or otherwise influence judgmental performance; and (c) to examine the viability of counter-measures aimed at reducing or eliminating them….”

Note to anyone wanting to see more into this than is really there: they're talking COGNITIVE, not POLITICAL bias.

A bit more detail available in the Statement of Work here.

KAF Abbey

Heh...we've talked before about golf in Kabul, but this is the first time I've ever heard of golf in Kandahar:

It took Pigden, tournament co-chairman Gilles Langlois of Kingston, Ont., and a host of volunteers three days to lay out KAF Abbey, which stands for Kandahar Air Field.

The Royal Canadian Golf Association provided technical information about the Glen Abbey course, which they laid out in miniature. The 18-hole course was set out in a small field in the middle of "the boardwalk," the centre of recreational life on the sprawling base, and it was complete with artificial turf greens.

"We've reconstructed it down to the correct scale . . . with the exception of water and trees. Not a lot of those," said Pigden.

That must have been one heck of a project to undertake. Of course (and yes, that little pun was intentional), it was for a great cause:

Proceeds from the tournament - it cost $20 to be part of the tournament or $5 for drop-in play - raised $1,500 for Soldier On, which helps wounded soldiers get involved in Paralympic sport as a means of recovery and rehabilitation.

For those who don't know much about Soldier On, you can read more - including how to donate - here.

"What the Thunder Said"...to me

Back at the beginning of June, I was invited to see LCol John Conrad, a decorated Canadian army officer, speak about a book he'd written called "What the Thunder Said: Reflections of a Canadian Officer in Kandahar." My curiosity was peaked by the fact that it was a book about combat logistics, a topic about which I am almost wholly ignorant. But even more than that, I wanted to attend because it's extremely rare - Haley's Comet rare - to see someone still wearing the uniform write a book about their military experience.

Conrad's presentation was fascinating. So, further encouraged by a resounding endorsement from Christie Blatchford in the foreward, I picked up a copy of the book. I'm so very glad I did. I wasn't forty pages into the book before I realized I should start using a highlighter as my bookmark, so that it was never far from hand. Not only is John Conrad a professional leader of men, he's also a damned fine writer.

A few weeks ago, I was also privileged to speak at length with LCol Conrad about this project, as he's now serving at the Canadian Forces College in Toronto. As we sat over coffee at the Armour Heights mess, I was able to glean a bit more about his motives for writing the book, as well as some of the challenges inherent in such an unusual undertaking.

For example, I was surprised to learn that Conrad won't make any money from all his hard work as an author, since the book is "published by The Dundurn Group and Canadian Defence Academy Press in cooperation with the Department of National Defence, and Public Works and Government Services Canada." Regardless of what one thinks of the content of the book, its writer's motives couldn't be more pure: to tell the story of his soldiers and their under-resourced unit in Kandahar in early 2006, and to provide a catalyst to begin a much needed and long overdue discussion about professional logistics in the CF. I certainly wouldn't begrudge John a bit of personal catharsis in the exercise, either.

The book isn't intended to serve as a history lesson, nor is it an academic text. But the paucity of his intended audience's knowledge of military affairs in Canada and about the specialized field of combat logistics requires a healthy dollop of context. Accordingly, Conrad devotes a couple of chapters to the history of logistics in the Canadian army and another to the history of the Canadian deployment to Afghanistan. His engaging, conversational writing style leavens what could have been a dreary and numbingly boring subject in any other author's hands. It sweeps the reader into the narrative flow of the book and prepares him or her for the lessons Conrad really wants his audience to understand.

Some of those lessons were painfully learned. At times, the wounds were bloody ones, and at times they were invisible to all but those experiencing them. As I mentioned earlier, the pages of my copy of What the Thunder Said are thoroughly defaced with notes scribbled in the margins and vast tracts of orange highlighted lines. But one passage in particular lays out the essential problem for the logistics soldier:

The battlefield of the logistics soldier lies so heavily entrenched in the realm of the mind - the psychological plane. Unlike our brothers in the combat arms we rarely go on the offensive. There is no cathartic release for the logistician that an attack can permit the infantryman. The logistic soldier in Kandahar rides with passive optimism that he or she will come up swinging after the attack. But whether you live or die, whether you get to come up fighting, depends not on your physical fitness, your intellect, or you prowess with the rifle. Instead, your survival hangs on such random factors as vehicle armour, proximity to the blast, and pure luck. Providence. That is hard to accept. The first move in a convoy fight belongs to the enemy and that is terrifically unsettling. Soon every Toyota that strays too close to your truck resembles a bomb, every colourful kite is a semaphore signal, and every smile from an Afghan pedestrian betrays a sinister secret. Ground convoys extract a continuous toll on the psychological reserves of a logistics unit.

This brutal operating environment was made even more difficult by the decision to populate Conrad's National Support Element (NSE) unit with about half the personnel he should have had:

Task Force Orion would actually tip the scales in February 2006 at 1,500 soldiers instead of its original planned number of just under 700. The NSE by comparison stayed nearly the same as recommended by the original model, not growing in size at all. My list of personnel dated 21 February 2006, some two weeks into our deployment reflects only 281 names. This was nearly the same strength of the Kabul Model NSE, which had been mostly static on Camp Julien. RC South was some 225,000 square kilometres of axle-snapping terrain by way of comparison.

What struck me most about both the book and my conversation with LCol Conrad was how unexpectedly candid he was. Military officers in Canada are a very frank bunch, but they're constrained by both custom and law in their criticism of the CF and the government. When it comes to talking about their own clan, they tend to follow every mother's advice: when they can't say something nice, they don't say anything at all. Conrad maintains his professionalism throughout his work, but he isn't shy expressing his disappointment in some of the cultural and organizational flaws in the CF when it comes to the logistics branch. He gives us some real gems:

• No professional soldier would ever dispute the primacy that the combat arms must command in an army. The logistics arm's sole raison d'être is to serve the needs of the combat forces. However, can you fight without bullets, without water? As trite as it sounds, logistics are ignored a the commander's peril.


• The army has not been greatly interested in improving logistics support to the combat arms because it has not really been in the line of work where logistics was a life and death necessity. The focus of army leadership was on protecting the combat arms in a long series of budget cuts.


• Today it is rare indeed to find leaders in the Canadian Army who understand the sustainment capacity of their commands. How much diesel fuel does their formation carry; how much more can be amassed in a given period? This is not to suggest that the commander must know every last detail about logistics. He or she must however know the limitations of his or her force and where the edges of possibility lie.


• Logistics is not hard in the academic sense of the word, but it is hard in the volume of detail, synchronicity, preparation, and planning that is essential for success.


• ...logistics has to become part of combat operations when there are no such words as front and rear anymore.


• Undoubtedly, the biggest factor in the erosion of logistics strength in the Canadian Forces was ourselves - the leadership of the logistics community. Specifically, the Canadian Forces Logistics Branch seemed to be either uninterested or unable to fight for their corps and provide the generals with a sound direction or vision for the future of the Canadian logistics soldier. Instead, the logistics people...flirted with the notion of handing responsibility for the military supply chain over to civilian companies...The logistics branch failed their soldiers the moment they stopped caring about the last 300 metres of the supply chain - the part of the chain that echoes with thunder. [my emphasis]


• The army decided to pass on the requirement for a LAV III recovery variant, a machine with the muscle to pull a damaged LAV III off the battlefield when it has been blown apart and none of its tires can move. A cheque written a decade before by army planners was cashed in during our tour.


• At its best, logistics is the well-planned, logical offspring of a fertile imagination harnessed early to the demands of the tactical plan. At its worst, logistics is a crudely rendered afterthought stapled to a military disaster.

While this criticism of the politicians, of the CF, and of his Logistics Branch is decidedly blunt, the only soldier he criticizes by name is himself, going so far as to recount a dressing-down he received - justifiably, he admits - by BGen Fraser towards the end of his tour. He says it still stings to remember it, and I can well believe that, because I cringed just reading it. Conrad's honesty in this, at his own expense, makes it far easier for the reader to trust his assessments throughout the rest of the book.

