Strategy , Grand Strategy, and Tactics

While I was away (moving) the last week and a half, I have not been idle. I have been reading On Strategyby Colonel of Infantry Harry G. Summers, Jr. and Strategyby B. H. L. Hart. Two classics in the field of military strategy. Col. Summers' book deals with the Vietnam War and Basil Hart's book deals with a historical look at strategy with a major focus on WW1 and WW2.

What I want to do is to discuss the issues involved in relationship to the War in Iraq and our long war with militant Islam.

I get notification of comments at Classical Values and at Power and Control. So if you want to be assured that I see your comment and have an opportunity to reply please post at those blogs.

This discussion will be ongong (at least for a while) and will consist of a number of posts on the topic. The place to start is to get copies of the books and read them or at least use them to follow along with the discussion.

Cross Posted at Classical Values and at The Astute Bloggers

Are We On the Right Road?

In Part IV of Nemesis' overview of the war (Parts I and II are covered at A Return to Those Thrilling Days of Yesteryear.... and Part III is covered at The Alpha Male Problem) Nemesis discusses possible strategies and their pros and cons.

Nemesis dismisses Passive containment out of hand. It was the pre 9/11 strategy and 9/11 proved it didnt work.

He then covers Active Containment vs Engagement. Here is his estimate of what active containment is about.

* A broad approach to terrorism emphasizing both national defense and active measures against terrorists overseas.
* A diplomatic approach to hostile governments emphasizing international penalties and sanctions, and practical support of dissident elements is preferred but not entirely relied upon.
* Strongly supports deterrence as preferable to defensive measures that may be provocative.
* Military action as a last resort and with a limited objective, which many or may include regime change
* Military action preferably, but not necessarily, conducted under a broad international coalition.
* Little emphasis on nation building.
* Strong emphasis on establishing lasting security under a compliant regime.
* UN participation in diplomatic and military measures is preferable but not considered vital.
* Exit strategies are based on stability.

He contrast that strategy with Engagement.

* A broad approach to terrorism emphasizing both national defense and active measures against terrorists overseas.
* Approach to hostile governments balances military and diplomatic options.
* Supports deterrence but prefers strong defense measures.
* Military action acceptable on clear evidence that further diplomacy is counterproductive.
* Military action preferably, but not necessarily, conducted under a broad international coalition.
* Military objective will usually include regime change and establishing lasting security.
* Strong emphasis on nation building and supporting representative government.
* UN participation in diplomatic measures is desirable but can be secondary.
* UN participation in military measures is undesirable and to be avoided.
* Exit strategies are based on victory

What are the prospects of these two (not mutually exclusive) strategies?

I think a good way to begin this process is by examining containment. Containment strategies, best exemplified by the Cold war, can offer a relatively low-risk way of overcoming an adversary with minimal armed conflict. They emphasize deterrence and steps are taken to keep what military actions that do occur from escalating. Military action may involve the use of proxies to keep the main antagonists out of direct contact. Diplomatic measures, including sanctions, embargoes, and agreements to internationally isolate the adversary, play an important role.

Accordingly, containment strategies require a high degree of international cooperation, making them subject to corruption and diplomatic gamesmanship, especially by non-aligned parties. A combination of leverage and accommodation is necessary to keep them working, and this often results in compromises with regimes and other actors whose behavior is otherwise distasteful.

Containment was always based on mirror imaging. The idea that the values of the opponent was sufficiently similar to our own so a policy of containment could work. It was based on the idea that both sides considered the results of a nuclear war catastrophic. That is probably not the case in this war. Iran has openly talked of accepting its own destruction in exchange for the destruction of Israel. So containment is of limited value in this conflict.

The difficulty, and I believe it is a fatal one, is the way a containment approach would have to interact with the nature of Islam itself. History records various Islamic movements that have attempted to restore Islam to the purity of its original faith. These movements have become radicalized and often violent because paths to reform in Islam are blocked by the autocratic nature of the state. Because the containment approach works through the existing political structure it cannot unblock these paths to reform. Instead, it must rely on imposing reform from the top down and unfortunately, the autocrats that would do the imposing are either the problem, as in Iran, or lack sufficient credibility to institute meaningful reform, as in Saudi Arabia or Egypt. The involvement of us in encouraging the state to undertake reform would also tend to discredit reform in direct proportion to our visibility in this regard. This has the obvious drawback of taking reform out of our hands and entrusting it to an autocratic government whose motives are suspect and whose operations are generally opaque. In effect, we would be putting the ultimate success of our strategy in the hands of people who have been the cause of much of the problem in the first place.

