Minimum Alcohol Pricing: the AG balances public health, trade and competition

Angus MacCulloch, Lancaster University Law School

Background to the Opinion

Advocate-General (AG) Bot delivered his Opinion in Case C-333/14, ECLI:EU:C:2015:527, on 3 September regarding plans by the Scottish Government to introduce a Minimum Unit Pricing (MUP) for retail sales in Scotland set at £0.50 per unit. Before it could be introduced the measure was challenged by the Scotch Whisky Association. At first instance the Scottish Government successfully defended their proposal, in The Scotch Whisky Association & Ors, Re Judicial Review [2013] CSOH 70, but on appeal the Inner House referred several questions to the CJEU: Scotch Whisky Association & Ors v The Lord Advocate [2014] CSIH_38. The questions referred address the compatibility of MUP with both the single Common Market Organisation (CMO) and the free movement provisions in the TFEU. The AG’s Opinion has been hailed as a victory by both sides in the dispute, and on less partisan examination it does give insight into the importance of price competition to EU law.

The Compatibility of MUP with the single CMO

Article 167(1)(b) of the ‘single CMO’ Regulation, Reg 1308/2013, sets out that Member States must not allow price fixing for wine. But the AG notes that the provision is set out in the specific context of Art 167 which governs the laying down of ‘marketing rules’ to regulate supply [33], particularly where the rules are promulgated by stakeholder ‘interbranch organisations’. He therefore found there was no direct prohibition of retail price fixing in the CMO, and Member States retained their shared competence on this issue.

He then turned to the potential for indirect prohibition through the Member States’ obligation not to jeopardise the objectives of the CMO through Art 4(3) TFEU. The Commission argued that regulating retail prices would be contrary to the principle of the free setting of prices, by denying low cost producers the pricing advantages encouraged by the CMO. At [36] the AG set out that: ‘the free formation of prices is the expression … of the principle of free movement of goods in conditions of effective competition.’ Minimum retail pricing in a Member State would undermine low cost competitive advantage and distort competition, and is therefore incompatible with the single CMO [38 & 39]. Notwithstanding this, the existence of the CMO did not prevent Member States from adopting measures which pursue ‘legitimate objectives’ such as the protection of public health [40]. However, when pursuing such an objective, ‘the principle of proportionality requires that the national measure must actually meet the objective … and must not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain that objective’ [44]. The proportionality analysis should be the same as used under Art 36 TFEU, concerning possible Treaty-based limitations on the free movement of goods.

The Compatibility of MUP with Art 34 TFEU

The first notable aspect of the AG’s Opinion in relation to Art 34 (the ban on quantitative restrictions or measures of equivalent effect – or MEEQRs – on the free movement of goods) is that he undertakes an analysis of whether MUP is a MEEQR, even though both parties to the dispute had accepted it was. Reconciliation of the CJEU’s approaches in its previous judgments in van Tieggle, Keck, and Trailers is not easy. Can, after Keck, MUP be characterised as a ‘selling arrangement’ and fall outside Art 34 TFEU in principle, effectively rendering the finding in van Tieggle otiose? The AG avoids the problem by, at [58], adopting a hybrid approach which takes elements from all the judgments, including the ‘market access’ test in Trailers, thus: ‘a national measure may constitute an obstacle not only when, as a selling arrangement, it is discriminatory, in law or in fact, but also when, irrespective of its nature, it impedes access to the market of the Member State concerned’. If the measure hinders access there is therefore no need to consider if it is discriminatory, because it will fall within the scope of Article 34 in any event. He goes on to make clear that the loss of the ability to exploit low cost competitive advantage is in itself a hindrance to market access and brings MUP within the scope of Art 34 TFEU; effectively contemporising van Tieggle reasoning through the Trailers ‘market access’ test [60]. This is perhaps one of the most interesting suggestions in the Opinion. It gives price competition special protection as a driver of free movement within the internal market. The AG, for completeness, goes on to also discuss whether MUP might be a dynamic selling arrangement (like an advertising restriction), but his arguments [66-67], particularly those about domestic wine production, are not very convincing.