Some of the more personal observations he shares are quite raw:

I noticed among all of my leaders that they tended to blame themselves when their soldiers got hurt. I was just as bad as my subordinates in this arena and right up to the end of the tour. It took me the entire seven months and most of the next year in Canada to realize that these wounds of war, the human toll on your unit, are not your fault. This is far easier to write and say than it is to practice.

The passage is too long to reprint here, but when Conrad recounted one of his weekly conversations with his son at home, the lines on the page got a little blurry for me. He summed it up a bit further on: "I may be a good officer or a good father, but surely I can't be both at the same time over here." The things we ask our soldiers, sailors, and airmen to endure in our names are enough to break your heart sometimes.

Even with all the personal sacrifices, all the mistakes made, all the lessons so painfully learned, all the shortfalls in manning and planning, all the make-do solutions he and his staff had to come up with, at the end of the day, they did it:

The Canadian Task Force eventually logged some 1,750,000 kilometres, fought in over 100 enemy engagements, and sustained battle damage to over 50 vehicles during our time in country. This necessitated nearly 6,400 repairs to equipment and the battlefield recovery of some 126 broken vehicles.

That's quite the record, and Conrad and his soldiers should be proud of it.

Above and beyond that, Lieutenant Colonel John David Conrad, M.S.M., C.D. should be proud of the service he has done his soldiers, his Logistics Branch, his army, and his country in the writing of this important book. I cannot recommend it to you highly enough.

Software Research to Ease Military Decision Making

How do make software to make military decision making easier while, at the same time, throwing more information into the face of the decision maker?

Defence Research and Development Canada wants to find an answer to this question.

For the record

The Dominion Institute of Canada sent me an e-mail about a worthwhile project they're undertaking:

Dear Damian,

On June 4th, The Dominion Institute launched its latest major project: The Memory Project : Stories of the Second World War.

The Dominion Institute will provide every living Canadian veteran of the Second World War who wants to share their story of service and sacrifice with the opportunity to do so. The Dominion Institute will record the oral history of thousands of veterans and digitize their artifacts and memorabilia.

The Dominion Institute will ensure that these stories are never forgotten and available to all Canadians through our website.

Once completed, the Institute will have created the definitive record of Canada's participation in the Second World War through thousands of first-person accounts of servicemen and women.

The Dominion Institute needs your help now!

Do you know a veteran who wants to share their story of service and sacrifice?

Are you a veteran of the Second World War?

Do you want to volunteer and help the Dominion Institute honour Canada's veterans?

Together, we can offer our Second World War veterans the gift of remembrance. We can ensure that their service and sacrifice is never forgotten.

Thank you.

Marc Chalifoux
Executive Director

The Memory Project: Stories of the Second World War is made possible through the generous support provided by the Government of Canada through the Celebrations and Commemorations Program of the Department of Canadian Heritage.

More on Canada's "Secret War Plans"

Remember this?

Well, it appears an alternative media outlet, Inter Press Service ("acting as a communication channel that privileges the voices and the concerns of the poorest and creates a climate of understanding, accountability and participation around development, promoting a new international information order between the South and the North"), has picked up the conspiracy theory ball.

However, unlike ceasefire.ca, IPS also dares to offer - GASP - an alternative viewpoint!

"Another Ottawa-based defence analyst who requested anonymity said he can't "see Canadian UAVs used in Pakistan, for the simple reason that the U.S. has more than enough drones and doesn't want to share that highly classified intelligence it is gathering."

His take is that Canadian drones will be primarily used for domestic coast and Arctic surveillance and in selective international military missions where they would be a cheaper alternative to Canadian troops in the field. "

Also, IPS thought it worthwhile to include comments from a Canadian senator who's on the government's benches (even if it doesn't reinforce the headline theme):

"Although on the outs with the Harper government after being turfed from his Senate committee chairmanship, Senator (Hugh) Segal disagrees with any assertion that the decision has already been made in Ottawa on the planes or other possible options for the Canadian military in Afghanistan.

"You know people often say, 'Are there secret meetings to which we are not being invited, or planned in which we are not being included'? My bet is there is none of the above. I don't know that, but I am just saying from my perspective, my bet is there are no plans. There are probably some options kicking around somewhere, but I don't think they have reached the point of formality that you might call plans." "

Enjoy the paranoia, folks!

"Iraq-Afghanistan fatalities"

Serious research from BruceR at Flit; I think we've certainly been doing our bit:

Just a quick look again at the combined Iraq-Afghanistan fatalities (figures from icasualties.org):

Total fatal casualties, both theatres (change in the 33 months since I did this the last time):

1. United States: 5066 (+1922)
2. United Kingdom: 364 (+204)
3. Canada: 125 (+83)
4. Italy: 48 (+6)
5. Spain: 36 (+6)
6. Germany: 33 (+15)
7. Poland: 32 (+15)
8. Denmark: 31 (+22)
9. France: 28 (+19)
10. Netherlands: 21 (+16)

Interesting how in 33 months all we've seen is Ukraine drop off the list and Netherlands come up.

Fatalities per 1,000 active-duty military personnel:

1. US: 3.44
2. UK: 1.94
3. Canada: 1.90
4. Denmark: 1.35
5. Latvia: 1.09

Fatalities per million population:

1. US: 16.5
2. UK: 5.91
3. Denmark: 5.64
4. Estonia: 4.48
5. Canada: 3.71

Again, not much change from 3 years ago, with Bulgaria and El Salvador (both of which are not deployed in numbers in Afghanistan) dropping off the list and being replaced in the rankings by the 2 Baltic republics (with 6 fatalities each, but in much smaller militaries (about 5,500 regulars each) and populations).

I think Denmark's contribution to Afghanistan (24 fatalities) and Iraq (7), where they have taken casualties at a greater rate per population, on a population one-sixth the size of Canada's, have generally been under-recognized [emphasis added--quite, see 2) here].

Here's some more stuff, on NATO under- and over-contributions by country:

Positive value is number of soldiers currently being contributed to ISAF above the NATO mean contribution (currently 11.85 soldiers in Afghanistan per 1000 full-time troops). Negative is soldiers below that mean national contribution:

Overcontributors:

UK: +6072
Canada: +2049
Netherlands: +1141
Germany: +441
Denmark: +429
Norway: +158
Latvia: +100
Estonia: +84
Poland: +68
Croatia: +53
Lithuania: +40
Macedonia: +18
Belgium: +17

Undercontributors:

Turkey: -5373
Greece: -1952
Spain: -1329
Portugal: -432
Italy: -376
France: -289
Czech Rep: -247
Romania: -234
Bulgaria: -134
Albania: -97
Slovakia: -80
Hungary: -76
Slovenia: -37
Luxemburg: -2

Lastly, a measure relating to combat intensity for the non-US ISAF countries in the different regions of Afghanistan, judged by total fatalities due to hostile action, factoring in the size of the current contingent (only countries with more than 400 personnel on average over the last 2 years are listed).

1. Canada (South): 38.5 combat fatalities per 1000 troops currently deployed
2. Denmark (South): 32.2
3. UK (South): 20.9
4. Romania (South): 15.9
5. France (East): 11.3
6. Australia (South): 10.9
7. Norway (North): 8.7
8. Spain (West): 8.5
9. Netherlands (South): 8.1
10. Poland (East): 6.8
11. Germany (North): 5.9
12. Italy (West): 3.3
13. Turkey (East): 0.0

Note a high number on this index could indicate consistent hard fighting. It could also indicate a measure of bad luck. What it does manage to confirm, though, is that the risk is being unevenly spread.

To nutshell it, NATO's ISAF contribution is significantly hurt at present by both countries that are underrepresented in terms of numbers, and underrepresented in terms of casualties they're willing to risk. Spain and France are examples of the first condition, Germany and Poland the second, and countries like Turkey, Greece, Portugal and Italy are managing to fail the alliance both ways.