It is the alpha male problem writ large. Which I discussed in my review of Part III titled appropriately enough The Alpha Male Problem.

If the Active Containment-Reform approach offers no realistic chance of success, does the Engagement approach do any better? Certainly the historical antecedents do not auger well. Liberal western ideologies did make their way into Islam from Europe during the 19th Century and there was a period of experiment with consultative bodies and representative government. Except in Turkey, none of them worked and overall they may have done more harm than good. These ideologies were in direct competition with authoritarian ideologies from eastern Europe, and it is these latter that had the more lasting effects, being familiar and comfortable to autocrats and authoritarian reformers alike.

It is on this basis I believe that many scholars and career experts on the Middle East doubt the wisdom of Engagement approach with its dependence on establishing democracy. The extensive experience and knowledge of these experts must carry great weight, yet I would be careful of showing them too much deference. Part of the difference between the approaches is philosophical and unfortunately, such differences are not generally resolvable through debate.

So how can the differences be resolved. Nemesis says the way to go is to "consult" the jihadis.

Perhaps a better argument for Engagement is that the Jihadis are less accustomed to it and less comfortable with it. Pursuing solutions thought to be idealistic puts more pressure on them than what might be called the "calculated realism" of a containment approach. They believe us to be timid and risk-adverse. To the extent we express fervor in our strategy and follow it up with deeds, we combat their portrayal of us and dilute their advantage in that regard. Idealism impresses them more than careful diplomatic maneuvering; it makes us an enemy to be reckoned with.

It can also be argued, as I have done, that promoting democracy confronts the Jihadis with a direct ideological challenge that shortens the time in which they have to establish themselves as leaders of Islam. Democracy hold out the promise of tangible benefits and, what is more, it is fundamentally incompatible with Jihadi ideology. Unlike the moderate Islamic theology, which seems too comfortable living with extremism, democracy requires its adherents to take sides and defend it if they are going to retain its benefits. This is likely to form a more compelling argument than asking them to oppose the Jihadis in the name of Islamic reform, but actually just because they threaten us. Evidence from Iraq and Afghanistan strongly argues that this is indeed the case.

In addition, the potential utility of democracy in promoting Islamic reform should not be overlooked. Democracy by its nature opens up the paths to reform that have been blocked, and allows the consultative nature of original Islam can be restored. Theologically then, Islam and representative government are not incompatible, and the adoption of one does not necessarily imply the abrogation of the other. I would argue that democracy coupled with Islamic reform presents an insurmountable challenge to the Jihadis.

So how should we judge victory?

They are not a rational enemy, many argue that they are not even sane, and they covet glorious death. There is only one way to deal with an enemy who will never give up: you convince the larger society of which he is a part to give him up. As I have pointed out throughout this essay, without the support of their larger society, the Jihadis cannot survive.

How do we measure such a thing? I submit that the best barometer we have is the Jihadis themselves in Iraq. By their words and actions, they reveal to us their assessment of how Islam regards them, how our strategy is working, and therefore their own prospects for victory.

Some of this evidence comes directly from internal communications and captured intelligence. These sources are encouraging but they are also limited in scope and possibly episodic. In contrast, their strategic choices are quite telling. The Jihadis are acutely aware of the value of time and patience; it occupies a vital place in their strategic doctrine. They know that they are currently fighting us in Iraq and Afghanistan at an increasingly severe tactical disadvantage. They know about the antiwar and anti-American feeling that they have done everything they can to intensify, here and abroad. Their know the pressures on us to leave Iraq and that their situation would greatly improved if we left, so their best strategy now would be to lay low and be patient until that happens.