Moving on to consider the potential justification of a MEEQR under Art 36 TFEU, the AG first discusses the discretion available to Member States when deciding on the level of protection for a legitimate objective. He argues that the Member States must be allowed discretion as range of policy choices could be taken in these complex areas, but that Member States must adduce evidence to show that they have made a suitable and proportionate choice [87]. The explanation of how the analysis of proportionality should be undertaken, at [91]-[93], is, however, not particularly clear. Para [93] is the most troubling, suggesting that the national court should balance the ‘degree of impediment’ to trade against ‘the importance of the objectives pursued and the expected gains’. Should a domestic court be required to balance the benefits of trade against a public health benefit?

When the AG moves onto more direct consideration of MUP he examines a vital question in the first instance judgment, which I have previously addressed elsewhere: the identification of the particular aim of the measure. He suggests, at [116]-[117], that there is an ‘ambiguity’ whether MUP’s aim is to tackle, ‘harmful’ and/or ‘hazardous’ drinking, or protect the health of all drinkers; it is, however, acknowledged that the national court will have to take the final decision on this matter. The AG does accept that in relation to harmful and hazardous drinking, notwithstanding the complexities involved, it ‘does not seem unreasonable’ that a Member State might consider MUP an ‘appropriate means’ of attaining the objective [127]. He was also convinced by evidence presented by the Lord Advocate regarding the particular impact of MUP alongside other polices in relation to harmful and hazardous drinkers, particularly amongst the young [135]. At this point you might think that the Lord Advocate has won over AG Bot, but there is sting in the tail of the Opinion.

When it comes to the necessity of the measure the AG is less convinced, especially when MUP is compared with the alternate policy of a general increase in alcohol duty. At first instance the Outer House of the Court of Session rejected a general increase in duty because it did not effectively target the measure at harmful and hazardous drinkers, as it would also have an impact on moderate drinkers, and less problematic on-sales consumption. The AG is not convinced by the argument that the measure is more targeted [147]. The key passage comes in para [149]: ‘on the assumption that the objective of the rules … is genuinely confined to combating the hazardous and harmful consumption of alcoholic beverages … I consider that it is for the those responsible for the drafting of those rules to show that increased taxation is not capable of meeting that targeted objective.’ In itself that is not a controversial statement; the burden of proof in such an instance is well established. But he goes on to add another element: he argues the Lord Advocate would have to ‘adduce evidence’ that a general increase would have a ‘disproportionate impact’ on moderate drinkers, and that it could also have a benefit in addressing harmful or hazardous consumption in higher income groups who are less likely to be effected by MUP. He also adds that a general increase might also have another ‘additional advantage’: a contribution to general health objectives. This might ‘constitute a decisive factor that would justify the choice of that measure rather than the MUP measure’ [150].

To my mind this is a false step at the end of the Opinion. Increases in general excise duties have been the preferred measure in many of the Tobacco cases referred to in the Opinion, but the problems of tobacco and alcohol consumption are very different and suit different solutions. All tobacco consumption is bad, and all consumption is essentially the same. That is not true of alcohol, even in Scotland. Consumption in bars and restaurants poses very different problems when compared to alcohol purchased for consumption at the home or on the streets. Patterns of consumption of different types of product are also very different. I am far more convinced that the targeting of the measure serves a useful purpose. I am also still confused as to why a general increase in duty, which by definition will impact on all consumers and all trade in alcohol, as opposed to the limited impact of MUP, is seen as being less restrictive on trade. A general increase in duty must affect a higher volume of trade if nothing else. I suggest the push towards general duty increases is not really about trade at all. Again we see a policy choice designed to protect price competition in the market. The Tobacco Directives make their competition goal explicit, but it appears that the AG is using Art 34 & 36 TFEU to achieve the same result in the free movement sphere.