It's a great pity, when one thinks how much of a positive effect those missing 5,000-odd Turkish trrops would have had, particularly in an area like army mentoring [emphasis added].

"A SITREP FROM THE CDS - June 2009"

I honestly found this largely bureaucratic boilerplate (via Spotlight on Military News and International Affairs). Pity.

Light from darkness

The family of Michelle Mendes has shown extraordinary class - grace in the most cruelly testing of circumstances:

The farm where Major Michelle Mendes grew up was crowded with friends, neighbours and family members Monday night to host a group of students from her alma mater.

The visitors, a 15-member Royal Military College team training for next week's Nijmegen walk, were easy to spot in their fatigues. Their being able to participate in what is also known as the Walk of the World in Holland is at least partly due to support from the Major Michelle Mendes Memorial Foundation.

Mendes's parents Ron and Dianne Knight had decided this is just the kind of thing they would like to see supported by the foundation set up in their daughter's honour. The team chose to do Monday's daily training in the Grafton area, so they could stop by and say thanks.

So many RMC cadets felt a connection with Mendes, and this particular group was royally welcomed at the farm with an old-fashioned potluck barbecue -- complete with a cake decorated with plastic soldiers, camouflage icing and a picture of combat boots.

BZ to the Knights. Finding a way forward after such a tragedy is so difficult, and actions such as this show they're tackling that task with poise and courage.

Still a good war

A post byBruceR at Flit:

Reasons for positive thinking

I and others may cavil about long-term sustainability of our plans, or note disappointment wastes of time or money, or wonder aloud whether our priorities as Afghanistan's allies need to be re-ordered a little. But there can be no question that Afghanistan is still on the whole a nicer, safer place than it was in 2001, or 1991 for that matter. Kabul is booming. And Peter Bergen is right that the majority of Afghans' war for a better future for themselves is far from lost, for reasons he aptly outlines here. The cause that we committed to, and in which Canadians continue to die, is still a just one. If I didn't continue to believe that, I frankly wouldn't care about the problems that have been identified as much as I do.

From the Bergen piece:

...
Objections to Obama’s ramp-up in Afghanistan begin with the observation that Afghanistan has long been the "graveyard of empires"—as went the disastrous British expedition there in 1842 and the Soviet invasion in 1979, so too the current American occupation is doomed to follow. In fact, any number of empire builders, from Alexander the Great to the Mogul emperor Babur in the sixteenth century to the British in the Second Afghan War three decades after their infamous defeat, have won military victories in Afghanistan. The graveyard of empires metaphor belongs in the graveyard of clichés [emphasis added]...

My bit on the "unconquerable Afghans" here, and more:

Jack Layton: Simply ignorant or just plain lazy?

"Battle for Helmand"

A blog by a Washington Post reporter Ann Scott Tyson, "Embedded With U.S. Marines in Afghanistan" (via The Canada-Afghanistan Blog).

"Afghanistan: equipping the fight"/More on Brits

Conference of Defence Associations media round-up--excerpt:

...
Defending Britain

John Burns for the New York Times analyses the British political debate over the Afghan mission and the equipping of British forces there.
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/12/world/europe/12britain.html

The Telegraph has published journal entries by Lieutenant Mark Evison, a British soldier who died in May from wounds received in Afghanistan.
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/5820679/Mark-Evison-We-are-walking-a-tight...

Michael Evans and Tom Coghlan for the Times and James Kirkup for the Telegraph report on comments by British Chief of the General Staff General Sir Richard Dannatt on required troops and equipment in Afghanistan.
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/politics/article6711041.ece
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/politics/defence/5824853/Army-chie...

Michael Evans for the Times reports on the equipment (armoured vehicles, helicopters) used by the British in Afghanistan.
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article6695154.ece
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article6715513.ece

Michael Evans for the Times writes on how the British prime minister chose the “cheapest” option when presented with options to boost the British military presence in Afghanistan.
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article6703626.ece

An editorial in the Times criticizes the British government’s approach and attitude towards the defence portfolio.
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/leading_article/article6702904.ece ...

Recent post here, with further Brit links. And another UK story:

MPs' report to say helicopter shortage puts troops at risk in Afghanistan

Ministers will come under intense pressure tomorrow [July 16] over their handling of Britain's military operations in Afghanistan when an influential committee of MPs challenges Gordon Brown's insistence that a lack of helicopters has not cost lives...

Today it emerged that [General Sir Richard] Dannatt [Chief of the General Staff] is being flown around Afghanistan in an American Black Hawk helicopter. "If I moved in an American helicopter, it's because I haven't got a British helicopter," he said...

Dannatt further increased pressure on the government by saying more "boots on the ground" were key to success in Helmand and that he would like to see "more energy" put into speeding up the supply of equipment to British troops...

Can you imagine Canadian Conservative MPs agreeing to a committee report critical of our government? Or, indeed, MPs from all parties actually working together to further what they see as real interests of the CF on any contentious issue?

Plus a major "Briefing" in The Economist:

British forces in Afghanistan

And the soldier home from the hill
The British public is honouring its fallen troops as never before. But for how long will it support the war in Afghanistan?



...
The British public has long been accustomed to the deaths in action of its servicemen. Almost every year since 1945 has seen military fatalities in some corner of the world. Indeed, Britain prides itself on being a nation of fine soldiers [not in Canada, pity]...

Ministers against generals

The cross-party consensus on Afghanistan is under more strain than ever before. Both the Tories and the Lib Dems still say they back the deployment, but they attack the government’s perceived lack of strategy and its parsimony towards the armed forces. Liam Fox, the Tory shadow defence secretary, has accused the government of “the ultimate dereliction of duty”. The Tories have concentrated their fire on the shortfall in the helicopters available to British forces—though the criticism is undermined by their reluctance to promise extra defence spending if they win the election due by next year. Nick Clegg, the leader of the Lib Dems, has been sharper: he talks about soldiers’ lives being “thrown away”, describing the mission in Afghanistan as “over-ambitious in aim and under-resourced in practice”.

Yet the most important divide may not be between political parties but between government ministers and military commanders. Gordon Brown’s ill-judged appointment of Des Browne in 2006 as defence secretary, doubling the next year as Scottish secretary, alienated some of the top brass. Confidence has hardly been increased by the loss of his successor, the well-liked John Hutton, during last month’s crisis over the future of Mr Brown, and the promotion of the junior defence minister, Bob Ainsworth, to the main job as the least bad option.

The prime minister now stands accused by many generals, more explicitly than is customary, of skimping on the men and kit needed for the Afghan campaign. In an interview this week in Helmand General Sir Richard Dannatt, the outgoing head of the army, noted that he was flying in an American helicopter because a British one was not available. He had asked in public for a reinforcement of 2,000 troops (and more in private), but received the promise of only a temporary boost of 700 soldiers, amid resistance from the Treasury and the Foreign Office. All this feeds the generals’ belief that Mr Brown does not much care for the armed forces. One general says: “Tony Blair did not understand us. Gordon Brown does not like us.”..

Update: Even more outspoken than Rick Hillier, I'd say:

Dannatt warns of strategic failure in Afghanistan as 16th soldier dies in a month

The head of the Army warned of strategic failure in Afghanistan today as it was announced that another British soldier had died in Helmand province.

General Sir Richard Danatt, who has been accused of playing politics over the issue of equipment, demanded more troops and greater investment as part of a shopping list of desires.

His plea was broadcast minutes before the Ministry of Defence said that a soldier from 2nd Battalion The Rifles was killed during a foot patrol in Helmand yesterday. Sixteen British soldiers have been killed this month.

General Danatt said: “Quite rightly if we carry on with the kind of casualty numbers we saw last week the people of our own country might say hold on this is not a price worth paying.”

“We do need more troops, we need more boots on the ground,” he told BBC Radio 4’s Today programme.

General Dannatt claimed that more soldiers were required to reduce the impact of the improvised explosive devices, which have caused many of the British injuries including the soldier killed yesterday.