But they are not being patient. They are in fact fighting tooth and nail, both against us and against the new Iraqi democracy. There can be only one explanation for this: they believe democracy in Iraq is working; that our strategy is therefore working, and that time is not on their side.

Twenty years or more of teaching in madrassas, preaching in mosques, exhorting through their media, issuing fatwas, establishing charities, subsidizing martyrdom, attacking us, and all rest have not brought more men to their banners than can support a strategy of weakness. But if they were confidant in their future — confidant that Iraq would not become a stable democratic state, confidant the Afghanistan would collapse again of its own discord, confidant that Islam would eventually turn to them for guidance and leadership — they would not be attacking and slaughtering fellow Muslims. They would not be fighting and dying in large numbers in battle against the most proficient military in history.

The Jihadis have watched the progress in Iraq and Afghanistan, considered the consequences for Islam and for themselves, and I think they are ones who now see the writing on the wall: that they are divided, that they have been found wanting, and that their days are numbered. They are not fighting for time anymore — they are fighting for their lives.

Which says that despite our current difficulties, the enemy has it worse.

As is usual I have left out a great deal that is good to get to the heart of the matter. You should read the whole thing.

Update: 07 Sept '06 1058zz

Shrink Wrapped has a Part V up which consists of links to Parts I - IV and some interesting commentary on Parts I - IV.

Tactics, Strategy, Grand Strategy

Lets look at Israel's strategy and grand strategy in the current war and see how it affects what happens next. First however I'd like people to look at the morale factor in Israel. Later we will look at the morale factors in the Arab and Persian world. The will of the people and their expectations play a crucial role in the outcome of any war. Especially this one. So first off:

Be strong and of a good courage, fear not, nor be afraid of them: for the LORD thy God, he [it is] that doth go with thee; he will not fail thee, nor forsake thee. Deu 31:6

We will get back to this later. First thing I'm going to look at is the foundations of war fighting.

The foundation of the art of war is fear and deception. Sun Tzu is always good for a quote:

Warfare is the Way of deception.
Therefore, if able, appear unable,
if active, appear not active,
if near, appear far,
if far, appear near.
If they have advantage, entice them;
if they are confused, take them,
if they are substantial, prepare for them,
if they are strong, avoid them,
if they are angry, disturb them,
if they are humble, make them haughty,
if they are relaxed, toil them,
if they are united, separate them.
Attack where they are not prepared, go out to where they do not expect.

What brought that to mind was trying to figure out from Israeli maximum objectives and the unfolding of the battle what was actually happening.

Let us start by looking at deception plans in WW2. One of the most interesting deception plans in the Middle East was Plan Bertram used in the Battle of El Alamein in 1942.General Montgomery did a build up of equipment and supplies right under the German noses. A number of interesting deception plans of that era are described in a book "Bodyguard of Lies" by Brown which discusses British and American deception plans.

Since public morale and desires fit so much into how this war is prosecuted and what the outcome will be let us look at that Biblical quote. Banners with excerpts from that qoute (or a similar one) line the streets of Israel. The banners say Be of Strength and Courage!.So despite the rocket attacks morale is high in Israel. This is a war the Israelis want to fight despite the losses.Why would that be? Because they has finally come to the conclusion that the war is for their survival. There is nothing their enemies want except their deaths. I predicted this over a year ago when I discussed the Sharon Plan. There I talked about Gaza. Clearing the Lebanon Problem is a bonus.

The morale in Lebanon? Low. Few want to die for Hizbollah. Other than the fighters and many people forced to stay on the battlefields to act as human shields.

In Syria the people are agitating to get into the fight. Hizbollah is dying and the Syrian Army is idle. Right now morale and war fever is high. This is good for dictators. It means that when they use harsh measures they will have support.Even dictators must have some base of support. Assad came in as a reformer. However he has changed his tune.

Assad's response has been to ditch all pretenses of reform and appeal directly to the Islamic "street" in Syria and the wider region. That's when the posters of Assad flanked by Nasrallah and Ahmadinejad became ubiquitous in Damascus.

This spring, when the Prophet Muhammad cartoon controversy turned ugly, Assad's security police stood by while a mob torched the Danish Embassy in Damascus. Also this year, for the first time in many years, Syrians were allowed to publicly celebrate the Prophet's birthday.