Barnard & Peers: chapter 12

So long, and thanks for all the fish: the CJEU clarifies international law and institutional issues applying to fisheries

 

Steve Peers

The EU’s fisheries policy is controversial both within the EU and outside it, due to its impact on both fish stocks and the livelihoods of fishing communities. Until the Treaty of Lisbon, its application was essentially the sole preserve of the Council. The European Parliament (EP) tried to obtain joint control of some of the external aspects of the policy by claiming that its consent was needed for international fisheries treaties that impacted the EU budget significantly, but the CJEU rejected this challenge.

Following the Treaty of Lisbon, however, the EP has joint decision-making power internally over agriculture and fisheries policies, since Article 43(2) TFEU states that the ordinary legislative procedure now applies to the adoption of legislation in this field. However, certain aspects are still reserved to the Council, with the European Parliament only consulted, namely ‘measures on fixing prices, levies, aid and quantitative limitations and on the fixing and allocation of fishing opportunities’ (Article 43(3)).

As regards fishing, this provision is used each year just before Christmas, to determine the annual allocation of fish between Member States. It’s safe to say that the tone of these usually bitter negotiations never induces fisheries ministers to kiss each other under the mistletoe.  

What exactly is the dividing line between the areas where the EP shares power with the Council, and where fisheries ministers are left to hold acrimonious discussions among themselves? There are pending cases on the dividing line as regards internal EU measures. But today the CJEU ruled on the division of powers externally, in a case which also raised interesting issues of international law.

The judgment

Today’s judgment concerned a Council Decision which awarded Venezuelan fishermen the possibility to fish in the waters of French Guiana (which is a constituent part of French territory). This confirmed what those fishermen had been doing for some time before. The EU had felt it was necessary to put this practice on a more formal footing, but the rather left-wing Venezuelan government did not want to sign a treaty with such dastardly agents of global capitalism.

So the EU adopted an apparently unilateral Decision on this issue. The Council believed that it fell within the scope of Article 43(3), so the EP only had to be consulted, while the EP and the Commission argued that it fell within the scope of Article 43(2), so that the EP had the power of consent. The rules on the EP’s role in the approval of international treaties to which the EU becomes a party are set out in Article 218 TFEU. Basically the EP has the power of consent whenever a treaty concerns an issue regulated by the ordinary legislative procedure (ie fisheries law generally), but is only consulted when a treaty falls within the scope of other decision-making rules internally (ie the non-legislative procedure that applies when the EU fixes and allocates fishing opportunities). (In fact, the rules on the EP’s role in approving international treaties are slightly more complicated, but only this basic distinction is relevant to today’s judgment).

But was the Council Decision an international agreement in the first place? The Advocate-General’s opinion argued that it was not. Rather, it was a unilaterally binding declaration, an interesting form of international law. In fact such legal creatures are so rare that international law had not yet clarified whether international organisations like the EU could adopt them. In the Advocate-General’s view, they could. But that left the awkward question of how exactly the EU could adopt one as a matter of its internal law, since Article 218 clearly only refers to agreements concluded by the EU (or on behalf of the EU by its Member States). She considered various options, but ultimately argued that the relevant provisions of Article 218, including the powers of the EP to give its consent and receive information on negotiations, as well as the special jurisdiction of the CJEU, applied by analogy.

In the Court’s view, however, the Decision did constitute an international agreement. It based itself on the relevant rules of the UN Convention on the law of the sea, to which the EU and its Member States (but not Venezuela) are parties, and confirmed its position in the recent ruling on the Hague Convention on child abduction (discussed here), that treaties could be concluded in two steps. In this case, the EU had extended an offer, which Venezuela was free to accept, reject or suggest changes to. It had chosen to accept.  

As for the internal division of powers, both the Advocate-General and the Court reached the same conclusion: the Parliament’s argument was correct. In the Court’s view, the main powers relating to agriculture and fisheries set out in Article 43(2) concerned ‘policy decision[s] that must be reserved to the EU legislature’. In contrast, Article 43(3) provided for ‘measures of a primarily technical nature’ to implement the legislation adopted in the field. Applying that distinction to this case, the ‘treaty’ with Venezuela set out only a general framework, which had then been implemented by further measures based on Article 43(3). So that ‘treaty’ could not itself be based on Article 43(3); rather it was subject to the consent of the European Parliament, as it was based on Article 43(2).