The general, who retires on August 28, said that it was vital to at least retain the number of British troops in Afghanistan at 9,000. He said that to reduce it to 8,300, as is currently planned after the Afghan elections, “would be quite wrong” [emphasis added].

“There may well be a case for what I would call a short term uplift, let’s not use the surge word that has sort of been worked to extinction in Iraq,” he said

The increasingly outspoken calls from General Dannatt led to senior Government officials questioning his behaviour this week. One junior minister accused him of “playing politics” and said: “This is a very difficult time and he should know better.”

Ministers fear that General Dannatt will launch an all-out attack on government policy when he retires as head of the Army next month [emphasis added].

General Dannatt suggested that as a temporary measure for 12-18 months, there may be a case for an increase in British troops while they wait for the Afghan National Army to be strong enough to take over...

Aussie F-35s not until 2017-19?

From Aviation Week & Space Technology:

Australia’s latest defense capability plan (DCP), which sets out expenditures expected over the next four years, confirms its intent to buy at least 72 F-35 Joint Strike Fighters but slips initial operational capability (IOC) by up to five years, to 2017-19 [emphasis added].

The previous DCP, in 2006, set the planned in-service date at 2012-14, and as recently as March the Royal Australian Air Force was still expecting to take delivery of its first F-35s in 2013, but Canberra’s recent defense white paper signaled a delay...

Australia, meanwhile, still plans to buy a total of 100 F-35s, acquiring a fourth squadron in conjunction with the withdrawal of its Boeing F/A-18E/Fs — which enter service late this year [more here]— but those aircraft, and a maritime strike weapon for the F-35, are expected to be programmed in later DCPs, it says...

Meanwhile back in Canada:

Why has our new fighter requirement been reduced to 65?

Deciding on the F-35 soon?
...
According to the DND official, there are no plans to accelerate the delivery of new fighters, which are planned to begin by 2018 [emphasis added] to replace Canada's CF-18s as they are phased out between 2017 and 2020...

Money.

More on new armoured vehicles

Further to this post, a comprehensive piece from Defense Industry Daily (via Galea Hortus):

Canada Looks to Upgrade Its Armor

In late November 2008, Canada’s Department of National Defence (DND) announced its intention to combine 3 programs into one general set of upgrades to its armored vehicle fleets. The C$ 5 billion (about $4.3 billion) meta-program would include (1) a “close combat vehicle,” in order to perform as a tracked Infantry Fighting Vehicle or Armored Personnel Carrier alongside Canada’s new Leopard 2A6 tanks; (2) a new “Tactical Armored Patrol Vehicle”; and (3) upgrades the existing LAV-III wheeled APC fleet. In July 2009, A 4th project was added to field dedicated Armored Engineering Vehicles based on the Leopard 2, along with engineering-related attachments for Canada’s new Leopard 2 tanks [more on those tanks' tribulations here] .

LAV-III: stuck
(click to view larger)

The “Close Combat Vehicle” appears to be the most urgent purchase, but the stated procurement approach isn’t structured to deliver urgency. As things stand, all contracts are scheduled to take effect after Canada is slated to end its Afghan mission. “Tanks for the Lesson: Leopards, too, for Canada” discussed the LAV-IIIs’ limitations in key terrain within Afghanistan, and keeping them in the field requires a lot of maintenance. Canada’s M113 tracked APCs have been used successfully as a supplement, but the Canadians appear to be leaning toward a heavier vehicle for their future CCV…

• The Close Combat Vehicle
• The Armored Tactical Patrol Vehicle
• LAV-IIIs, and the RESET/RECAP Imperative
• Updates and Developments
• Additional Readings & Sources

The Close Combat Vehicle

CF M113, Afghanistan
(click to view larger)

The CCV is not replacing a vehicle in the current Canadian Forces fleet. Instead, it’s meant to bridge the gap between 5t-20t light armoured vehicles and main battle tanks. A 2008 Ottawa Citizen report drove the mobility point home:

“Defence sources say the current LAV-3 does not have the mobility needed for the job in off-road conditions. The likely preferred option is to go for a tracked vehicle.”

Present plans call for 108 CCVs, with an option for up to 30 more. The procurement process will be a “competitive military off-the-shelf approach.” for existing vehicles, and a letter of interest and price and availability (LOI/P&A) is expected in summer 2009. The project’s definition phase will include a solicitation of interest and qualifications (SOIQ) and a request for proposals (RFP). A contract is expected by summer 2011, with initial operational capability (IOC) declared a year later in July 2012. Full operational capability is expected by July 2015.

The question is, what kind of tracked vehicle? DND says that is looking at options between 25t – 45t, which would encompass almost every IFV on the market.

Existing M113s could be upgraded with cage and/or explosive reactive armor, upgraded with a higher caliber turret or remote weapon system, and have their engines and transmissions upgraded to M113A3 or better status. Australia has taken this approach, absent the full explosive reactive armor protection required to defeat early model Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG) anti-tank rockets. Canada ’s own M113 Life Extension Project has been underway since 2000, but its aim has mostly been to improve maintenance with new engines and transmissions, while converting most of Canada’s M113s to specialty support variants. This makes them less than ideal candidates, and at 12.3 tonnes, the base vehicle is underweight for Canada’s stated requirements.

Swedish CV90, Afghanistan
(click to view full)

At the moment, the preferred CCV choice appears to be BAE Hagglunds’ CV90 series. This popular armored vehicle comes in a number of variants, including IFV troop carriers with turret options ranging from 30mm-40mm, up-gunned 105mm and even 120mm assault guns and tank killers (105 or 120T), reconnaissance and forward observation (FOV), C2 forward command (FCV or COM), armored recovery (ARV), and a 40mm anti-aircraft model (AAV). Canada had expressed interest during the vehicle’s initial development, but backed out; a purchase now would make them its 7th customer, alongside Sweden, Denmark, Finland, The Netherlands, Norway, and Switzerland.

If Canada does purchase CV90s, there are rumors that it will adopt that same approach used to buy Leopard 2 tanks: immediate lease from an existing owner to get the vehicles into the field quickly, followed by a longer-term purchase or lease-to-buy arrangement [emphasis added]. Sweden would be the most likely lease owner candidate, and that country recently announced its intent to deploy its own CV90s to Afghanistan in light of a growing threat from RPGs.

Their decision was helped along by the fact that CV90s have been decisive for the Norwegians in 2 separate battles. In November 2007, CV90s saw heavy combat during Operation Harekate Yolo in Afghanistan, where they were used alongside outnumbered Norwegian 2nd battalion and Kystjegerkommandoen troops to beat down a Taliban attack on in the Ghowrmach district, near Mazar-e-Sharif. In May 2008, 2nd battalion used them during Operation Karez in Badghis Province. An attempted Taliban ambush used heavy machine gun fire and RPG volleys, which could have been devastating against unarmored or lightly armored vehicles. Instead, 2nd battalion used its CV90s to kill the ambushers. Norwegian casualties? None.

RAF CH-47 w. BvS10,
Afghanistan
(click to view full)

The other touted contender in press reports is the German Puma IFV, which is under contract but not yet operational. Canada would become the vehicle’s 2nd customer behind Germany, and this option offers no possibility of immediate bridging leases, or lease-to-buy arrangements from an existing customer.

BAE’s M2A3 Bradley IFV is another vehicle in that category, which would be available as rapid-delivery vehicles from the US Army and its Bradley remanufacturing lines. It has also been absent from press mentions to date.

Despite their successful use by British forces in Afghanistan, and the presence of Bv206 vehicles that performed well with the Princess Patricia Canadian Light Infantry Battle Group during Afghanistan’s Operation Anaconda, the much lighter BvS10 all terrain armored vehicle falls below DND’s weight threshold, and has not been mentioned in reports to date. Canada appears to prefer a heavier vehicle with a demonstrated capacity to defeat RPG rounds, over the BvS family’s improved air and ground mobility.