Last week, cars with pale yellow Hezbollah flags paraded through the streets of Damascus, and cheers erupted in many neighborhoods when TV broadcast the news that Hezbollah rockets had hit Israeli targets.

All of this has greatly boosted the prestige of Assad. The young president now portrays himself as the defiant defender of the "resistance," determined to confront the U.S. and Israel everywhere in the Middle East.

That street is going to force him into a war if he wants to maintain his credibility as a strong leader. The only kind that survives in a dictatorship.

In Iran morale is low. There is a strong movement against helping Hizbollah. The government of course has different ideas.

The Arab world is rising up behind behind Hizbollah. The Egyptians lost the Six Day War and here Hizbollah has been fighting for over two weeks and is still in the field. A moral victory if not a real one.

So there is the civilian morale factors. There are of course others which I intend to ignore for purposes of this analysis.

Next I'd like to state Israel's maximum war aims, followed by how the war in Lebanon started and evolved. What is the desired outcome for Israel? The defeat of Hizbollah, Syria, and Iran.How do you do that? Pin the Hizbollah. Take the Bekaa resupply area. Syria gets involved out of popular desire, and because the Bekaa Valley is on the Syrian border. Iran comes in to support Syria. America takes out Iran.

So those are the goals and grand strategy. What strategy and tactics are required to achieve those goals?

The first part of the strategy was to give Hizbollah 24 hours to respond to Israeli demands to return its soldiers or else. With no response Israel crossed the border but didn't get far. Raids. Reconisance in force. Day after day. Occasionally new troops are called up. Stupid Olmert insist that they be used to relieve front line troops. They rotate in and out of what amounts to a live fire exercise. Hizbollah is being attrited but no ground is being gained. The Israeli Army and government is looking more and more incompetent by the day. Israel defeated five armies in the Six Day War. It is now going on two weeks plus and 5,000 Hezbollah fighters are holding the mighty Israeli Army within a few miles of the border. The front is static. The hizzies are winning. This is no Six Day War. The Israeli forces are checked by what appears to be a force barely adequate to hold them for a day let alone several weeks. Things are not going well. Not going well at all. The Arab street is convinced of the ineptness Israeli generalship. The civilians in goverment from Olmert on down are giving the military bad advice. Who put those galoots in charge? The thing that is fooling most people is that Olmert, Peretz, and the rest look and sound like nebbishes. And they are mostly Labor. Not known for their warrior spirit. All the better. And all the reporting about cabinet meetings saying there is dissention in the cabinent and they are holding the troops back.

That is almost all deception. Its purpose is to entice Syria and Iran. If that doesn't work secondary pressure can be brought from an inflamed Arab street. And the Arab street is on fire. So much so that Saudi Arabia has been forced to change its "official position" on the war. And the troop rotations? Well when the big push comes you will have a lot of very well and recently trained troops to lead the way and teach others. Reducing casualties.

In any case Hizbollah is pinned. Its forces reduced and the axis of advance to the Bekka Valley has had the chance and intensity of flank attacks reduced.

This is what is called preparing the battlefield. Such artistry hasn't been seen since WW2.These folks will go down as some of the greatest warriors in this century or any other. The only thing that could hurt this plan is lack of time.

That has always stopped the Israelis in the past. Not this time. Condi is making painfully slow progress. At the start Bush delayed any diplomacy for a week. Her latest gambit is proposing a multinational force (Which does not exist) to separate the two warring parties when the fighting stops (which it hasn't). Hizbollah can't stop fighting. Its street cred is on the line. How can it be a "resistance" if it stops resisting? So nothing useful diplomatically will be done for weeks. It does help to quiet the French street though. French diplomacy is also enhanced since Condi is proposing the French military be the lead force. Best to keep the jaw jaw going while the war war continues for those who need to believe something is being done by the International Community to stop the war.

What about American leadership? Bush is telling what is going on:

Bush said Thursday[27 July '06] that Iran is connected to Hizbullah, and now was the "time for the world to confront this danger."

Fortunately he is so stupid no one will believe him.