Comments

On the international law issue, the Advocate-General’s analysis is more convincing than the Court’s, given the clear unwillingness of Venezuela to engage in any formal negotiations along its failure to ratify the UN Convention on the law of the sea, which the CJEU relied on so heavily. Nor is the Court’s use of the language of contract law very convincing. True, Venezuela’s application for fisheries authorisations might be described as the acceptance of an offer, but what is the consideration? Why should Venezuela’s actions be characterised in light of a treaty it had not ratified? Possibly the relevant rules reflect customary international law on the law of the sea which apply to Venezuela, but the Court does not make that argument.

Nor is its analysis of the text of the Law of the Sea Convention very convincing. The relevant clause refers to making ‘agreements or other arrangements’ regarding surplus fish. Could not a unilateral binding declaration constitute a form of ‘other arrangement’? Possibly that interpretation has been rejected by the Law of the Sea tribunal or by experts in that field of law (I confess that I’m not one), in accordance with the sources of international law as defined in the UN Charter. But if that is the case, the Court needs to bolster its interpretation by citing such evidence.

The distinction between the forms of international obligation matters mainly as regards the EU’s internal law. If the Decision was a unilateral binding declaration, the CJEU would have the awkward job of deciding whether the EU can adopt such measures, and if so how. Since the Court didn’t have to address these issues today, they must be considered open. But if it is every necessary to consider them in future, there is much to recommend the Advocate-General’s very thorough analysis of both of these points.

As for the internal decision-making rules, the judgment is more convincing, particularly in light of the Advocate-General’s arguments that Article 43(3) cannot apply to everything concerning fishing opportunities, since that would render the main legislative powers set out in Article 43(2) superfluous.

The broader implications of this judgment remain to be seen. But it’s an early indication that the Court is inclined to tilt in favour of a broad interpretation of the scope of the EP’s legislative and treaty approval powers over agriculture and fisheries following the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon.

 

Barnard & Peers: chapter 5

In Vino Veritas: the CJEU again strengthens the EU’s external role

Steve Peers

Only a few Member States produce good wine; but it is quaffed enthusiastically in all of them. That simple fact lies at the heart of today’s judgment in Germany v Council, in which the CJEU, consistently with a string of recent judgments, significantly strengthened the EU’s role in external relations.

Background

In particular, this case concerned the situation where Member States are ‘trustees’ of the EU’s external competence. This occurs where (as is often the case), the EU is not able to sign up to a treaty or participate in an international organisation, even though it has external competence as regards the subject-matter of that organisation or treaty. In that case, as established in prior case law, Member States must act on the EU’s behalf.

However, the Treaties don’t regulate this situation directly, and before today, there was little case law regulating the details of such ‘trusteeship’. So the exercise of the EU’s powers in such scenarios can be awkward. For instance, earlier this year the Council could not agree on a Commission proposal to coordinate Member States’ positions on behalf of the EU as regards possible new ILO measures regarding forced labour (see further my blog post on this issue).

Today’s judgment concerned the International Organisation of Vine and Wine (OIV), an international organisation which was originally set up back in 1924, but which was reconstituted with a new name in 2001. Its membership includes 21 Member States, including some (such as Finland) which are not known for their quality of wine production, although the scope of the OIV also extends to grapes and (unfortunately for small children) raisins.

In practice, the main focus of the OIV is drafting technical resolutions on wine production and quality. These resolutions don’t bind the members as such, so essentially constitute ‘soft law’. The OIV adopts these measures at a lengthy annual conference held each summer in a rather pleasant location. There are probably many opportunities for delegates to sample all the latest fine wines. In short, OIV membership appears to be a little-known – but doubtless much-loved – perk for agriculture ministers and their officials.

But after 90 years of such genteel wine-tasting, this classy organisation was dragged into the mud of an arcane EU inter-institutional dispute. This began when the EU legislation establishing a common market organisation for wine was amended in 2008, in order to make the organisation’s resolutions binding as regards EU law. The Commission promptly proposed that the EU become a member of the organisation, alongside its Member States.