The Armored Tactical Patrol Vehicle

RG-31 and G-Wagen
(click to view full)

The second program, for an Armored Tactical Patrol Vehicle, is more ambiguous. Canada currently operates 50-75 RG-31 Nyala “Armoured Patrol Vehicles” in Afghanistan, which have had some maintenance issues but performed well as route-clearance vehicles and convoy leads. A handful of heavier Cougar 6×6 and Buffalo vehicles currently round out Canada’s blast-resistant vehicle fleet, with 50 more on the way. They are accompanied by a large number of Mercedes G-Wagen vehicles, whose protection level is very low – far too low for deployment as a patrol vehicle in combat zones.

A DND Backgrounder says that the renamed TAPV will consist of 500 vehicles, with an option for another 100. An initial 300 TAPV General Utility Vehicle variants will replace the current RG-31 Armoured Patrol Vehicle. They will carry a crew of 3, plus 4 equipped passengers and a remote-controlled weapon (RWS) up top. Canada’s LAV 2 Coyote reconnaissance vehicles will be replaced with 200 TAPV reconnaissance variants, which will carry a crew of 4, plus a one-man turret or a RWS, in addition to extensible surveillance equipment. According to DND, TAPV will “complement” the existing Mercedes G-Wagen LUV-W.

The procurement process will be a competitive military off-the-shelf acquisition, and the key term will be whether the competition restricts the competition to combat-proven designs. A letter of interest (LOI) and price and availability (P&A) will be issued in summer 2009 to identify potential bidders, followed by a solicitation of interest and qualification (SOIQ) and a request for proposals (RFP). A contract award is expected by spring 2011, deliveries by 2012, and initial operational capability by 2013.

The ATPV could be Canada’s long-term MRAP buy of blast-resistant vehicles, replacing and supplementing its RG-31s. It could also wind up as something closer to the American/Australian JLTV competition’s lighter 7-10 ton vehicle set, with blast protection that compares with an RG-31, but far better off-road and urban mobility.

Time will tell.

LAV-IIIs, and the RESET/RECAP Imperative

Canadian LAV-III,
Afghanistan
(click to view full)

The 3rd vehicle program would involve Canada’s LAV-III fleet, which is being ground down by Afghan operations. An up-armoring program is underway for the existing fleet, but that fleet will eventually need to be RESET, remanufactured, or replaced. The Canadian Army adds that this problem is not unique to the LAV-III platform, as they grapple with the same vehicle wear issues experienced by the Americans, British, and Dutch. From the Ottawa Citizen:

“All of our equipment is either deployed, being reset, used in training or broken and waiting either labour or spare parts,” wrote army commander Lt.-Gen. Andrew Leslie in the January [2008] report.”

General Dynamics Canada, which manufactures the LAV-III for Canadian and American customers, has reportedly floated the idea of a LAV-H (Heavy) replacement that would incorporate a slightly v-hulled sub-floor for added mine protection, while raising the vehicle’s maximum recommended weight from 17.2t/ 38,000 pounds to 25t/ 55,100 pounds in order to cope with additional equipment and heavier armor.

The other option for the Canadian Forces is some form of full RESET program, similar to the efforts by the US Army to restore its vehicles to “zero mile” configuration. At present, the CASR think tank states that “All Afghan-deployed LAV IIIs must be rotated out for refit and repair every 12 months”; but this is more akin to depot maintenance than full disassembly and RESET.

In the end, the 2 may be combined. Canada’s LAV-III Upgrade Program officially aims to extend the fleet’s life span to 2035, which strongly implies a full RESET. At the same time, the program will add heavier armor, upgraded weapons, and mobility upgrades to the vehicles’ powertrain, suspension, running gear and brakes. This combination sounds a lot like General Dynamics Canada’s LAV-H, and the project will upgrade 550 vehicles, with an option for an additional 80. Initial operational capability is scheduled for 2012.

Updates and Developments

Canadian Parliament
(click to view larger)

July 8/09: Canada’s DND makes a slew of announcements regarding its FLCS programs, including the CCV, LAV Upgrade, TAPV, and Leopard 2 engineering upgrades and AEVs.

Most of these programs are in the pre-RFP stage, except the C$ 1 billion LAV Upgrade project. General Dynamics Land Systems–Canada (GDLS-C), the original equipment manufacturer, will be awarded a contract to conduct that definition work, and has also been selected in advance to implement the LAV-III upgrades. DND overview announcement.

A political note is required. While 2011 lies within the term limit of the present Conservative Party government, it is a minority government in uncertain economic times, and Canada is currently set to wind down its Afghan mission in 2011. Until contracts is signed, therefore, each component of the FLCS program must be considered to carry varying degrees of political risk [emphasis added]...

Good on the US defence media.

Fixed-wing SAR aircraft balls-up

A month ago:

Conservatives and CF procurement: Political/industrial policy, not defence policy
...
This is how the Conservative government plans to make defence procurement less, er, cumbersome. Lobbyists and votes rule. Hurl:

Tories to revamp military buying procedures
Move comes after critics complain Canadian firms are not benefiting

The Conservative government is changing direction on how it buys military equipment after facing a barrage of criticism that such multibillion-dollar purchases have not delivered enough jobs and work to domestic companies.

Public Works Minister Christian Paradis said Thursday that the government will ask the defence and aerospace industry to participate more in the process [emphasis added] in the hope of avoiding public squabbles like the one that has dogged the $3-billion program to buy new fixed-wing search-and-rescue aircraft. [Where was MND MacKay? I guess he lost in Cabinet the battle to procur the C-27J as the new fixed-wing SAR aircraft.]

The $3-billion purchase has bogged down, with some companies complaining the Defence Department designed the program to favour one particular firm.

"We want to make sure industry is part of the solution given the investments that are coming in military procurement," said Paradis. "It's a good news story and it was important for us to send the message."..

Now from the blog of the Ottawa Citizen's David Pugliese:

FWSAR INDUSTRY DAY LEAVES MUCH TO BE DESIRED SAY AEROSPACE AND DEFENCE FIRM EXECS

For more than a few of those who attended the Fixed Wing SAR industry day in Ottawa on Tuesday, the low point came when Brig.-Gen. Greg Matte was asked about what type of sensors the new aircraft would carry.

The question, I believe from Cascade Aerospace, seemed to be a reasonable one. How do you find someone in the Atlantic Ocean during a storm, in the dark was on the mind of more than a few industry reps?

But the crowd of 140 aerospace executives, standing room only crammed like sardines into a conference room, didn’t get much of an answer.

As you probably read in my Ottawa Citizen article in today’s paper, the industry day was a mess, according to those who attended. Go here to read the full article:

http://davidpugliesemilitaryphotos.blogspot.com/2009/07/canadian-forces-fixed-wing-search-and.html

A Public Works rep had trouble answering questions, according to those in the room. No one could say who would be responsible of in-service support for the planes (industry or DND?). Even the number of aircraft, once set at 15-17, no longer applies it seems.

Some aerospace reps I talked to called the industry day a waste of time. One referred to it as a “cluster…….”

Some were amused by the 10 technicians running around trying unsuccessfully to fix the microphones that malfunctioned and the audio-visual system, which projected blanks. “It looked like we were at a rock concert there was so many of these guys but of course nothing worked,” said one aerospace executive.

The most happy campers I touched base with were the folks from Viking Air of British Columbia. They saw the day as positive since they feel the field is now open to their new production Buffalo aircraft (yet to be built) [more here and here].

One positive aspect, agreed most, was the chance to talk to SAR Techs and get feedback from those people.

It's not about attracting everyone, it's about attracting the right one

A friend sent me a link to a piece in Sunday's National Post entitled "Military recruits drawn to steady jobs, not combat." It drew some interesting conclusions about advertising for the CF:

It's all about the career -- not the combat.

That's the message the Canadian Forces should pitch to young recruits, according to recently released polling research on potential military advertising campaigns.