The next move to look for is an Israeli advance into the Bekaa. Expect it in less than a week.

What is the end state in Iran? The Iranian people who are already unhappy with the government and might over throw it for losing a war. Think Russia 1917. If they start lobbing missiles at Israel, Bush might invoke his mutual defence promises to Israel and attack Iran.

The really interesting thing is that the hizzies, Syria, and Iran are so enmeshed in the Israeli plan that no matter what move they make now it will only give them bad and worse options. At this point you could lay the plan out in front of them and it wouldn't make any difference. They are defeated.

What about the hizzies? The primere rule of guerilla warfare is no fixed positions. Mobility. The typical mistake guerillas make is transitioning to normal military formations before the field is appropriately developed. i.e. the opposition weakened and sufficient recruiting and training is possible. Hizbollah hoped to beat this problem by taking over the Lebanese Army. The Israelis beat them to it and forced them into a war for which they were not prepared. That is called a spoiling attack. The number one mistake that Hizbollah made at the start of all this was that they were a guerilla movement that didn't know where its sanctuary was. They thought it was in Lebanon on the border with Israel. That thinking forced it to fight toe to toe with a regular army that had tanks and an airforce. Almost always the death of guerilla movements. Get out the old vegematic. Slice and dice time.

As to book larnin' may I suggest "Strategy" by B.H.L. Hart. The premiere book in the field and required reading for all the American Armed Services. There is a nice addendum by General Yigal Yadin discussing battles in the 1948 war for Independence. Another set of books that is easy to read and also required reading by all the American Ground Services (Army and Marines) is Gordon R. Dickson's Dorsai series. Start with "Tactics of Mistake".

I am having so much fun with this. Sadly.

Well death to our enemies. Coming soon to a theater near you.

=====================

My thinking for the above article developed out of comments made at the following blogs.

Power and Control
Winds of Change
Winds of Change
Winds of Change
Winds of Change
Captain's Quarters
Captain's Quarters

Update 01 Aug '06 0438z

For those interested in my defence of the above speculations see the following threads:

Winds of Change
Captain's Quarters
Bellmont Club

Update: 02 Aug '06 0519z

As I predicted above Israel has moved into the Bekaa. Some good maps are linked as well.

Update: 12 Aug '06 0258z

Unfrozen Caveman Linguist links with a very good analysis. (article dated 10 Aug)

Technorati:
Israel, Shalit, Olmert, Palestinians, Middle East, Hamas, Middle East Rules, Lebanese Rules, Lebanon, Gaza, Hezbollah, Hizbollah, Hizbullah, Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Nasrallah, Palestine, Bush, Arab League, Intifada, America, United States, USA, Golan Heights, Shebba Farms

Grand Strategy

The folks over at Volokh Conspiracy were discussing missile defence. A very long discussion which prompted this discourse on WW2 from me:

Exagerated fear of loss is common to humans. We know what we have to lose and underestimate what the opposition has to lose.

You fight a war based on two things: what losses will most quickly cripple an enemy and what does the enemy fear to lose most? The two are often not the same. Take WW2 Japan. They were crippled by loss of oil and transport for raw materials. What they feared to lose most was the Emperor.

Which got me to thinking about our jihadi enemies. What is their operational weakness? What do they fear to lose the most?

So I'm thinking:

What can we do that will impact the enemies war fighting capabilites? Cut off their money supply and degrade their command and control. Militarily we are mainly going after leaders as our offensive phase while defending against ambushes. The Israelis have shown this to be an effective tactic if you can develop the intel.

What do the jihadis fear most to lose? Their honor. Most of all they want their religion respected.

I think the best answer to the honor question is: Mohammed? You are a follower of that old pervert? This could lead to the destruction of Islam or its reformation. The destruction is easy to see. The reformation could come about by acknowledgement that marrying six year olds is not very civilized behavior. Which then opens the gates to questioning lots of other stuff. Separate the good from the bad in light of current standards.

Technorati:
Grand Strategy, Military, Islam, Mohammed, Religion, Honor, Respect, Win, Lose, Enemy, Jihad, Islamic Imperialism, Islamic Fascism, Pervert