There was not enough support among Member States for the Council to adopt this proposal. Instead, the individual Member States coordinated their voting in the OIV’s annual meeting. The Commission then threatened those Member States with infringement actions if they continued to vote in the OIV to adopt measures which affected the EU acquis. So as a compromise, the Council agreed to adopt a Decision which would coordinate their position on behalf of the EU as a whole.

The Council acted on the basis of Article 218(9) TFEU, which provides as follows:

The Council, on a proposal from the Commission or the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, shall adopt a decision suspending application of an agreement and establishing the positions to be adopted on the Union’s behalf in a body set up by an agreement, when that body is called upon to adopt acts having legal effects, with the exception of acts supplementing or amending the institutional framework of the agreement

Germany, supported by several other Member States, then challenged this Decision on two grounds. First, it argued that Article 218(9) TFEU only permits the Council to establish the position of the EU as such, as distinct from the action of its Member States. Secondly, it argued that Article 218(9) TFEU only applies where the measures in question are binding as a matter of international law, rather than as a matter of EU law.

The judgment

The Advocate-General’s opinion agreed with Germany on both points, but the Court’s judgment rejected them both. First of all, as regards the scope of Article 218(9), the Court pointed out that the words ‘on the Union’s behalf’ did not specifically limit themselves to cases where the Union was party to the agreement in question. The Court did agree that the previous provisions of the external relations Title of the Treaty only referred to treaties signed by the EU. So did the reference to suspending a treaty, set out in Article 218(9) itself.

However, when it came to a decision adopted by a body established by an agreement, the word ‘agreement’ had a different, wider meaning, applying not only to treaties which the EU was a party to, but also to treaties which only the Member States (or some of them) were party to. The Court justified this distinction on the grounds that the Treaty rules on the negotiation, conclusion or suspension of agreements only applied to the EU itself, whereas the EU does not have to be a party to an agreement in order to control Member States’ actions as regards implementing measures.

On the second point, the Court described the soft-law decision-making process of the OIV, and then noted that due to the link with OIV measures made by EU law, those measures ‘were capable of decisively influencing the content’ of EU legislation. Therefore those measures had ‘legal effect’, and the Council could rightly adopt a Decision establishing the EU’s position on what they should be.  

Comments

The Court’s judgment means that the EU is in a strong position to coordinate its Member States’ action in international organisations, where the Member States are trustees of the Union’s external competence. In fact, as the Advocate-General’s opinion pointed out, there is now no real difference between the EU being a party to the OIV and not being a party to it.

First of all, there can now be no doubt that the EU has such a coordination power, on the basis of Article 218(9) TFEU. Secondly, since the scope of that power is linked to the existence and nature of the EU’s external competences, the Court’s recent judgment in the broadcasting rights case, giving a generous interpretation of the EU’s exclusive external powers after the Treaty of Lisbon, is relevant here.

That recent judgment is arguably also relevant by analogy to the interpretation of the condition that the planned acts must have ‘legal effects’. This condition applies, as today’s judgment makes clear, whenever EU legislation has made an express link to the measures which an international organisation might adopt. But the Court did not limit the notion of ‘legal effects’ to such cases. The concept might therefore also apply where there is merely an indirect potential impact upon EU legislation (cf the broadcasting rights case), or where the measure in question has effect only upon third parties, or within the international organisation itself.

What does this mean in practice? Where the EU has exclusive external powers, Member States can’t act to affect EU law, even if the EU is not a member of the international organisation (see the Commission v Greece judgment, as regards the IMO). The Council Decisions coordinating Member State positions have to include a substantive legal base, so the nature of the EU’s competence is clear (CITES judgment). Even where the EU and the Member States share competence, and the EU has not regulated the issue in question, the existence of an EU strategy might prevent Member States from acting alone (see by analogy Commission v Sweden, although that case concerned a treaty which both the EU and its Member States were parties to).

Of course, the obligation of Member States to act as trustees in the EU’s interest does not mean that they will necessarily agree on a proposed Council Decision to coordinate their action (for instance, see the example of the ILO forced labour measures, referred to above).