The Department of National Defence commissioned polling firm Phoenix Strategic Perspectives to test potential ad concepts among focus groups of Canadians aged 18 to 34 who are involved or interested in skilled trades.

The clear favourite was a TV ad with the tagline, "This is my job." The ad was preferred by a majority of participants in six out of eight focus groups, and in some cases was the unanimous winner. The main reasons? The ad emphasized the career prospects of joining the military, as opposed to the prospect of armed conflict. The ad also highlighted the opportunities for paid education and training and referred to a three-year minimum commitment required of recruits.

Coming in a distant second was an ad with the tagline, "Wanted: Fighters of all kinds," while an ad called "Now hiring" came in third.

"The results of this research provide clear direction to DND in terms of advertising [and] promoting the benefits of a career with the Canadian Forces. In every group, the ‘career/job' theme resonated much more with participants than the ‘combat/fight' theme," Phoenix states in a recently released report on its research.

"Put succinctly, to the extent that participants are willing to consider joining the CF, they are interested in joining as skilled technical personnel, and not as soldiers or potential combatants. This is an important consideration to keep in mind for all related marketing and communications activities."

I've had the opportunity to meet some of the people who handle advertising for the CF, and I trust they're smart enough to take this report with a frigate-sized grain of salt.

Why?

Well, first of all, the focus groups were conducted in Toronto, Vancouver, Montreal, and Moncton. While all are undoubtedly big sources of recruits for the CF, I'd hazard a wild-assed guess that Moncton's recruiting rate per capita is likely five times that of the bigger population centres. I would have liked to see focus groups that mirrored where the CF's labour pool actually comes from: small town and rural Canada.

Secondly, "Each of the eight focus groups had seven to eight participants." That's a maximum sample size of 64 souls, out of a population of 30-some-odd million. 'Nuff said.

But most importantly, this report should be viewed in the context of who the CF is looking to recruit. It's not the "average Canadian," it's not the twenty-something who wants a safe lifetime sinecure in a cushy union or academic job, and it's not anyone with a me-first mentality. We've had quite enough of the man in the green flannel suit, thank you very much (and if you've never read the linked essay, I heartily recommend it).

A career in the military is, at its essence, a contract of unlimited liability. There's no way around that. Those who can't bear that thought have no business putting on a uniform.

Trying to sell young Canadians on the idea of a military whose only distinguishing feature from the civilian world is wearing the same outfit to work every day is dishonest advertising.

What I find most interesting in the article is one line that neither the journalist nor the headline writer seem to have picked up upon:

The Department of National Defence commissioned polling firm Phoenix Strategic Perspectives to test potential ad concepts among focus groups of Canadians aged 18 to 34 who are involved or interested in skilled trades.

The CF's biggest recruiting challenge right now isn't infanteers. There are plenty of young men and women joining precisely for the lifestyle shown in the 'Fight with the Canadian Forces' ads derided in the article. The recruiting challenge is in the technical trades.

If this research can give some insight into the mindset of those interested in becoming naval electronics technicians, then it might have some lessons to teach in terms of targeted, specific tag-lines and themes for that particular group of potential recruits. Stuff for the trade magazines at their schools, or for recruiters visiting their classrooms and campuses to remember.

But wider lessons for CF recruiting as a whole? I don't think so.

More UK forces to stay in Afstan after all?

Further to posts here and here, this prime minister may be for turning:

Gordon Brown says troops in Afghanistan have right equipment
Gordon Brown has insisted that British troops are equipped well enough to succeed in the increasingly bloody war against the Taliban in Afghanistan.
...
Mr Brown appeared to give ground on the issue of troop numbers. Earlier this year he vetoed a permanent increase in the British force to 10,000.

Instead he agreed a short-term rise from 8,300 to 9,000. After September's elections in Afghanistan it was expected to return to 8,300.

But in the Commons Mr Brown told MPs: "Once the elections are over, we will review the numbers on the ground."

It is now likely that the 9,000 level is to be maintained...

Canadian special forces ops in Afstan (and CSIS)

The veil lifted a bit; I trust Sen. Kenny isn't the only source for this story:

Elite forces target bomb makers

OTTAWA – Canada's elite special forces soldiers have been launching raids on enemy compounds to directly target insurgents making roadside bombs, the main killer of coalition troops in Afghanistan, the Toronto Star has learned.

Using intelligence gathered by Canadian spies on the ground in the troubled country, soldiers with Joint Task Force 2 and the special forces regiment are actively involved in going after the networks that produce the improvised explosive devices.

"It's a very high value target for them," said Senator Colin Kenny, chair of the Senate defence committee.

While it's been known that members of the special forces group have been operating in Afghanistan, the government has maintained a strict silence about their specific operations. But their website boasts that they work abroad "to destroy, disorganize and disrupt the networks of violent organizations."

Kenny said the group is spending "80 per cent" of its time trying to counter the manufacture of IEDs, an effort that has ramped up this year as coalition soldiers face a record number of bomb attacks [lots more here on counter-IED efforts generally].

"The whole (Canadian Forces) is conscious of where their casualties are coming from and they've turned to a major effort to address it," Kenny said in an interview.

The elite troops have been working with agents from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, who are also in the country, to help identify the locations where the bombs are made – and then launch operations to wipe them out.

[There's not much officially public on CSIS' foreign operations; but there's this from the CBC's Brian Stewart, April 2009:

...

The number of CSIS agents now in this one danger zone in and around Afghanistan is secret but my sources say it is not less than 20 and their work in targeting Taliban field leaders and collecting tribal intelligence is increasingly valued by our generals [emphasis added].

The CSIS contribution is an untold part of the war...]

When a bomb-making operation is found, "they can send it up in a puff of smoke," Kenny said...

See also this article at p. 23 of the Conference of Defence Associations' On Track magazine, Summer 2009, by Col. Bernd Horn:

COMING TO GRIPS WITH THE INVISIBLE HAND:
UNDERSTANDING SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

And this post:

Much improved Canadian intelligence in Afstan, and IEDs

US Marines in Helmand: "Operation Khanjar"/ Canadian general's view/Brit Update

Start of a post at The Canada-Afghanistan Blog:

I'm a bit worried about linking to this article so early, because I have a feeling that tomorrow I'll read a blog post by a well-informed person (for example) blasting it for naivety or misguided intentions...

Not necessarily yet, but an earlier post:

US Marine realities in Helmand

Meanwhile, Paul at Celestial Junk posts about a Canadian's opinion:

Physically, Morally - Broken

In every conflict, climaxes that spell the beginning of the end for one side usually are signalled by increases, not decreases, in casualties on all sides. It happened in Iraq ... are we witnessing the same in Afghanistan?

Vance:

The general said Canadians have to remember progress in the war cannot be measured by the number of soldiers killed, because the purpose of the mission is to protect Afghans and help the country onto its feet.

That, he said, would be an enormous challenge even without the insurgency.
"It's a shattered place -- physically, morally, broken -- but has shown in the past the ability to rebound," he said.

"I see the ability to rebound present, and the potential, everywhere I go."

And on the other hand...more here.

Update: The Canada-Afghanistan Blog continues, with this interesting post:

The British And Afghanistan

Across the pond, Defence of the Realm takes note of the "storm of coverage" in the media since the Brits saw fifteen deaths in nine days. "We predicted it would come, although even we had no idea that it would be this intense – magnified as it was by the highest land mortality rate since operations began in 2001."..

Upperdate: BruceR goes into one part of the Washington Post story at the second link in this post:

Generals negotiate over a platoon

This rings a few bells. WashPost...

More from Flit based on another Post story:

U.S. PRTs going all-green?

WashPost...

Canadian Fallen x 15 = Taliban Claims of Canadian Casualties

Latest update from English-language Taliban statements: Talib info-machine alleged almost 15 (14.74) Canadians killed (339) for every one Canadian repatriated (23) between October 2008 and June 2009.

June 2009 stats, for example: 2 fallen, 38 claimed by Taliban.