The Court’s judgment necessarily does not directly touch upon the question of the process by which the EU authorises its Member States to sign or conclude treaties (as distinct from acting within an international organisation) as trustees of EU competence. But if the judgment is read literally, it will have a significant impact on that process. For although the judgment states that Article 218(1) to (8) TFEU only applies to the negotiation and conclusion of agreements by the EU, the EU practice until now is to use these provisions also to approve the negotiation and conclusion of treaties by the Member States, acting as trustees of the EU’s interest. (See for instance, the Council Decision concerning the domestic workers convention, based on Article 218(6) and (8)).

Oddly, there was no real discussion in this litigation of the possible alternative route of using the EU’s internal legislative powers to regulate Member States’ behaviour within international organisations. The Advocate-General briefly (and bizarrely) mentioned the possible use of Article 352 TFEU, the ‘residual powers’ clause in the Treaties, but why not simply use Article 43 TFEU, the power relating to the common agricultural policy?

This would entail the adoption of a legislative act. While it might be argued that this is too cumbersome a process to use every time the OIV holds an annual meeting, it might instead be possible to adopt only one legislative measure, which sets out a general framework for coordinating Member States’ action as regards all future OIV meetings.

Adopting a legislative act in relation to an international treaty might seem odd at first sight, but it isn’t really. It was, of course, a legislative act that first gave legal effect to OIV soft law in the EU legal order in the first place. More broadly, the EU often adopts legislative acts to coordinate Member States’ treaty-making competence, in areas subject either to EU exclusive competence (cf investment agreements) or to shared competence, where there is a large EU role (cf air transport treaties).

And if the Court really meant to say that Article 218(1) to (8) can no longer be used to allow Member States to sign and ratify international treaties as trustees of EU competence, then legislative acts will have to be used in this context too. So it would have made more sense for the Court to rule that EU internal legislative powers must be used to regulate all aspects of Member States’ trusteeship.

Some final thoughts on the role of the other EU institutions, and the position of non-participating Member States, following this judgment. First, the European Parliament (EP). It didn’t participate in the proceedings, but perhaps it should have done. As the Advocate-General pointed out, the judgment is the worst-case outcome for the EP, since it did not have the opportunity to approve EU membership in the OIV, and nor can it control the Council’s adoption of measures which impact ultimately upon the interpretation of EU legislation. In future, the EP would have the opportunity to address such issues when the EU legislation making such a link to international measures is adopted. But in this case, the legislation was adopted before the Treaty of Lisbon, when the EP was only consulted upon agricultural legislation. At least, as the Advocate-General pointed out, the EP must be ‘immediately and fully informed’ of the Council Decisions relating to Member States’ trusteeship pursuant to Article 218(10) TFEU, which the CJEU has recently interpreted broadly.

As for the CJEU, it has special jurisdiction relating to envisaged international treaties pursuant to Article 218(11) TFEU. If Article 218(9) applies to Member States’ trusteeship, then surely so does Article 218(11). Indeed, as the Advocate-General pointed out, the Court has already ruled as much. In fact, it will imminently be ruling again on such a case (Opinion 1/13, on the Hague Convention on child abduction). So we will be able in a week’s time to see how the two judgments fit together.

Finally, what about the position of Member States which are not members of the OIV? Actually, the operative part of the Court’s ruling makes no reference to this issue, and the judgment is logically equally applicable whether some or all Member States are party to the international agreement in question.

But in the particular context of the OIV, the Court’s confirmation that the Council has the power to coordinate Member States’ positions in the EU’s interests makes obvious sense. Due to the link between OIV resolutions and EU law, those resolutions impact all Member States, because they affect the quality and price of wine drunk in every Member State. Furthermore, they affect the operation of the common market in wine, which is paid for by all EU taxpayers, whether they are teetotallers or exclusively drink beer or even (inexplicably) whisky.  In this light, the decision of the UK (not a member of the OIV) to intervene, with other Member States, in support of Germany, rather than the EU institutions, is simply Pavlovian.

Barnard & Peers: chapter 24