Keep this in mind the next time you hear/read/see a Taliban spokesperson claiming anything.

A bit more here.

"U.S. military wants a quick boost in Afghan security forces"

This story should be read in conjunction with this post yesterday:

The U.S. commander in Afghanistan is expected to recommend a rapid increase in the size of the Afghan army and police, which could require sending more U.S. troops for training.

The U.S. military commander in Afghanistan has told top Pentagon officials that Afghan security forces must expand faster and beyond current target levels to more quickly secure the country, Defense officials said.

A dramatically stepped-up training program would probably require additional U.S. forces, but it is not clear whether American commanders in Afghanistan will request more, and if so, how many.

Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, is to make a formal report with his recommendations in August. Defense officials emphasized that though McChrystal believes more Afghan security forces are needed sooner, he has not yet made formal recommendations.

U.S. military leaders in Afghanistan repeatedly have said they need more Afghan army soldiers and police officers to help secure cities and villages as they expand their operations against Taliban fighters.

The Afghan army, generally considered far more skilled than the police forces, has about 85,000 members and is scheduled to grow to 134,000.

The Pentagon already has accelerated the training schedule. Military officials are debating how much faster they can go, as well as how many more American trainers the job would require. A brigade of U.S. troops assigned to the training mission is due to arrive in August.

With about $800 million a year in overall revenue, the Afghan government cannot support the security forces it already has. Further expansion would require support for years from the United States or other nations.

"We don't want to put any numbers to it yet, but everyone knows expanding the Afghan national security forces is key to the counter-insurgency campaign," said a military official. Officials discussed the issue on condition of anonymity because McChrystal's recommendations have not been made public...

The recommendation by McChrystal was first reported Friday by the Washington Post. The Post reported that officials believe that the Afghan army might need to double its ultimate target size, to nearly 270,000.

Meanwhile, BruceR weighs in on vehicles and ANA training.

Update: Flit notes a key problem:

Afghan army size remains the elephant in the middle of the room. Rory Stewart [see also end of this post]:

Yet the current state-building project, at the heart of our policy, is justified in the most instrumental terms – not as an end in itself but as a means towards counter-terrorism. In pursuit of this objective, Obama has committed to building "an Afghan army of 134,000 and a police force of 82,000", and adds that "increases in Afghan forces may very well be needed." US generals have spoken openly about wanting a combined Afghan army-police-security apparatus of 450,000 soldiers (in a country with a population half the size of Britain's).

Such a force would cost $2 or $3 billion a year to maintain; the annual revenue of the Afghan government is just $600 million. We criticise developing countries for spending 30 per cent of their budget on defence; we are encouraging Afghanistan to spend 500 per cent of its budget.

As Colin Powell would say, there is no real "exit strategy" here. We are building an indigenous army that will only be sustainable in anything like its current form so long as it remains wholly subsidized by the west. On the other hand, although everything is paid for by someone else, the Afghan government still retains full operational and administrative control. All the best intentions in the world have been falling into that basic gap in accountability.

I would just add that the 400,000-plus ANSF would obviously be scaled down considerably once/if the insurgency is essentially under, er, control. But what then will all the demobbed, mainly young, men do? Bit of a sticky wicket, eh? And clearly a great deal of foreign money would be required for many years to maintain decent ANSF in a reasonable range of 100-150,000.

Improving Taliban capabilities?

I wonder how accurate this article in The Guardian is (related earlier post):

New peril for British troops in Afghanistan: Taliban have learned modern warfare
Imagination, greater firepower and strengthening of Taliban's ideological bond leaves coalition facing higher casualty rates

For many months, military planners in Afghanistan have been readying themselves – and trying to prepare domestic public opinion – for a bloody summer. In spring, a number of officers – from the then commander of coalition forces, David McKiernan, to commanders patrolling sullen villages – said significant casualties were inevitable in the traditional "fighting season" of July and August.

Nor were casualties likely to be due to greater numbers of troops coming into the country and venturing into new areas. "The Taliban are much, much more stood up. They are much tighter, much more professional, much more together," one intelligence officer in Kabul told the Guardian earlier this year.

A lot has been made of the Taliban's increasing use of "asymmetric tactics", such as booby traps, roadside bombs and suicide attacks. A few hours on an operation with US troops, supported by helicopters, jets and unmanned armed drones, makes it clear why: if the insurgents do not stay out of the way, they will be killed, as thousands have been.

But once coalition troops establish a presence, they become vulnerable. They need supplies, they need to patrol; they are perfect targets for the hit and run tactics of the Taliban. Those tactics have been particularly honed in ambushes.

Soldiers fighting the insurgents say they now show vastly improved ability to co-ordinate fire. So volleys of rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) now rain down during engagements. The Taliban have also learned to focus fire on their opponents' heavy weapons or radios .

Pre-prepared fighting positions in karez irrigation ditches are now used, often as part of defensive posts with carefully calculated fields of fire designed to interlock and to trap any counterattack.Nato officers say the Taliban's command has also been improved to co-ordinate fighting with foot soldiers and to allow rapid engagement or disengagement. According to American soldiers who served in Iraq, Afghan fighters compared favourably to the disorganised militants they had faced before...

Yet the work done by the Taliban high command – based mainly in Pakistan – goes way beyond tactics. Through the winter, Nato intelligence officers say, the insurgents worked at stiffening internal discipline, weeding out those who were felt to be insufficiently attached, ideologically speaking, to the movement...

The tactics of the coalition forces have been studied closely. One preoccupation is air power. As with the conflict with the Soviets, airpower is what insurgents fear most. Helicopters have not yet been attacked successfully in a systematic way.

The insurgents only have a few old Chinese-made missiles and rocket propelled grenades. The latter, fired into rotor blades, are effective only from very close range, and imply almost certain death for the attacker.

However, if the Taliban do find a means to target coalition aircraft, this will not simply change tactics but geopolitics – as it did for the Soviets. Within three years of the Afghan mujahideen receiving effective surface-to-air missiles, the Soviets had pulled out.

Jason Burke is the author of On the Road to Kandahar: Travels Through Conflict in the Islamic World

More on ANSF training problems/Future scale of operations

Further to Damian's post, BruceR hard at it at Flit--see UPDATE at 2):

1) Congress June report, part 2

More from the June 8 DOD report to Congress on Afghanistan:

If provided the necessary resources, the Afghan National Army (ANA) will reach its currently-authorized end-strength of 134,000 personnel by December 2011. As part of this acceleration plan, eight infantry kandaks (battalions) are being fielded in 2009 as security force kandaks. Shortages of training personnel
for the ANA persist. The United States has fielded 1,665 of the 3,313 personnel required for Embedded Training Teams for ANA. Fifty-two ISAF Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams provide the equivalent of another 799 personnel.

Canada provides something over 100 of those 799. Note that the current mentoring shortfall (849 personnel) is larger than the entire NATO/ISAF contribution. Put another way:

NATO has committed to providing 103 OMLTs by the time the ANA reaches 134,000 personnel in 2011. As of April 2009, there were a total of 53 OMLTs out of the current requirement of 65 OMLTs.

Canada currently provides ~6 of those 53 teams, which under current policy will be leaving with the rest of Canada's forces in 2011, at the same time NATO is trying to find 50 more on top of that. More on the security force kandaks in the next post.

2) Congress June report, part 3

More:

CSTC-A has requested $589 million in supplemental funds in order to build the first eight kandaks of the new force structure in FY 2009. Because of the limited amount of equipment immediately available for accelerated fielding, these kandaks will initially receive only 40 percent of the standard infantry kandak transport capabilities. The new kandaks will be used to provide security along the Ring Road.

One could be excused for wondering whether forces who only have trucks for 40% of their personnel are going to be very successful when assigned a primary task of road patrol. But, TIA.

UPDATE, July 10: The new 1230 Report (the biannual report by the U.S. Department of Defense to Congress on Afghanistan) linked in this and the two posts below was briefly pulled from the DOD site yesterday, after initially being put up on July 8, and has been now replaced with a new PDF version. No significant changes, at least to the sections I was excerpting, so after briefly pulling these posts overnight until it was clear what was going on here, they're now going back up with the correct link.

Related earlier post. More on CSTC-A from last month:

...Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan is not under ISAF, it's under Gen. McChrystal in his other hat as commander of US Forces - Afghanistan, reporting to Gen. Petraeus at US Central Command (see Update here for a Canadian angle to CSCT-A). So is the NATO training mission now effectively under CENTCOM and not NATO HQ? Still unity of command confusion though things seem to be shaking out bit by bit...

And excerpts of what BruceR has to say about the coming scale of operations in another post:

New report to Congress on Afstan

Link to the June "1230" report here. Of note:

Military deaths, including international and Afghan security forces personnel, increased by 68 percent [over last winter]. The increased level of violence outside of the usual “fighting season” was due in part to an ISAF decision to deny insurgents respite and to aggressively pursue them in their winter enclaves.
Unseasonably warm conditions also facilitated higher levels of insurgent activity during the late winter and early spring.

Interesting how the increased tempo is attributed to intent on the West's part, and exogenous factors (weather) on the insurgents' part. I'd respectfully suggest we may not be the only ones here who have intentions, plans, etc...

The good news...is that we're getting much better at neutralizing IEDs and killing the IED-layers, so while it's true one might reasonably expect to see increased attacks this summer, a reasonable forecast would be that we'll see only comparable levels of Western and ANA casualties to the year before, at least when looked at on a country-wide basis, meaning the insurgents are having to work harder to achieve the same direct military effect in some ways. That's not the only metric either side cares about, of course, but it's not nothing if you're deployed there.

"Afghanistan: armoured-up"

Conference of Defence Associations' media round-up--excerpts:

...
Sean Maloney responds to a recent National Post article criticizing Canadian troops’ withdrawal from Strongpoint Mushan. The NP article is also linked below.
http://www.rmcclub.ca/everitaswp/?p=11755
http://www.nationalpost.com/news/canada/story.html?id=1737628

Brian Stewart for CBC reflects on the international presence in Afghanistan and its shortcomings.
http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2009/07/09/f-vp-stewart.html ...

Michael Yon for the Washington Times writes on the lack of development and economic opportunity in Afghanistan’s Ghor province.
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/jul/09/girl-with-no-future/

The Carnegie Endowment has released a report by Gilles Dorronsoro entitled, “The Taliban’s Winning Strategy in Afghanistan.”
http://carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=23331

The BBC reports on comments by UK defence secretary on British casualties in Afghanistan. Michael Evans for the Times reports on recent British casualties.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/8139662.stm
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article6650770.ece

Der Spiegel reports on the German government changing the rules of engagement for its troops in Afghanistan [emphasis added, more on Germans]
http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,635192,00.html ...

Reuters reports on the Chinese starting work on the Aynak copper mine in Logar province.
http://www.reuters.com/article/email/idAFISL48779720090709 ...

"New Combined Air Operations Centre Up and Running"

Air Force story (via Spotlight on Military News and International Affairs):

Lieutenant-General Marcel Duval, Commander 1 Canadian Air Division / Canadian NORAD Region, officially opened the new Combined Air Operations Centre (CAOC) in a small ceremony July 9th at 1 Canadian Air Division / Canadian NORAD Region Headquarters in Winnipeg.

LGen Angus Watt, Chief of the Air Staff, presided over the ceremony.

"The Combined Air Operations Centre has been an undertaking with special significance for me," said LGen Duval. "It is now a fully functioning, state-of-the-art facility that will better integrate Canada's air operations with those of our international partners and allies."

"The greatest benefit of this transformation comes with the technology and personnel incorporated in this new operations facility," said Colonel Michel Latouche, CAOC director. "It will enable the commander to monitor, communicate with and direct all aerospace forces under his command and enable the delivery of air capabilities in an efficient and effective manner."

The CAOC will provide operational-level command and control of air and space for Commander 1 Canadian Air Division / Canadian NORAD Region, who is also the Canadian Combined Forces Air Component Commander (CFACC). It is the focal point for planning, directing and assessing air and space operations. It is uniquely structured to meet Canadian Forces' requirements to deliver effects to various commanders in support of strategic, operational and tactical objectives across a full spectrum of operations including domestic and international disaster response, search and rescue, evacuation operations, air mobility operations and NORAD operations.

Brit outrage over government's handling of forces in Afstan

There's been a lot more like this recently in the British media (see Defence of the Realm):

Afghanistan: Who is going to stand up and fight for Britain's short-changed soldiers
Nick Clegg is right to break the all-party consensus on the Afghan campaign, says Con Coughlin

It says a great deal about the parlous state of political leadership in this country that it should fall to Nick Clegg, the Liberal Democrat leader, to articulate the mounting anger and frustration our Armed Forces feel about the Government's disastrous handling of the military campaign in Afghanistan...

the Lib Dems are...Britain's most accomplished political opportunists. In normal circumstances, one might expect criticism of the Government's handling of a major military operation overseas to be dominated by the main political parties. But the failure of both Labour and the Conservatives to address the glaring shortcomings in our Afghan campaign has left the field wide open for Mr Clegg to take centre stage. And, for once, the Lib Dem leader's blatant act of opportunism in breaking with the cross-party consensus on Afghanistan is utterly justified. By highlighting the Government's failure to provide our troops with the equipment and force levels they require to succeed in Afghanistan, Mr Clegg is merely stating the widely held view within the military that this Government is guilty of the most shameful betrayal of the covenant between the nation and the Armed Forces.

When Tony Blair announced in 2006 that Britain would take a leading role in the Nato mission to rebuild Afghanistan, and stop it becoming a safe haven for drug barons and Islamist terrorists, he promised to give British forces everything they needed. Three years later, and with the death toll rising by the day, nothing could be further from the truth.

The Government has failed to provide the armoured vehicles and helicopters necessary to protect our forces from the Taliban's deadly roadside bombs. Even worse, it is now refusing – on cost grounds – to send the additional 2,500 troops senior commanders say are essential for the mission to succeed. As a result of Gordon Brown's parsimony, the British forces in Helmand find themselves in the humiliating position of being bailed out by the Americans.

The facts concerning the Government's abdication of its fundamental duty of care to our Servicemen and women – to give them the best possible chance of avoiding death or serious injury – are well known throughout the political establishment. And yet, until Mr Clegg's long-overdue intervention, the criticism had been muted, to say the least...

I think it fair to say that our government has done rather a better job meeting the CF's needs in Afstan (e.g. see here, here and here--though it took the Manley panel to get helicopters and UAVs. And we simply do not have more soldiers to send (even if the government wanted to, which it manifestly does not).

Update: Tough times:

8 British soldiers killed in Afghanistan



Gordon Brown insists British soldiers are succeeding in Afghanistan

British troops giving their lives to secure Britain's future, says David Miliband

And a long piece to make one think:

Afghanistan: a war we cannot win
The threat posed by al-Qaeda is exaggerated; the West's vision of a rebuilt Afghanistan ultimately flawed, says former soldier, diplomat and academic Rory Stewart
...
*RORY Stewart has been a soldier, diplomat and academic and has travelled extensively in Afghanistan and Iraq.

As a student at Oxford, he was a summer tutor to Princes William and Harry. After a short period with the Black Watch, he joined the Foreign Office. He was British Representative to Montenegro in the wake of the Kosovo campaign. After the coalition invasion of Iraq, he was appointed deputy governor of Maysan and senior advisor in Dhi Qar, two provinces in southern Iraq.

His first book, The Places in Between, a New York Times bestseller, was an account of a walk across Afghanistan in the winter of 2001/2. In 2005, he founded an NGO in Afghanistan and moved to Kabul. He is Ryan Family Professor of the Practice of Human Rights and the director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at the John F Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University [a previous director of the center].